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Abstract	
Human	 capital,	 as	 measured	 by	 your	 text-based	 and	 numerical	 problem-
solving	 skills,	 varies	 between	 countries	 as	 well	 as	 between	 cohorts	 of	
individuals	 from	 the	 same	 country.	 The	 forces	 driving	 these	 patterns	 are	
poorly	 understood,	 however.	 This	 thesis	 deals	 with	 topics	 related	 to	 the	
development	and	maintenance	of	human	capital	 in	different	 stages	of	 life.	
The	research	questions	include:	To	what	extent	does	schooling	contribute	to	
the	 development	 in	 students’	 problem-solving	 skills	 (chapter	 3)?	 Does	
graduating	 in	 a	 slow	 economy	 affect	 your	 future	 cognitive	 performance	
(chapter	 4)?	 Does	 retirement	 influence	 the	 age-trajectory	 in	 cognitive	
functioning	 among	 the	 elderly	 (chapter	 5)?	 This	 thesis	 also	 addresses	 a	
somewhat	 different	 but	 related	 topic,	 by	 analyzing	 college	 application	
behaviors	of	high	school	graduates,	and	how	these	behaviors	differ	depen-
ding	on	socioeconomic	background	(chapter	6).	Chapter	2	is	the	odd	one	out,	
where	I	present	the	adjusted-POLS	estimator.	This	is	a	variant	on	the	POLS-
estimator,	 suggested	 by	 Praag	 &	 Ferreri-i-Carbonell,	 and	 it	 is	 used	 for	
estimating	ordered	response	models.	In	addition,	I	also	suggest	an	estimator	
for	a	marginal	effect,	when	controlling	for	a	latent	independent	variable.	
In	order	to	answer	these	questions,	I	mainly	rely	on	survey	data	from	the	
The	 Programme	 for	 the	 International	 Assessment	 of	 Adult	 Competencies	
(PIAAC)	which	covers	tens	of	thousands	of	individuals	from	different	OECD-
countries	(including	Russia).	The	identification	regularly	relies	on	exploiting	
different	instruments	as	exogenous	stimuli	in	the	variable	of	interest.	Based	
on	 the	 data,	 I	 argue	 for	 the	 following	main	 conclusions:	 1)	 Post-primary	
schooling	has	meaningful	effects	on	cognitive	performance	later	in	life.	The	
performance	gap	between	university	students	and	‘others’	is,	however,	best	
explained	 by	 self-selection.	 2)	 Graduating	 in	 a	 bad	 economy	 may	 have	
negative	impacts	on	your	future	cognitive	performance.	This	effect,	however,	
is	likely	to	be	economically	small.	3)	Retiring	may	slow	down	the	age-related	
decline	 in	 cognitive	 performance	 among	 men.	 For	 women,	 the	 evidence	
points	towards	a	positive	effect	on	self-perceived	health.	4)	When	applying	
to	 college,	 students	 gravitate	 towards	 colleges	 located	 nearby,	 and	 this	
tendency	 is	 somewhat	 stronger	 for	 those	 from	poorly	educated	neighbor-
hoods.	Women	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	apply	in	a	way	that	is	
consistent	with	being	comparatively	wage	risk	averse.	5)	Adjusted-POLS	can	
be	 a	 useful	 alternative	 for	 estimating	 models	 with	 ordered	 responses	 in	
situations	where	ordered	probit	or	logit	are	inappropriate	or	inconvenient.		
	
	
	 	
 
 
iv 
Sammanfattning	
Humankapital	 –	mätt	 som	 förmågan	 att	 lösa	 textbaserade	 och	 numeriska	
problem	 –	 varierar	 mellan	 länder	 och	 mellan	 kohorter	 av	 individer	 från	
samma	land.	Orsakerna	bakom	dessa	mönster	är	fortfarande	oklara.	Den	här	
avhandlingen	behandlar	humankapital,	dess	utveckling	och	bevarande	un-
der	 livets	olika	skeden.	Till	 forskningsfrågorna	hör:	Till	vilken	grad	bidrar	
utbildning	till	att	utveckla	individens	problemlösningsförmåga	(kapitel	3)?	
Hur	 påverkas	 individens	 kognitiva	 prestationsförmåga	 av	 att	 ta	 examen	
under	en	lågkonjunktur	(kapitel	4)?	Kan	pensionering	påverka	ålderstren-
den	i	kognitiv	prestationsförmåga	bland	äldre	(kapitel	5)?	Denna	avhandling	
behandlar	också	ett	annat	relaterat	ämne	genom	att	analysera	ansöknings-
strategier	till	högre	utbildning,	och	hur	dessa	strategier	skiljer	sig	beroende	
på	socioekonomisk	bakgrund	(kapitel	6).	Kapitel	2	avviker	 från	de	övriga;	
här	 presenterar	 jag	 estimatorn	 ’justerade-POLS’	 som	 används	 för	 att	
estimera	modeller	där	utfallet	mäts	på	ordinalnivå.	 ’Justerade-POLS’	är	en	
variant	av	POLS,	som	föreslagits	av	Praag	&	Ferreri-i-Carbonell.	Vidare	ger	
jag	 också	 förslag	 på	 en	 estimator	 som	 kan	 användas	 för	 att	 mäta	 en	
marginaleffekt	då	vi	kontrollerar	för	en	latent	oberoende	variabel.	
För	 att	 besvara	 dessa	 frågor	 använder	 jag	 främst	 enkätdata	 från	 ’The	
Programme	 for	 the	 International	 Assessment	 of	 Adult	 Competencies’	
(PIAAC).	 Detta	 datamaterial	 täcker	 tusentals	 individer	 från	 olika	 OECD-
länder	 inklusive	 Ryssland.	 Identifikationen	 bygger	 ofta	 på	 instrument-
variabeltekniken,	 dvs.	 jag	 använder	 instrument	 i	 syfte	 att	 utnyttja	 exogen	
variation	 i	 den	 oberoende	 variabeln	 av	 intresse.	 Baserat	 på	 data	 drar	 jag	
följande	slutsatser:	1)	Eftergrundskoleutbildning	har	betydelsefulla	effekter	
på	 kognitiv	 förmåga	 senare	 under	 livet.	 Skillnaden	 i	 prestationer	 mellan	
högskolestuderande	och	övriga	förklaras	dock	bäst	av	självselektion.	2)	Det	
kan	finnas	negativa	kognitiva	effekter	av	att	ta	ut	examen	i	en	lågkonjunktur.	
En	 sådan	 effekt	 är	 dock	 sannolikt	 ekonomiskt	 liten.	 3)	 Pensionering	 kan	
potentiellt	motverka	den	negativa	 ålderstrenden	 i	 kognitiv	 förmåga	bland	
män;	 bland	 kvinnor	 pekar	 data	 på	 att	 pensionering	 gynnar	 självupplevd	
hälsa.	4)	 Individen	har	en	 tendens	att	söka	sig	 till	utbildningar	som	 ligger	
nära	hemmet.	Denna	tendens	är	något	starkare	bland	dem	som	kommer	från	
lågutbildade	 områden.	 Kvinnor	 från	 lågutbildade	 områden	 har	 en	 ansök-
ningsstrategi	som	överensstämmer	med	en	relativt	hög	löneriskaversion.	5)	
’Justerade-POLS’	kan	vara	ett	användbart	alternativ	till	 ’ordinal	probit’	och	
logit	i	situationer	där	dessa	estimatorer	är	olämpliga	eller	opraktiska.	
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CHAPTER	1	
The	Mystery	
Our	cognitive	functioning	is	of	personal	interest	to	most	of	us.	To	economists,	
however,	human	capital	 formation	is	 important	also	 for	other	reasons,	 for	
example	 due	 to	 its	 central	 role	 as	 a	 driver	 of	 economic	 growth.	 In	 the	
standard	Solow	growth	model,	labor-augmented	technological	change	is	the	
sole	 cause	 of	 long	 run	 economic	 growth.	 Hence,	 there	 should	 be	 few	
questions	in	economics	that	triumph	over	this	one	in	importance:	What,	then,	
are	the	drivers	of	human	capital	growth?1	
In	order	to	present	some	initial	hypotheses,	I	assume	a	simple	idea	in	the	
spirit	of	Becker:	Your	cognitive	problem-solving	skills	(cog)	are	a	function	of	
practice,	innate	ability	and	other	factors	(such	as	age):		
cog	=	f	(practice,	innate	ability,	other	factors)	
Hence,	 your	 problem-solving	 skills	 are	 partly	 determined	 by	 how	 many	
problems	you	have	already	tried	to	solve;	the	more	you	practice,	the	better	
you	become.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	diminishing	 returns	on	practicing	
however,	 i.e.	 each	 additional	 hour	 contributes	 less	 than	 the	previous	one.	
Also,	it	seems	reasonable	to	assume	that	innate	abilities	also	contribute	to	
the	variation	 in	cognitive	 skills.	 If	we,	 for	 the	sake	of	 simplicity,	 assume	a	
constant	marginal	cost	of	time	spent	practicing,	then	the	individual	chooses	
an	optimal	level	where	the	marginal	return	meets	this	cost.	
Here,	this	simple	idea	is	used	as	a	foundation	in	order	to	form	a	hypothesis	
regarding	one	of	the	greatest	mysteries	in	the	data:	Why	are	individuals	from	
some	countries,	 such	as	 Japan	and	Finland,	performing	so	much	better	on	
cognitive	 tests	 than	 individuals	 from	 some	other	OECD-countries?	 I	 study	
this	question	using	survey	data	from	The	Programme	for	the	International	
Assessment	of	Adult	Competencies	(PIAAC).	This	 is	a	pooled	cross-section	
covering	 roughly	 200,000	 individuals	 in	 the	 age	 range	 of	 16-65	 from	 31	
OECD-countries	(including	Russia).	The	survey	was	conducted	during	2010–
2015	 using	 personal	 house	 interviews.	 The	 variables	 of	 key	 interest	 are	
literacy	 and	 numeracy,	 measuring	 your	 text-based	 and	 mathematical	
problem-solving	skills.	Below	follows	a	description	of	these	measures.	
	
                                                             
1 Labor-augmented technological change may include other factors than human capital growth. 
From a policy perspective, human capital is arguably one of the most interesting, however, given 
its potentially endogenous character. 
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1 Labor-augmented technological change may include other factors than human capital growth. 
From a policy perspective, human capital is arguably one of the most interesting, however, given 
its potentially endogenous character. 
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Literacy	and	numeracy	
Literacy	 is	defined	as	 “the	ability	 to	understand,	evaluate,	use	and	engage	
with	written	 texts	 to	 participate	 in	 society,	 to	 achieve	 one’s	 goals,	 and	 to	
develop	one’s	knowledge	and	potential.”	Numeracy	is	defined	as	“the	ability	
to	 access,	 use,	 interpret	 and	 communicate	mathematical	 information	 and	
ideas	in	order	to	engage	in	and	manage	the	mathematical	demands	of	a	range	
of	situations	of	adult	life.”	(OECD,	2016a)	
In	comparison	to	conventional	intelligence	tests,	the	questions	on	literacy	
and	numeracy	are	practical	 in	nature	and	resemble	the	kinds	of	problems	
you	face	in	everyday	life	(such	as	reading	off	a	thermometer	or	data	chart,	
transforming	units	of	measurement,	or	interpreting	written	guidelines	and	
rules).2	The	testing	procedure	is	based	on	item	response	theory	and	multiple	
imputations;	each	individual	answers	a	subset	of	questions	and	a	distribu-
tion	over	test	scores	is	constructed.	I	have	access	to	ten	draws	or	‘plausible	
values’	 from	 each	 individual	 distribution	 on	 literacy	 and	 numeracy.	 I	 use	
these,	collectively,	 in	all	estimations	and	account	for	the	added	imputation	
variance.		
The	 distributional	 properties	 of	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 have	 been	
described	in	detail	by	OECD	Skills	studies	(OECD,	2016b)	and	they	have	been	
found	 to	be	 strong	predictors	of	productivity	and	wages	 (Hanushek	et	al.,	
2015;	OECD,	2016b).		
	Table	 1	 below	 describes	 average	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 by	 country.	
Japan,	Finland	and	the	Netherlands	are	in	the	top	for	both	measures;	Italy,	
Spain,	 Turkey	 and	 Chile	 are	 in	 the	 bottom.3	 All	 numbers	 on	 literacy	 and	
numeracy	are	standardized	z-values.	Example:	A	value	at	0.1	means	that	you	
fall	 10	 percent	 of	 a	 standard	 deviation	 above	 the	 OECD	 average,	 i.e.	 the	
expected	 value	 for	 a	 randomly	 chosen	 individual	 from	 the	 PIAAC	 target	
population.	 The	 standard	 deviation	 is	 measured	 using	 within-country	
variation	only.	All	estimates	account	for	the	country-specific	survey	designs.		
	
	
	
                                                             
2 See OECD, 2016a for example questions. 
3 Section A.1 in the Appendix presents the corresponding list for natives only. This has some effect 
on the ranking. For example, Sweden has now moved to 1st place on numeracy. 
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Table	1	reveals	that	the	gap	between	different	countries	can	be	large	indeed.	
Example:	Only	8	percent	of	Chileans	reach	the	Japanese	average	on	numer-
Table 1. Average numeracy and literacy by country 
 NUMERACY LITERACY 
Country Rank Average Rank Average 
Japan 1 0.47 1 0.61 
Finland 2 0.37 2 0.42 
Netherlands 3 0.33 3 0.36 
Belgium 4 0.32 9 0.16 
Sweden 5 0.29 5 0.25 
Denmark 6 0.29 15 0.08 
Norway 7 0.29 6 0.24 
Czech Republic 8 0.24 10 0.15 
Austria 9 0.23 19 0.04 
Slovak Republic 10 0.23 11 0.14 
Estonia 11 0.19 7 0.20 
Germany 12 0.16 16 0.06 
New Zealand 13 0.15 4 0.28 
Russia 14 0.13 8 0.17 
Lithuania 15 0.08 21 -0.00 
Canada 16 0.04 12 0.13 
Cyprus 17 0.03 18 0.05 
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acy.4	Similarly,	if	you	perform	at	least	one	standard	deviation	above	average,	
then	it	is	roughly	nine	times	more	likely	that	you	are	Japanese	than	Chilean	
(here	I	assume	that	the	countries	are	equally	large).5	
In	the	Appendix	(see	section	A.2)	I	also	present	some	other	key	statistics	
related	 to	 literacy	 and	 numeracy,	 including	 gender	 differences	 and	 age	
trends.	
Why	do	some	countries	perform	better	than	others	do?	
Sweden	 performs	 clearly	 better	 than	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 On	 average,	
Swedes	 perform	 0.48	 standard	 deviations	 above	 the	 OECD	 average	 on	
numeracy;	for	the	United	Kingdom,	this	number	is	0.05	standard	deviations.	
In	these	samples,	I	only	include	natives.	
So	 why	 does	 Sweden	 perform	 so	 well?	 There	 are	 several	 possible	
hypotheses.	 In	 order	 to	 sort	 them	 out,	 let	 us	 start	 by	 comparing	 the	
distributions:	 Is	Sweden	overrepresented	by	 ‘militarily	 trained	prodigies’?	
Or	is	Sweden	evenly	better	across	the	scale?	Or	is	Sweden,	to	the	contrary,	
underrepresented	by	poorly	performing	individuals?	
Data	 shows	 that	 the	 last	 alternative	 is	 closest	 to	 the	 truth:	 Sweden	
maintains	a	comparatively	high	 level	at	 the	bottom.	Sweden	 is	probably	a	
good	country	for	those	with	weak	innate	abilities;	otherwise,	the	country	of	
residence	 is,	perhaps,	of	 less	 importance.	This	 is	shown	in	table	2a	below.	
Sweden	performs	0.26	standard	deviations	above	the	United	Kingdom	at	the	
90th	percentile.	This	 is	a	significant	difference,	but	the	largest	difference	is	
found	at	the	bottom.	If	you,	as	a	Swede,	perform	worse	than	90	percent	of	
your	countrymen,	then	you	score	0.65	standard	deviations	below	the	OECD	
average.	In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	corresponding	number	is	1.21	standard	
deviations.	Hence,	 the	gap	at	 the	bottom	of	 the	distributions	 is	more	 than	
twice	as	large	as	the	gap	at	the	top.	
	
                                                             
4 For Chile: The 91.75th percentile is 0.47. 
5 The probability of performing at least one standard deviation above average is 2.95 % in Chile 
and 26.99 % in Japan.  
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This	pattern	is	not	exclusive	to	Sweden	and	the	United	Kingdom,	but	can	be	
seen	in	a	wide	country	comparison:	The	main	difference	between	highly	and	
poorly	performing	countries	can	be	found	in	the	bottom	of	the	distributions.	
This	 is	 shown	 in	 table	 2b	 below.	Here	 I	 divide	 the	 31	 countries	 into	 two	
groups:	 the	top	16	performers	and	the	bottom	15.	The	gap	between	these	
groups	is	the	largest	at	the	5th	and	10th	percentiles;	the	gap	is	comparatively	
modest	at	the	90th	and	95th	percentiles.	
	
Notes: Natives only. 
Figure	1	below	illustrates	the	same	phenomena.	The	x-axis	shows	the	per-
centile	gap,	i.e.	the	distance	between	the	90th	and	10th	percentile;	the	y-axis	
shows	 the	 average	 performance	 on	 numeracy.	 Countries	 with	 large	
percentile	gaps	also	perform	poorly	on	average,	r	=	-0.63;	p	<	0.01.	
	
Table 2a. The numeracy distribution comparing Sweden to the UK 
 Sweden United Kingdom Difference 
5th percentile 
10th percentile 
-1.02 
-0.65 
-1.61 
-1.21 
0.59 
0.56 
Median 0.50 0.08 0.43 
90th percentile 1.58 1.33 0.26 
95th percentile 1.89 1.63 0.27 
Notes: Natives only. 
Table 2b. The numeracy distribution comparing top and bottom countries 
 Top 16 countries Bottom 15 countries Difference 
5th percentile -1.24 -2.03 0.79 
10th percentile -0.86 -1.55 0.69 
Median 0.35 -0.16 0.51 
90th percentile 1.40 1.02 0.39 
95th percentile 1.69 1.32 0.37 
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Figure 1. The relationship between the percentile distance and 
average numeracy 
Notes: The percentile distance is the gap between the 90th and 10th per-
centiles on numeracy. Sample: Natives only. 
	
Hence,	an	equal	country	is	also	performing	well	on	average.	Why	should	this	
be	the	case?	One	possible	explanation	is	diminishing	returns	to	training:	The	
more	you	practice	on	increasing	your	problem-solving	skills	the	better	you	
become,	but	each	additional	hour	has	a	lower	return	than	the	previous	one.	
In	 order	 to	 attain	 a	 high	 average	 performance	 level,	 a	 country	 can	 either	
increase	 the	 overall	 training	 time	 of	 its	 citizens,	 or	 then	 redistribute	 this	
training	time	from	those	with	the	lowest	marginal	returns	to	those	with	the	
highest.	In	practice,	this	would	probably	mean	a	relatively	even	distribution	
of	training	time.	
This	idea	fits	well	with	the	data.	Here,	I	estimate	average	numeracy	(num)	
as	 a	 function	 of	 average	 schooling	 (mean,	 measured	 in	 years)	 and	 the	
standard	deviation	for	schooling	(sd):	
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛$ = −0.62 + 0.13𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 − 0.34𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠												𝑅𝑅5 = 0.48	
Both	effects	are	significant	(p	<	0.01)	and	both	variables	have	similar	pre-
dictive	power.6	In	other	words,	schooling	is	a	strong	predictor	of	numeracy,	
but	equally	important	is	an	equal	distribution	of	schooling.	
                                                             
6 I test this by keeping one of the independent variables constant while making predictions using 
the other one. For both variables, the correlation between the predictions and the outcome is 
0.56. 
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One	may	ask	why	such	a	 ‘redistribution	of	 training	time’	 is	not	selfregula-
ting.	Suppose	there	is	a	constant	marginal	cost	related	to	training,	and	that	
individuals	 train	 until	 it	 no	 longer	 pays	 off,	 i.e.	 until	 the	marginal	 return	
meets	 this	cost.	Depending	on	 innate	ability,	 this	optimal	 level	would	cer-
tainly	 be	 achieved	 sooner	 for	 some	 individuals	 than	 others.	 This	 kind	 of	
inequality	in	training	time	is	still	efficient,	however.	The	inefficient	inequality	
occurs	when	we	introduce	‘artifical’	variation	in	training	time,	i.e.	variation	
that	is	not	explainable	by	differences	in	ability.	Driving	factors	could	include	
differences	 in	 upbringing,	 school	 segregation	 or	 financial	 restrictions	 on	
higher	education.		
Are	there	any	empirical	signs	for	such	structures?	In	order	to	analyze	this	
question,	I	measure	the	degree	of	intergenerational	mobility	for	each	country.	
Example:	4.3	percent	of	the	variation	in	schooling	is	explainable	by	parental	
education	levels	for	Sweden:	R2	=	4.3	%.	Here,	the	degree	of	intergenerational	
mobility	is	defined	as	100	minus	this	coefficient:	100-4.3	=	95.7.	In	the	United	
Kingdom,	the	corresponding	coefficient	of	determination	is	9.0	percent	and	
the	intergenerational	mobility	is	91.0	percent.7	Hence,	the	measure	for	inter-
generational	mobility	can	 take	on	values	between	0	and	100,	where	0	de-
scribes	‘no	mobility’	and	100	is	‘total	mobility’.	Now,	with	a	low	intergenera-
tional	 mobility,	 your	 training	 time	 is,	 presumably,	 relatively	 strongly	
restricted	by	your	socioeconomic	background.	Naturally,	one	would	expect	
some	correlation	in	education	between	parents	and	their	children	in	any	case	
–	 for	 example	 due	 to	 their	 shared	 genetics	 –	 but	 the	 variation	 that	 arises	
between	countries	is	likely	to	reflect	institutional	differences.			
The	scatterplot	in	figure	2	below	illustrates	the	relationship	between	the	
intergenerational	mobility	and	the	average	performance	on	numeracy.	The	
correlation	is	striking;	countries	where	the	intergenerational	mobility	is	high	
are	also	the	countries	where	average	performance	is	high,	r	=	0.72;	p	<	0.01.	
	
                                                             
7 The coefficient of determination is measured in the following way: First, I measure parental 
education levels in six categories: (1) Both parents have a basic/unknown education, (2) One 
parent has a secondary degree, the other one has a basic/unknown education, (3) Both parents 
have a secondary degree, (4) One parent has tertiary degree, the other one has a basic/unknown 
education, (5) One parent has a tertiary degree, the other one has a secondary degree, and (6) 
Both parents have a tertiary degree. The coefficient of determination is retrieved from a regression 
where ‘years of schooling’ is predicted by parental education levels included using a set of dummy 
variables. (I do this regression separately for each country.) Note that countries with a low variation 
in parental education levels also get lower coefficients of determination (everything else equal). In 
a second step, I construct a coefficient of determination that corrects for this, i.e. I calculate R2 as if 
each parental education level were equally common. This makes little practical difference, and the 
results are omitted here. 
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Figure 2. The relationship between intergenerational mobility and 
average numeracy 
Notes: Intergenerational mobility is a measure that, theoretically, can take on 
values between 0 and 100 with 100 describing total mobility; 0 describing no 
mobility. Sample: Natives only. 
	
This	 correlation	 is	 not	 explainable	 by	 ‘schooling’	 functioning	 as	 a	
confounding	factor.	When	comparing	two	countries	–	A	and	B	–	both	with	an	
equal	amount	of	average	schooling,	but	where	A	has	’10	percentage	points	
higher	 intergenerational	 mobility’,	 then	 the	 citizens	 of	 country	 A	 are	
predicted	to	perform	half	of	a	standard	deviation	above	those	in	country	B:	
	
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛$ = −5.60 + 0.10𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 + 0.05𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚														𝑅𝑅5 = 0.60	
where	mean	is	average	schooling	and	mob	is	intergenerational	mobility.	Both	
of	these	effects	are	significant	(p	<	0.05	&	p	<	0.01)	but	the	intergenerational	
mobility	has	stronger	predictive	power.8		
Hence,	one	natural	interpretation	of	the	data	is	that	‘equal	opportunities’	
is	an	 important	part	of	 the	equation.	 It	 is	worth	noting,	however,	 that	 the	
analysis	presented	in	this	chapter	is	exploratory	in	nature.	In	the	remainder	
of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 dig	deeper	 into	 the	 causal	mechanisms	underlying	human	
capital	 formation	 and	 its	 maintenance.	 I	 start	 by	 looking	 into	 the	 role	 of	
higher	 education	 (chapter	 3);	 continue	 onto	 the	 role	 of	 labor	 market	
conditions	(chapter	4)	and	end	with	retirement	(chapter	5).	In	chapter	6,	I	
                                                             
8 I test this by keeping one of the independent variables constant while making predictions using 
the other one. For intergenerational mobility, the correlation between the predictions and the 
outcome is 0.72. For average schooling, the correlation is 0.56. 
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study	a	related	–	but	somewhat	different	issue	–	college	application	strate-
gies.	Chapter	2	is	the	odd	one	out,	where	I	evaluate	the	adjusted-POLS	esti-
mator,	which	 I	 also	 apply	 in	 a	 subsequent	 chapter.	 Below	 follows	 a	 short	
summary	of	the	main	conclusions	from	each	chapter.	In	these	descriptions,	I	
often	substitute	‘literacy’	and/or	‘numeracy’	for	cognitive	performance,	for	
short,	although	it	is	worth	being	aware	of	the	distinction.	
A	simple	and	consistent	alternative	for	estimating	ordered	
response	(and	regressor)	models	
This	chapter	presents	the	adjusted-POLS	estimator,	which	is	a	variant	of	the	
POLS-estimator	suggested	by	Praag	&	Ferreri-i-Carbonell.	Adjusted-POLS	is	
a	useful	alternative	for	estimating	models	with	ordered	responses,	such	as	
self-perceived	‘health’,	‘job	satisfaction’	or	‘happiness’.	I	show	that	adjusted-
POLS	is	consistent,	and	that	it	generally	performs	on	par	with	ordered	probit	
in	 a	 cross-sectional	 setting	 where	 the	 distributional	 assumptions	 of	 both	
estimators	are	met.	In	comparison	to	probit	or	logit,	however,	adjusted-POLS	
is	simple	to	combine	with	other	linear	estimation	techniques	–	such	as	fixed	
effects	or	two-stage	least	squares	–	and	estimates	are	easy	to	interpret.	 In	
addition,	 I	 also	present	a	 consistent	 estimator	 for	 a	marginal	 effect,	when	
controlling	for	a	latent	independent	variable.	
Higher	education	and	the	gains	in	cognitive	abilities	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 for	 the	 following	 two	main	 conclusions:	 1)	 Post-
primary	schooling	has	positive	effects	on	cognitive	performance	later	in	life.	
2)	The	immediate	cognitive	gains	of	university	studies	are	likely	to	be	rather	
modest,	at	least	for	individuals	who	choose	to	study	at	this	level.	I	build	my	
argument	on	different	pieces	of	empirical	evidence.	Firstly,	I	exploit	yearly	
variations	 in	 cohort	 sizes	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 schooling.	 Example:	 Some	
countries	experienced	a	rising	number	of	births	 in	the	early	1960s,	but	as	
these	individuals	reached	adulthood,	the	number	of	college	and	university	
spots	 seems	 to	 have	 lagged	 behind.	 I	 find	 that	 individuals	 born	 into	
‘unpopular’	cohorts	have	longer	education	–	and	significantly	higher	cogniti-
ve	performance	–	later	in	life.	I	interpret	this	cognitive	effect	as	the	result	of	
education,	 although	 I	 do	 admit	 that	 other	 interpretations	 are	 possible.	
Secondly,	 I	 measure	 the	 trends	 in	 cognitive	 performance	 in	 the	 years	
following	 graduation	 from	 upper-secondary	 school,	 comparing	 university	
students	to	others.	I	find	that	the	trend	for	those	who	enroll	in	a	university	
program	is	similar	to	the	trend	for	those	who	move	into	the	workforce	or	
other	 activities.	 This	 suggests	 that	 university	 studies	 have	 small	 (if	 any)	
effects	on	cognitive	performance	as	measured	by	literacy	and	numeracy.	The	
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addition,	 I	 also	present	a	 consistent	 estimator	 for	 a	marginal	 effect,	when	
controlling	for	a	latent	independent	variable.	
Higher	education	and	the	gains	in	cognitive	abilities	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 for	 the	 following	 two	main	 conclusions:	 1)	 Post-
primary	schooling	has	positive	effects	on	cognitive	performance	later	in	life.	
2)	The	immediate	cognitive	gains	of	university	studies	are	likely	to	be	rather	
modest,	at	least	for	individuals	who	choose	to	study	at	this	level.	I	build	my	
argument	on	different	pieces	of	empirical	evidence.	Firstly,	I	exploit	yearly	
variations	 in	 cohort	 sizes	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 schooling.	 Example:	 Some	
countries	experienced	a	rising	number	of	births	 in	the	early	1960s,	but	as	
these	individuals	reached	adulthood,	the	number	of	college	and	university	
spots	 seems	 to	 have	 lagged	 behind.	 I	 find	 that	 individuals	 born	 into	
‘unpopular’	cohorts	have	longer	education	–	and	significantly	higher	cogniti-
ve	performance	–	later	in	life.	I	interpret	this	cognitive	effect	as	the	result	of	
education,	 although	 I	 do	 admit	 that	 other	 interpretations	 are	 possible.	
Secondly,	 I	 measure	 the	 trends	 in	 cognitive	 performance	 in	 the	 years	
following	 graduation	 from	 upper-secondary	 school,	 comparing	 university	
students	to	others.	I	find	that	the	trend	for	those	who	enroll	in	a	university	
program	is	similar	to	the	trend	for	those	who	move	into	the	workforce	or	
other	 activities.	 This	 suggests	 that	 university	 studies	 have	 small	 (if	 any)	
effects	on	cognitive	performance	as	measured	by	literacy	and	numeracy.	The	
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data	is	a	cross-section,	however,	meaning	that	I	cannot	exclude	the	possibi-
lity	of	confounding	cohort	effects.		
Some	evidence	for	a	cognitive	decline	from	leaving	school	in	a	
recession	
Several	 recent	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 graduating	 in	 a	 bad	 economy	has	
large	and	persistent	adverse	labor	market	effects.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	
graduating	 in	 a	 bad	 economy	 may	 also	 affect	 your	 future	 cognitive	 per-
formance.	This	effect,	however,	is	likely	to	be	economically	small.	I	build	my	
argument	on	a	couple	of	complementary	pieces	of	evidence.	Firstly,	students	
who	 graduate	 in	 a	 slow	 economy	 perform	 marginally	 (but	 signifycantly)	
worse	 later	on.	This	effect	persists	after	 instrumenting	the	unemployment	
rate	 at	 graduation.	 Also,	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 year(s)	 following	
graduation	 is	 successful	 in	 predicting	 your	 future	 cognitive	 performance,	
conditional	on	the	unemployment	rate	at	graduation.			
The	effect	of	retiring	on	cognitive	functioning	and	subjective	
health	
Official	retirement	ages	are	now	increasing	in	several	OECD-countries.	The	
effects	on	the	cognitive	and	physical	health	of	the	elderly	is	unclear,	however.	
In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	retiring	may	slow	down	the	age-related	decline	
in	 cognitive	 performance	 among	 men.	 For	 women,	 the	 evidence	 points	
towards	a	positive	effect	on	self-perceived	health.	I	base	these	conclusions	
on	the	following	data	patterns:	Firstly,	I	observe	a	significant	trend-break	in	
literacy	as	men	reach	the	official	retirement	age	of	their	country.	I	interpret	
this	trend-break	as	the	result	of	retirement.	This	conclusion	is	strengthened	
by	the	fact	that	I	observe	no	such	trend-break	when	creating	‘fake’	retirement	
ages	by	moving	the	real	ones	five	years	into	the	past.	Similarly,	for	women	I	
observe	a	significant	discontinuity	in	self-perceived	health:	those	who	have	
reached	the	retirement	age	score	their	health	significantly	above	that	of	their	
younger	counterparts	(controlling	for	age,	among	other	factors).	
Socioeconomic	background	and	college	application	strategies		
(in	cooperation	with	Roope	Uusitalo)	
In	 this	 chapter,	 we	 analyze	 college	 application	 behaviors	 of	 Finnish	 high	
school	 graduates,	 and	 how	 these	 behaviors	 differ	 depending	 on	 socioeco-
nomic	 background	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 education	 level	 in	 your	 local	
neighborhood.	By	estimating	a	discrete	choice	model	 for	portfolio	choices,	
we	 make	 the	 following	 main	 arguments:	 1)	 Students	 gravitate	 towards	
colleges	 located	nearby,	and	this	tendency	is	somewhat	stronger	for	those	
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from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods.	 2)	 Women	 from	 poorly	 educated	
neighborhoods	apply	 in	a	way	that	 is	consistent	with	being	comparatively	
wage	risk	averse.	We	find	little	support,	however,	for	the	notion	that	these	
differences	 in	 application	 strategies	 would	 cause	 any	 large	 wage	 gaps	
between	 the	 student	 groups,	 i.e.	 those	 from	 poorly	 and	 highly	 educated	
neighborhoods.		
My	contribution:	The	research	question,	 identifying	 its	 importance	and	
choosing	the	methodology	–	a	random	expected	utility	approach	within	the	
framework	of	a	conditional	logit	model	–	is	not	my	own.	My	contribution	lies	
mainly	in	the	practical	execution	of	this	idea.		
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Appendix	
A.1		A	country	comparison	using	natives	only	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table A1. Average numeracy and literacy by country, natives only 
 NUMERACY LITERACY 
Country Ranking Average Ranking Average 
Sweden 1 0.48 4 0.45 
Japan 2 0.48 1 0.61 
Netherlands 3 0.45 3 0.48 
Finland 4 0.43 2 0.49 
Norway 5 0.41 5 0.35 
Denmark 6 0.38 12 0.17 
Belgium 7 0.37 9 0.22 
Austria 8 0.33 18 0.13 
Germany 9 0.26 14 0.16 
Czech Republic 10 0.25 15 0.16 
Slovak Republic 11 0.24 16 0.15 
Estonia 12 0.23 8 0.26 
New Zealand 13 0.16 6 0.33 
Russia 14 0.15 10 0.18 
Canada 15 0.14 7 0.26 
Lithuania 16 0.09 21 0.01 
United Kingdom 17 0.05 11 0.18 
Cyprus 18 0.03 19 0.07 
Korea 19 0.01 17 0.13 
Slovenia 20 -0.03 24 -0.16 
Poland 21 -0.05 22 -0.00 
France 22 -0.07 23 -0.01 
United States 23 -0.10 13 0.17 
Singapore 24 -0.12 26 -0.19 
Ireland 25 -0.14 20 0.02 
Israel 26 -0.17 25 -0.16 
Greece 27 -0.21 28 -0.26 
Italy 28 -0.27 29 -0.30 
Spain 29 -0.28 27 -0.25 
Turkey 30 -0.85 30 -0.87 
Chile 31 -1.10 31 -1.01 
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A.2		Literacy	and	numeracy	–	descriptive	statistics	
	
	
	
       Figure A1. Distributions for literacy and numeracy 
	
These	distributions	differ	 to	 some	extent	between	 the	 sexes,	with	women	
scoring	 0.21	 standard	 deviations	 below	 men	 on	 numeracy.	 This	 gender	
difference	 is	greater	at	 the	 top	 than	at	 the	bottom.	At	 the	10th	percentile,	
women	score	0.19	standard	deviations	below	men;	at	the	90th	percentile,	the	
corresponding	gap	is	0.26	standard	deviations.	There	is	no	gender	difference	
in	literacy	worth	mentioning,	however.	
	Age	trends	
Figure	A2	below	describes	the	trend	in	literacy	and	numeracy	over	the	ages	
(16-65).	From	the	age	of	16	and	above,	performance	grows	rather	rapidly	
until	the	age	of	~30	after	which	performance	starts	declining.	Note,	however,	
that	this	is	a	cross-section	and	not	a	longitudinal	dataset.	Hence,	there	may	
be	 relevant	 differences	 between	 the	 cohorts	 besides	 age	 alone	 (e.g.	 edu-
cation).	
	
The overall distribution 
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 Figure A2. Age-trends in numeracy and literacy 
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CHAPTER	2	
A	Simple	and	Consistent	Alternative	for	Estimating	Ordered	
Response	(and	Regressor)	Models	
	
Abstract	
The	POLS-estimator	–	suggested	by	Praag	&	Ferreri-i-Carbonell	–	is	a	simple	
way	of	estimating	a	linear	regression	model	with	a	latent	outcome	variable,	
assuming	we	observe	a	collapsed	ordinal-scale	version	of	this	variable.	The	
estimator	can	be	described	in	two	steps:	1)	Estimate	the	expected	standard-
ized	 score	 for	 each	 observation,	 conditional	 on	 the	 ordinal	 score:	 E(Stan-
dardized	 latent	variable|ordinal	 score).	2)	Estimate	your	model	using	 this	
expectation	 as	 the	 outcome.	 Here,	 I	 also	 add	 a	 third	 step:	 3)	 Divide	 the	
obtained	coefficients	by	the	variance	for	the	expected	standardized	scores.	I	
call	 this	 estimator	 adjusted-POLS	 and	 show	 that	 it	 is	 consistent.	 Further-
more,	my	simulations	suggest	that	adjusted-POLS	generally	performs	on	par	
with	ordered	probit	in	a	cross-sectional	setting	where	the	distributional	as-
sumptions	of	both	estimators	are	met.	Most	importantly,	however,	adjusted-
POLS	 is	 easily	 combined	with	 other	 linear	 estimation	 techniques,	 such	 as	
fixed	effects	or	 two-stage	 least	 squares.	 In	addition,	 this	 chapter	also	pre-
psents	a	consistent	estimator	 for	a	marginal	effect,	when	controlling	 for	a	
latent	independent	variable.	
	 	
14
 
 
15 
CHAPTER	2	
A	Simple	and	Consistent	Alternative	for	Estimating	Ordered	
Response	(and	Regressor)	Models	
	
Abstract	
The	POLS-estimator	–	suggested	by	Praag	&	Ferreri-i-Carbonell	–	is	a	simple	
way	of	estimating	a	linear	regression	model	with	a	latent	outcome	variable,	
assuming	we	observe	a	collapsed	ordinal-scale	version	of	this	variable.	The	
estimator	can	be	described	in	two	steps:	1)	Estimate	the	expected	standard-
ized	 score	 for	 each	 observation,	 conditional	 on	 the	 ordinal	 score:	 E(Stan-
dardized	 latent	variable|ordinal	 score).	2)	Estimate	your	model	using	 this	
expectation	 as	 the	 outcome.	 Here,	 I	 also	 add	 a	 third	 step:	 3)	 Divide	 the	
obtained	coefficients	by	the	variance	for	the	expected	standardized	scores.	I	
call	 this	 estimator	 adjusted-POLS	 and	 show	 that	 it	 is	 consistent.	 Further-
more,	my	simulations	suggest	that	adjusted-POLS	generally	performs	on	par	
with	ordered	probit	in	a	cross-sectional	setting	where	the	distributional	as-
sumptions	of	both	estimators	are	met.	Most	importantly,	however,	adjusted-
POLS	 is	 easily	 combined	with	 other	 linear	 estimation	 techniques,	 such	 as	
fixed	effects	or	 two-stage	 least	 squares.	 In	addition,	 this	 chapter	also	pre-
psents	a	consistent	estimator	 for	a	marginal	effect,	when	controlling	 for	a	
latent	independent	variable.	
	 	
 
 
16 
2.1		INTRODUCTION	
Working	 with	 ordinal	 response	 variables	 can	 be	 frustrating.	 Firstly,	 the	
parameters	of	ordered	probit	and	 logit	models	are	difficult	 to	 interpret	 in	
terms	of	effect	sizes.	Also,	it	can	be	challenging	to	combine	these	estimators	
with	other	statistical	techniques,	such	as	fixed	effects,	instrumental	variables	
or	multivariate	techniques.	
One	way	to	get	around	these	problems	is	to	quantify	your	ordinal	variable,	
i.e.	set	the	‘appropriate’	distances	between	categories.	But	how	would	you	do	
that?	A	couple	of	authors	have	made	suggestions,	which	includes	methods	
such	 as	 ridit	 scoring9	 (Bross,	 1958),	 the	 conditional	 median10	 (Brockett,	
1981)	and	the	conditional	mean	or	the	POLS-estimator.	The	last	method	has	
been	suggested	by	several	authors	(see	Brockett,	1981;	Fielding	1997;		Terza,	
1987;	and	van	Praag	&	Ferreri-i-Carbonell,	2006	who	also	named	it	POLS).11	
The	idea	behind	POLS	is	the	following:	We	start	by	assuming	that	there	exists	
a	 latent	version	of	our	ordinal	variable,	and	 that	 this	 latent	variable	has	a	
known	distribution.	Now	we	can	calculate	your	expected	value	on	that	latent	
variable,	 given	 your	 ordinal	 score.	 At	 this	 point,	 we	 have	 ‘quantified’	 the	
distances	between	categories	and	 life	goes	back	to	normal,	 i.e.	we	can	use	
ordinary	 linear	 estimation	 techniques.	 But	 there	 is	 one	 problem:	 the	
censoring	 will	 bias	 your	 estimate,	 potentially	 quite	 severely.	 The	 new	
‘quantified	variable’	is	measured	with	error	and	this	error	is	correlated	with	
the	independent	variables,	assuming	they	have	predictive	power.	In	section	
2,	I	show	that	this	bias	can	be	eliminated	by	dividing	the	coefficients	with	the	
variance	for	the	 ‘quantified’	variable.	Below,	 I	call	 this	estimator	adjusted-
POLS.		
Now,	if	we	assume	that	the	latent	variable	is	normally	distributed,	then	
adjusted-POLS	 is	essentially	estimating	 the	same	model	as	ordered	probit	
(after	appropriate	rescaling).12	This	brings	us	to	the	question:	How	well	does	
                                                             
9 The ridit score is your expected percentile rank given your ordinal score: 𝑅𝑅: = 0,5(𝜋𝜋:>? + 𝜋𝜋:) 
where 𝑅𝑅:  is the ridit score corresponding to value j on the ordinal variable; 𝜋𝜋:  is a cumulative 
probability, i.e. the probability for this ordinal value, or a lower one.  
10 For ordinal value j, the conditional median is given by the inverse distribution function, F, 
evaluated at ridit score j: 𝐹𝐹>?(𝑅𝑅:) where F is an appropriate function as chosen by the researcher.  
11 Terza (1987) suggested this ‘quantification’ specifically for the case when the ordinal variable is a 
regressor; van Praag & Ferreri-i-Carbonell suggested it specifically for the case when the ordinal 
variable is an outcome. Hence, they named it POLS which is short for Probit OLS. 
12 The ordered probit model has a normally distributed error term; the adjusted-POLS model has a 
normally distributed latent variable. However, if the structural part and the error term are 
independently distributed, then adjusted-POLS also has a normally distributed error term (this is a 
result of Cramérs decomposition theorem). The scaling of the model parameters differ, however: 
While ordered probit anchors the error variance, adjusted-POLS anchors the latent variable 
variance. 
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adjusted-POLS	perform	 in	comparison	 to	ordered	probit?	The	simulations	
presented	in	section	4.1	suggest	that	adjusted-POLS	generally	performs	on	
par	 with	 ordered	 probit	 when	 the	 distributional	 assumptions	 of	 both	
estimators	are	met.	You	can	find	cases	that	slightly	favors	one	estimator	over	
the	 other,	 but	 any	 differences	 in	 performance	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 small	 in	
practice.	
The	main	advantage	of	adjusted-POLS	presents	itself	in	situations	where	
ordered	probit	is	an	inconvenient	or	inconsistent	estimator.	When	I	compare	
the	estimators	in	a	panel	data	setting	this	advantage	becomes	apparent	(see	
section	4.2).13	Here,	 ordered	probit	 is	 plagued	by	 the	 so	 called	 ‘incidental	
parameters	 problem’	 which	 becomes	 an	 issue	 when	 we	 would	 like	 to	
estimate	fixed	effects	models	(see	Neyman	and	Scott,	1948).	Adjusted-POLS,	
on	the	other	hand,	performs	well	also	for	short	panel	datasets.	This	is	true	
when	we	describe	the	coefficients	in	their	original	unit	of	measurement,	or	
when	we	use	the	estimated	model	to	calculate	average	treatment	effects,	i.e.	
the	average	change	 in	 the	probability	of	a	 specific	outcome	as	x	 increases	
from	one	fixed	number	to	another.14		
Ordinal	 predictors	 are	 typically	 viewed	 as	 being	 less	 problematic	 than	
ordered	outcomes.	Usually,	ordinal	predictors	are	inserted	into	a	regression	
using	 a	 dummy-specification,	 or	 then	 simply	 treated	 as	 a	 quantitative	
variable	 using	 the	 researcher’s	 prescribed	 numbering.	 Nevertheless,	 both	
strategies	would	generally	lead	to	biased	estimates.	This	can	be	troubling	if	
the	latent	variable	is	judged	to	be	an	important	control.	Example:	We	want	
to	estimate	the	effect	of	online	lecturing	on	exam	scores,	controlling	for	the	
exam	score	from	a	previous	course.	Furthermore,	assume	we	only	observe	if	
you	 passed	 or	 failed	 this	 course.	 In	 section	 3,	 I	 present	 an	 alternative	
estimator	that	allows	you	to	estimate	the	treatment	effect	as	if	the	prior	exam	
scores	were	indeed	observable.	Again,	this	requires	an	assumption	regarding	
the	distribution	of	the	latent	variable.	
	 	
                                                             
13 Riedl & Geishecker (2014) compares POLS to a range of alternative estimators for ordered 
response models in a panel data setting. They note that POLS performs well for estimating ratios 
between parameters (but is inconsistent for estimating single parameter values).  
14 If, however, the goal is to estimate probabilities while fixing the value of the panel-specific 
intercept, then adjusted-POLS is also unreliable in this setting. 
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2.2		ADJUSTED-POLS	
Let	𝛽𝛽?	denote	the	parameter	of	interest	in	the	latent	variable	model:	
𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝑥𝑥 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛽𝛽H + 𝜀𝜀J	
where	the	latent	variable	(L)	is	measured	on	a	standardized	scale	(mean	0,	
standard	deviation	1);	x	is	the	independent	variable	of	interest;	𝑧𝑧G 	is	a	vector	
of	controls	and	𝜀𝜀J	is	the	random	error	term.	The	estimator	for	𝛽𝛽?	is	given	by:	
𝛽𝛽?K = 𝛼𝛼?M 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜇𝜇)Q⁄ 	
where	𝛼𝛼?	is	the	corresponding	parameter	in	the	‘trimmed’	model:	
𝜇𝜇 = 𝛼𝛼D + 𝛼𝛼?𝑥𝑥 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛼𝛼H + 𝜀𝜀S	
Here,	𝜇𝜇	denotes	your	expected	value	on	 the	 latent	variable	 (L)	given	your	
ordinal	score.	For	a	particular	ordinal	score	(j)	this	expectancy	is	given	by:	
𝜇𝜇: = 𝐸𝐸[𝐿𝐿|𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 = 𝑗𝑗] = \ 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿)𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿
^_`a
^bca
𝑝𝑝:e 	
where	𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜: 	and	𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝑥𝑥: 	represent	the	smallest	and	largest	possible	values	on	
the	latent	variable	given	this	ordinal	score15;	𝑝𝑝: 	is	the	probability	of	having	
this	score.	𝐿𝐿	denotes	the	values	on	the	random	variable	(L)	and	𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿)	 is	 its	
probability	distribution.	In	practice,	𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜: ,	𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉𝑥𝑥: 	and	𝑝𝑝: 	are	estimated	from	
data,	using	some	additional	assumption	regarding	 the	distribution	of	L.	 In	
many	 applications,	 it	 would	 be	 natural	 to	 think	 of	 L	 as	 being	 normally	
distributed.	In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter,	this	is	also	my	assumption.	
Example:	We	measure	‘work	satisfaction’	on	a	5-point	scale,	and	4	percent	
of	 individuals	are	very	dissatisfied	with	 their	 jobs	 (work	satisfaction	=	1).	
Now,	 assuming	 that	 L	 is	 normally	 distributed,	 then	 the	 estimate	 for	 the	
expected	standardized	score	for	this	group	is	-2.15:	
?̂?𝜇? = 𝐸𝐸[𝐿𝐿|𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 = 1] = 𝐸𝐸g𝐿𝐿| − ∞ ≤ 𝐿𝐿 ≤ 𝐹𝐹>?(0.04)j	
≈ 𝐸𝐸g𝐿𝐿| − ∞ ≤ 𝐿𝐿 ≤ −1.75j ≈ −2.15	
Appendix	A.1	presents	 a	 simple	way	of	 computing	 this	 integral	when	L	 is	
normally	distributed.	Appendix	A.2	presents	the	conditions	for	consistency.	
It	 is	 worth	 noting	 the	 close	 relationship	 between	 adjusted-POLS	 and	
POLS,	the	only	difference	being	that	adjusted-POLS	adds	an	‘inflation	factor’	
–	1/𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜇𝜇)Q 	–	offsetting	the	‘attrition	bias’	due	to	discretization.	Hence,	if	the	
                                                             
15 In other words, maxp = F>?(πp) where πp is the probability of having this ordinal score (j) or a 
smaller one. Similarly, minp = F>?(πp>?). 
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interest	lies	in	estimating	a	ratio	between	parameters,	then	adjusted-POLS	is	
identical	to	POLS.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	interest	lies	in	estimating	single	
parameters,	adjusted-POLS	produces	larger	estimates	in	absolute	terms	than	
POLS,	 and	 sometimes	 distinctly	 so.	 For	 adjusted-POLS,	 estimates	 are	
independent	of	the	degree	of	discretization:	if,	for	example,	one	researcher	
uses	 a	 3-point	 scale	 and	 another	 one	 a	 10-point	 scale,	 estimates	 are	 still	
directly	comparable.	
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2.3		A	LATENT	INDEPENDENT	VARIABLE	
In	this	model,	our	latent	variable	is	on	the	right-hand	side:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛽𝛽H + 𝜀𝜀	
where	𝛽𝛽?	 and	𝛽𝛽5	 are	 the	 parameters	 of	 interest;	 z	 is	 a	 vector	 of	 controls		
and	𝜀𝜀	is	the	random	error	term.		
The	estimators	for	𝛽𝛽?	and	𝛽𝛽5	are	given	by:	
𝛽𝛽v? =
𝛽𝛽vw,J|H − 𝛽𝛽vw,`|H𝛽𝛽v`,J|H
1 − 𝛽𝛽v`,J|H𝛽𝛽vJ,`|H
	
𝛽𝛽v5 =
𝛽𝛽vw,`|H − 𝛽𝛽vw,J|H𝛽𝛽vJ,`|H
1 − 𝛽𝛽v`,J|H𝛽𝛽vJ,`|H
	
where	 𝛽𝛽w,J|H,	 𝛽𝛽w,`|H,	 𝛽𝛽`,J|H	 and	 𝛽𝛽J,`|H	 are	 parameters	 as	 defined	 by	 the	
following	models:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽w,J|H𝐿𝐿 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛽𝛽w,H|J + 𝜖𝜖	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽w,`|H𝑥𝑥 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛽𝛽w,H|` + 𝑢𝑢	
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽`,J|H𝐿𝐿 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛽𝛽`,H|J + 𝑣𝑣	
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽J,`|H𝑥𝑥 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛽𝛽J,H|` + 𝑤𝑤	
These	parameters	can	be	estimated	recursively.	Starting	with	a	model	that	
includes	 no	 other	 independent	 variables	 than	 L,	 then	 𝛽𝛽?	 is	 consistently	
estimated	by	replacing	L	with	𝜇𝜇:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝐿𝐿 + 𝜀𝜀		 ↔ 		𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝜇𝜇 + 𝜀𝜀′	
With	two	independent	variables,	the	model	is	given	by:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀	 (1)	
and	the	parameters	to	be	estimated	are	given	by:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽w|J𝐿𝐿 + 𝜖𝜖		 ↔ 		𝑌𝑌 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽w|J𝜇𝜇 + 𝜖𝜖′	 (1.1)	
	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽w,`𝑥𝑥 + 𝑢𝑢	
	
(1.2)	
	
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽`,J𝐿𝐿 + 𝑣𝑣		 ↔ 		𝑥𝑥 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽`,J𝜇𝜇 + 𝑣𝑣′	
	
(1.3)	
	
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽J,`𝑥𝑥 + 𝑤𝑤	 ↔ 𝜇𝜇/𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟(𝜇𝜇) = 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽J,`𝑥𝑥 + 𝑤𝑤′	
	
(1.4)	
	
Hence,	the	equations	where	L	is	on	the	right-hand	side,	(1.1)	and	(1.3),	are	
estimated	by	replacing	L	with	𝜇𝜇;	the	equation	where	L	is	on	the	left-hand	side	
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(1.4)	is	estimated	by	replacing	L	with	𝜇𝜇	divided	by	its	variance	(this	is	the	
adjusted-POLS	estimator).	In	practical	applications,	the	equations	(1.1),	(1.2)	
and	(1.4)	cannot	be	estimated	directly,	as	𝜇𝜇	is	not	observed.	If,	however,	the	
distributional	 assumption	 regarding	L	 is	 correct,	 then	𝜇𝜇	 can	 be	 estimated	
consistently	(as	described	in	section	2).		
With	three	independent	variables,	the	model	is	given	by:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽~𝑧𝑧 + 𝜀𝜀	 (2)	
	
and	the	parameters	to	be	estimated	are	given	by:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽w,J|H𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽w,H|J𝑧𝑧 + 𝜖𝜖	 (2.1)	
	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽w,`|H𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽w,H|`𝑧𝑧 + 𝑢𝑢	
	
(2.2)	
	
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽`,J|H𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽`,H|J𝑧𝑧 + 𝑣𝑣	
	
(2.3)	
	
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽J,`|H𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽w,`|H𝑧𝑧 + 𝑤𝑤	
	
(2.4)	
Note	that	(2.1)	and	(2.3)	can	be	estimated	in	the	same	way	as	equation	(1);	
(2.4)	is	estimated	using	adjusted-POLS.	In	a	similar	fashion,	we	can	estimate	
a	model	with	any	number	of	independent	variables.	Note,	however,	that	the	
number	 of	 equations	 increases	 fast	 with	 the	 number	 of	 independent	
variables:	With	three	independent	variables,	we	estimate	eight	equations	in	
order	to	gain	a	consistent	estimate	of	𝛽𝛽5;	with	ten	independent	variables,	the	
corresponding	number	is	64	equations.16			
In	the	Appendix	(A.3:	Latent	independent	variable	–	extensions)	I	show	
that	this	estimator	is	consistent.	I	also	present	a	stepwise	procedure	that	can	
aid	in	programming,	and	show	a	practical	example	using	real	data.	
	 	
                                                             
16 With k independent variables, we estimate 𝑘𝑘5 − ∑ 𝑖𝑖Å>5bÇ?  equations. 
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16 With k independent variables, we estimate 𝑘𝑘5 − ∑ 𝑖𝑖Å>5bÇ?  equations. 
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2.4		SIMULATIONS:	ADJUSTED-POLS	vs	ORDERED	PROBIT	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 simulate	 the	 sampling	 distribution	 of	 𝛽𝛽v 	 under	 different	
assumptions	regarding	the	distribution	of	the	observed	ordinal	variable,	and	
using	different	sample	sizes	and	models.	I	find	that	adjusted-POLS	performs	
on	 par	 with	 ordered	 probit	 in	 a	 cross-sectional	 setting,	 and	 can	 be	
particularly	useful	in	a	panel	data	setting.		
2.4.1	The	cross-sectional	case	
The	benchmark	latent	variable	model	used	here	is:	
𝐿𝐿 = 0.2𝑥𝑥 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀	
where	L	follows	a	standard	normal	distribution;	x	is	the	independent	variable	
of	 interest	 and	 𝑧𝑧G 	 is	 a	 vector	 consisting	 of	 nine	 control	 variables.	 All	
independent	variables	are	normally	distributed	with	means	at	0,	standard	
deviations	at	1	and	pairwise	covariances	at	0.2.	The	vector	𝛿𝛿	is	given	by	[0.2,	
0.2,	 0.2,	 0.2,	 -0.2,	 -0.2,	 -0.2,	 -0.2,	 -0.2].	 The	 independent	 variables	 and	 the	
error	term	(𝜀𝜀)	are	 independently	distributed,	which	implies	that	the	error	
term	is	also	normally	distributed	with	mean	0	and	standard	deviation	√0.68.	
In	 a	 second	 step,	 I	 experiment	with	 a	 smaller	 error	 standard	deviation	 at	
√0.318	which	is	the	result	of	multiplying	𝛿𝛿	with	1.5.	I	denote	these	models	
(1)	and	(2),	respectively.	
Now,	ordered	probit	uses	a	different	scale	than	the	one	presented	above.	
While	 both	 estimators	 measure	 the	 coefficients	 in	 units	 of	 standard	
deviations,	adjusted-POLS	uses	the	standard	deviation	of	the	latent	variable	
while	 ordered	 probit	 uses	 that	 of	 the	 error	 term.	 In	 order	 to	 compare	
estimators,	 I	 convert	 the	 adjusted-POLS	 coefficients	 to	 the	ordered	probit	
scale	and	vice	versa.	For	model	(1),	𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà	is	equal	to	~0.243;	for	model	(2),	
𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà	is	equal	to	~0.355.17	This	conversion	requires	an	estimate	for	the	error	
variance	(in	the	adjusted-POLS	model)	and	an	estimate	for	the	latent	variable	
                                                             
17 The adjusted-POLS estimates are converted to the ordered probit scale by dividing the 
coefficients with the error standard deviation:  
𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà = 𝛽𝛽 â𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀)⁄  
For model (1), 𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà = 0.2 √0.68⁄ ≈ 0.243 and for model (2), 𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà = 0.2 √0.318⁄ ≈ 0.355. In a 
similar fashion, the ordered probit coefficients are converted to the adjusted-POLS scale by divi-
ding the coefficients with the standard deviation for the latent variable in the ordered probit 
model: 
𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà ä𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿ÖÜáà)ã  
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variance	 (in	 the	 corresponding	 ordered	 probit	 model).	 I	 describe	 the	
estimators	for	these	variances	in	the	Appendix,	section	A.4.	
Table	 1	 below	 describes	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 simulated	 sampling	
distributions.	Here	I	experiment	with	different	distributions	for	the	observed	
ordinal-scale	variable	and	different	sample	sizes.	As	for	the	ordinal	variable,	
I	use	the	following	five	variants:	(i)	‘Discrete	normal’	distribution:	the	latent	
variable	is	rounded	off	to	its	closest	integer	and	truncated	as	to	fit	a	7-point	
scale;	(ii)	Uniform	(5	pts);	(iii)	Binomial(4,	0.75);	(iv)	U-shaped	(5	pts):	f(1)	
=	f(5)	=	0.4;	f(2)	=	f(4)	=	0.08	and	f(3)	=	0.04,	and	(v)	Bernoulli	(p	=	0.2).	With	
each	ordinal	variable	distribution,	the	variance	for	µ	decreases,	starting	at	
~0.923	 (for	 the	 ‘discrete	 normal’	 distribution)	 and	 ending	 at	~0.490	 (the	
Bernoulli	distribution).18	In	general,	I	set	the	sample	size	to	1000	but	I	also	
experiment	with	a	small	sample	size	at	100.	
Adjusted-POLS	 performs	 well	 in	 all	 cases,	 producing	 no	 noteworthy	
biases.	This	 is	 true	 independently	of	 scale,	 i.e.	whether	 the	 latent	variable	
variance	or	error	variance	is	set	to	one.	Furthermore,	there	is	little	difference	
in	performance	between	the	estimators:	In	general,	it	comes	down	to	the	flip	
of	a	coin	which	estimator	hits	closer	to	target	in	a	particular	sample.	You	can	
find	 cases	 that	 slightly	 favors	 one	 estimator	 over	 the	 other,	 but	 any	
differences	in	performance	are	likely	to	be	small	in	practice.	
Now,	the	performance	of	adjusted-POLS	hinges	upon	the	assumption	that	
the	 latent	variable	distribution	 is	correctly	modeled.	 If	not,	 then	adjusted-
POLS	can	perform	poorly,	depending	on	the	severity	of	the	misspecification.	
Section	A.5	in	the	Appendix	provides	some	examples.		
	
                                                             
18 The variance for µ is equal to ~0.923 (for the ‘discrete normal’ ordinal variable distribution); 
~0.897 (the Uniform distribution); ~0.852 (the skewed Binomial distribution); ~0.750 (the U-
shaped distribution) and ~0.490 (the Bernoulli distribution). 
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POLS	can	perform	poorly,	depending	on	the	severity	of	the	misspecification.	
Section	A.5	in	the	Appendix	provides	some	examples.		
	
                                                             
18 The variance for µ is equal to ~0.923 (for the ‘discrete normal’ ordinal variable distribution); 
~0.897 (the Uniform distribution); ~0.852 (the skewed Binomial distribution); ~0.750 (the U-
shaped distribution) and ~0.490 (the Bernoulli distribution). 
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O
LS	in
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an
el	d
ata	settin
g	
In	this	section,	I	com
pare	adjusted-PO
LS	to	ordered	probit	in	a	panel	data	
setting:		
𝐿𝐿
bç
=
0.2𝑥𝑥
bç
+
𝛼𝛼
b +
𝜀𝜀
bç 	
𝑥𝑥
bç
=
𝜇𝜇
`
b +
𝑢𝑢
bç 						𝑢𝑢
bç
=
0.5𝑢𝑢
b(ç>
?
) +
𝑣𝑣
bç 	
I	sam
ple	250	panels	(i	=	1,	2,	…
,	250)	and	m
ake	four	m
easurem
ents	for	each		
(t	=	1,	2,	3	and	4).	T
he	panel-specific	intercept	( 𝛼𝛼
b )	and	𝑥𝑥
bç 	are	both	norm
ally	
distributed	w
ith	m
eans	at	0	and	a	correlation	at	0.5.	 𝑥𝑥
bç 	is	m
odeled	as	an	
autoregressive	process	w
ith	values	fluctuating	around	a	panel-specific	m
ean,	
𝜇𝜇
`
b .	T
he	standard	deviation	for	this	m
ean	is	√
0.5	and	the	standard	deviation	
for	 𝑢𝑢
bç 	is	also	set	to	√
0.5.	H
ence,	𝑥𝑥
bç 	has	a	standard	deviation	at	1.	A
s	for	𝛼𝛼
b ,	I	
experim
ent	w
ith	tw
o	different	standard	deviations;	firstly	√
0.5	and	secondly	
√
0.7.	I	label	these	m
odels	(3)	and	(4),	respectively.	T
he	error	term
,	𝜀𝜀
bç ,	is	
independently	and	norm
ally	distributed,	w
ith	a	m
ean	at	0	and	a	standard	
deviation	at	~
√
0.319	for	m
odel	(3)	and	~
√
0.093	for	m
odel	(4). 19	For	both	
estim
ators,	the	panel-specific	intercepts	are	captured	using	a	set	of	dum
m
ies.		
T
he	result	is	presented	in	table	2,	separately	for	three	different	ordinal	
variable	distributions:	(i)	‘discrete	norm
al’	(7	points),	(iii)	skew
ed	binom
ial	
(n	=	4;	p	=	0.75)	and	(v)	B
ernoulli	(p	=	0.2).	In	order	to	com
pare	the	
estim
ators,	I	convert	the	adjusted-PO
LS	coefficients	to	the	ordered	probit	
scale	and	vice	versa.	For	m
odel	(3),	 𝛽𝛽
Ö
Üá
à 	is	equal	to	~
0.354;	for	m
odel	(4),	
𝛽𝛽
Ö
Üá
à 	is	equal	to	~
0.657. 20	T
his	conversion	requires	an	estim
ate	for	the	error	
variance	(in	the	adjusted-PO
LS	m
odel)	and	an	estim
ate	for	the	latent	variable	
variance	(in	the	corresponding	ordered	probit	m
odel).	For	details,	see	
section	A
.4	in	the	A
ppendix.	
A
djusted-PO
LS	perform
s	w
ell	in	all	cases	w
hen	I	estim
ate	 𝛽𝛽
	on	its	original	
scale	(𝛽𝛽
=
0.2).	T
he	estim
ate	for	the	error	variance	is	shaky,	how
ever.	T
his	
is	especially	so	w
hen	this	error	variance	is	low
	as	in	m
odel	(4)	or	w
hen	
V
ar(µ)	is	low
	as	for	the	B
ernoulli-distributed	ordinal	variable.	H
ence,	the	
                                                             
19 The error variance is given by 1
−
(0.5
+
0.2
5
+
0.02
D
.è)
≈
0.319 for m
odel (3) and by 1
−
(0.7
+
0.2
5
+
0.028
D
.è)
≈
0.093 for m
odel (4). M
ore generally: 
𝑉𝑉
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 (𝜀𝜀
bç )
=
1
−
[𝑉𝑉
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 (𝛼𝛼
b )
+
𝑉𝑉
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 (0.2𝑥𝑥
bç )
+
2𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝛼𝛼
b ,0.2𝑥𝑥
bç ) ]	
20 The adjusted-PO
LS estim
ates are converted to the ordered probit scale by dividing the 
coefficients w
ith the error standard deviation. For m
odel (3), 
 𝛽𝛽
Ö
Üá
à
=
𝛽𝛽
â
𝑉𝑉
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀
bç )
⁄
=
0.2
√
0.3185
…
⁄
≈
0.354;		
for m
odel (4) 
	𝛽𝛽
Ö
Üá
à
=
𝛽𝛽
â
𝑉𝑉
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 (𝜀𝜀
bç )
⁄
=
0.2
√
0.0926
…
⁄
≈
0.657.	
 ADJUSTED-POLS ORDERED PROBIT  
 Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(%)'  
mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(()'  
mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
MSDpols/ 
MSDprob 
Ordinal Model (1): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.2, Var(ε) = 0.68 Model (1): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.2; Var(L) = 1  
  (i) 
  (ii) 
  (iii) 
  (iv) 
  (v) 
0.200 
0.200 
0.200 
0.200 
0.201 
0.029 
0.030 
0.031 
0.034 
0.044 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.05 
-0.01 
0.00 
3.00 
2.97 
3.08 
2.99 
2.93 
0.680 
0.681 
0.681 
0.681 
0.681 
0.843 
0.909 
0.939 
1.150 
1.972 
0.200 
0.200 
0.200 
0.200 
0.201 
0.029 
0.030 
0.031 
0.034 
0.044 
-0.02 
-0.00 
-0.05 
-0.01 
-0.02 
3.00 
2.98 
3.09 
2.97 
2.94 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.845 
0.903 
0.932 
1.129 
1.894 
0.997 
1.007 
1.008 
1.019 
1.041 
  n = 100 n = 100  
  (iii) 0.201 0.104 -0.07 3.03 0.686 10.865 0.202 0.105 -0.06 3.03 1 11.070 0.981 
 Model (1): Probit scale: )./01 ≈ 0.243; Var(εprob) = 1 Model (1): Probit scale: )./01 ≈ 0.243; Var(Lprob) ≈ 1.47 
 
  (i) 
  (ii) 
  (iii) 
  (iv) 
  (v) 
0.243 
0.242 
0.243 
0.243 
0.244 
0.037 
0.038 
0.039 
0.043 
0.056 
0.02 
0.04 
-0.00 
0.05 
0.09 
2.99 
2.99 
3.09 
3.01 
2.96 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1.334 
1.441 
1.489 
1.832 
3.179 
0.245 
0.244 
0.245 
0.245 
0.248 
0.037 
0.038 
0.039 
0.043 
0.056 
0.02 
0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.07 
2.99 
3.00 
3.10 
2.99 
2.97 
1.49 
1.49 
1.49 
1.49 
1.51 
1.360 
1.451 
1.502 
1.831 
3.147 
0.981 
0.993 
0.991 
1.001 
1.010 
   n = 100 n = 100  
  (iii) 0.246 0.132 0.10 3.16 1 17.563 0.267 0.144 0.12 3.18 1.73 21.454 0.819 
 Model (2): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.2, Var(ε) = 0.318 Model (2): A-POLS scale, ) = 0.2; Var(L) = 1  
  (iii) 0.203 0.024 -0.02 2.95 0.330 0.586 0.204 0.024 -0.01 2.95 1 0.568 1.032 
 Model (2): Probit scale: )./01 ≈ 0.355, Var(ε) = 1 Model (2): Probit scale, )./01 ≈ 0.355, Var(Lprob) ≈ 3.14 
 
  (iii) 0.355 0.044 0.06 2.99 1 1.956 0.358 0.044 0.05 2.98 3.10 1.913 1.022 
Notes: (i) The latent variable is rounded off to its closest integer and truncated as to fit a 7-point scale; the variance for µ is ~0.923. (ii) The ordinal variable is uniformly 
distributed (5 pts); the variance for µ is ~0.897. (iii) The ordinal variable is binomially distributed (n = 4; p = 0.75); the variance for µ is ~0.852. (iv) The ordinal variable 
is u-shaped: f(1) = f(5) = 0.4; f(2) = f(4) = 0.08; f(3) = 0.04; the variance for µ is ~0.750. (v) The ordinal variable is Bernoulli distributed (p = 0.2); the variance for µ is 
~0.490. MSD is the mean square deviation: avg(β − β;)<.
Table 1. Characteristics of the simulated sampling distributions (10,000 repetitions). Multiple regression model, n = 1000 
unless otherwise stated  
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2.4.2		Adjusted-POLS	in	a	panel	data	setting	
In	this	section,	 I	compare	adjusted-POLS	to	ordered	probit	 in	a	panel	data	
setting:		
𝐿𝐿bç = 0.2𝑥𝑥bç + 𝛼𝛼b + 𝜀𝜀bç	
𝑥𝑥bç = 𝜇𝜇`b + 𝑢𝑢bç						𝑢𝑢bç = 0.5𝑢𝑢b(ç>?) + 𝑣𝑣bç	
I	sample	250	panels	(i	=	1,	2,	…,	250)	and	make	four	measurements	for	each		
(t	=	1,	2,	3	and	4).	The	panel-specific	intercept	(𝛼𝛼b)	and	𝑥𝑥bç	are	both	normally	
distributed	with	means	at	0	and	a	 correlation	at	0.5.	𝑥𝑥bç	 is	modeled	as	an	
autoregressive	process	with	values	fluctuating	around	a	panel-specific	mean,	
𝜇𝜇`b .	The	standard	deviation	for	this	mean	is	√0.5	and	the	standard	deviation	
for	𝑢𝑢bç	is	also	set	to	√0.5.	Hence,	𝑥𝑥bç	has	a	standard	deviation	at	1.	As	for	𝛼𝛼b ,	I	
experiment	with	two	different	standard	deviations;	firstly	√0.5	and	secondly	
√0.7.	 I	 label	 these	models	 (3)	and	 (4),	 respectively.	The	error	 term,	𝜀𝜀bç ,	 is	
independently	and	normally	distributed,	with	a	mean	at	0	and	a	standard	
deviation	at	~√0.319	for	model	(3)	and	~√0.093	for	model	(4).19	For	both	
estimators,	the	panel-specific	intercepts	are	captured	using	a	set	of	dummies.		
The	result	 is	presented	in	table	2,	separately	for	three	different	ordinal	
variable	distributions:	(i)	‘discrete	normal’	(7	points),	(iii)	skewed	binomial	
(n	 =	 4;	 p	 =	 0.75)	 and	 (v)	 Bernoulli	 (p	 =	 0.2).	 In	 order	 to	 compare	 the	
estimators,	 I	 convert	 the	 adjusted-POLS	 coefficients	 to	 the	ordered	probit	
scale	and	vice	versa.	For	model	(3),	𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà	is	equal	to	~0.354;	for	model	(4),	
𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà	is	equal	to	~0.657.20	This	conversion	requires	an	estimate	for	the	error	
variance	(in	the	adjusted-POLS	model)	and	an	estimate	for	the	latent	variable	
variance	 (in	 the	 corresponding	 ordered	 probit	 model).	 For	 details,	 see	
section	A.4	in	the	Appendix.	
Adjusted-POLS	performs	well	in	all	cases	when	I	estimate	𝛽𝛽	on	its	original	
scale	(𝛽𝛽 = 0.2).	The	estimate	for	the	error	variance	is	shaky,	however.	This	
is	 especially	 so	when	 this	 error	 variance	 is	 low	 as	 in	model	 (4)	 or	when	
Var(µ)	 is	 low	 as	 for	 the	Bernoulli-distributed	 ordinal	 variable.	Hence,	 the	
                                                             
19 The error variance is given by 1 − (0.5 + 0.25 + 0.02D.è) ≈ 0.319 for model (3) and by 1 −
(0.7 + 0.25 + 0.028D.è) ≈ 0.093 for model (4). More generally: 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀bç) = 1 − [𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝛼𝛼b) + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(0.2𝑥𝑥bç) + 2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝛼𝛼b, 0.2𝑥𝑥bç)]	
20 The adjusted-POLS estimates are converted to the ordered probit scale by dividing the 
coefficients with the error standard deviation. For model (3), 
 𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà = 𝛽𝛽 â𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀bç)⁄ = 0.2 √0.3185…⁄ ≈ 0.354;		
for model (4) 
	𝛽𝛽ÖÜáà = 𝛽𝛽 â𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀bç)⁄ = 0.2 √0.0926…⁄ ≈ 0.657.	
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conversion	 to	 the	 ordered	 probit	 scale	 can	 produce	 large	 biases	 indeed.	
Ordered	probit,	on	the	other	hand,	is	generally	unreliable	independently	of	
scale.		
To	 further	 test	 the	performance	of	 adjusted-POLS,	 I	 experiment	with	a	
small	sample	consisting	of	200	observations	(i	=	1,	2,	…,	100	and	t	=	1,	2);	an	
autocorrelated	 error	 term	 and	 lastly,	 several	 covariates	 combined	 with	
distinct	time-trends.	Adjusted-POLS	–	as	measured	on	its	original	scale	–	still	
performs	well	in	these	cases	(not	included	in	table	2).21		
The	lack	of	a	valid	error	variance	estimator	prohibits	us	from	estimating	
individual-specific	 probabilities	 using	 adjusted-POLS.	 However,	 adjusted-
POLS	can	still	be	used	to	estimate	average	treatment	effects,	i.e.	the	average	
change	in	the	probability	of	a	specific	outcome	as	x	increases	from	one	fixed	
number	 to	 another.	 In	 the	 Appendix	 (see	 section	 A.6)	 I	 show	 how	 these	
probabilities	are	estimated	and	I	also	provide	simulations	that	compare	the	
theoretical	probabilities	to	those	produces	by	adjusted-POLS,	ordered	probit	
and	–	in	the	case	of	a	binary	response	–	OLS.	These	simulations	suggest	that	
adjusted-POLS	can	serve	as	a	useful	alternative	for	estimating	such	proba-
bilities	in	a	panel	data	setting:	In	general,	the	adjusted-POLS	probabilities	–	
and	 the	 corresponding	 average	 treatment	 effects	 –	 match	 well	 with	 the	
theoretical	predictions.	
	
	
                                                             
21 In the first two cases, I estimate model (4) using the skewed binomially distributed ordinal 
variable and I make 10,000 repetitions for each sampling distribution. For a sample size at 200, the 
estimates average at 0.203 (SD 0.098). In the second case, I slightly modify model (4) by letting 
the error term follow: 𝜀𝜀bç = 0.5𝜀𝜀bç>? + 𝑤𝑤bç  (the sample size is now set to 1000). Here, the 
estimates average at 0.201 (SD 0.031). In the third case, I estimate a model with four covariates as 
well as distinct time trends, combined with an IID error. The time-specific intercepts are 
uncorrelated with the other covariates and I control for them in the regressions. The model: 
𝐿𝐿bç = 0.2𝑥𝑥?bç + 0.2𝑥𝑥5bç − 0.2𝑥𝑥~bç − 0.2𝑥𝑥íbç + 𝛼𝛼b + 𝜏𝜏ç + 𝜀𝜀bç 
𝛼𝛼b = 0.3𝜇𝜇?bç + 0.3𝜇𝜇5bç − 0.3𝜇𝜇~bç − 0.3𝜇𝜇íbç + 𝑒𝑒b     𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑒𝑒b) = 0.462 
𝜏𝜏ç = −0.4, 0, 0.1, 0.3 
where 𝜇𝜇:  is the expected value for the j:th covariate; the covariates are normally distributed and 
autocorrelated over time, with variances at unity and pairwise covariances at 0.2, but no 
correlation within panels. The error variance is 0.093. Here, the estimates for the effect of 𝑥𝑥? 
average at 0.200 (SD 0.033). 
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 ADJUSTED-POLS ORDERED PROBIT  
 Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(%)'  
mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(()'  
Mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
MSDpols/ 
MSDprob 
Ordinal Model (3): ) = 0.2, Var(ε) ≈ 0.319 Model (3): ) = 0.2; Var(L) = 1  
  (i) 
  (iii) 
  (v) 
0.201 
0.200 
0.202 
0.041 
0.044 
0.071 
0.03 
0.01 
-0.01 
2.95 
3.01 
2.91 
0.322 
0.304 
0.118 
0.166 
0.195 
0.498 
0.198 
0.151 
0.139 
0.041 
0.034 
0.048 
0.03 
0.05 
0.04 
2.92 
3.07 
3.02 
1 
1 
1 
0.167 
0.357 
0.609 
0.996 
0.545 
0.818 
 Model (3): )./01 ≈ 0.354; Var(εprob) = 1 Model (3): )./01 ≈ 0.354; Var(Lprob) ≈ 3.14 
 
  (i) 
  (iii) 
  (v) 
0.354 
0.364 
0.697a 
0.073 
0.081 
0.763 
0.03 
0.01 
21.0 
2.92 
3.01 
750.9 
1 
1 
1 
0.528 
0.672 
69.98 
0.431 
0.442 
0.518 
0.089 
0.099 
0.187 
0.03 
0.06 
0.13 
2.92 
3.08 
3.09 
4.76 
8.68 
13.86 
1.368 
1.747 
6.150 
0.386 
0.385 
11.38 
 Model (4): ) = 0.2, Var(ε) ≈ 0.093 Model (4): ) = 0.2; Var(L) = 1  
  (i) 
  (iii) 
  (v) 
0.202 
0.201 
0.202 
0.029 
0.032 
0.056 
0.05 
0.06 
0.10 
2.99 
3.10 
2.99 
0.093 
0.051 
-0.399 
0.082 
0.105 
0.316 
0.149 
0.145 
0.218 
0.037 
0.038 
0.059 
0.24 
0.26 
0.28 
2.57 
2.44 
3.41 
1 
1 
1 
0.400 
0.444 
0.383 
0.206 
0.235 
0.824 
 Model (4): )./01 ≈ 0.657, Var(εprob) = 1 Model (4): )./01 ≈ 0.657, Var(Lprob) ≈ 10.79 
 
  (i) 
  (iii) 
  (v) 
0.664 
0.950b 
- 
0.096 
0.322 
- 
0.11 
5.53 
- 
3.03 
72.99 
- 
1 
1 
- 
0.919 
18.99 
- 
0.910 
0.930 
0.985 
0.139 
0.159 
0.290 
0.20 
0.26 
0.44 
3.18 
3.34 
3.73 
43.42 
47.69 
20.38 
8.339 
9.969 
19.19 
0.110 
1.905 
- 
Notes: (i) ‘Discrete normal’ distribution (7 pts); (iii) Binomial(4, 0.75); (v) Bernoulli (p = 0.2).  MSD is the mean square deviation: avg(β − β=)>. aSee model (3v): For the 
9088 cases with positive error variance estimates, β=?@AB averaged at 0.697. bSee model (4iii): For the 9967 cases with positive error variance estimates, β=?@AB averaged 
at 0.950.  
Table 2. Characteristics of the simulated sampling distributions (10,000 repetitions) in a panel data setting: n = 1000 (i = 1, 2, 
…250; t = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
27
 
 
31 
2.5		INTERPRETATION		
It	is	well	known	that	the	coefficients	from	ordered	probit	models	are	difficult	
to	 interpret.	 “Indeed,	without	a	 fair	amount	of	extra	calculation,	 it	 is	quite	
unclear	 how	 the	 coefficients	 in	 the	 ordered	 probit	 model	 should	 be	
interpreted.”	 (Greene,	 2012,	 p.	 830).	 The	 unit	 of	 measurement	 –	 error	
standard	deviations	–	does	nothing	to	ease	in	interpretation.	Adjusted-POLS,	
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 gives	 the	 latent	 variable	 a	 standard	 deviation	 of	 one.	
Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 still	 room	 for	 saying	 a	 couple	 of	 words	 on	
interpretation.	I	will	do	this	using	an	example.	
Example:	We	want	to	measure	how	body	mass	 index	(BMI)	varies	with	
age	and	gender:	
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 + 𝜀𝜀	
where	 ln(BMI)	 is	 the	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 BMI.	 Here,	 ln(BMI)	 is	 also	 our	
latent	 variable,	 and	we	observe	 it	measured	 in	 five	 categories	 (BMI<18.5:	
Underweight;	 18.5-25:	 Normal	 weight;	 25-30:	 Overweight;	 30-35:	
Moderately	obese;	>35:	Severely	obese).	The	distribution	for	this	variable	is	
illustrated	 in	 figure	1	below.	Here,	 I	exploit	 ‘nhanes2’	which	 is	part	of	 the	
Stata	data	library.22	
	
  Figure 1. Body mass index 
Table	3	below	presents	 the	estimates	when	using	 (1)	POLS,	 (2)	Adjusted-
POLS,	 (3)	OLS	on	BMI	 (standardized)	and	 (4)	OLS	on	BMI	measured	on	a	
logarithmic	 scale	 (and	 standardized).	 Hence,	 we	 would	 only	 be	 able	 to	
                                                             
22 For the sake of simplicity, I ignore the sampling weights. 
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observe	 the	 POLS-	 and	 adjusted-POLS-coefficients.	 The	 estimates	 from	
adjusted-POLS	 correspond	 more	 closely	 to	 (4)	 than	 (3)	 which	 can	 be	
explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 BMI	 is	 approximately	 log	 normally	 distributed.	
Now,	without	much	background	knowledge,	we	would	not	generally	know	
this	(although	in	this	case,	the	distribution	for	the	ordinal	variable	would	give	
us	a	hint).	Hence,	we	would	conclude	that	aging	by	a	decade	 is	associated	
with	 an	 increase	 in	 (normalized)	 BMI	 by	 0.105	 standard	 deviations,	
controlling	for	gender.	
	
	
	
Is	 0.105	 standard	 deviations	 a	 small	 or	 large	 movement	 up	 the	 BMI-
distribution?	 One	 way	 to	 assess	 this	 is	 to	 convert	 the	 estimate	 into	 an	
‘average	percentile	rank’	effect	as	follows:	
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴 ô
∂𝐹𝐹õ𝐿𝐿ú
∂𝑥𝑥
ù =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
	
where	𝐹𝐹õ𝐿𝐿ú	 is	 the	 standard	 normal	 distribution	 function	 and	
ûüõJú
û`
	 is	 the	
marginal	 effect	 of	 x	 on	 𝐹𝐹õ𝐿𝐿ú;	 𝛽𝛽	 is	 the	 marginal	 effect	 of	 x	 on	 L.	 See	 the	
Appendix	(A.7)	for	the	intermediate	steps.		
Example	 continued:	On	average,	 and	 conditional	 on	gender,	 aging	by	 a	
decade	 is	 predicted	 to	 move	 you	 three	 percentile	 ranks	 up	 the	 BMI-
distribution:	
10𝛽𝛽v
2√𝜋𝜋
=
0.105
2√𝜋𝜋
≈ 0.030	
	
	
Table 3. The effect of aging on BMI (POLS, Adjusted POLS & OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS Adj.-POLS OLS, BMI OLS, ln(BMI) 
Age (years) 0.00886*** 0.0105*** 0.00994*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.00052) (0.00061) (0.00056) (0.00056) 
Female -0.0275 -0.0325 0.00774 -0.0451** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 10,351 10,351 10,351 10,351 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.6		CONCLUSIONS	
Adjusted-POLS	 is	a	simple	and	consistent	estimator	 for	estimating	ordinal	
response	models.	 The	 estimator	 generally	 performs	 on	 par	 with	 ordered	
probit	 when	 the	 distributional	 assumptions	 of	 both	 estimators	 are.	 Most	
importantly,	however,	 adjusted-POLS	 is	easily	 combined	with	other	 linear	
estimation	 techniques,	 such	 as	 fixed	 effects	 or	 instrumental	 variables	
estimation.	 On	 the	 downside,	 adjusted-POLS	 relies	 on	 a	 rather	 strong	
assumption:	 If	 the	 structural	 part	 of	 the	 model	 and	 the	 error	 term	 are	
independently	distributed,	 then	adjusted-POLS	requires	 that	both	of	 these	
are	also	normally	distributed;	ordered	probit	only	requires	normality	of	the	
error	term.	
In	 addition	 to	 adjusted-POLS,	 this	 chapter	 also	 presents	 a	 consistent	
estimator	 for	 a	marginal	 effect,	when	 controlling	 for	 a	 latent	 independent	
variable.	This	is	useful	when	this	variable	is	an	important	control,	i.e.	when	
the	 bias	 induced	 by	 controlling	 for	 the	 observed	 ordinal-scale	 variable	 is	
judged	unacceptable.	
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Appendix	
A.1		Calculating	the	µ:s		
Here,	the	latent	variable,	L,	is	taken	to	follow	a	standard	normal	distribution.	
For	a	particular	ordinal	score	(j)	the	expected	value	of	L	can	be	calculated	as:	
𝜇𝜇: =
𝑓𝑓õ𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖:ú − 𝑓𝑓õ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚:ú
𝑝𝑝:
	
where	𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: 	and	𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚: 	are	the	smallest	and	largest	possible	values	on	L	for	
individuals	belonging	to	this	category	(j);	f(.)	is	the	standard	normal	density	
function	 and	 𝑝𝑝: 	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 belonging	 to	 this	 category	 (see,	 for	
example,	Maddala,	1983,	p.	366).	
A.2		Consistency	of	adjusted-POLS	
First	note	that	the	latent	variable	(L)	is	the	sum	of	your	expected	score	given	
your	ordinal	value	(µ)	and	an	error	(u):	
𝐿𝐿 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝑢𝑢																							
Now,	using	the	simple	linear	regression	model	as	a	starting	point:		
L	=	𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀	
we	write	the	inverse	latent	variable	model	as:	
𝑚𝑚 = 𝛾𝛾D + 𝛾𝛾?𝐿𝐿 + 𝜖𝜖	
𝑚𝑚 = 𝛾𝛾D + 𝛾𝛾?(𝜇𝜇 + 𝑢𝑢) + 𝜖𝜖	
𝑚𝑚 = 𝛾𝛾D + 𝛾𝛾?𝜇𝜇 + 𝑣𝑣,	where	𝑣𝑣 = 𝜖𝜖 + 𝛾𝛾?𝑢𝑢	
Now,	if	𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝜇𝜇, 𝑣𝑣) = 0,	then:	
𝛾𝛾? =
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝐿𝐿, 𝑚𝑚)
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿)
=
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝜇𝜇, 𝑚𝑚)
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉(𝜇𝜇)
	
where	𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿) = 1.	Hence,	
𝛽𝛽? =
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝐿𝐿, 𝑚𝑚)
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉(𝑚𝑚)
=
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝜇𝜇, 𝑚𝑚)
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉(𝑚𝑚)𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉(𝜇𝜇)
	
𝛽𝛽? =
𝛼𝛼?
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉(𝜇𝜇)
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where	𝛼𝛼?	is	the	corresponding	parameter	in	the	trimmed	model:	
𝜇𝜇 = 𝛼𝛼D + 𝛼𝛼?𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀S	
Hence,	consistent	estimation	of	𝛽𝛽?	 can	be	obtained	 if	𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜇𝜇, 𝐶𝐶) = 0	where	
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜇𝜇, 𝐶𝐶) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜇𝜇, 𝜖𝜖) + 𝛾𝛾?𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜇𝜇, 𝑢𝑢).	 When	 is	 this	 assumption	 satisfied?	
Firstly,	𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜇𝜇, 𝑢𝑢) = 0	if	the	distributional	assumption	regarding	L	is	correct.	
Secondly,	𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜇𝜇, 𝜖𝜖) = 0	 if	x	 is	 unable	 to	predict	𝜇𝜇	 conditional	 on	L.23	This	
assumption	 is	 satisfied	 if	 the	 inverse	 conditional	 expectations	 function	 –	
E(x|L)	–	is	also	linear.	For	a	normally	distributed	latent	variable	where	x	and	
𝜀𝜀	are	independently	distributed,	the	inverse	conditional	expectations	func-
tion	is	linear	and	adjusted-POLS	is	consistent.24		
The	proof	presented	above	is	easily	extended	to	the	multiple	regression	
model	by	replacing	𝑥𝑥	with	𝑥𝑥°,	where	𝑥𝑥°	is	the	‘population’	residual	in	a	model	
with	x	as	outcome	and	the	other	independent	variables	as	predictors.		
A.3		A	latent	independent	variable	–	extensions		
Consistency		
Let	𝛽𝛽?	and	𝛽𝛽5	be	the	parameters	of	interest	as	defined	by	the	model:	
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥 + 𝑧𝑧G𝛽𝛽H + 𝜀𝜀	
where	L	is	the	latent	variable.		
Now,	let	𝛽𝛽w,J|H	denote	the	conditional	effect	of	L	on	Y	in	a	model	that	excludes	
x.	 Similarly,	 let	𝛽𝛽`,J|H	 and	𝛽𝛽J,`|H	 denote	 conditional	 effects	 in	models	 that	
exclude	Y.	Then	we	have	that:	
𝛽𝛽w,J|H = 𝛽𝛽? + 𝛽𝛽5𝛽𝛽`,J|H	
𝛽𝛽w,`|H = 𝛽𝛽5 + 𝛽𝛽?𝛽𝛽J,`|H	
These	 are	your	 standard	 textbook	 formulas	 that	 relate	parameters	of	 one	
model,	 to	 the	 corresponding	 parameters	 in	 a	 model	 with	 one	 additional	
control	(x	and	L,	respectively).	Solving	for	𝛽𝛽?	and	𝛽𝛽5	gives	us:	
                                                             
23 In other words, δ2 = 0 in the model: 𝜇𝜇 = 𝛿𝛿D + 𝛿𝛿?𝐿𝐿 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑥𝑥 + 𝑒𝑒. 
24 Assume that L is normally distributed. If x and 𝜀𝜀 are independently distributed, then if follows that 
they are also normally distributed (at least if 𝛽𝛽? ≠ 0). This is a result of Cramér’s decomposition 
theorem. Hence, L and x are jointly normal and their relationship – as described by E(L|x) or E(x|L) – 
is linear. 
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𝛽𝛽? =
𝛽𝛽w,J|H − 𝛽𝛽w,`|H𝛽𝛽`,J|H
1 − 𝛽𝛽`,J|H𝛽𝛽J,`|H
	
𝛽𝛽5 =
𝛽𝛽w,`|H − 𝛽𝛽w,J|H𝛽𝛽J,`|H
1 − 𝛽𝛽`,J|H𝛽𝛽J,`|H
	
Hence,	𝛽𝛽?	and	𝛽𝛽5	can	be	estimated	consistently	if	all	of	its	components	also	
can	 be	 estimated	 consistently.	We	 have	 seen	 that	𝛽𝛽J,`|H	 can	 be	 estimated	
consistently	using	adjusted-POLS.	Now,	𝛽𝛽.,J|H(§) 	will	be	a	function	of	𝛽𝛽.,J|H(§•¶) 	
which	in	turn	is	a	function	of	𝛽𝛽.,J|H(§•ß) 	and	so	on.25	Ultimately,	 	𝛽𝛽.,J|H(§) 	 is	a	
function	of	𝛽𝛽.,J	which,	in	turn,	can	be	estimated	consistently	by	replacing	L	
with	µ.	We	know	this	since	L	=	µ	+	u	where	µ	and	u	are	uncorrelated	if	the	
distributional	assumption	regarding	L	is	correct.		
Programming	
It	 is	 rather	 tedious	 to	write	a	code	 for	 this	estimator.	Below	 is	a	 stepwise	
procedure	that	can	aid	in	programming.	In	this	example,	𝛽𝛽5	is	the	parameter	
of	interest.		
Step	1:	Estimate	𝜷𝜷.,𝑳𝑳		
Example:	With	k	=	5	independent	variables	(L,	x,	z1,	z2	and	z3)	we	estimate	the	
following	 five	 effects:	𝛽𝛽w,J ,	𝛽𝛽`,J ,	𝛽𝛽H¶,J ,	𝛽𝛽Hß,J	 and	𝛽𝛽H™,J ,	 i.e.	 the	 unconditional	
effects	of	L	on	each	remaining	variable.		
Step	2:	Estimate	𝜷𝜷.,𝑳𝑳|𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏 		
Example	 continued:	 Here	 we	 estimate	 the	 following	 four	 effects:	 𝛽𝛽w,J|H¶ ,	
𝛽𝛽`,J|H¶ ,	𝛽𝛽Hß,J|H¶ 	and	𝛽𝛽H™,J|H¶ ,	i.e.	the	conditional	effects	of	L	on	each	remaining	
variable.	These	effects,	in	turn,	are	estimated	using	a	set	of	five	unconditional	
effects,	i.e.	the	effects	of	z1	on	each	remaining	variable	(Y,	L,	x,	z2	and	z3).	We	
can	now	construct	the	estimates	of	interest,	for	example:	
𝛽𝛽vw,J|H¶ =
𝛽𝛽vw,J − 𝛽𝛽vw,H¶𝛽𝛽
v
H¶,J
1 − 𝛽𝛽vH¶,J𝛽𝛽vJ,H¶
	
Step	3:	Estimate	𝜷𝜷.,𝑳𝑳|𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏,𝒛𝒛𝟐𝟐 	
                                                             
25 Notation: 𝑧𝑧(c) is a label for the vector z consisting of n components. 
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25 Notation: 𝑧𝑧(c) is a label for the vector z consisting of n components. 
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Example	continued:	Here	we	estimate	the	following	three	effects:	𝛽𝛽w,J|H¶,Hß ,	
𝛽𝛽`,J|H¶,Hß 	 and	𝛽𝛽H¶,J|H¶,Hß ,	 i.e.	 the	 conditional	 effects	 of	 L	 on	 each	 remaining	
variable.	These,	in	turn,	are	estimated	using	a	set	of	four	conditional	effects,	
i.e.	the	effects	of	z2	on	each	remaining	variable	(Y,	L,	x	and	z3)	conditional	on	
z1.	We	construct	the	estimates	of	interest,	for	example:	
	𝛽𝛽vw,J|H¶,Hß =
𝛽𝛽vw,J|H¶ − 𝛽𝛽vw,Hß|H¶𝛽𝛽vHß,J|H¶
1 − 𝛽𝛽vHß,J|H¶𝛽𝛽vJ,Hß|H¶
	
Step	4:	Estimate	𝜷𝜷.,𝑳𝑳|𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏,𝒛𝒛𝟐𝟐,𝒛𝒛𝟑𝟑 	
Example	continued:	Here	we	estimate	the	following	two	effects:	𝛽𝛽w,J|H¶,Hß,H™ 	
and	𝛽𝛽`,J|H¶,Hß,H™ .	These,	in	turn,	are	estimated	using	a	set	of	three	conditional	
effects,	i.e.	the	effects	of	z3	on	each	remaining	variable	(Y,	L	and	x)	conditional	
on	z1	and	z2.	We	construct	the	estimates	of	interest,	for	example:	
𝛽𝛽vw,J|H¶,Hß,H™ =
𝛽𝛽vw,J|H¶,Hß − 𝛽𝛽vw,H™|H¶,Hß𝛽𝛽vH™,J|H¶,Hß
1 − 𝛽𝛽vH™,J|H¶,Hß𝛽𝛽vJ,H™|H¶,Hß
	
Step	k-1:	Estimate	𝜷𝜷.,𝑳𝑳|𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏,𝒛𝒛𝟐𝟐,𝒛𝒛𝟑𝟑,…,,𝒛𝒛𝒏𝒏 	
Step	k:	Estimate	𝜷𝜷.,𝒙𝒙|𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏,𝒛𝒛𝟐𝟐,𝒛𝒛𝟑𝟑,…,,𝒛𝒛𝒏𝒏 	
Example	continued:	Here	we	estimate	the	following	two	effects:	𝛽𝛽w,`|H¶,Hß,H™ 	
and	𝛽𝛽J,`|H¶,Hß,H™ ,	 i.e.	 the	 conditional	effect	of	x	 on	Y	 and	L,	 respectively.	We	
construct	the	estimate	of	interest:	
𝛽𝛽5 =
𝛽𝛽w,`|H¶,Hß,H™ − 𝛽𝛽w,J|H¶,Hß,H™𝛽𝛽J,`|H¶,Hß,H™
1 − 𝛽𝛽`,J|H¶,Hß,H™𝛽𝛽J,`|H¶,Hß,H™
	
Also,	 note	 that	 any	 regression	 where	 L	 is	 an	 outcome	 is	 estimated	 by	
replacing	L	with	?̂?𝜇/𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜇𝜇)Q ;	any	regression	where	L	is	a	predictor	is	estimated	
by	replacing	L	with	?̂?𝜇.	
An	example	using	real	data	
In	this	example,	we	want	to	measure	how	hemoglobin	(hgb)	varies	with	age	
and	BMI	among	women:	
ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝛽𝛽D + 𝛽𝛽?𝑉𝑉𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) + 𝜀𝜀	
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where	ln(BMI)	is	the	natural	logarithm	of	BMI.	This	is	also	our	latent	variable,	
and	here	we	assume	that	we	only	observe	if	a	person	is	obese	(BMI	>	30)	or	
not.	
Table	 A1	 below	 presents	 the	 results	 when	 (1)	 BMI	 is	 observed	 and	
measured	on	a	logarithmic	scale	(and	standardized),	(2)	We	control	for	being	
obese	using	a	dummy,	and	(3)	we	use	the	estimator	of	interest.	Here,	I	exploit	
“nhanes2”	which	is	part	of	the	Stata	data	library.	
		
Table	A1	 (1)	 shows	 that	 each	 additional	 decade	 increases	 hemoglobin	 by	
roughly	 0.08	 units,	 when	 holding	 ln(BMI)	 constant.	When	 controlling	 for	
obesity	instead,	this	effect	is	slightly	overestimated.	The	estimator	of	interest	
(see	(3))	adjusts	for	this	bias,	and	gives	us	also	an	estimate	for	the	effect	of	
BMI.		
A.4		Estimating	the	error	and	latent	variable	variances		
The	error	variance	in	the	adjusted-POLS	model	
Consider	the	model:	
𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽D +≤𝛽𝛽Å𝑥𝑥Å + 𝜀𝜀	
where	k	is	an	index	numbering	the	independent	variables	(k	=	1,	2,	…,	K).	The	
estimator	for	the	error	variance	is	given	by:	
Table A1. The effect of aging on hemoglobin, using three alternative 
ways of controlling for BMI (obesity) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Age (in decades) 0.0779*** 0.0857*** 0.0800*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0091) 
ln(BMI) (z) 0.0925*** 
(0.0156) 
- 0.118*** 
(0.0244) 
Obese (dummy) 
 
 
- 0.207*** 
(0.0396) 
 
- 
 
 
Observations 5,436 5,436 5,436 
(1) BMI is observed, (2) BMI is not observed; instead I use a dummy for being obese, 
(3) BMI is not observed, but we reconstruct the coefficients using the estimator of 
interest. Standard errors in parentheses; (3) Bootstrapped standard errors (20,692 
reps.) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀)Q = 1−≤≤g𝑏𝑏Å𝑏𝑏^ − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏Å, 𝑏𝑏^)Q j𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥Å, 𝑥𝑥^)Q
^Å
	
where	𝑏𝑏Å 	is	the	adjusted-POLS	estimate	for	𝛽𝛽Å .	Below	follows	the	motivation.		
The	variance	for	the	latent	variable	is	given	by:	
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿) = 1 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝛽𝛽D +≤𝛽𝛽Å𝑥𝑥Å) + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜀𝜀)	
where	
	
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝛽𝛽D +≤𝛽𝛽Å𝑥𝑥Å) =≤≤𝛽𝛽Å𝛽𝛽^𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥Å, 𝑥𝑥^)
^Å
	
	
I	 estimate	𝛽𝛽Å𝛽𝛽^	with	𝑏𝑏Å𝑏𝑏^ − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏Å, 𝑏𝑏^)Q ;	𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥Å, 𝑥𝑥^)	 is	 estimated	by	 its	
sample	counterpart.	This	is	motivated	by	the	following:	Assume	that	𝑏𝑏Å 	is	an	
unbiased	estimator	for	𝛽𝛽Å .	Then	it	follows	that	𝑏𝑏Å𝑏𝑏^	is	a	biased	estimator	for	
𝛽𝛽Å𝛽𝛽^,	overestimating	this	parameter	value	by	𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏Å, 𝑏𝑏^):		
𝐸𝐸(𝑏𝑏Å𝑏𝑏^) = 𝛽𝛽Å𝛽𝛽^ + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏Å, 𝑏𝑏^)	
Hence,	an	unbiased	estimator	for	𝛽𝛽Å𝛽𝛽^	is	given	by	𝑏𝑏Å𝑏𝑏^ − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏Å, 𝑏𝑏^).		
I	use	 the	same	error	variance	estimator	 in	 the	panel	data	case,	where	 the	
panel-specific	dummies	are	treated	like	other	independent	variables.			
The	latent	variable	variance	in	the	ordered	probit	model	
Here,	I	follow	the	convention26	and	estimate	𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿ÖÜáà)	as:	
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐿𝐿ÖÜáà)Q =
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑛𝑛 − 1
+ 1	
where	 SSM	 is	 the	model	 sum	 of	 squares	 in	 the	 estimated	 ordered	 probit	
model.		
A.5		A	non-normal	latent	variable,	treated	as	normal	
In	this	section,	I	sample	from	a	non-normal	latent	variable	distribution	that	I	
treat	 as	 a	 normal	 distribution.	 I	 estimate	 one	 simple	 and	 one	 multiple	
regression	model.	 In	 both	 cases,	 I	 let	 the	 random	error	 term	be	normally	
distributed.	Hence,	these	models	obey	the	distributional	assumption	of	the	
                                                             
26 This is how the Stata-written spost-program calculates the variance.  
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ordered	probit	estimator	only.	For	both	models,	L	has	mean	0	and	standard	
deviation	1;	the	first	independent	variable	(x1)	is	a	dummy	that	takes	on	the	
values	 0	 and	1	with	 equal	 probability;	 the	 independent	 variables	 and	 the	
error	term	are	independently	distributed.	The	models	include:	
𝐿𝐿 = −0.2 + 0.4𝑥𝑥? + 𝜀𝜀	 (N1)	
	
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑎𝑎 + 0.4𝑥𝑥? + 0.4𝑥𝑥5 + 0.4𝑥𝑥~ + 0.4𝑥𝑥í + 0.4𝑥𝑥è + 𝜀𝜀	
	
(N2)	
(N1)	This	 implies	 that	 the	 error	 term	has	mean	0	and	 standard	deviation	
√0.96.	 Measured	 on	 the	 probit-scale,	 the	 coefficient	 for	 x1	 has	 a	 value	 at	
roughly	0.408	(=0.4/√0.96).	
(N2)	Here,	x2	is	a	mixture	between	two	normal	distributions:	0.9𝑁𝑁õ0, √0.4ú +
0.1𝑁𝑁(0, √6)	which	gives	this	variable	excess	kurtosis	(outliers);	x3	follows	a	
Weibull	distribution	with	scale	and	shape	parameters	set	to	1	and	1.5	(the	
location	parameter	is	set	to	0);	x4	is	a	dummy	taking	on	the	value	1	with	30	
percent	probability	(and	0	otherwise)	and	x5	is	Poisson	distributed	(𝜆𝜆 = 1).	
Some	of	these	variables	correlate:	the	correlation	between	x1	and	x2	is	~0.29;	
the	correlation	between	x4	and	x5	is	approximately	-0.35.27	a	is	a	constant	(-
1.08…)	that	gives	the	error	term	a	mean	at	0.		This	is	a	model	where	L	has	a	
slight	 positive	 skew	 (~0.05)	 with	 excess	 kurtosis	 (~3.30).	 Roughly	 44	
percent	of	the	variance	in	L	is	explained	by	the	model;	the	error	variance	is	
~0.558.	Measured	on	the	probit-scale,	the	coefficients	have	a	value	at	~0.535	
(=	0.4/√0.558…).	
Table	 A2a	 presents	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 simulated	 sampling	
distributions.	 In	 all	 simulations,	 I	 sample	 1000	 observations	 where	 the	
ordinal	variable	follows	a	skewed	binomial	distribution	(n	=	4;	p	=	0.75).28	
For	model	(N1),	there	is	little	difference	in	performance	between	adjusted-
POLS	and	ordered-probit;	for	model	(N2)	the	difference	is	quite	clear.	Here,	
adjusted-POLS	 produces	 biases	 at	 -0.03	 to	 0.02	 standard	 deviations	
depending	 on	parameter;	 as	 expected,	 ordered	probit	 produces	 no	 biases	
worth	mentioning.	
Now,	 the	 performance	 of	 adjusted-POLS	 also	 depends	 on	 the	 ordinal	
variable	 distribution.	 This	 is	 exemplified	 in	 table	 A2b.	 Here,	 the	 ordinal	
variable	is	a	discretized	version	of	the	latent	variable:	the	latent	variable	is	
                                                             
27 x1 takes on the value 1 if 0.5x2 + n > 0, where n is a standard normal variable; x4 takes on the 
value 1 if 0.641x5 + n < 0. 
28 I determine the ‘theoretical cutpoints’ through a simulation of its own: I sample 20 million 
observations on L and treat this as the theoretical distribution, i.e. I use it to determine the 
‘theoretical cutpoints’ that are used in all of the following simulations. (When applying adjusted-
POLS to the data, I estimate the cutpoints separately for each sample using sample proportions.)  
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adjusted-POLS	 produces	 biases	 at	 -0.03	 to	 0.02	 standard	 deviations	
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27 x1 takes on the value 1 if 0.5x2 + n > 0, where n is a standard normal variable; x4 takes on the 
value 1 if 0.641x5 + n < 0. 
28 I determine the ‘theoretical cutpoints’ through a simulation of its own: I sample 20 million 
observations on L and treat this as the theoretical distribution, i.e. I use it to determine the 
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 ADJUSTED-POLS ORDERED PROBIT  
 Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(%)'  
mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(()'  
Mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
MSDpols/ 
MSDprob 
Covariate Model (N1): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.4, !"#(%) = 0.96 Model (N1): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.4, !"#(() = 1  
  x1 0.401 0.066 0.03 3.00 0.960 4.315 0.400 0.065 0.02 3.00 1 4.205 1.026 
 
Model (N1): Probit scale: )2345 ≈ 0.408, !"#8%23459 = 1 Model (N1): Probit scale: )2345 ≈ 0.408, !"#8(23459 ≈ 1.04 
 
  x1   0.410 0.070 0.10 3.03 1 4.900 0.409 0.069 0.08 3.02 1.04 4.774 1.027 
 Model (N2): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.4, !"#(%) ≈ 0.558 Model (N2): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.4, !"#(() = 1  
  x1 
  x2 
  x3 
   x4 
   x5 
0.422 
0.372 
0.393 
0.406 
0.390 
0.057 
0.029 
0.042 
0.064 
0.027 
-0.03 
0.07 
-0.03 
-0.01 
0.02 
3.00 
3.02 
2.97 
3.04 
3.00 
0.585 
0.585 
0.585 
0.585 
0.585 
0.377 
0.163 
0.181 
0.414 
0.080 
0.399 
0.401 
0.401 
0.399 
0.400 
0.055 
0.029 
0.043 
0.062 
0.028 
-0.04 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.03 
2.97 
3.03 
2.96 
3.05 
2.99 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.300 
0.086 
0.189 
0.383 
0.078 
1.256 
1.883 
0.957 
1.080 
1.033 
 
Model (N2): Probit scale: )2345 ≈ 0.535, !"#8%23459 = 1 Model (N2): Probit scale: )2345 ≈ 0.535, !"#8(23459 ≈ 1.79 
 
  x1 
  x2 
  x3 
   x4 
   x5 
0.553 
0.486 
0.514 
0.532 
0.511 
0.079 
0.042 
0.059 
0.087 
0.040 
0.03 
0.13 
0.03 
0.04 
0.11 
3.01 
3.06 
2.96 
3.03 
2.99 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.649 
0.414 
0.387 
0.751 
0.222 
0.537 
0.540 
0.539 
0.537 
0.539 
0.076 
0.046 
0.062 
0.086 
0.043 
0.01 
0.12 
0.05 
0.05 
0.13 
2.98 
3.07 
2.95 
3.05 
3.00 
1.81 
1.81 
1.81 
1.81 
1.81 
0.581 
0.213 
0.391 
0.738 
0.190 
1.116 
1.943 
0.990 
1.017 
1.169 
Notes: x1 is a dummy (50/50); x2 is a mixture between two normal distributions with excess extreme value probability (outliers); x3 follows a Weibull distribution (λ = 1, 
k = 1.5); x4 is a dummy (30/70) and x5 is Poisson distributed (λ = 1). MSD is the mean square deviation: avg(β − βB)C. 
Table A2a. Characteristics of the simulated sampling distributions (10,000 repetitions) with a non-normal latent variable and 
normal error term; n = 1000. The ordinal variable is binomially distributed (n = 4, p = 0.75) 
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 ADJUSTED-POLS ORDERED PROBIT  
 Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(%)'  
mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
Mean Standard- 
deviation 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurtosis !"#(()'  
Mean 
MSD 
(´100) 
MSDpols/ 
MSDprob 
Covariate  Model (N2): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.4, !"#(%) ≈ 0.558 Model (N2): A-POLS scale: ) = 0.4, !"#(() = 1  
  x1 
  x2 
  x3 
   x4 
   x5 
0.405 
0.394 
0.400 
0.401 
0.400 
0.052 
0.025 
0.040 
0.058 
0.025 
-0.02 
0.05 
-0.03 
-0.00 
-0.00 
2.96 
2.96 
2.95 
3.03 
2.89 
0.563 
0.563 
0.563 
0.563 
0.563 
0.274 
0.066 
0.163 
0.342 
0.064 
0.401 
0.401 
0.400 
0.400 
0.401 
0.052 
0.026 
0.041 
0.058 
0.026 
-0.02 
0.05 
-0.03 
-0.00 
0.01 
2.96 
2.96 
2.96 
3.03 
2.89 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.273 
0.068 
0.165 
0.341 
0.065 
1.005 
0.980 
0.992 
1.005 
0.980 
 
Model (N2): Probit scale: )2345 ≈ 0.535, !"#8%23459 = 1 Model (N2): Probit scale: )2345 ≈ 0.535, !"#8(23459 ≈ 1.79 
 
  x1 
  x2 
  x3 
   x4 
   x5 
0.541 
0.525 
0.534 
0.535 
0.534 
0.073 
0.038 
0.057 
0.080 
0.039 
0.04 
0.10 
0.02 
0.04 
0.07 
2.98 
3.01 
2.94 
3.02 
2.91 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.529 
0.151 
0.329 
0.646 
0.150 
0.539 
0.539 
0.538 
0.538 
0.539 
0.073 
0.040 
0.058 
0.081 
0.039 
0.04 
0.12 
0.03 
0.04 
0.08 
2.98 
3.00 
2.94 
3.02 
2.91 
1.81 
1.81 
1.81 
1.81 
1.81 
0.531 
0.163 
0.337 
0.653 
0.156 
0.996 
0.923 
0.990 
0.976 
0.963 
Notes: x1 is a dummy (50/50); x2 is a mixture between two normal distributions with excess kurtosis (outliers); x3 follows a Weibull distribution (λ = 1, k = 1.5); x4 is a 
dummy (30/70) and x5 is Poisson distributed (λ = 1). MSD is the mean square deviation: avg(β − βB)C.
Table A2b. Characteristics of the simulated sampling distributions (10,000 repetitions) with a non-normal latent variable and 
normal error term; n = 1000. The ordinal variable is a discretized version of the latent variable (7 pts) 
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A.6		Estimating	probabilities	in	a	panel	data	setting	using	
adjusted-POLS	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 show	 how	 we	 can	 use	 adjusted-POLS	 to	 describe	 the	
probability	distribution	over	 the	ordinal	values,	 and	how	 this	distribution	
changes	 as	 𝑥𝑥bç	 is	 manipulated.	 I	 also	 provide	 simulations	 that	 compare	
adjusted-POLS	to	ordered	probit	and	–	in	the	case	of	a	binary	response	–	OLS.	
For	 all	 estimators,	 I	 capture	 the	 panel-specific	 intercepts	 using	 a	 set	 of	
dummies.		
The	 simulations	 suggest	 that	 adjusted-POLS	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 useful	
alternative	 for	 estimating	 conditional	 probability	 distributions	 in	 a	 panel	
data	setting.	In	general,	adjusted-POLS	performs	well	in	estimating	‘average	
effects’,	 ‘average	 marginal	 effects’	 as	 well	 as	 ‘average	 treatment	 effects’	
(described	 in	more	detail	below).	For	sufficiently	small	samples,	however,	
the	performance	of	adjusted-POLS	does	start	to	suffer.	
Average	effects	and	average	marginal	effects	using	adjusted-POLS	
Here,	an	average	effect	is	the	expected	change	in	the	probability	of	a	specific	
outcome	as	𝑥𝑥bç	increases	by	one	unit.		
If	𝑥𝑥bç	 increases	 by	 one	 unit	 for	 each	 observation,	 the	 probability	 of	 an	
ordinal	value	at	j	or	below	becomes:	
𝑃𝑃 ∂𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑗𝑗∑𝑥𝑥bç = 𝑥𝑥bç + 1∏ = 𝑁𝑁õ𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐::	𝜇𝜇 = 𝛽𝛽; 𝜎𝜎 = 1ú	
where	𝑥𝑥bç	 denotes	 the	 random	variable	and	𝑥𝑥bç	 is	 the	 realization;	N	 is	 the	
normal	distribution	function	evaluated	at	the	relevant	cutpoint	(𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:):	this	
cutpoint	is	given	by	𝑁𝑁>?(𝜋𝜋:)		where	𝜋𝜋: 	is	the	initial	probability	of	having	an	
ordinal	 value	 at	 j	 or	 below;	𝛽𝛽	 is	 the	 adjusted-POLS	 parameter	 for	𝑥𝑥bç .	 By	
comparing	this	probability	distribution	to	the	original	(𝑥𝑥bç = 𝑥𝑥bç),	we	obtain	
the	average	effects.		
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The	average	marginal	effect	is	given	by29:	
𝐸𝐸 ô
∂𝑃𝑃(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑗𝑗)
∂𝑥𝑥bç
ù =	
=
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
Ωexp ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:>?
5
2
¡ù − exp	 ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:
5
2
¡ù¬	
For	the	first	category	(j	=	1)	this	simplifies	to:	
𝐸𝐸 ô
∂𝑃𝑃(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 1)
∂𝑥𝑥bç
ù = −
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
exp	 ô− ¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐?
5
2
¡ù	
	
	
                                                             
29 The probability of belonging to category j is given by: 
𝑃𝑃: = 0.5 erfõ𝑧𝑧:ú − 0.5erf	(𝑧𝑧:>?) 
Where erf(z) is the so called error function, and where zj is given by: 
𝑧𝑧: =
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐: − 𝐿𝐿≈
𝜎𝜎∆√2
 
𝐿𝐿≈  is your prediction, 𝐿𝐿≈ = 𝛽𝛽?𝑥𝑥? +⋯+ 𝛽𝛽»𝑥𝑥» + 𝛼𝛼, and 𝜎𝜎∆  is the error standard deviation in the 
corresponding model. Hence, 
∂𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
=
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
∙
∂0.5 erfõ𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗ú
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
+
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗−1
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
∙
∂ − 0.5 erfõ𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗−1ú
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗−1
= 
=
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új 
𝐸𝐸  
∂𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
À = 𝐸𝐸 Ω
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új¬ 
= \ 𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿Ã)
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿Ã
Õ
>Õ
 
= \
1
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿Ã√2𝜋𝜋
exp ¿−
𝐿𝐿Ã2
2𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿Ã
2¡
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿Ã
Õ
>Õ
 
=
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
Ωexp ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:>?
5
2
¡ù − exp	 ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:
5
2
¡ù¬ 
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ù =	
=
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
Ωexp ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:>?
5
2
¡ù − exp	 ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:
5
2
¡ù¬	
For	the	first	category	(j	=	1)	this	simplifies	to:	
𝐸𝐸 ô
∂𝑃𝑃(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 1)
∂𝑥𝑥bç
ù = −
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
exp	 ô− ¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐?
5
2
¡ù	
	
	
                                                             
29 The probability of belonging to category j is given by: 
𝑃𝑃: = 0.5 erfõ𝑧𝑧:ú − 0.5erf	(𝑧𝑧:>?) 
Where erf(z) is the so called error function, and where zj is given by: 
𝑧𝑧: =
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐: − 𝐿𝐿≈
𝜎𝜎∆√2
 
𝐿𝐿≈ is your prediction, 𝐿𝐿≈ = 𝛽𝛽?𝑥𝑥? +⋯+ 𝛽𝛽»𝑥𝑥» + 𝛼𝛼, and 𝜎𝜎∆  is the error standard deviation in the 
corresponding model. Hence, 
∂𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
=
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
∙
∂0.5 erfõ𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗ú
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗
+
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗−1
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
∙
∂ − 0.5 erfõ𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗−1ú
∂𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗−1
= 
=
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új 
𝐸𝐸  
∂𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
∂𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
À = 𝐸𝐸 Ω
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új¬ 
= \ 𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿Ã)
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿Ã
Õ
>Õ
 
= \
1
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿Ã√2𝜋𝜋
exp ¿−
𝐿𝐿Ã2
2𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿Ã
2¡
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀√2𝜋𝜋
gexpõ−𝑧𝑧:>?
5 ú − expõ−𝑧𝑧:
5új𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿Ã
Õ
>Õ
 
=
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
Ωexp ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:>?
5
2
¡ù − exp	 ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐:
5
2
¡ù¬ 
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And	for	the	last	category	(j	=	J):	
𝐸𝐸 ô
∂𝑃𝑃(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝐽𝐽)
∂𝑥𝑥bç
ù =
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
exp ô−¿
𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐œ>?
5
2
¡ù	
This	is	also	the	relevant	expression	for	a	binary	response	variable.30		
Average	treatment	effects	using	adjusted-POLS	
Here,	an	average	treatment	effect	is	the	change	in	the	probability	of	a	specific	
outcome	as	𝑥𝑥bç	increases	from	one	fixed	number	to	another.	The	probability	
of	 attaining	 an	 ordinal	 value	 at	 j	 or	 below	when	𝑥𝑥bç	 is	 set	 equal	 to	 some	
constant	(c)	is	given	by:		
𝑃𝑃(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑗𝑗|𝑥𝑥bç = 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑁𝑁õ𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐::	𝜇𝜇 = 𝜇𝜇∗; 𝜎𝜎 = 𝜎𝜎∗ú	
where	𝜇𝜇∗	is	the	expected	value	for	the	latent	variable	when	𝑥𝑥bç	is	set	equal	to	
c;	 𝜎𝜎∗	 is	 the	 conditional	 standard	 deviation	 for	 the	 latent	 variable,	 i.e.	
conditional	on	𝑥𝑥bç	equaling	𝑠𝑠.		
	
Example	with	simulations	
Consider	model	(4)	from	section	4.2:	
𝐿𝐿bç = 0.2𝑥𝑥bç + 𝛼𝛼b + 𝜀𝜀bç	
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝐿𝐿bç) = 1; 	𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥bç) = 1; 	𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼b) = 0.7; 	𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶(𝛼𝛼b, 0.2𝑥𝑥bç) = √0.007						
Here,	the	unconditional	variance	for	𝐿𝐿bç	is	given	by:	
1 = 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(0.2𝑥𝑥bç) + 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼b) + 2𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶(𝛼𝛼b, 0.2𝑥𝑥bç) + 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝜀𝜀bç)	
Hence,	the	conditional	variance	for	𝐿𝐿bç	is:	
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝛼𝛼b) + 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝜀𝜀bç) = 1 − 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(0.2𝑥𝑥bç) − 2𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶(𝛼𝛼b, 0.2𝑥𝑥bç)	
I	 estimate	 2𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶(𝛼𝛼b, 0.2𝑥𝑥bç)	 using	 its	 sample	 counterpart;	 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(0.2𝑥𝑥bç)	 is	
estimated	with:	
g𝑏𝑏5 − 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑏𝑏)Q j𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥)Q 	
                                                             
30 For the notation above to be accurate in the binary case, we number these responses 1 and 2 
(instead of 0 and 1). 
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where	 𝑏𝑏	 is	 the	 adjusted-POLS	 estimate	 for	 the	 corresponding	 parameter	
(0.2).31	The	conditional	mean	-	𝜇𝜇∗	-	is	easily	estimated	by	replacing	𝑥𝑥bç	with	c	
and	taking	the	average	over	the	predicted	values.		
Table	A3a	presents	the	theoretical	and	estimated	probabilities	based	on	
model	 (4).	 Here,	 I	 let	 the	 ordinal	 variable	 follow	 a	 skewed	 binomial	
distribution	(n	=	4;	p	=	0.75)	and	I	number	these	values	1	through	5.	Panel	A	
presents	 the	probability	distribution	over	 these	values	as	𝑥𝑥bç = 𝑥𝑥bç	 and	as	
𝑥𝑥bç = 𝑥𝑥bç + 1;	panel	B	presents	the	corresponding	probability	distribution	as	
𝑥𝑥bç = 0	and	as	𝑥𝑥bç = 1.	The	sample	size	is	set	to	1000	(i	=	1,	2,	…,	250;	t	=	1,	2,	
3,	4)	and	I	make	10,000	repetitions	for	each	simulated	sampling	distribution.		
Table	 A3a	 reveals	 that	 adjusted-POLS	 –	 on	 average	 –	 does	 well	 in	
matching	 the	 theoretical	 values,	 while	 ordered	 probit	 is	 somewhat	 off.	
Example:	The	probability	of	attaining	an	ordinal	value	at	five	increases	by	8.2	
percentage	points	as	𝑥𝑥bç	increases	from	zero	to	one.	This	is	also	the	average	
estimate	 using	 adjusted-POLS;	 ordered-probit	 puts	 it	 at	 7.5	 percentage	
points.	The	pattern	is	similar	when	I	estimate	average	marginal	effects	(not	
presented	in	table	A3a).32			
Now,	with	a	binary	outcome,	a	probability-based	measure	is	(perhaps)	the	
only	pertinent	way	of	describing	the	effect	size.	For	that	reason,	table	A3b	–	
panels	A	&	B	 –	 repeats	 this	 exercise	using	 a	Bernoulli-distributed	ordinal	
variable	(p	=	0.2).	Here,	I	also	compare	with	OLS.	The	results	are	similar	to	
those	presented	 in	 table	A3a:	On	average,	 the	adjusted-POLS	probabilities	
match	well	with	the	theoretical	values,	while	probit	and	OLS	are	somewhat	
off.33	All	estimators	do	a	rather	good	job	at	estimating	the	average	marginal	
effect,	however.	
It	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	adjusted-POLS	relies	on	a	rather	strong	
assumption,	i.e.	that	the	latent	variable	is	normally	distributed.	In	panels	C	to	
F,	 this	 assumption	 is	 not	 fully	met.	 In	 panel	 C,	 I	 estimate	 a	model	 that	 is	
similar	to	(4)	only	that	𝑥𝑥bç	is	replaced	by	a	treatment	indicator:	T	=	1	if	𝑥𝑥bç >
0	and	0	otherwise;	β	=	0.4;	Var(ε)	≈	0.126.	I	refer	to	this	as	model	(5).	In	panel	
D	 &	 E,	 I	 estimate	 a	 model	 that	 includes	 several	 normally	 distributed	
covariates	as	well	as	distinct	time	trends.	I	refer	to	this	as	model	(6)	and	it	is	
                                                             
31 The motivation for subtracting 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑏𝑏)Q  is described in section A.4. 
32 The theoretical average marginal effects:  
-0.2 (ordinal outcome #1), -1.9 (#2), -4.4 (#3), -0.6 (#4) and 7.1 (#5) 
Adjusted-POLS matches these numbers, ordered probit puts them at:  
-0.1 (#1), -1.2 (#2), -4.0 (#3), -1.5 (#4) and 6.8 (#5) 
33 Note that the average effect, the average marginal effect and the average treatment effect are 
the same measure when using OLS. Any differences observed in the panels are due to random 
chance, as each panel uses new samples. 
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described	in	more	detail	 in	the	end	of	this	section.	In	panel	F,	 I	estimate	a	
model	that	is	similar	to	(6)	only	that	𝑥𝑥?bç	is	replaced	by	a	treatment	indicator:	
T	=	1	if	𝑥𝑥?bç > 0	and	0	otherwise;	β1	=	0.4;	Var(ε)	≈	0.097.	I	refer	to	this	as	
model	(7).	For	model	(5)	and	(7),	 I	omit	the	 ‘average	effect’	as	well	as	the	
‘average	marginal	effect’	since	the	treatment	indicator	cannot	take	on	values	
above	one.		
Overall,	 adjusted-POLS	 still	 performs	 well	 in	 estimating	 the	 effects	 of	
interest	 in	 these	 cases,	 although	 the	 underlying	 probabilities	 are	 usually	
overesti-mated.	 OLS	 is	 also	 a	 good	 alternative	 for	 estimating	 average	
marginal	effects	and	average	treatment	effects,	when	the	treatment	is	binary.		
The	 performance	 of	 adjusted-POLS	 does	 start	 to	 suffer	 for	 sufficiently	
small	samples.	This	is	exemplified	in	panel	F	&	G	of	table	A3b	which	uses	a	
sample	consisting	of	200	observations	(i	=	1,	2,	…,	100;	t	=	1,	2)	and	estimates	
model	(4).	Due	to	regular	non-convergence,	the	probit	estimates	are	omitted	
here.	
Below	is	a	description	of	model	(6)	that	I	estimate	in	panel	D	&	E	of	table	
A3b.	 The	 model	 includes	 four	 covariates	 as	 well	 as	 distinct	 time	 trends,	
combined	with	an	 IID	error.	The	 time-specific	 intercepts	are	uncorrelated	
with	 the	 other	 covariates	 and	 I	 control	 for	 them	 in	 the	 regressions.	 The	
model:	
𝐿𝐿bç = 0.2𝑥𝑥?bç + 0.2𝑥𝑥5bç − 0.2𝑥𝑥~bç − 0.2𝑥𝑥íbç + 𝛼𝛼b + 𝜏𝜏ç + 𝜀𝜀bç	
	
𝛼𝛼b = 0.3𝜇𝜇?bç + 0.3𝜇𝜇5bç − 0.3𝜇𝜇~bç − 0.3𝜇𝜇íbç + 𝑒𝑒b 					𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑒𝑒b) = 0.462	
𝜏𝜏ç = −0.4, 0, 0.1, 0.3	
where	 𝜇𝜇: 	 is	 the	 expected	 value	 for	 the	 j:th	 covariate;	 the	 covariates	 are	
normally	distributed	and	autocorrelated	over	time,	with	variances	at	unity	
and	pairwise	covariances	at	0.2,	but	no	correlation	within	panels.	The	error	
variance	is	0.093.	 	
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Panel A Theoretical probabilities (%) Adjusted-POLS probabilities (%) Ordered probit probabilities (%) 
Ordinal 
value ! = ! ! = ! + 1 Diff. ! = ! ! = ! + 1 Diff. ! = ! ! = ! + 1 Diff. 
1 0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.4 (0.3) 0.2 (0.2) -0.2 (0.1) 0.4 (0.3) 0.2 (0.2) -0.2 (0.1) 
2 4.7 3.1 -1.6 4.7 (1.1) 3.1 (0.8) -1.6 (0.4) 4.7 (1.1) 3.1 (0.9) -1.6 (0.5) 
3 21.1 16.8 -4.3 21.1 (2.1) 16.8 (2.0) -4.3 (0.8) 21.1 (2.1) 16.8 (2.1) -4.3 (1.1) 
4 42.2 40.8 -1.4 42.2 (2.4) 40.8 (2.4) -1.4 (0.6) 42.2 (2.4) 41.2 (2.7) -1.0 (1.4) 
5 31.6 39.1 7.4 31.6 (2.6) 39.1 (2.9) 7.4 (1.2) 31.6 (2.6) 38.7 (3.0) 7.0 (1.3)           
Sum 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 
Panel B Theoretical probabilities (%) Adjusted-POLS probabilities (%) Ordered probit probabilities (%) 
Ordinal 
value ! = 0 ! = 1 Diff. ! = 0 ! = 1 Diff. ! = 0 ! = 1 Diff. 
1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) -0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.2) 0.1 (0.2) -0.0 (0.1) 
2 3.2 1.9 -1.3 3.2 (0.9) 1.9 (0.7) -1.2 (0.3) 3.3 (1.0) 2.3 (0.9) -1.0 (0.4) 
3 20.4 15.4 -5.0 20.4 (2.1) 15.4 (2.1) -5.0 (0.9) 20.3 (2.1) 15.4 (2.4) -4.9 (1.3) 
4 46.7 44.9 -1.8 46.7 (2.7) 44.8 (2.6) -1.9 (0.8) 46.4 (2.7) 44.9 (3.0) -1.5 (1.7) 
5 29.6 37.8 8.2 29.6 (2.6) 37.8 (3.0) 8.2 (1.5) 29.8 (2.6) 37.3 (3.0) 7.5 (1.5)           
Sum 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 
 Notes: The sample size is set to 1000 in all simulations (i = 1, 2, …, 250; t = 1, 2, 3, 4). All estimates are based on model (4), see section 4.2. Standard deviations 
in parenthesis.
Table A3a. Theoretical and empirical probabilities using adjusted-POLS and ordered probit in a panel data setting 
(10,000 repetitions). The ordinal variable is binomially distributed (n = 4, p = 0.75) numbered 1-5.  
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Panel A 
Theoretical 
(%) 
Adjusted-
POLS (%) 
Probit (%) OLS (%) 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 + 1 
Difference 
Avg. marg. 
20.0 
26.1 
6.1 
5.6 
20.0 (2.2) 
26.1 (3.0) 
6.1 (1.8) 
5.6 (1.6) 
20.0 (2.2) 
25.2 (2.7) 
5.2 (1.3) 
5.5 (1.5) 
20.0 (2.2) 
25.6 (2.9) 
5.6 (1.6) 
5.6 (1.6) 
Panel B     
𝑥𝑥 = 0 
𝑥𝑥 = 1 
Difference 
17.2 
23.6 
6.3 
17.2 (2.2) 
23.6 (2.7) 
6.4 (2.0) 
17.4 (2.2) 
22.8 (2.5) 
5.4 (1.4) 
19.9 (2.1) 
25.5 (2.8) 
5.6 (1.6) 
Panel C     
𝑇𝑇 = 0 
𝑇𝑇 = 1 
Difference 
12.3 
23.6 
11.3 
12.6 (2.3) 
24.1 (2.7) 
11.5 (2.9) 
13.1 (2.3) 
23.2 (3.1) 
10.1 (3.4) 
14.4 (2.2) 
25.7 (2.7) 
11.3 (2.8) 
Panel D     
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 + 1 
Difference 
Avg. marg. 
20.0 
26.1 
6.1 
5.6 
20.0 (2.0) 
26.1 (3.0) 
6.1 (2.0) 
5.6 (1.7) 
20.0 (2.0) 
25.1 (2.7) 
5.1 (1.5) 
5.2 (1.7) 
20.0 (2.0) 
25.6 (2.8) 
5.6 (1.7) 
5.6 (1.7) 
Panel E     
𝑥𝑥 = 0 
𝑥𝑥 = 1 
Difference 
19.3 
25.4 
6.2 
19.8 (2.0) 
25.9 (2.9) 
6.2 (2.1) 
19.2 (2.1) 
24.1 (2.7) 
4.9 (1.6) 
20.0 (2.0) 
25.6 (2.8) 
5.6 (1.8) 
Panel F     
𝑇𝑇 = 0 
𝑇𝑇 = 1 
Difference 
14.1 
25.5 
11.3 
14.7 (2.1) 
26.0 (2.7) 
11.3 (2.9) 
14.7 (2.1) 
24.2 (2.5) 
9.5 (2.3) 
14.4 (2.2) 
25.6 (2.6) 
11.3 (2.8) 
Panel G     
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 + 1 
Difference 
Avg. marg. 
20.0 
26.1 
6.1 
5.6 
20.0 (3.6) 
26.3 (6.7) 
6.4 (5.5) 
5.6 (4.7) 
- 
- 
- 
20.0 (3.6) 
25.6 (6.2) 
5.6 (4.7) 
5.6 (4.7) 
Panel H     
𝑥𝑥 = 0 
𝑥𝑥 = 1 
Difference 
17.2 
23.6 
6.3 
17.7 (4.0) 
24.5 (5.7) 
6.8 (6.1) 
- 
- 
- 
19.9 (3.4) 
25.5 (6.0) 
5.6 (4.7) 
Notes: The Difference measures the ‘average effect’ or ‘average treatment effect’; Avg. marg. is 
short for the ‘average marginal effect’. Panel A & B: Based on estimates of model (4), see section 
4.2; the sample size is set to 1000 (i = 1, 2, …, 250; t = 1, 2, 3, 4). Panel C: Based on estimates of 
model (5); see model (4) where x is replaced by a treatment indicator; the sample size is set to 1000. 
Panel D & E: Based on estimates of model (6) with several covariates and time-trends; the sample 
size is set to 1000. Panel F: Based on estimates of model (7); see model (6) where x?”‘ is replaced 
by a treatment indicator; the sample size is set to 1000. Panel G & H: Based on estimates of model 
(4); the sample size is set to 200 (i = 1, 2, …, 100; t = 1, 2). In panel F & G, the ordered probit 
probabilities are omitted due to regular non-convergence. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table A3b. The probability of a positive outcome using adjusted-POLS, 
probit and OLS in a panel data setting (10,000 repetitions). The ordinal 
variable is Bernoulli distributed (p = 0.2).  
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A.7		Average	percentile	rank	effect	(APE)	
Here	I	show	that	a	movement	up	the	L-distribution	by	β	standard	deviations	
is,	on	average,	equal	to	an	increase	by	100𝛽𝛽 2√𝜋𝜋⁄ 	percentile	ranks,	assuming	
that	L	follows	a	normal	distribution.	In	other	words,	the	average	percentile	
rank	effect	(APE)	34	is	given	by:	
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴  
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
À =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
	
where	𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)	is	the	distribution	function	for	L,	and	𝛽𝛽	is	the	coefficient	for	x.	
We	start	by	noting	that:	
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
= 𝑓𝑓õ𝐿𝐿ú
∂𝐿𝐿
∂𝑥𝑥
=
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
exp	(−0.5𝐿𝐿5)	
Taking	the	expectancy	on	both	sides	gives	us:	
𝐴𝐴  
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
À =
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
Egexp	(−0.5𝐿𝐿5)j	 (A.1)	
where:	
Egexp	(−0.5𝐿𝐿5)j =	
\gexpõ−0.5𝐿𝐿2új𝑓𝑓õ𝐿𝐿ú
Õ
>Õ
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿 = \
expõ−𝐿𝐿2ú
√2𝜋𝜋
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿
Õ
>Õ
=
1
√2
	 (A.2)	
	
Substituting	(A.2)	into	(A.1)	gives	us:	
𝐴𝐴  
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
À =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
	
	
	 	
                                                             
34 Note that this is a general result applying also to models where the outcome is observable. 
46
46 
 
A.7		Average	percentile	rank	effect	(APE)	
Here	I	show	that	a	movement	up	the	L-distribution	by	β	standard	deviations	
is,	on	average,	equal	to	an	increase	by	100𝛽𝛽 2√𝜋𝜋⁄ 	percentile	ranks,	assuming	
that	L	follows	a	normal	distribution.	In	other	words,	the	average	percentile	
rank	effect	(APE)	34	is	given	by:	
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴  
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
À =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
	
where	𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)	is	the	distribution	function	for	L,	and	𝛽𝛽	is	the	coefficient	for	x.	
We	start	by	noting	that:	
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
= 𝑓𝑓õ𝐿𝐿ú
∂𝐿𝐿
∂𝑥𝑥
=
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
exp	(−0.5𝐿𝐿5)	
Taking	the	expectancy	on	both	sides	gives	us:	
𝐴𝐴  
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
À =
𝛽𝛽
√2𝜋𝜋
Egexp	(−0.5𝐿𝐿5)j	 (A.1)	
where:	
Egexp	(−0.5𝐿𝐿5)j =	
\gexpõ−0.5𝐿𝐿2új𝑓𝑓õ𝐿𝐿ú
Õ
>Õ
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿 = \
expõ−𝐿𝐿2ú
√2𝜋𝜋
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿
Õ
>Õ
=
1
√2
	 (A.2)	
	
Substituting	(A.2)	into	(A.1)	gives	us:	
𝐴𝐴  
∂𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿)
∂𝑥𝑥
À =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
	
	
	 	
                                                             
34 Note that this is a general result applying also to models where the outcome is observable. 
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CHAPTER	3	
Higher	Education	and	the	Gains	in	Cognitive	Abilities	
	
Abstract	
This	chapter	uses	PIAAC	survey	data	to	estimate	the	effect	of	schooling	on	
cognitive	abilities	as	measured	by	literacy	and	numeracy.	The	identification	
is	 threefold.	 Firstly,	 I	 exploit	 yearly	 variations	 in	 the	 cohort	 size	 as	 an	
instrument	 for	 schooling.	 Example:	 Some	 countries	 experienced	 a	 rising	
number	 of	 births	 in	 the	 early	 1960s,	 but	 as	 these	 individuals	 reached	
adulthood,	the	number	of	college	and	university	spots	seems	to	have	lagged	
behind.	 Exploiting	 this	 pattern,	 I	 estimate	 that	 each	 additional	 year	 of	
schooling	adds	0.22	and	0.27	standard	deviations	to	literacy	and	numeracy,	
respectively.	Secondly,	I	use	country-level	data	and	exploit	the	variation	in	
schooling-trends	over	age	groups.	As	a	third	strategy,	I	measure	the	trends	
in	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 in	 the	 years	 following	 graduation	 from	 upper-
secondary	school,	comparing	university	students	to	others.	The	results	from	
these	 two	analyses	paint	a	more	pessimistic	picture	of	 the	cognitive	gains	
from	 higher	 education.	 I	 find	 that	 the	 trend	 for	 those	 who	 enroll	 in	 a	
university	 program	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 trend	 for	 those	 who	 move	 into	 the	
workforce	or	other	activities,	suggesting	that	university	studies	have	small	
effects	on	literacy	and	numeracy	(if	any).	I	discuss	potential	explanations	for	
the	differences	in	the	estimated	effects.		
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3.1		INTRODUCTION	
There	is	little	doubt	that	education	adds	significantly	to	wages.	Most	studies	
find	that	one	year	of	schooling	increases	wages	by	5	to	15	percent	(see,	for	
example,	the	reviews	by	Belzil,	2007;	Card,	1999,	and	Harmon	et	al.,	2003).	
Less	is	known	about	the	mechanism,	i.e.	whether	the	returns	to	schooling	are	
mediated	mainly	 through	 increases	 in	cognitive	skills	and	productivity,	or	
whether	 higher	 education	 is	 mainly	 functioning	 as	 a	 signal	 for	 pre-
determined	 ability.35	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 estimate	 the	 effect	 of	 schooling	 on	
cognitive	skills	as	measured	by	literacy	and	numeracy	(see	chapter	1	for	a	
description).	 Overall,	 I	 find	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 hypothesis	 that	
schooling	 has	 positive	 effects	 on	 cognitive	 skills.	 I	measure	 this	 effect	 by	
contrasting	 three	 identification	 strategies:	 the	 instrumental	 variables	
approach,	a	country-level	analysis	and	a	‘dose-response’	analysis.	
Firstly,	I	use	individual	level	data	where	schooling	is	instrumented	by	the	
relative	cohort	size:	If	you	are	born	in	a	year	when	the	cohort	size	is	large	in	
comparison	to	previous	years,	that	would	make	competition	for	college	and	
university	 spots	 tougher	 and	 entry	 into	 higher	 education	 less	 probable	 –	
assuming	that	the	number	of	college	and	university	places	are	fixed	in	the	
short	run.	This	is	also	clearly	visible	in	these	data.	Exploiting	this	pattern,	I	
estimate	that	each	additional	year	of	schooling	adds	0.22	and	0.27	standard	
deviations	to	literacy	and	numeracy,	respectively.	These	are	the	medium-	to	
long-term	 effects,	 with	 outcomes	measured	 among	 individuals	 in	 the	 age	
range	of	28	to	60.	
Secondly,	 I	 exploit	 the	 variation	 in	 schooling	 that	 arises	 between	
individuals	of	varying	ages	(16-30).	Here	I	use	country-level	data,	comparing	
the	development	 in	 literacy	and	numeracy	with	 the	 increase	 in	 schooling,	
adjusted	for	the	effects	of	aging.	I	find	that	one	additional	year	of	schooling	
adds	0.05	standard	deviations	to	literacy	and	numeracy.	
As	 a	 last	 strategy,	 I	 carry	 out	 a	 ‘dose-response’	 analysis	 by	 comparing	
recently	 enrolled	 university	 students	 to	 those	 with	 a	 couple	 of	 years	 of	
university	experience.	I	find	only	small	differences	in	literacy	and	numeracy	
depending	on	university	experience.	Also,	the	trend	for	those	who	enroll	in	a	
university	 program	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 trend	 for	 those	 who	 move	 into	 the	
workforce	or	other	activities	after	completing	an	upper-secondary	degree.	
This	suggests	that	university	studies	has	small,	if	any,	effects	on	literacy	and	
numeracy.		
Even	 though	 the	 estimates	 from	 these	 strategies	 point	 in	 the	 same	
direction,	there	is	a	qualitative	difference	in	magnitudes	that	cannot	easily	
be	 explained	 away	 by	 chance	 variation.	While	 the	 instrumental	 variables	
                                                             
35 See the discussion by Weiss, 1995. 
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35 See the discussion by Weiss, 1995. 
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approach	suggests	a	sizeable	effect,	 the	country-level-	and	dose-response-
analyses	are	more	pessimistic.	As	these	strategies	exploit	different	kind	of	
variation	 in	 schooling,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 underlying	
effect	 is	 part	 of	 the	 explanation.	Also,	 since	 all	 strategies	 exploit	 observa-
tional	data,	they	are	open	to	critique	regarding	endogeneity.		
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3.2		BACKGROUND	AND	PREVIOUS	RESEARCH	
One	of	the	main	goals	of	education	is	for	students	to	develop	their	cognitive	
skills;	at	least	this	is	how	educational	reforms	are	often	evaluated.	So	how	
well	 is	 this	 goal	 accomplished?	 Several	 studies	 have	 measured	 the	
relationship	between	schooling	and	cognitive	performance,	 for	example	 in	
the	 form	 of	 IQ-scores.	 There	 is	 little	 doubt	 of	 a	 positive	 correlation	with	
Neisser	et	al.	 (1996)	putting	this	number	at	~0.55	based	on	the	 literature	
overall.	It	is	unclear,	however,	to	what	degree	schooling	actually	contributes	
to	cognitive	performance.	In	order	to	measure	this	effect,	researchers	mainly	
face	two	empirical	challenges.	When	using	data	for	children	and	adolescents,	
schooling	is	perfectly	correlated	with	age,	making	it	difficult	to	distinguish	
between	 the	 two.36	When	 using	 data	 for	 adults,	 self-selection	 into	 higher	
education	makes	it	difficult	to	separate	the	effect	of	pre-determined	ability	
from	the	schooling-effect.	Several	recent	studies	have	attempted	to	address	
these	issues	by	exploiting	arguably	more	exogenous	sources	of	variation	in	
schooling,	such	as	the	variation	induced	by	educational	reforms37	(Banks	&	
Mazzonna,	2012;	Brinch	&	Galloway,	2012;	Glymour	et	al.,	2008;	Meghir	et	
al.,	2013;	Schneeweiss	et	al.	2014),	by	school	entrance	cutoff	dates38	(Cascio	
                                                             
36 Alternatively, age is perfectly correlated with season of birth for students at the same grade level. 
Steltzl et al. (1995) measure the effect of schooling on IQ using ten year olds in the third and fourth 
grade, under the implicit assumption that season of birth has no influence on cognitive skills. They 
find that one additional year of schooling raises IQ-scores by 0.6 standard deviations. A similar 
approach was also used by Cahan & Cohen (1989).  
37 Glymour et al. (2008) exploit changes in the state-specific compulsory schooling laws during 
1907-1961, and measure the effects on memory and mental status at an old age. They find a large 
effect (0.34 standard deviations) on memory; the effect on mental status is unclear due to large 
error bounds. The sample is restricted to white (non-Hispanic) Americans without a college 
degree that were born in 1900-1947. Banks and Mazzonna (2012) exploit the 1947 English 
educational reform which increased the minimum school-leaving age from 14 to 15 years. They 
find profound effects on late life cognition (memory and executive functioning) roughly equaling 
half a standard deviation. Brinch and Galloway (2012) uses a Norwegian primary school reform as 
an instrument for schooling. They find that one year of schooling increases IQ by 3.7 points 
(roughly 0.25 standard deviations). Meghir et al. (2013) find that the Swedish school reform that 
was introduced successively during 1949 to 1962, increased schooling by 0.23 years on average 
and cognitive skills by 0.07-0.15 standard deviations. The outcome was measured among 18 year 
old men. Using the reform as an instrument, one year of schooling translates into an increase in 
cognitive skills by 0.32-0.40 standard deviations for men to poorly educated fathers. However, 
the authors stress that this interpretation of the data could be misleading, as the reform 
transformed both the quantity and quality of schooling. Schneeweiss et al. (2014) exploit several 
European primary school reforms as an instrument for schooling. They use four different outcome 
measures (memory, fluency, numeracy and orientation-to-date) and measure effects among 60 
year olds. They find that one additional year of schooling adds 0.1 standard deviations to memory, 
but find no significant effects on other outcomes. 
38 Leuven et al. (2004) find that one additional month of potential schooling increases test scores 
(language, math) by 0.06 standard deviations among disadvantaged children in the 2nd grade. 
They find no significant effects among non-disadvantaged children. (Note that this is ‘potential 
schooling’ as opposed to actual schooling, meaning that the actual effect is likely to be larger if 
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year olds. They find that one additional year of schooling adds 0.1 standard deviations to memory, 
but find no significant effects on other outcomes. 
38 Leuven et al. (2004) find that one additional month of potential schooling increases test scores 
(language, math) by 0.06 standard deviations among disadvantaged children in the 2nd grade. 
They find no significant effects among non-disadvantaged children. (Note that this is ‘potential 
schooling’ as opposed to actual schooling, meaning that the actual effect is likely to be larger if 
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and	Lewis,	2006;	Leuven	et	al.,	2004),	by	conditioning	on	earlier	test-scores39	
(Falch	&	Sandgren	Massih,	2011;	Ritchie	et	al.,	2013;	Winship	&	Korenman,	
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Ritchie	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 measure	 the	 effect	 on	 IQ	 by	
conditioning	on	childhood	IQ-scores;	they	find	comparatively	modest	effect	
sizes	 at	 0.16	 and	 0.06	 standard	 deviations	 (for	 70	 and	 79	 year	 olds,	
respectively).42		
                                                             
anything.) Cascio & Lewis (2006) find that one additional year of high school increases the Armed 
Forces Qualifying Test scores by 0.31-0.32 standard deviations among minority groups (Blacks 
and Hispanics); the effect for non-Hispanic whites is unclear. This study uses data from several 
states with varying school-entry cutoff dates, making it possible to control for season of birth.  
39 Winship & Korenman (1997) find that one additional year of schooling raises IQ-scores by 2.7 
points (best guess 2-4 points) when holding early IQ-scores constant. Falch & Sandgren Massih 
(2011) find that one additional year of schooling increases IQ-scores at the age of 20 by roughly 
0.2 standard deviations, when holding IQ at age 10 constant. Ritchie et al. (2013) find that one 
additional year of schooling increases IQ-scores at age 70 by 1.4 points (0.16 standard deviations) 
and at age 79 by 0.7 points (0.06 standard deviations), when holding IQ at age 11 constant. (The 
translation into standard deviations is my own, based on the standard deviations in the two 
samples.) They find no effects of schooling on late life processing speed. 
40 Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) find that one additional year of schooling increases test scores (reading, 
math) by one standard deviation for children in kindergarten and first grade (this is their 
conservative estimate). Carlsson et al. (2012) use data for 18 year old Swedish males, where the 
test date for army entrance is conditionally random. They find that 180 days (1 year) of schooling 
adds roughly 0.2 standard deviations to your cognitive skills. 
41 Hansen et al. (2004) find that one additional year of schooling adds 2-4 percentage points to 
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (0.16-0.19 standard deviations). This effect is somewhat larger 
for lower latent ability levels. 
42 The conversion of the effect sizes into standard deviations is my own, based on the stated 
standard deviations for each sample. The raw effects are 1.4 and 0.7 points for 70 and 79 year 
olds, respectively. 
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These	studies	illustrate	that	there	is	little	agreement	on	the	magnitude	of	the	
schooling-effect	 in	 the	 medium-	 to	 long-term,	 and	 to	 my	 knowledge,	 no	
studies	have	 looked	specifically	at	 the	effects	of	post-secondary	schooling.	
There	are	reasons	to	suspect	that	these	distinctions	are	of	importance.	In	the	
pessimistic	scenario,	the	cognitive	returns	to	education	are	short	lived,	with	
individuals	regressing	towards	a	default	path	in	the	years	following	gradua-
tion.	For	example,	several	studies	have	shown	that	achievement	test	scores	
tend	to	fall	over	the	summer	vacation43,	suggesting	that	some	cognitive	gains	
are	temporary.	In	the	optimistic	scenario,	on	the	other	hand,	the	cognitive	
returns	 to	 education	 are	 amplified	 over	 time,	 for	 example	 due	 to	 further	
effects	on	career	and	lifestyle	choices.44		
There	are	also	reason	to	suspect	that	the	cognitive	returns	to	schooling	
might	differ	depending	on	educational	 level.	 Common	sense	 suggests	 that	
elementary	 schools	 –	 teaching	 core	 abilities	 such	 as	 reading,	 writing	 and	
basic	math	 –	 enhance	 cognitive	 skills	 at	 least	 in	 some	 sense.	 This	 is	 less	
obviously	true	for	secondary	schools,	and	even	less	so	for	colleges	and	uni-
versities	 which	 typically	 teach	 comparatively	 narrowly	 oriented	 subjects.	
Also,	a	couple	of	authors	have	suggested	that	your	intelligence	is	more	or	less	
set	by	 the	 time	you	 reach	adulthood	 (or	 even	much	earlier)	which	would	
suggest	 that	 the	opportunities	 to	enhance	your	cognitive	skills	are	 limited	
thereafter.45		
In	comparison	to	the	current	literature,	I	exploit	new	sources	of	variation	
in	schooling	and	measure	both	immediate,	medium-	and	long-term	effects.	
Furthermore,	these	data	allow	me	to	exploit	variation	in	schooling	at	both	
the	 upper-secondary	 and	 tertiary	 levels.	 There	 are	 also	 some	 important	
limitations	 to	 this	 study.	 The	 IV-approach	 is	 only	 as	 good	 as	 the	 chosen	
instrument,	and	there	is	reason	to	suspect	that	your	cohort	size	could	affect	
both	 the	 quantity	 and	 quality	 of	 education.	 The	 country-level-	 and	 dose-
response-analyses,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 open	 to	 critique	 regarding	
confounding	cohort-effects	and	measurement	errors	in	schooling.	
                                                             
43 See the review by Cooper et al., 1996. 
44 See Oreopoulus & Salvanes (2009) for lifetime effects of education on a range of outcome 
variables, such as work satisfaction, unemployment, health, marriage and parenting decisions, 
patience and risk behavior. 
45 See, for example, Jensen (1969).  
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3.3		DATA	AND	DESCRIPTIVE	STATISTICS	
I	use	PIAAC	survey	data	that	has	been	collected	and	compiled	by	OECD.	My	
main	sample	covers	roughly	77,000	adults	 in	25	countries46	and	has	been	
collected	during	2010-2015	using	personal	house	interviews.	The	variables	
of	central	interest	are	those	describing	the	respondents’	cognitive	abilities.	
Here	 I	 use	 two	different	measures	 –	 literacy	 and	numeracy	 –	designed	 to	
capture	your	ability	to	interpret	text-based	and	mathematical	information.	
See	chapter	1	for	a	description.	
My	 first	 identification	 strategy	 relies	 on	 exploiting	 variations	 in	 the	
national	 yearly	 cohort	 sizes	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 schooling.	To	 this	 end,	 I	
make	the	following	restrictions	on	the	sample:	Each	individual	included	was	
born	in	1955	or	later,	and	no	one	was	younger	than	28	years	old	at	the	time	
when	 the	 survey	 was	 conducted.	 I	 exclude	 older	 individuals	 as	 the	
instrument	 is	 not	 available	 for	 those	 born	 in	 1954	 or	 earlier;	 I	 exclude	
younger	 individuals	 as	 they	 may	 not	 have	 yet	 reached	 their	 highest	
educational	 degree.	 Also,	 I	 exclude	 anyone	 with	 missing	 values	 on	 key	
variables47	or	inconsistencies	in	their	year	of	birth48.	Also,	I	generally	exclude	
immigrants,	 unless	 they	 arrived	 early	 enough	 as	 to	 go	 through	 the	whole	
educational	 system	 in	 the	 receiving	 country	 (arriving	 at	 the	 age	 of	 0-5	
years).49	 I	 include	 individuals	 with	 missing	 values	 on	 other	 background	
characteristics,	 and	 code	 these	 accordingly.	This	 leaves	me	with	 a	 sample	
consisting	 of	 76,709	 individuals	whose	 characteristics	 are	 summarized	 in	
table	1	below.	Here,	all	means	are	weighted	as	to	account	for	the	country-
specific	survey	designs;	on	a	cross-country	level,	all	countries	are	weighted	
equally	according	to	the	full	sample	(76,709	obs.).		
                                                             
46 Belgium, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
47 Including age, gender, years of schooling, literacy, numeracy or year of birth. 
48 You have an inconsistency in ‘year of birth’ if your age (combined with your birth-year) would 
suggest that the survey took place in 2009 or earlier, or 2016 or later, i.e. outside the actual time 
frame. 
49 Including immigrants who arrived later weakens the instrument slightly, but has essentially no 
effect on the main estimates.  
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Table	1	 shows	 that	 those	with	 tertiary	degrees	outperform	 those	without	
such	a	degree;	 the	raw	difference	 is	0.83	and	0.82	standard	deviations	for	
literacy	 and	 numeracy,	 respectively.50	 There	 are,	 however,	 also	 other	
differences	between	the	groups:	Women	and	individuals	with	highly	educa-
ted	parents	 are	overrepresented	among	 those	with	 tertiary	degrees.	Also,	
those	with	 tertiary	degrees	 are	 on	 average	 younger.	 Table	2	presents	 the	
schooling-effect	adjusted	for	these	differences,	i.e.	controlling	for	gender,	age	
                                                             
50 The standard deviations for literacy and numeracy have been calculated using the full PIAAC 
sample (roughly 200,000 individuals) and within-country variation only, i.e. I estimate the 
(weighted) variances separately for each country; the standard deviation is the square root of the 
average variance.  
Table 1. Weighted means for the individual characteristics 
	 All Tertiary 
education 
Below 
tertiary 
Literacy (z-scorea) 0.082 0.61 -0.22 
Numeracy (z-scorea) 0.097 0.62 -0.20 
Female 0.50 0.54 0.48 
Age 42.2 40.7 43.0 
Schooling (years) 12.7 15.8 10.9 
  Mother’s educationb 
Low 
 
0.57 
 
0.39 
 
0.67 
Medium 0.29 0.37 0.25 
High 
Missing 
0.12 
0.020 
0.23 
0.010 
0.055 
0.025 
  Father’s educationb 
Low 
 
0.49 
 
0.32 
 
0.59 
Medium 0.32 0.36 0.29 
High 
Missing 
0.15 
0.040 
0.30 
0.020 
0.071 
0.049 
  Immigration status 
Non-immigrant 
 
0.90 
 
0.89 
 
0.91 
Immigrant 
Missing 
0.0094 
0.091 
0.0097 
0.10 
0.0092 
0.081 
Observations 76,709 29,479 47,230 
Notes: The averages are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; on 
a cross-country level all countries are weighted equally according to the sample “All” 
(76,709 obs.). a z-scores are estimated using the full public sample of 16-65 year olds 
(roughly 200,000 individuals) with standard deviations estimated using within-country 
variation only. b Educational degrees: Low = Lower secondary school, primary school or less. 
Medium = Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary degree. High = Tertiary 
degree.  
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(using	 a	 second-degree	 polynomial),	 the	 mother’s	 and	 father’s	 education	
levels,	immigration	background	and	country	of	residence.	
		
	
Table 2. The effect of schooling on literacy and numeracy (WLS-
regressions)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Literacy 
(z-score) 
Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Schooling (years) 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0015) 
Observations 76,709 76,709 76,709 76,709 
R-squared (overall) 0.234 0.357 0.248 0.383 
Notes: (1) & (3) Includes no controls, (2) & (4) Controls included for gender, age (using a 
second degree polynomial), parental education levels, immigration status and country of 
residence. All observations are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; 
on a cross-country level all countries are weighted equally. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and further adjusted for the imputation 
variance induced by using plausible values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table	2	 shows	 that	one	additional	 year	of	 schooling	 is	 associated	with	an	
increase	 in	 literacy	 and	numeracy	by	0.16	 standard	deviations	 (see	 (1)	&	
(3)).	 This	 effect	 is	 partly	 explainable	 by	 differences	 in	 background	
characteristics:	After	adding	controls,	 the	estimates	drop	 to	0.12	and	0.13	
standard	deviations	for	literacy	and	numeracy,	respectively	(see	(2)	&	(4)).	
These	 effects	 are	 of	 similar	 magnitude	 for	 men	 and	 women51	 and	 over	
different	age	groups52	(not	presented	in	table	2).		
Note	 that	 these	 estimates	 cannot	 be	 interpreted	 as	 causal	 effects.	 If	
anything,	I	would	expect	these	estimates	to	be	positively	biased,	as	I	have	not	
(fully)	 controlled	 for	 differences	 in	 pre-determined	 ability.	 In	 the	 next	
section,	 I	 turn	 to	 the	 instrumental	 variables	 approach	 in	 order	 to	 exploit	
presumably	more	exogenous	sources	of	variations	in	schooling.	
                                                             
51 For women, one additional year of schooling is associated with an increase in literacy by 0.12 
standard deviations and in numeracy by 0.13 standard deviations (after adjusting for differences in 
background characteristics). The corresponding effects for men are 0.13 and 0.14 standard 
deviations. 
52 One additional year of schooling is associated with an increase in numeracy by 0.13 standard 
deviations (for 28-37 year olds); by 0.14 standard deviations (for 38-47 year olds), and by 0.14 
standard deviations (for 48-60 year olds).  
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3.4		THE	INSTRUMENTAL	VARIABLES	APPROACH	
In	this	section,	I	use	the	relative	cohort	size	as	an	instrument	for	schooling.	I	
find	 that	one	year	of	 schooling	adds	0.22	and	0.27	 standard	deviations	 to	
literacy	and	numeracy,	respectively	(95	%	confidence	interval:	0.14-0.30	for	
literacy	and	0.19-0.35	for	numeracy).	These	are	rather	large	effects:	An	effect	
at	 0.22	 standard	 deviations	 is	 comparable	 to	 an	 average	 increase	 by	 6	
percentile	 points.	 Similarly,	 0.27	 standard	 deviations	 translates	 into	 an	
average	increase	by	8	percentile	points.53	
3.4.1	The	model	
The	instrument	is	your	relative	cohort	size.	This	is	measured	as	the	deviation	
in	the	number	of	births	in	a	given	year	from	the	average	based	on	the	five	
previous	years.54	The	number	of	births	are	measured	on	a	logarithmic	scale	
(the	natural	logarithm):			
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟	𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟	𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟÷ç = ln(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑠𝑠÷ç) −
1
5
≤ln	(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑠𝑠÷(ç>b))
è
bÇ?
	
where	c	is	a	country	index	and	t	is	indexing	year	of	birth,	t	=	1955,	1956,	….,	
1987.	 Example:	 If	 the	 relative	 cohort	 size	 is	 0.01	 then	 that	 cohort	 is,	 on	
average,	 one	 percent	 larger	 than	 the	 cohorts	 in	 the	 five	 previous	 years.55	
Figure	1	below	shows	the	development	in	relative	cohort	sizes	separately	by	
country	and	overall.	Typically,	a	cohort	deviates	from	the	moving	average	by	
no	 more	 than	 plus/minus	 15	 percent.	 South	 Korea	 is	 the	 outlier,	 having	
exceptionally	large	cohort	sizes	in	the	years	following	the	Korean	war.	
                                                             
53 The ‘average percentile rank effect’ (APE) is given by: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
 
assuming that literacy and numeracy are normally distributed. Example: For literacy, the average 
percentile rank effect is 0.22/(2√𝜋𝜋) ≈ 0.06. For reference, see chapter 2, section 5. 
54 Data source: UN population division, World Population Prospects 2015.  
55 This interpretation is approximate: it would be accurate if the past five cohorts were all equally 
large.  
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country	and	overall.	Typically,	a	cohort	deviates	from	the	moving	average	by	
no	 more	 than	 plus/minus	 15	 percent.	 South	 Korea	 is	 the	 outlier,	 having	
exceptionally	large	cohort	sizes	in	the	years	following	the	Korean	war.	
                                                             
53 The ‘average percentile rank effect’ (APE) is given by: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
 
assuming that literacy and numeracy are normally distributed. Example: For literacy, the average 
percentile rank effect is 0.22/(2√𝜋𝜋) ≈ 0.06. For reference, see chapter 2, section 5. 
54 Data source: UN population division, World Population Prospects 2015.  
55 This interpretation is approximate: it would be accurate if the past five cohorts were all equally 
large.  
57
57 
 
	
Figure 1. Deviation in the number of births from five year moving 
average – by country and overall 
Notes: The deviation is measured on a logarithmic scale. Solid line represents 
the overall development; the dotted lines are the country-specific trends. 
		
If	you	are	born	in	a	year	when	the	cohort	is	large	in	comparison	to	previous	
years,	that	would	make	entry	into	higher	education	less	probable,	assuming	
that	the	supply	of	college	and	university	spots	is	fixed	in	the	short	run.	This	
pattern	 is	 also	visible	 in	 the	data,	 as	 illustrated	 in	 figure	2.	Here	 I	predict	
years	of	schooling	as	a	function	of	your	relative	cohort	size	divided	into	six	
quantile	 groups;	 I	 rely	 on	 within-country	 and	within-birth-year	 variation	
only.	Among	those	belonging	to	the	smallest	cohorts,	38.2	percent	attain	a	
tertiary	 degree	 and	 the	 average	 education	 is	 12.8	 years;	 among	 those	
belonging	 to	 the	 largest	 cohorts,	 the	 corresponding	 numbers	 are	 35.1	
percent	and	12.6	years.56		
                                                             
56 Here, the largest cohorts (the 6th quantile group) are, on average, 7 percent above the five-year 
average; the smallest cohorts (the 1st quantile group) are 9 percent below the five-year average. 
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Figure 2. The relationship between the relative cohort size and 
schooling  
Notes: Years of schooling is estimated as a function of your relative cohort size 
using within-country and within-birth-year variation only. The relative cohort size 
is divided into six quantile groups. The x-axis displays the average relative cohort 
size in that quantile group. 
The	relative	cohort	size	is	a	valid	instrument	for	schooling	if	any	differences	
in	skill	performance	between	individuals	from	large	and	small	cohorts	can	
be	attributed	to	educational	differences	alone.	If,	for	example,	relative	cohort	
sizes	tend	to	be	larger	among	individuals	born	in	the	1960s	as	compared	to	
those	born	 in	 the	80s,	 that	 could	 invalidate	 the	 instrument	unless	year	of	
birth	is	appropriately	controlled	for.	Similarly,	if	baby	booms	tend	to	go	hand	
in	 hand	with	 economic	 upturns,	 that	 could	 also	 invalidate	 the	 instrument	
unless	the	economic	environment	at	birth	is	appropriately	controlled	for.57	
Here,	I	specify	the	reduced	form	equation58	in	the	following	way:	
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐÷çb = 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑧𝑧𝑒𝑒÷ç + 𝜗𝜗𝑋𝑋÷çb + 𝑍𝑍÷ç + 𝜀𝜀÷çb 	
                                                             
57 A couple of studies have described procyclical movements in birthrates: see, for example, 
Sobotka et al. (2011), Hofmann & Hohmeyer (2012) and Goldstein et al., (2013). This correlation is 
also present in this data set. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the economic environment 
at birth has effects on future outcomes, with recessions correlating with worse cognitive 
performance late in life (Doblhammer et al., 2013).  
58 The reduced form equation models the outcome (literacy/numeracy) as a function of the 
instrument (relative cohort size) and other covariates. The first stage equation models the 
independent variable of interest (schooling) as a function of the instrument and other covariates 
(i.e. the same set as in the reduced form equation). The two-stage-least squares estimate is given 
by the ratio between the reduced form and first stage estimates (𝛽𝛽vÜ€‹›÷€‹	fiáÜ^/𝛽𝛽vfibÜflç	flç_‡€) where 
β is the coefficient for the instrument. 
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where	c	 is	a	country	index	(c	=	1,	2,	…,	25);	t	 is	 indexing	year	of	birth	(t	=	
1955,	1956,	…,	1987)	and	 i	 is	 indexing	individuals.	The	outcome,	𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐÷çb ,	 is	
either	 literacy	or	numeracy;	𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠÷ç	 is	 the	 relative	 cohort	 size	and	𝑋𝑋÷çb 	 is	 a	
vector	of	background	characteristics	including	gender,	age	(and	a	quadratic	
polynomial	in	age),	parental	education	levels,	and	immigration	background	
(see	 table	 1);	 𝜀𝜀÷çb 	 is	 an	 individual-specific	 error	 term.	 The	 variable	 𝑍𝑍÷ç	
captures	the	effect	of	being	born	in	year	t	and	residing	in	country	c.	I	mainly	
consider	the	following	model	for	𝑍𝑍÷ç:	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿÷ + 𝜏𝜏ç + 𝜃𝜃?𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝜃𝜃5𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	
where	𝛿𝛿÷ 	 represents	 country-specific	 fixed	 intercepts	 and	𝜏𝜏ç	 captures	 any	
general	cohort	effects.	I	also	control	for	the	macroeconomic	environment	at	
birth	as	measured	by	GDP	per	capita	(𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç)	and	the	GDP	gap	(𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç),	
i.e.	the	deviation	from	potential	GDP	per	capita.	The	trend	in	potential	GDP	is	
estimated	from	data	separately	for	each	country	using	the	Hodrick-Prescott	
filter.59	Both	GDP-variables	are	measured	in	real	numbers	using	logarithmic	
scales.	 𝑢𝑢÷ç	 is	 the	 error	 term	 specific	 to	 that	 country	 and	 cohort.	 In	 the	
robustness	section	I	also	consider	alternative	specifications	for	𝑍𝑍÷ç .	
All	estimates	are	weighted	as	to	account	for	the	country	specific	survey	
designs;	on	a	cross-country	 level,	all	countries	are	weighted	equally.	Stan-
dard	errors	are	estimated	using	jackknife	replicate	sampling	weights.	In	the	
reduced-form	and	 instrumental	variables	regressions	 I	 further	correct	 the	
standard	errors	for	the	imputation	variance	added	by	using	plausible	values.	
3.4.2	Main	results	
I	find	that	the	relative	cohort	size	has	a	significant	effect	on	schooling:	when	
the	relative	cohort	size	increases	by	ten	percent,	schooling	decreases	by	0.2	
years	on	average.60	This	is	the	first	stage	estimate,	also	presented	in	table	3.	
The	relative	cohort	size	is	a	strong	instrument,	with	an	F-value	(df	=	1,	79)	at	
105.6.61	Furthermore,	every	ten	percent	increase	in	the	relative	cohort	size	
leads	to	a	decrease	in	literacy	by	0.045	standard	deviations	and	in	numeracy	
by	0.055	standard	deviations.62	These	are	the	reduced	form	estimates,	also	
presented	in	table	3.	Both	effects	are	significant	(p	<	0.01).	
	
	
                                                             
59 Data source (GDP): Penn World Tables. 
60 (−2.12) ∙ ln(1.1) ≈ −0.2. 
61 Following the rule of thumb (F > 10) as suggested by Stock & Yogo (2002). 
62 (−0.47) ∙ ln	(1.1) ≈ −0.045; (−0.58) ∙ ln	(1.1) ≈ −0.055.  
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Taken	together,	we	have	that	a	 ten	percent	 increase	 in	the	relative	cohort	
size	decreases	schooling	by	0.2	years,	literacy	by	0.045	standard	deviations	
and	numeracy	by	0.053	standard	deviations.	Thus,	one	full	year	of	schooling	
is	translated	into	an	increase	in	literacy	by	0.22	standard	deviations	and	in	
numeracy	by	0.27	standard	deviations	(95	%	CI:	0.14-0.30	for	literacy	and	
0.19-0.35	 for	 numeracy).	 These	 are	 the	 instrumental	 variables	 estimates,	
also	presented	 in	 table	4.	The	 schooling-effect	 is	 of	 similar	magnitude	 for	
men	and	women.	
From	a	practical	point	of	view,	these	effects	are	rather	large:	Adding	one	
year	 of	 schooling	 to	 your	 education	 is	 comparable	 to	 a	movement	 up	 the	
numeracy	 distribution	 by	 8	 percentile	 points.	 Previous	 research	 suggests	
that	cognitive	gains	of	these	magnitudes	also	have	effects	on	wages:	Adding	
0.27	 standard	 deviations	 to	 your	 numeracy	 score	 is	 associated	 with	 an	
increase	in	hourly	wages	by	roughly	3	percent.	This	figure	is	based	on	the	
pooled	estimate	in	Hanushek	et	al.	(2015)	where	a	one	standard	deviation	
increase	 in	numeracy	corresponds	 to	an	 increase	 in	hourly	wages	by	10.7	
percent	when	holding	work	experience,	gender	and	schooling	constant.	
	
Table 3. First stage and reduced form regressions  
 Schooling 
(years) 
Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Relative cohort size -2.12*** -0.47*** -0.58*** 
 (0.21) (0.090) (0.089) 
Observations 76,709 76,709 76,709 
R-squared (overall) 
F-value (1, 79) 
0.303 
105.6 
0.256 
- 
0.261 
- 
Notes: Relative cohort size measures the number of births in the year you were born in 
comparison to an average based on the five previous years, where the number of births is 
measured on a logarithmic scale. All regressions control for gender, age (using a second-
degree polynomial), parental education levels and immigration background, as well as the 
effects of being born in country c in year t, as modeled by Z. All regressions are weighted as 
to account for the country specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all countries are 
weighted equally. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate 
sampling weights and further adjusted for the imputation variance in the reduced form 
regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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How	lasting	is	the	cognitive	effect	of	schooling?	One	possibility	is	that	this	
effect	is	amplified	with	age,	for	example	due	to	further	effects	on	career	paths	
and	other	life-style	choices.	Another	possibility	is	that	the	process	of	aging	
triumphs	in	the	long-run,	making	individuals	regress	towards	a	default	path.	
Naturally,	 there	 is	 also	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 middle-ground,	 where	 the	
educational	gains	are	preserved	more	or	less	unchanged	with	age.	In	order	
to	discriminate	between	these	possibilities,	I	instrument	schooling	as	well	as	
schooling	interacted	with	age	and	age	squared.63	The	estimates	suggest	that	
the	cognitive	effect	increases	at	a	diminishing	rate,	peaking	around	age	50.64	
See	the	Appendix	(section	A.1	Heterogeneity)	for	the	estimates.		
From	a	policy	perspective,	it	is	of	special	interest	to	recognize	potential	
heterogeneity	 in	 effects	with	 regard	 to	 social	 background.	 If	 the	 cognitive	
returns	to	education	are	especially	high	in	some	socioeconomic	groups,	then	
that	 could	 warrant	 for	 targeted	 policies.	 However,	 I	 find	 no	 evidence	 of	
differential	effects	depending	on	parental	education	levels	(see	table	A1	in	
the	 Appendix).	 The	 error	 margins	 are	 wide,	 however,	 leaving	 room	 for	
interpretations.	
                                                             
63 The instrument is given by your relative cohort size, as well as your relative cohort size interacted 
with age and age squared. 
64 At the age of 30, the cognitive gain of schooling is insignificant at -0.02 standard deviations (se 
= 0.42). At the age 40, this effect has grown to 0.21 standard deviations (se = 0.23); at 50 the 
effect is 0.27 standard deviations (se = 0.049) and at 60 0.16 standard deviations (se = 0.20). 
Table 4. The effect of schooling on literacy and numeracy (IV-estimates) 
All Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Schooling (years) 0.22*** 0.27*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Observations 76,709 76,709 
By gender Numeracy 
Women 
Numeracy 
Men 
Schooling (years) 0.26*** 0.28*** 
 (0.047) (0.060) 
Observations 
F-value (first stage) 
40,863 
49.5 
35,846 
50.3 
Notes: Both regressions control for gender, age (age, age2), parental education levels and 
immigration background, as well as the effects of living in country c and being born in year t, 
as modeled by Z. All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific survey 
designs; on a cross-country level all nations are weighted equally. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and further adjusted for 
the imputation variance.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.3	Robustness	and	validity	
The	estimates	are	robust	between	different	variants:	The	results	do	not	hinge	
upon	 including	or	excluding	South	Korea65,	or	upon	 the	details	on	how	 to	
measure	 ‘relative	 cohort	 sizes’66.	 I	 also	experiment	with	using	 two	 instru-
ments	(the	relative	cohort	size	&	the	relative	cohort	size	squared)	as	sugges-
ted	 by	 Dieterle	 &	 Snell	 (2016)	 as	 a	 test	 of	 validity;	 this	 leaves	 the	 main	
estimate	unchanged.		
Of	 special	 interest	 for	 the	 identification	 is	 the	 function	 describing	 𝑍𝑍÷ç	
which	 captures	 the	 country	 and	 cohort	 effects.	 I	 experiment	 with	 the	
following	four	alternative	specifications:	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿÷ + 𝜏𝜏ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	 (i)	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿÷ + 𝜏𝜏Dç + 𝜏𝜏?ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝜏𝜏5ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	 (ii)	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿D÷ + 𝜏𝜏Dç + 𝜏𝜏?ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝜏𝜏5ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç
+ 𝛿𝛿?÷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝛿𝛿5÷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	
(iii)	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿÷ + 𝛾𝛾÷𝑡𝑡ç + 𝜃𝜃?𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝜃𝜃5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	
	
(iv)	
(i)	Here,	 I	only	control	 for	country	of	residence	(𝛿𝛿÷)	and	year	of	birth	(𝜏𝜏ç)	
where	𝑢𝑢÷ç	 represents	 the	 country-	 and	 cohort-specific	 error.	 This	 specifi-
cation	differs	from	the	main	specification	only	in	that	I	exclude	controls	for	
the	economic	environment	at	birth.	
(ii)	Here	I	build	on	the	main	specification,	but	also	allow	for	the	cohort	effects	
to	vary	by	the	economic	environment	at	birth.	In	other	words,	the	effect	of	
being	born	in,	say,	1960	is	now	allowed	to	differ	between	countries	that	were	
                                                             
65 South Korea is of special interest here due to the peculiar trend in relative cohort sizes after the 
Korean war (see figure 1). Excluding South Korea increases the effect on numeracy from 0.27 to 
0.31 standard deviations. 
66 I experiment with measuring the ‘relative cohort size’ as the deviation in the number of births in a 
given year from a weighted average based on the five previous years: 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟	𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡	𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟÷ç = ln(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠÷ç) −≤
6− 𝑟𝑟
15
ln	(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠÷(ç>b))
è
bÇ?
 
where c is a country index and t is indexing year of birth, t = 1955, 1956, …., 1987. This leaves the 
estimate practically unchanged. Furthermore, exploiting the last ten years (as opposed to five 
years) makes no qualitative difference (the effect increases from 0.27 to 0.35). I also experiment 
with calculating the relative cohort size as a log deviation from the hodrick-prescott trend. Here, 
the instrument was too weak for any robust inference. 
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estimate	unchanged.		
Of	 special	 interest	 for	 the	 identification	 is	 the	 function	 describing	 𝑍𝑍÷ç	
which	 captures	 the	 country	 and	 cohort	 effects.	 I	 experiment	 with	 the	
following	four	alternative	specifications:	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿÷ + 𝜏𝜏ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	 (i)	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿÷ + 𝜏𝜏Dç + 𝜏𝜏?ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝜏𝜏5ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	 (ii)	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿D÷ + 𝜏𝜏Dç + 𝜏𝜏?ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝜏𝜏5ç𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç
+ 𝛿𝛿?÷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝛿𝛿5÷𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	
(iii)	
	
𝑍𝑍÷ç = 𝛿𝛿÷ + 𝛾𝛾÷𝑡𝑡ç + 𝜃𝜃?𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝜃𝜃5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙÷ç + 𝑢𝑢÷ç	
	
(iv)	
(i)	Here,	 I	only	control	 for	country	of	residence	(𝛿𝛿÷)	and	year	of	birth	(𝜏𝜏ç)	
where	𝑢𝑢÷ç	 represents	 the	 country-	 and	 cohort-specific	 error.	 This	 specifi-
cation	differs	from	the	main	specification	only	in	that	I	exclude	controls	for	
the	economic	environment	at	birth.	
(ii)	Here	I	build	on	the	main	specification,	but	also	allow	for	the	cohort	effects	
to	vary	by	the	economic	environment	at	birth.	In	other	words,	the	effect	of	
being	born	in,	say,	1960	is	now	allowed	to	differ	between	countries	that	were	
                                                             
65 South Korea is of special interest here due to the peculiar trend in relative cohort sizes after the 
Korean war (see figure 1). Excluding South Korea increases the effect on numeracy from 0.27 to 
0.31 standard deviations. 
66 I experiment with measuring the ‘relative cohort size’ as the deviation in the number of births in a 
given year from a weighted average based on the five previous years: 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟	𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡	𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟÷ç = ln(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠÷ç) −≤
6− 𝑟𝑟
15
ln	(𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠÷(ç>b))
è
bÇ?
 
where c is a country index and t is indexing year of birth, t = 1955, 1956, …., 1987. This leaves the 
estimate practically unchanged. Furthermore, exploiting the last ten years (as opposed to five 
years) makes no qualitative difference (the effect increases from 0.27 to 0.35). I also experiment 
with calculating the relative cohort size as a log deviation from the hodrick-prescott trend. Here, 
the instrument was too weak for any robust inference. 
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rich	 and	 poor	 at	 the	 time,	 and	 between	 countries	 that	were	 in	 economic	
upturns	and	downturns	at	the	time.	These	effects	are	captured	by	the	vectors	
𝜏𝜏?ç	and	𝜏𝜏5ç;	𝜏𝜏Dç	is	a	vector	of	parameters	setting	the	level	for	each	cohort.	
(iii)	Here	I	further	allow	for	the	effects	of	the	economic	environment	at	birth	
to	vary	by	country.	For	example:	The	effect	of	being	born	in	a	recession	is	
now	allowed	to	differ	between,	say,	Finland	and	Turkey.	These	effects	are	
captured	by	the	vectors	𝛿𝛿?÷ 	and	𝛿𝛿5÷;	𝛿𝛿D÷ 	is	a	vector	of	parameters	setting	the	
level	for	each	country.			
(iv)	This	is	similar	to	the	main	specification,	but	here	I	replace	the	general	
cohort	effects	with	country-specific	linear	time	trends	in	year	of	birth	(𝛾𝛾÷𝑡𝑡ç).	
The	estimates	are	qualitatively	robust	between	these	specifications,	with	
the	effect	on	numeracy	varying	between	0.23	and	0.29	standard	deviations	
(see	table	5).	Table	5	also	presents	the	results	from	two	other	specifications	
where	I	experiment	with	excluding	different	sets	of	individual	characteris-
tics:	firstly	parental	education	levels	and	secondly,	the	full	set	of	individual	
characteristics	including	also	gender,	age	and	immigration	status.67	This	has	
practically	no	effect	on	the	estimate.		
Naturally,	 any	 tests	 of	 robustness	 can	 only	 include	 a	 small	 subset	 of	
possible	specifications.	The	estimated	gains	from	schooling	do	not	seem	to	
disappear	easily,	however.	Nevertheless,	there	is	room	for	interpretation	of	
this	 finding.	Note	that	the	 instrument	 is	valid	 if	 the	difference	 in	cognitive	
skills	between	individuals	from	small	and	large	cohorts	can	be	attributed	to	
educational	differences	alone.	It	is,	however,	possible	that	the	relative	cohort	
size	also	affects	other	aspects	of	your	upbringing	such	as	educational	quality.	
Most	importantly,	being	born	in	a	‘popular	year’	could	correlate	with	having	
many	classmates	which	potentially	affects	your	future	literacy	and	numeracy	
scores	negatively.68	In	other	words,	this	could	potentially	bias	the	estimates	
upwards,	 i.e.	 overstating	 the	 effect	 of	 education.	 At	 this	 point,	 it	 is	worth	
making	the	distinction	between	the	estimates	and	their	interpretation:	The	
data	shows	that	being	born	as	part	of	a	relatively	large	cohort	shows	up	as	
you	attaining	significantly	less	education	and	performing	significantly	worse	
on	 future	 literacy	 and	numeracy	 tests.	 The	 interpretative	part	 is	 that	 this	
drop	in	skills	is	brought	about	by	less	education.	
Also,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 even	 a	 valid	 instrument	 can	 only	 claim	 to	
estimate	the	so	called	‘local	average	treatment	effect’,	meaning	that	the	effect	
                                                             
67 Here I consistently use the main specification for Z. 
68 A couple of randomized trials, as well as natural experiments, support the hypothesis of class 
sizes having meaningful impacts on test performance, both immediately (see, for example, 
Mosteller, 1995 and Angrist & Levy, 1999) and in the long-run (see, for example, Fredriksson et al., 
2012).  
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is	identified	using	only	a	subsample	of	individuals,	i.e.	those	affected	by	the	
added	competition	of	being	part	of	a	larger	cohort.69	In	other	words,	the	most	
academically	motivated	 and	 gifted	 students	 are	 unlikely	 to	 contribute,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 academically	 unmotivated.	 If	 the	 effects	 of	 schooling	 are	
heterogeneous	 in	 this	 respect,	 then	 the	 instrumental	 variables	 estimate	
could	 be	 a	 poor	 estimate	 of	 the	 average	 treatment	 effect.	 From	 a	 policy	
perspective,	this	isn’t	necessarily	a	disadvantage:	The	students	influenced	by	
cohort	sizes	are	also	likely	to	be	the	students	first	gaining	access	to	higher	
education	if	admission	rates	were	to	increase	(or	losing	access	if	admission	
rates	were	to	fall).	These	data	also	indicate	who	this	‘marginal	student’	could	
be,	 i.e.	 someone	with	 relatively	 poorly	 educated	 parents:	 The	 instrument	
does	 not	 significantly	 predict	 schooling	 for	 those	 with	 highly	 educated	
parents;	dropping	this	group	has	practically	no	effect	on	the	estimates.		
			
                                                             
69 The ‘local average treatment effect’ is described by Imbens & Angrist (1994). 
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 Main (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Excluding Excluding 
 
 
     parental 
education 
all individual 
characteristics  
Schooling (years) 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.26** 0.28*** 0.29*** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.041) (0.082) (0.11) (0.053) (0.052) 
Observations 
F-value (first stage) 
76,709 
105.6 
76,709 
143.3 
76,709 
104.22 
76,709 
29.8 
76,709 
14.4 
76,709 
51.1 
76,709 
50.5 
Notes: ‘Main’, (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) use different specifications for Z (which captures the country- and cohort-specific effects). The last two columns use the main 
specification for Z but successively exclude sets of individual characteristics. All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; 
on a cross-country level all nations are weighted equally. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and adjusted 
for the imputation variance added by using plausible values.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5. The effect of schooling on numeracy using alternative specifications (IV-estimates) 
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3.5		A	COUNTRY-LEVEL	ANALYSIS	
In	this	section,	I	explore	an	alternative	identification	strategy:	I	measure	the	
effect	of	schooling	by	exploiting	the	variation	that	arises	between	cohorts	of	
young	adults	(going	from	the	age	of	16	to	30).	Here	I	use	country-level	data,	
comparing	the	development	 in	 literacy	and	numeracy	with	the	increase	in	
schooling,	adjusted	for	the	effect	of	aging.	I	find	that	one	additional	year	of	
schooling	adds	0.05	standard	deviations	to	literacy	and	numeracy.	
	
	
	
Figure 3a. The increase in schooling when comparing 16-18-year olds to 
28-30-year olds, and its relationship to the growth in numeracy (country-
level data)	
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Figure 3b. The increase in schooling when comparing one co-hort to 
the next, and its relationship to the growth in numeracy (country-level 
data). 
Note: One cohort consists of individuals of three ages: 16-18-year olds, 19-21- 
year olds, … and 28-30-year olds.		
Figure	 3a	 illustrates	 the	 change	 in	 schooling	when	 comparing	 16-18-year	
olds	to	those	in	the	age	range	of	28-30.	For	example,	Turks	add	roughly	three	
years	of	schooling	to	their	education	over	this	period,	while	Danes	add	more	
than	eight	years.	This	 increase	 in	schooling	 is	also	significantly	correlated	
with	the	growth	in	numeracy,	r	=	0.43	(p	<	0.05).	Figure	3b	illustrates	the	
same	relationship,	but	exploits	also	the	intervening	cohorts.	Hence,	the	x-axis	
illustrates	the	change	in	schooling	when	comparing	one	cohort	to	the	next;	
the	y-axis	illustrates	the	corresponding	change	in	numeracy.	Here,	a	‘cohort’	
is	three	years	long:	16-18-year	olds,	19-21-year	olds,	…	and	28-30-year	olds.	
The	 countries	where	 the	 increase	 in	 schooling	 is	 large	 –	 going	 	 from	 one	
cohort	 to	 the	 next	 –	 are	 also	 the	 ones	 experiencing	 large	 growths	 in	
numeracy,	r	=	0.52	(p	<	0.01).	This	is	especially	so	for	the	youngest	cohorts,	
r	 =	 0.59	 (p	 <	 0.01).	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 model	 and	 estimate	 this	
relationship	more	formally.	
3.5.1	The	model	
In	order	to	estimate	the	effect	of	schooling,	 I	measure	the	development	 in	
skills	within	countries	and	over	cohorts,	adjusted	for	the	effects	of	aging:	
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠÷_ = 𝛼𝛼÷ + 𝛼𝛼_ + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔÷_ + 𝜗𝜗𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝÷_ + 𝜀𝜀÷_	
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where	c	is	a	country	index	and	a	is	indexing	age	groups,	a	=	16-18,	19-21,	22-
24,	 25-27	 and	 28-30.	 The	 outcome,	 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠÷_ ,	 is	 either	 average	 literacy	 or	
average	numeracy;	𝛼𝛼÷ 	and	𝛼𝛼_	represent	country	and	age	group	fixed	effects;	
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜÷_	 is	 the	 average	 years	 of	 schooling	 and	 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝÷_	 is	 parental	
education	level,	measured	as	the	share	of	individuals	with	at	least	one	highly	
educated	 parent;	 𝜀𝜀÷_	 is	 the	 error	 term.	 All	 averages	 are	 weighted	 as	 to	
account	 for	 the	 country	 specific	 survey	 designs.	 I	 use	 heteroscedasticity-
robust	standard	errors	clustered	on	the	country	level.	
In	this	model,	𝛽𝛽	represents	the	causal	effect	of	schooling,	assuming	that	
the	differences	 in	 schooling	 from	one	 cohort	 to	 the	next	 are	uncorrelated	
with	 other	 changes	 that	 are	 of	 importance	 for	 skill	 development.	 For	
example:	Finns	at	the	age	of	16-18	have	10.5	years	of	schooling	on	average	
which	increases	to	13.0	years	at	the	age	of	19-21.	Here,	the	cohort	of	16-18-
year	olds	are	assumed	to	be	comparable	 to	 the	cohort	of	19-21-year	olds,	
after	adjusting	 for	 the	difference	 in	age	and	parental	education	 level.	This	
assumption	is	more	likely	to	hold	when	the	means	(such	as	average	years	of	
schooling	 among	 16-18-years	 olds	 in	 Finland)	 are	 based	 on	 large	 sample	
sizes,	so	that	the	variation	in	pre-determined	ability	on	the	individual	level	
cancels	 out	 on	 the	 cohort	 level.	 On	 average,	 I	 use	 355	 observations	 to	
calculate	one	such	mean	(min:	161;	max:	2086).	
3.5.2	Result	
I	find	that	one	additional	year	of	schooling	adds	0.05	standard	deviations	to	
literacy	and	numeracy.	The	estimates	are	presented	in	table	6,	where	the	first	
specification	 (1)	 controls	 for	 country	 of	 residence	 only;	 the	 second	 speci-
fication	 (2)	 adds	 cohort	 fixed	 effects	 and	 the	 third	 specification	 (3)	 adds	
parental	education	level.	The	table	shows	that	the	schooling-effect	is	rather	
robust	 to	 the	 inclusion	of	 these	controls,	 changing	by	no	more	 than	0.015	
standard	 deviations.	 These	 estimates	 support	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 higher	
education	 contributes	 to	 the	 development	 in	 literacy	 and	 numeracy.	 The	
effects	are	modest,	however,	especially	compared	 to	 the	 IV-estimates	(see	
section	4.2).	
Figure	3b	 above	hinted	 that	 the	 schooling-effect	might	 be	 rather	 small	
after	the	age	of	~18.	Dropping	the	youngest	cohort	(16-18	year	olds)	does	
pull	the	estimates	down	to	0.038	for	numeracy	and	0.029	for	literacy	(3),	but	
the	error	margins	are	too	wide	to	make	any	strong	conclusions.	
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3.5.3	Validity	and	bias	
There	 are	mainly	 two	 threats	 against	 validity.	 Firstly,	 the	model	 does	not	
control	for	differences	in	cohort-specific	factors	that	are	not	picked	up	by	age	
or	parental	education.	To	the	degree	such	cohort	effects	are	present,	these	
are	likely	to	bias	the	schooling-effect	upwards:	If	some	cohorts	have	higher	
pre-determined	ability	levels	than	others,	this	would	presumably	affect	both	
schooling	 and	 the	 skill	 outcomes	 positively.	 One	 central	 cause	 for	 such	
cohort-effects	is	that	individuals	differ	with	regard	to	pre-determined	ability.	
For	 finite	 cohort	 sizes,	 the	 variation	 in	 pre-determined	 ability	 on	 the	
individual	level	will	not	completely	cancel	out	on	the	cohort	level,	hence	it	is	
likely	to	be	picked	up	as	part	of	the	schooling-effect.		
What	can	we	say	regarding	the	size	of	this	bias?	Under	general	assump-
tions,	 it	will	be	smaller	 than	 the	corresponding	bias	using	 individual-level	
data,	 and	 it	 tends	 towards	 zero	 as	 the	 sample	 size	 on	 the	 group-level	
Table 6. The effect of average schooling on average literacy and 
numeracy (fixed effects regressions) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Literacy Literacy Literacy 
Schooling 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.045** 
 (0.0059) (0.018) (0.019) 
Par. education - - 0.24 
   (0.29) 
Cohort FE  No Yes Yes 
 
Observations 
 
125 
 
125 
 
125 
Countries 
R2 (within) 
25 
0.432 
25 
0.450 
25 
0.455 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Numeracy Numeracy Numeracy 
Schooling 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.050** 
 (0.0052) (0.019) (0.020) 
Par. education - - 0.30 
   (0.25) 
Cohort FE No Yes Yes 
 
Observations  
 
125 
 
125 
 
125 
Countries 
R2 (within) 
25 
0.615 
25 
0.621 
25 
0.628 
Notes: Schooling is the average number of years of schooling; Parental education is the share 
of individuals with at least one highly educated parent (tertiary degree). A ‘cohort’ is three 
years long (16-18, 19-21, …, 28-30). Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroscedasticity-
robust and clustered on the country level; all regressions include country fixed effects.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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increases.	(Here,	a	group	denotes	every	one	of	the	same	age	living	in	the	same	
country.)	To	see	this,	we	begin	by	describing	the	bias	on	the	individual	level.	
Assume	we	want	to	estimate	𝛽𝛽	as	defined	by	the	model:	
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼÷ + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 + 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 + 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 + 𝑛𝑛	
where	𝛼𝛼÷ 	represents	country-specific	intercepts	and	𝑛𝑛	is	the	individual	error	
term.	Schooling,	in	turn,	is	assumed	to	be	a	function	of	your	group	(𝛼𝛼‡)	and	
your	ability.	I	set	the	effect	of	ability	to	equal	unity	without	loss	of	generality:	
𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 = 𝛼𝛼‡ + 𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀	
Lacking	data	on	ability,	the	omitted-variable-bias	equals	𝛿𝛿𝛾𝛾,	where	𝛿𝛿	is	the	
conditional	effect	of	schooling	on	ability,	i.e.	conditional	on	age	and	country.	
This	effect	(𝛿𝛿)	can	be	described	as	the	ratio	between	the	conditional	variance	
for	ability	and	the	conditional	variance	for	schooling:	
𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽 = 𝛿𝛿𝛾𝛾 =
𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛|𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛, 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)
𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜|𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛, 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)
∙ 𝛾𝛾	 (1)	
assuming	 that	 𝛼𝛼‡	 does	 not	 correlate	 with	 ability	 conditional	 on	 age	 and	
country.	Example:	If	Finland	has	a	steeper	aging-trend	in	schooling	than	the	
United	Kingdom,	then	this	does	not	reflect	a	steeper	aging-trend	in	ability	
among	Finns.	I	derive	expression	(1)	in	the	Appendix	(A.4).	
Now,	turning	to	group-level	data,	the	corresponding	bias	becomes:	
𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽„ = 𝛿𝛿„𝛾𝛾 =
𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ|𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛, 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)
𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜|ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛, 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)
∙ 𝛾𝛾	
where	𝛿𝛿′	is	the	effect	of	average	schooling	on	average	ability	with	averages	
measured	on	the	group-level.	This	bias,	𝛿𝛿′𝛾𝛾,	can	be	expressed	as:		
𝛿𝛿„𝛾𝛾 =
𝜎𝜎Ê5 ∙ 𝛾𝛾
𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 + 𝜎𝜎Ê
5 + 𝜎𝜎∆
5	 (2)	
< 𝛿𝛿𝛾𝛾 =
𝜎𝜎Ê5 ∙ 𝛾𝛾
𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 + 𝜎𝜎Ê
5 + 𝜎𝜎∆
5	
where	m	is	the	sample	size	on	the	group	level,	assumed	to	be	the	same	for	all	
groups;	𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 	 is	 the	 conditional	 variance	 for	 the	 group-effects,	 i.e.	
this	variance	reflects	the	differences	in	schooling-trends	between	countries;	
𝜎𝜎Ê5	 is	the	within-country	variance	in	ability.	See	the	Appendix	(A.4)	for	the	
intermediate	steps.	
These	equalities	reveal	two	points.	Firstly,	when	using	group-level	data,	
the	 bias	 tends	 towards	 zero	 as	 the	 group	 size,	 m,	 increases	 (assuming	
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United	Kingdom,	then	this	does	not	reflect	a	steeper	aging-trend	in	ability	
among	Finns.	I	derive	expression	(1)	in	the	Appendix	(A.4).	
Now,	turning	to	group-level	data,	the	corresponding	bias	becomes:	
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where	𝛿𝛿′	is	the	effect	of	average	schooling	on	average	ability	with	averages	
measured	on	the	group-level.	This	bias,	𝛿𝛿′𝛾𝛾,	can	be	expressed	as:		
𝛿𝛿„𝛾𝛾 =
𝜎𝜎Ê5 ∙ 𝛾𝛾
𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 + 𝜎𝜎Ê
5 + 𝜎𝜎∆
5	 (2)	
< 𝛿𝛿𝛾𝛾 =
𝜎𝜎Ê5 ∙ 𝛾𝛾
𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 + 𝜎𝜎Ê
5 + 𝜎𝜎∆
5	
where	m	is	the	sample	size	on	the	group	level,	assumed	to	be	the	same	for	all	
groups;	𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 	 is	 the	 conditional	 variance	 for	 the	 group-effects,	 i.e.	
this	variance	reflects	the	differences	in	schooling-trends	between	countries;	
𝜎𝜎Ê5	 is	the	within-country	variance	in	ability.	See	the	Appendix	(A.4)	for	the	
intermediate	steps.	
These	equalities	reveal	two	points.	Firstly,	when	using	group-level	data,	
the	 bias	 tends	 towards	 zero	 as	 the	 group	 size,	 m,	 increases	 (assuming	
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𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 > 0).	Also,	 for	 any	 finite	 group	 size	 (m	>	1)	 the	bias	will	 be	
smaller	when	using	group-level	data	 as	 compared	 to	 individual-level	data	
(assuming	𝜎𝜎‡|_‡€,÷á›cçÜÁ
5 > 0).	Furthermore,	these	expressions	allow	me	to	
estimate	how	much	the	omitted	variable	bias	falls	by	turning	to	group-level	
data.	 Here,	 the	 bias	 is	 predicted	 to	 fall	 by	 95	 percent	when	 using	 groups	
consisting	of	355	individuals	(the	average	for	this	data	set).	70	In	other	words,	
it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 omitted	 variable	 bias	 is	
significantly	suppressed	here.		
Omitted	variable	bias	is	one	threat	against	validity,	potentially	pulling	the	
estimates	upwards.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	however,	schooling	is	likely	
measured	 with	 error,	 potentially	 pulling	 the	 estimates	 downwards.	 This	
measurement	 error	 arises	 since	 schooling	 is	 not	 directly	 observable	 for	
individuals	who	are	still	in	school.	Instead,	I	infer	‘years	of	schooling’	using	
the	assumption	that	you	stay	in	school	until	you	achieve	your	highest	degree	
or	drop	out,	after	which	you	never	reenter	the	educational	system	again.71	
For	students,	schooling	equals	your	age;	for	non-students,	schooling	equals	
your	age	at	graduation	or	dropping	out.72	This	also	 implies	 that	 countries	
where	students	regularly	have	gap	years	or	work	while	studying	will	have	
steeper	schooling-trends	only	for	those	reasons.		
	
	 	
                                                             
70 The bias-ratio can also be expressed as: 
𝛿𝛿„𝛾𝛾
𝛿𝛿𝛾𝛾
=
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜|𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐)
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ|𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐) ∙ 𝑚𝑚
 
I replace m with the average group size (355) and the variances with their sample counterparts. 
This gives me a ratio at ~0.05, i.e. a bias-reduction by 95 percent.  
71 Furthermore, I assume that everyone from the same country enter school at the same age, which 
is realistic on a group level. 
72 Naturally, schooling is now overestimated for everyone. However, this error is equally large for 
everyone from the same country, assuming they started school at the same age. Hence, this error 
does not affect the estimates. However, there are also some individuals who are enrolled in an 
educational program but do not consider themselves students (but rather workers or home-
keepers, for example). For these individuals, I assume that you have been a student up until last 
year.  
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3.6		THE	TREND	IN	COGNITIVE	SKILLS	AMONG	UNIVERSITY	
STUDENTS	
In	this	section,	I	measure	the	trends	in	literacy	and	numeracy	in	the	years	
following	graduation	from	upper-secondary	school.	I	find	that	the	trend	for	
those	who	enroll	in	a	university	program	is	similar	to	the	trend	for	those	who	
move	 into	 the	workforce	 or	 other	 activities.	 This	 suggests	 that	 university	
studies	have	small	 immediate	effects	on	 literacy	and	numeracy	 if	any;	 the	
large	gaps	between	the	groups	is	better	explained	by	self-selection.		
In	order	to	measure	these	trends,	I	select	individuals	who	graduated	from	
upper-secondary	school73	at	the	age	of	17	to	21.	Some	of	these	individuals	
continue	onto	university	programs	while	others	continue	into	working	life	
or	other	activities.74	I	observe	individuals	1	to	4	years	later	when	some	have	
accumulated	 a	 couple	 of	 years	 of	 university	 studies	 while	 others	 have	
accumulated	a	couple	of	years	of	other	experiences.	I	compare	the	trends	in	
literacy	and	numeracy	over	these	years	and	groups.	I	also	control	for	country	
of	residence,	gender,	immigration	status,	age	at	graduation	(17-21),	upper-
secondary	degree	(converted	into	years	of	schooling)	and	parental	education	
levels.	The	result	is	presented	in	table	7,	where	panel	A	shows	estimates	for	
the	full	sample	and	panel	B	separately	by	gender	(for	literacy	only).	I	find	that	
university	students	gain	~0.03	standard	deviations	in	literacy	and	numeracy	
for	 each	 passing	 year.	 These	 trends	 are	 significant75,	 but	 not	 significantly	
different	from	the	trend	of	non-students.	Using	a	dummy-specification	gives	
similar	results	(see	the	Appendix,	section	A.2).		
This	analysis	suggests	that	the	observed	cognitive	gap	between	university	
students	 and	others	 is	mainly	due	 to	 selection;	 the	 immediate	 gains	 from	
university	studies	seem	to	be	rather	small	(to	the	degree	they	exist	at	all).	At	
‘year	1’	there	is	a	large	gap	between	the	groups:	Those	who	are	enrolled	in	a	
university	program	score	roughly	half	of	a	standard	deviation	above	those	
who	 are	 not	 (see	 table	 7).	 For	 each	 year	 thereafter,	 this	 gap	 increases	
modestly	by	0.02-0.03	standard	deviations	depending	on	outcome,	but	this	
increase	is	insignificant	or	marginally	significant	(for	women).		
                                                             
73 Includes any upper secondary program (academic or vocational) except for ISCED 3C short 
(shorter than 2 years). 
74 Some individuals continue onto other educational programs; these are not included here. (This 
is because the length of these programs are not clear.) Also, some individuals continue studying 
but later drop out. These are also not included. Naturally, I cannot exclude individuals who will 
drop out in the future. Hence, these are part of the student sample. 
75 For each additional year since graduation, the university students add an estimated 0.033 
standard deviations to their literacy score (p = 0.046) and 0.031 standard deviations to their 
numeracy score (p = 0.021). These are the trends from the main specification presented in table 7. 
When I estimate the corresponding model using university students only, these estimates increase 
to 0.051 (p = 0.001) and 0.052 (p = 0.001) for literacy and numeracy, respectively. 
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different	from	the	trend	of	non-students.	Using	a	dummy-specification	gives	
similar	results	(see	the	Appendix,	section	A.2).		
This	analysis	suggests	that	the	observed	cognitive	gap	between	university	
students	 and	others	 is	mainly	due	 to	 selection;	 the	 immediate	 gains	 from	
university	studies	seem	to	be	rather	small	(to	the	degree	they	exist	at	all).	At	
‘year	1’	there	is	a	large	gap	between	the	groups:	Those	who	are	enrolled	in	a	
university	program	score	roughly	half	of	a	standard	deviation	above	those	
who	 are	 not	 (see	 table	 7).	 For	 each	 year	 thereafter,	 this	 gap	 increases	
modestly	by	0.02-0.03	standard	deviations	depending	on	outcome,	but	this	
increase	is	insignificant	or	marginally	significant	(for	women).		
                                                             
73 Includes any upper secondary program (academic or vocational) except for ISCED 3C short 
(shorter than 2 years). 
74 Some individuals continue onto other educational programs; these are not included here. (This 
is because the length of these programs are not clear.) Also, some individuals continue studying 
but later drop out. These are also not included. Naturally, I cannot exclude individuals who will 
drop out in the future. Hence, these are part of the student sample. 
75 For each additional year since graduation, the university students add an estimated 0.033 
standard deviations to their literacy score (p = 0.046) and 0.031 standard deviations to their 
numeracy score (p = 0.021). These are the trends from the main specification presented in table 7. 
When I estimate the corresponding model using university students only, these estimates increase 
to 0.051 (p = 0.001) and 0.052 (p = 0.001) for literacy and numeracy, respectively. 
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It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 error	 margins	 are	 rather	 wide.	 Hence,	 these	
regressions	do	not	exclude	the	possibility	of	modest	gains	from	university	
studies	(up	to	~8	percent	of	a	standard	deviation	per	year	on	 literacy).	 In	
order	 to	 increase	 the	 statistical	 power,	 I	 experiment	 with	 less	 stringent	
sample	selection	criteria	(see	the	Appendix,	section	A.3).	These	regressions	
strengthen	the	case	for	the	effect	being	small	or	non-existent.	Example:	 In	
one	 sample	 I	 include	 all	 students	 enrolled	 in	 post-secondary	 and	 tertiary	
programs,	and	observe	them	0-4	years	after	graduation.	Here,	the	gains	from	
higher	education	are	still	0.030	standard	deviations	per	year	for	literacy	and	
0.020	for	numeracy,	but	now	more	precisely	measured	(with	standard	errors	
at	0.018	and	0.017,	respectively).	In	the	Appendix	(section	A.3)	I	also	com-
pare	the	trend	of	students	to	that	of	workers,	but	the	conclusions	remain	the	
same.	 Similarly,	 I	 find	 no	 significant	 differences	 in	 trends	 depending	 on	
educational	area	(see	section	A.3,	table	A3).	
	
	
	
Table 7. Trends in literacy and numeracy after graduating from upper-
secondary school 
Panel A: Full sample Literacy Numeracy 
 (z-score) (z-score) 
Enrolled in a University program 0.46*** 0.48*** 
 (0.068) (0.067) 
Years later (1-4) 0.0025 0.012 
 (0.019) (0.024) 
Years later*Enrolled 0.031 0.020 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
 
Observations 
 
6,316 
 
6,316 
R-squared (overall) 0.319 0.318 
Panel B: By gender Literacy Literacy 
 Women Men 
Enrolled in a University program 0.35*** 0.56*** 
 (0.091) (0.10) 
Years later (1-4) -0.0081 0.0076 
 (0.028) (0.026) 
Years later*Enrolled 0.060* 0.0033 
 (0.033) (0.038) 
 
Observations 
 
3,183 
 
3,133 
R-squared (overall) 0.313 0.342 
Notes: All regressions include controls for country of residence, gender, immigration status, 
age at graduation, upper-secondary degree (converted into years of schooling) and parental 
education levels. All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific survey 
designs, on a cross-country level all countries are weighted equally in all regressions. Standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and adjusted 
for the imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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There	are	a	couple	of	caveats	worth	mentioning	at	this	point.	First,	note	that	
these	estimates	are	based	on	cross-sectional	data.	Example:	The	individuals	
observed	in	‘year	1’	is	an	independent	sample	from	those	observed	in	year	2,	
3	or	4.	For	university	students,	this	means	that	‘year	1’	also	includes	those	
who	will	graduate	or	drop	out	before	 ‘year	4’;	 ‘year	4’	only	 includes	those	
who	did	not.	For	this	reason,	I	would	expect	the	university-trend	to	be	overly	
optimistic	 (although	 the	 opposite	 is	 also	 possible	 if	 ‘year	 4’-students	 are	
overrepresented	by	individuals	who	did	not	graduate	on	time).	In	a	similar	
fashion,	one	could	expect	the	control-trend	to	be	overly	pessimistic;	some	of	
the	individuals	in	‘year	1’	may	enter	a	university	program	later	on,	leaving	
only	those	who	never	did	so	in	‘year	4’.		
I	do	find	some	evidence	of	such	sorting:	The	probability	of	having	highly	
educated	parents	is	marginally	higher	later	on	(in	the	student	sample)	and	
significantly	lower	later	on	(in	the	control	group).76	This	would	suggest	that	
the	gap	in	trends	between	the	groups	is	overestimated,	if	anything.	This	does	
not	change	the	main	conclusion,	however.		
There	is	also	reason	to	suspect	that	the	estimated	university-trend	is	an	
understatement	of	the	true	trend,	since	I	only	observe	the	number	of	years	
since	graduation,	and	not	‘years	as	enrolled’.	Now,	students	who	graduated	
three	years	ago	are	 likely	 to	have	more	university	education	compared	 to	
those	 who	 graduated	 two	 years	 ago,	 but	 probably	 not	 a	 full	 year	 more.	
However,	this	measurement	error	needs	to	be	rather	large	in	order	for	the	
university-trend	to	change	in	important	ways.77		
	
	 	
                                                             
76Among the students: 53.4 percent have at least one highly educated parent in ‘year 1’ which 
grows to 55.7 percent by ‘year 4’ (p = 0.331). Similarly, there is no significant difference in 
schooling, age at graduation, the probability of being female or immigrant depending on ‘years 
since graduation’. For the control group: 25.8 percent have at least one highly educated parent in 
‘year 1’. By ‘year 4’ this number has dropped significantly to 19.7 percent (p = 0.023). There are 
no other significant differences in background characteristics depending on ‘years since 
graduation’ in this group. In these regressions, ‘years since graduation’ is included linearly. I have 
not included any controls except for country of residence. 
77 As a thought experiment: Assume that 25 % of students go directly from upper secondary 
school to higher education; 35 % wait one year; 20 % wait two years, 10 % wait three years and 5 
percent wait 4 years (the rest wait five years or longer). In this scenario, one additional year since 
graduation would correspond to 0.76 additional years of education.  
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schooling, age at graduation, the probability of being female or immigrant depending on ‘years 
since graduation’. For the control group: 25.8 percent have at least one highly educated parent in 
‘year 1’. By ‘year 4’ this number has dropped significantly to 19.7 percent (p = 0.023). There are 
no other significant differences in background characteristics depending on ‘years since 
graduation’ in this group. In these regressions, ‘years since graduation’ is included linearly. I have 
not included any controls except for country of residence. 
77 As a thought experiment: Assume that 25 % of students go directly from upper secondary 
school to higher education; 35 % wait one year; 20 % wait two years, 10 % wait three years and 5 
percent wait 4 years (the rest wait five years or longer). In this scenario, one additional year since 
graduation would correspond to 0.76 additional years of education.  
75
75 
 
3.7		DISCUSSION	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	measure	 the	 effect	 of	 schooling	 on	 cognitive	 abilities	 by	
contrasting	 three	 identification	 strategies:	 the	 instrumental	 variables	
approach,	a	country-level	analysis	and	a	dose-response	analysis.	The	instru-
mental	 variables	 approach	 suggests	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 schooling	 is	 rather	
large:	With	 each	 additional	 year,	 numeracy	 is	 expected	 to	 increase	 by	 27	
percent	 of	 a	 standard	 deviation	 using	 the	 main	 specification	 (95	 %	
confidence	interval:	19-35	percent).	This	prediction	fits	rather	well	with	the	
results	 from	previous	 studies,	 but	 is	 hard	 to	 reconcile	with	my	other	 two	
findings.	 If	 one	 year	 of	 schooling	 increases	 numeracy	 by	 0.27	 standard	
deviations,	then	why	isn’t	performance	growing	more	rapidly	as	individuals	
age?	 For	 example,	 Finns	 add	 3.8	 years	 of	 schooling	 to	 their	 education	
between	the	ages	of	20	and	25.78	This	predicts	an	increase	in	numeracy	by	
roughly	 one	 standard	 deviation,	 assuming	 no	 change	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
schooling.	 The	 real	 increase,	 however,	 is	 much	 smaller	 at	 0.36	 standard	
deviations.	A	similar	pattern	can	be	observed	for	any	other	country	in	this	
data	 set.	 Also,	 the	 fact	 that	 experienced	 university	 students	 perform	 only	
somewhat	above	those	recently	enrolled,	suggests	that	the	cognitive	return	
to	education	is	rather	small	at	this	level.		
Assuming	that	all	three	identification	strategies	are	valid,	what	does	this	
say	about	the	effect	of	schooling	on	cognitive	abilities?	There	are	a	couple	of	
possible	 interpretations.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 instrumental	 variables	
approach	measures	the	outcomes	years,	and	even	decades,	after	graduation,	
whereas	 the	 country-level	 and	 dose-response	 analyses	 measure	 the	
immediate	effects.	Indeed,	the	instrumental	variables	approach	suggests	that	
the	 cognitive	 return	 to	 education	 peaks	 at	 age	 ~50.	 Secondly,	 the	 identi-
fication	strategies	use	variation	in	schooling	at	partly	different	levels:	while	
the	 dose-response	 analysis	 looks	 at	 university	 students	 specifically,	 the	
instrumental	variables	approach	uses	any	variation	in	schooling	influenced	
by	the	instrument	(which	could	include	both	secondary	and	tertiary	levels).	
Thirdly,	 the	 instrumental	 variables	 technique	 estimates	 a	 ‘local	 average	
treatment	 effect’.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 this	 effect	 differs	 markedly	 from	 the	
average	treatment	effect.	Indeed,	the	IV-estimate	is	roughly	twice	as	big	as	
the	corresponding	ordinary	regression	estimate,	which,	in	turn,	is	expected	
to	be	positively	biased	if	anything.	This	is	a	common	finding	in	the	‘returns	
to	 education’-literature,	where	 IV-estimates	 tend	 to	 overshoot	 the	 corres-
ponding	OLS-estimates,	suggesting	that	the	‘marginal	student’	has	more	to	
                                                             
78 I calculate this number by assuming that you stay in school until you achieve your highest degree 
or drop out, after which you never reenter the educational system again. For students, schooling 
equals your age; for non-students, schooling equals your age at graduation or dropping out. 
Hence, the estimate is probably overly liberal, but even so, my point remains. 
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gain	from	additional	schooling	than	the	average	student.79	Furthermore,	the	
dose-response	analysis	is	not	either	measuring	an	average	treatment	effect,	
but	rather,	the	average	treatment	effect	on	the	treated.	It	is	possible	that	this	
effect	is	comparatively	small.	Indeed,	recently	enrolled	university	students	
perform	roughly	half	of	a	standard	deviation	above	others,	where	additional	
gains	might	be	harder	to	come	by.	Lastly,	the	treatment	–	schooling	–	may	
differ	 depending	 on	 identification	 strategy.	 Note	 that	 the	 country-level	
analysis	 exploits	 differences	 in	 institutions	 or	 norms	 between	 countries,	
where	 some	 countries	 observe	 a	 larger	 portion	 of	 their	 youth	 continuing	
onto	higher	education.	Now,	countries	with	a	large	uptake	into	colleges	and	
universities	could	potentially	also	contain	a	higher	degree	of	tracking	due	to	
the	diversity	in	abilities	among	the	student	population.	This	‘tracking-effect’	
would	be	part	of	the	estimate	in	the	country-level-analysis,	but	presumably	
not	in	the	instrumental	variables	approach.	
Naturally,	there	is	also	the	possibility	of	bias.	One	could	suspect	that	the	
instrumental	variables	approach	overestimates	the	effect	of	schooling,	 if	 it	
also	captures	the	effect	of	educational	quality.	For	example,	individuals	born	
into	 relatively	 small	 cohorts	 would	 probably	 have	 experienced	 higher	
teacher-to-student	ratios	growing	up.	On	the	other	hand,	the	country-level	
and	dose-response	analyses	are	sensitive	to	critique	regarding	unobserved	
cohort-effects	and	measurement	errors,	the	compounded	effect	of	which	is	
uncertain.	
	
	 	
                                                             
79 See the discussion by Carneiro et al. (2011). 
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79 See the discussion by Carneiro et al. (2011). 
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3.8		CONCLUSIONS	
In	order	to	measure	the	effect	of	schooling	on	cognitive	abilities,	I	use	three	
alternative	identification	strategies:	the	instrumental	variables	approach,	a	
country-level-analysis	and	a	dose-response-analysis.	These	strategies	have	
different	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses.	 The	 IV-approach	 is	 open	 to	 critique	
regarding	instrument	validity;	the	country-level-	and	dose-response-analys-
es,	on	 the	other	hand,	are	open	 to	 critique	 regarding	confounding	cohort-
effects	and	measurement	errors	in	schooling.	With	these	caveats	in	mind,	I	
draw	the	following	two	main	conclusions:		
1)	Post-primary	schooling	has	positive	and	significant	effects	on	cognitive	
abilities	later	in	life.	This	is	supported	by	the	fact	that	individuals	born	into	
relatively	 large	 cohorts	 have	 significantly	 less	 education	 later	 on	 and	
perform	 significantly	 worse	 on	 future	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 tests.	 The	
instrumental	 variables	 approach	 suggests	 that	 one	 additional	 year	 of	
schooling	 increases	 numeracy	 by	 0.27	 standard	 deviations	 among	 28-60	
year	olds.	This	effect	is	robust	to	a	wide	range	of	specifications,	with	effect	
sizes	 varying	 between	 0.23	 and	 0.30	 standard	 deviations.	 Naturally,	 this	
effect	may	not	be	representative	for	all	groups	of	individuals.	For	example,	
those	who	choose	to	study	at	this	level	could	experience	smaller	gains	from	
education	than	the	marginal	student	targeted	by	the	instrument.		
This	finding	is	in	line	with	the	literature	at	large	which	usually	find	clear	
effects	 of	 schooling	 on	 cognitive	 abilities,	 although	 the	 effects	 on	 late	 life	
cognition	vary	substantially	between	studies.	This	finding	is	more	difficult	to	
reconcile	with	the	ordinary	regression	estimates	based	on	these	data,	which	
are	substantially	smaller.	Likewise,	the	country-level-analysis	also	suggests	
a	 clearly	 smaller	 immediate	 schooling-effect,	 amounting	 to	 0.05	 standard	
deviations	 among	16-30	year	olds.	One	plausible	 explanation	 is	 heteroge-
neity	 in	 the	underlying	 effect,	 although	 I	 cannot	 exclude	 the	possibility	of	
bias.	
2)	 The	 immediate	 effects	 of	 university	 studies	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 rather	
modest,	 at	 least	 for	 individuals	 choosing	 to	 study	 at	 this	 level.	 University	
students	 experience	 a	 yearly	 growth	 in	 numeracy	 by	 0.03-0.04	 standard	
deviations.	This	effect	is	significant,	but	not	significantly	different	from	the	
trend	of	non-students.		
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Appendix	
A.1		Heterogeneity	
	
Table A1. Heterogeneous effects of schooling on numeracy (IV-
estimates) 
By age Numeracy 
Schooling  -0.083 
 (0.46) 
Schooling x (Age-28) 
 
Schooling x (Age-28)2 
0.035 
(0.021) 
-0.00086** 
 
 
Chi2 (age-interactions) 
Chi2 (schooling, age-interactions) 
Observations 
(0.00034) 
 
7.02** 
20.74*** 
76,709 
By parental education Numeracy 
Schooling  0.28*** 
(ref. Parents have primary education) (0.042) 
Schooling x Parent has a secondary education 
 
Schooling x Parent has a tertiary education 
0.00057 
(0.069) 
-0.053 
 
 
Chi2 (parental-interactions) 
Chi2 (schooling, parental-interactions) 
Observations 
(0.51) 
 
0.01 
101.29*** 
76,709 
Notes: Your parents have ‘primary education’ if both have a lower secondary degree of less; 
your parents have ‘secondary education’ if at least one has an upper-secondary degree and 
none has a tertiary degree; your parents have ‘tertiary education’ if at least one has a tertiary 
degree. I also include individuals with missing values on parental education levels: If both 
are missing, your parent have primary education; if one is missing, the non-missing parent 
determines your group. All regressions control for gender, age (age, age2), parental 
education levels and immigration background, as well as the effects of living in country c and 
being born in year t, as modeled by Z. All regressions are weighted as to account for the 
country specific survey designs; on a cross-country level, all nations are weighted equally in 
all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate 
sampling weights and further adjusted for the imputation variance.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Figure A2. The trend in numeracy among university students and others 
	
A.3	Alternative	sample	selection	criteria		
Here	I	compare	the	trend	in	literacy	and	numeracy	of	students	to	the	trend	
of	non-students,	using	alternative	samples.	In	the	original	sample,	I	include	
individuals	who	graduated	from	upper-secondary	school	one	to	four	years	
ago;	 the	 students	 are	 all	 enrolled	 at	 universities	 and	 the	 control	 group	
include	all	others	(69	percent	are	working,	15	percent	are	unemployed	and	
16	percent	are	not	 in	 the	 labor	 force).	Here	 I	extend	(limit)	 the	sample	 in	
several	ways	as	to	gain	statistical	power	(see	table	A2).	I	make	the	following	
adjustments	to	the	sample	selection	criteria:	
1)	1-3	years:	Here	I	exclude	anyone	in	their	fourth	year	after	graduation,	as	
these	students	might	be	especially	vulnerable	 to	 selection	 (these	students	
are,	presumably,	overrepresented	by	master	students	and	students	who	did	
not	earn	a	bachelor	on	time).	
2)	 0-4	 years:	 Here	 I	 include	 individuals	 who	 graduated	 from	 upper-
secondary	school	0-4	years	ago.	Including	‘year	0’	may	be	problematic:	These	
individuals	have	recently	graduated	and	it	seems	likely	that	some	of	those	in	
the	‘control	group’	actually	belong	in	the	‘treatment	group’,	i.e.	they	will	soon	
enroll.	However,	the	estimates	remain	mainly	unchanged	but	the	standard	
errors	are	further	reduced.	
83 
 
3)	0-4	years,	All	students:	Here	I	further	broaden	the	‘treatment	group’	to	all	
students	who	are	enrolled	in	a	post-secondary	or	tertiary	program	(not	only	
university	students).	This	leaves	the	estimates	mainly	unchanged.	
4)	 0-4	 years,	 All	 students	 vs	Workers:	 Here	 I	 further	 restrict	 the	 ‘control	
group’	to	workers	with	a	‘reasonable’	amount	of	work	experience.	Example:	
If	 you	graduated	 two	years	 ago	 then	you	need	at	 least	 two	years	of	work	
experience	in	order	to	be	included.	This	closes	the	gap	in	trends	between	the	
student	and	the	control	group.		
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Table A2. Trends in literacy and numeracy after graduating from 
upper-secondary school, alternative samples 
LITERACY 1-3 years 0-4 years 0-4 years 0-4 years 
   All stud. All stud. 
vs Work 
Enrolled  0.45*** 0.44*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.081) (0.045) (0.050) (0.055) 
Enrolled*Uni 
 
Years later  
- 
 
0.0075 
- 
 
-0.0039 
0.27*** 
(0.036) 
-0.0056 
0.29*** 
(0.038) 
0.021 
 (0.029) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) 
Years later*Enrolled 0.033 0.032* 0.030 0.0029 
 (0.039) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) 
Observations 5,091 7,644 9,374 7,703 
R-squared (overall) 0.311 0.309 0.294 0.265 
NUMERACY 1-3 years 0-4 years 0-4 years 0-4 years 
   All stud. All stud. 
vs Work 
Enrolled  0.46*** 0.48*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.080) (0.043) (0.050) (0.059) 
Enrolled*Uni 
 
Years later  
- 
 
0.021 
- 
 
0.0095 
0.26*** 
(0.037) 
0.0076 
0.27*** 
(0.037) 
0.036* 
 (0.032) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) 
Years later*Enrolled 0.024 0.018 0.020 -0.0086 
 (0.036) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) 
Observations 5,091 7,644 9,374 7,703 
R-squared (overall) 0.307 0.310 0.292 0.261 
Notes: 1-3 years: Includes individuals who graduated from upper-secondary school 1-3 
years ago; 1-4 years: Includes individuals who graduated from upper-secondary school 1-4 
years ago; 0-4 years: Includes individuals who graduated from upper-secondary school 0-4 
years ago; 0-4 years, All stud.: Here I further broaden the treatment group to all students at 
a post-secondary or tertiary level; 0-4 years, All stud. vs Work: Here I further restrict the 
control group to workers with a ‘reasonable’ amount of work experience. All regressions 
include controls for country of residence, gender, immigration status, age at graduation, 
upper-secondary degree (converted into years of schooling) and parental education levels. 
All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs, on a cross-
country level all countries are weighted equally in all regressions. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and adjusted for the 
imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3. Trends in literacy and numeracy after graduating from 
upper-secondary school, by educational area 
 Literacy Numeracy 
 (z-score) (z-score) 
Enrolled 0.45*** 0.43*** 
(ref. Social sciences, business, law) (0.090) (0.10) 
Enrolled*HumEduc 
 
Enrolled*ScienceMath 
 
Enrolled*Engineering 
 
Enrolled*Else 
 
Years later  
-0.13 
(0.11) 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
-0.017 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
0.0020 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
0.41*** 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.039 
(0.13) 
0.012 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Years later*Enrolled 0.039 0.029 
(ref. Social sciences, business, law) (0.033) (0.037) 
Years later*Enrolled*HumEduc 
 
Years later*Enrolled*ScienceMath 
 
Years later*Enrolled*Engineering 
 
Years later*Enrolled*Else 
 
 
Observations 
0.014 
(0.039) 
-0.082* 
(0.042) 
-0.011 
(0.049) 
0.037 
(0.042) 
 
6,316 
0.023 
(0.044) 
-0.075 
(0.049) 
0.0016 
(0.047) 
0.015 
(0.049) 
 
6,316 
R-squared (overall) 0.325 0.329 
Notes: HumEduc is an indicator for those studying humanities, languages and art; Scien-
ceMath includes science, mathematics and computing; Engineering includes engineering, 
manufacturing and construction; Else includes, for example, teacher training, agriculture 
and health. All regressions include controls for country of residence, gender, immigration 
status, age at graduation, upper-secondary degree (converted into years of schooling) and 
parental education levels. All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific 
survey designs, on a cross-country level all countries are weighted equally in all regressions. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and 
adjusted for the imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.4		Bias	reduction	
Equation	(1)	states	that:	
	
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 =
𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎|𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎)
𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎|𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎)
∙ 𝛿𝛿	
(1)	
Here	I	show	that:	
𝛿𝛿 =
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎|𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎)
𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎|𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎)
	
 
=
𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎|𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎)
𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉(𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎|𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎)
	
Using	the	schooling-equation,	we	can	re-write	the	numerator	as:	
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CHAPTER	4	
Some	Evidence	for	a	Cognitive	Decline	from	Leaving	School	
in	a	Recession	
	
Abstract	
Several	 recent	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 graduating	 in	 a	 bad	 economy	has	
large	and	persistent	adverse	labor	market	effects.	In	this	study,	I	investigate	
whether	graduating	in	a	bad	economy	also	affects	your	cognitive	skills.	I	use	
PIAAC	survey	data	covering	roughly	48,000	individuals,	mostly	from	Euro-
pean	OECD-countries.	 I	 exploit	 three	 complementary	 identification	 strate-
gies.	Firstly,	I	measure	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving,	
controlling	 for	 observable	 confounders.	 Secondly,	 I	 instrument	 the	 unem-
ployment	 rate	 using	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 time	 of	
graduation.	 Thirdly,	 I	 measure	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 after	
leaving	school,	conditional	on	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	year	of	leaving.	
Overall,	 there	 is	 some	 evidence	 for	 a	 small	 cognitive	 decline.	 The	 main	
estimate	 (IV)	 suggests	 that	 a	 one-percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	 unem-
ployment	rate	at	school	 leaving	causes	a	0.006	standard	deviation	drop	in	
literacy	 (p	 <	 0.1)	 with	 an	 even	 smaller	 effect	 on	 numeracy.	 Here,	 the	
unemployment	rate	 is	measured	as	a	three-year	average	starting	from	the	
year	of	leaving	school.	Outcomes	are	measured	14	years	after	leaving	school	
on	average,	for	individuals	at	an	average	age	of	35.	
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4.1.	INTRODUCTION	
Many	young	adults	struggle	 to	 find	their	 first	 job.80	As	reported	 in	several	
studies,	 these	 struggles	are	exacerbated	 for	 those	who	graduate	 in	a	 slow	
economy.	Emerging	evidence	suggests	that	other	areas	of	your	life	may	also	
be	affected,	including	your	physical	and	mental	wellbeing,	self-esteem,	sleep	
quality	and	family	life	(see	Cutler	et	al.,	2015;	Maclean,	2013;	Maclean,	2015;	
Maclean	&	Hill,	2015;	Maclean,	2016,	Maclean	et	al.,	2016;	Maclean	&	Hill,	
2017).	Here,	I	investigate	whether	your	cognitive	skills	are	also	affected.	To	
this	 end,	 I	 use	 survey	 data	 from	 The	 Programme	 for	 the	 International	
Assessment	of	Adult	Competencies	(PIAAC).	This	 is	a	pooled	cross-section	
covering	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 individuals	 from	 mostly	 European	 OECD-
countries.	 The	 variables	 of	 central	 interest	 are	 literacy	 and	 numeracy,	
measuring	 your	 text-based	 and	 mathematical	 problem-solving	 skills	 (see	
chapter	1).	The	identification	is	three-fold.	First,	I	compare	individuals	who	
left	school	when	the	unemployment	rate	was	high	to	those	who	left	school	
when	 it	 was	 low,	 controlling	 for	 differences	 in	 observable	 confounders.	
Below,	this	strategy	is	called	the	‘standard	regression’.	Secondly,	I	instrument	
the	school	leaving	unemployment	rate	using	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	
expected	time	of	graduation.	Thirdly,	I	measure	the	effect	of	the	unemploy-
ment	 rate	 in	 the	 first	 year(s)	 following	 school	 leaving,	 conditional	 on	 the	
unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving.		
I	 find	 some	 evidence	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 small	 negative	 effect.	 The	
‘standard	regression’	and	the	instrumental	variables	approach	give	similar	
results:	A	one-percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	
leaving	predicts	a	0.005-0.006	standard	deviation	drop	in	literacy;	the	effect	
on	numeracy	is	even	smaller.	Here,	the	unemployment	rate	is	measured	as	a	
three-year	average	starting	 from	the	year	of	 leaving	school.	Outcomes	are	
measured	 14	 years	 after	 leaving	 school	 on	 average,	 for	 individuals	 at	 an	
average	age	of	35.	Hence,	a	deep	recession	–	increasing	this	unemployment	
rate	 by	 four	percentage	points	 –	 predicts	 a	 future	 loss	 in	 literacy	by	0.02	
standard	deviations	or	roughly	0.6	percentile	points.	The	third	identification	
strategy	provides	additional	support	for	a	cognitive	decline:	High	unemploy-
ment	rates	in	the	year(s)	following	school	leaving	predict	significantly	lower	
performances	on	literacy	and	numeracy	later	on,	conditional	on	the	unem-
ployment	rate	at	school	leaving.		
It	is	worth	noting	that	this	is	a	modest	effect	indeed.	The	state	of	the	labor	
market	at	graduation	is	unlikely	to	be	an	economically	significant	contributor	
to	the	variation	in	cognitive	functioning	among	cohorts	later	in	life.	On	the	
other	hand,	graduating	in	a	bad	economy	is	a	gentle	stressor	in	comparison	
                                                             
80 Based on NLSY79: The median school leaver takes 4.6 years before finding stable employment 
(a relationship lasting at least three years). (Yates, 2005) 
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80 Based on NLSY79: The median school leaver takes 4.6 years before finding stable employment 
(a relationship lasting at least three years). (Yates, 2005) 
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to	being	unable	to	find	a	job.	Hence,	this	study	does	not	exclude	the	possi-
bility	that	some	groups	of	the	labor	force	are	cognitively	severely	affected.	
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4.2		BACKGROUND	AND	PREVIOUS	RESEARCH	
Several	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 graduating	 in	 a	 recession	 has	 large	 and	
persistent	adverse	labor	market	effects	(Brunner	&	Kuhn,	2014;	Cutler	et	al.,	
2015;	Genda	et	al.,	2010;	Hershbein,	2012;	Kahn,	2010;	Kondo,	2015;	Kwon	
et	al.,	2010;	Liu	et	al.,	2016;	Oreopoulos	et	al.,	2012;	Oyer,	2006	and	Raaum	
&	Røed,	2006).	For	example,	Liu	et	al.	use	Norwegian	data	and	find	that	a	one-
percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate	at	graduation	increases	
the	short-term	risk	of	unemployment	by	1.4	percentage	points.	Such	labor	
market	 effects	 are	 typically	 larger	 early	 on,	 and	 last	 a	 couple	 of	 years	 or	
decades,	depending	on	study	and	demographic.81		
As	 suggested	by	 several	of	 the	authors,	 these	effects	may	be	driven	by	
cyclical	skill	mismatch,	which	seem	to	be	difficult	to	swiftly	recover	from.	One	
potential	reason	for	this	is	that	your	job	–	or	lack	thereof	–	also	influences	
your	 human	 capital	 formation.	 Indeed,	 this	 assumption	 underlies	 several	
models	of	persistent	unemployment	(see,	for	example,	Pissarides,	1992,	and	
Acemoglu,	1995).	For	example,	Acemoglu	argues	that	employers	use	unem-
ployment-duration	as	a	signal	for	productivity,	further	alienating	segments	
of	 the	 labor	 force.	 In	 his	model,	 unemployment	 itself	 becomes	 a	 cause	 of	
unemployment,	 fueled	 by	 human	 capital	 deterioration.	Whether	 your	 job	
position	actually	affects	your	skill	formation,	and	to	what	degree,	is	therefore	
central	for	the	understanding	of	career	developments.		
A	priori,	 there	are	both	pecuniary	and	non-pecuniary	motivations	 for	a	
relationship	between	your	work	situation	and	cognitive	performance.	Gross-
man	(1972)	introduced	the	idea	of	health	as	an	endogenous	variable,	formed	
by	 both	market	 and	 non-market	 inputs.	 This	model	 presents	 a	 couple	 of	
potential	mechanisms,	if	we	allow	for	the	concept	of	health	to	also	include	
cognitive	health.	First,	 there	 is	 the	 ‘investment-argument’:	Some	jobs	have	
higher	returns	on	cognitive	investments.	Hence,	we	might	expect	individuals	
with	cognitively	challenging	jobs	to	make	more	of	these	investments.	Then	
there	is	the	‘consumption-argument’,	where	cognitive	health	is	viewed	as	a	
normal	 good	 comparable	 to	 a	 gym-membership	 or	 a	 healthy	 diet.	 On	 the	
other	hand,	well-paid	jobs	may	also	increase	the	opportunity	cost	of	certain	
health-promoting	activities,	such	as	sleeping.		
One	can	also	make	a	case	for	a	stress-related	pathway,	i.e.	that	the	stresses	
of	a	poor	labor	market	position	affects	your	cognitive	functioning.	There	is	
robust	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 unemployment	 and	
several	other	adverse	outcomes,	including	general	dissatisfaction,	poor	men-
tal	 health	 and	 depression	 (Clark	 et	 al.,	 2001;	Dooley	 et	 al.,	 1994;	Kassen-
boehmer	 &	 Haisken-DeNew,	 2009;	 Krueger	 &	Mueller,	 2011;	 Kuhn	 et	 al.,	
                                                             
81 Brunner & Kuhn (2014) is an exception in this regard, finding larger effects later on.  
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As	 suggested	by	 several	of	 the	authors,	 these	effects	may	be	driven	by	
cyclical	skill	mismatch,	which	seem	to	be	difficult	to	swiftly	recover	from.	One	
potential	reason	for	this	is	that	your	job	–	or	lack	thereof	–	also	influences	
your	 human	 capital	 formation.	 Indeed,	 this	 assumption	 underlies	 several	
models	of	persistent	unemployment	(see,	for	example,	Pissarides,	1992,	and	
Acemoglu,	1995).	For	example,	Acemoglu	argues	that	employers	use	unem-
ployment-duration	as	a	signal	for	productivity,	further	alienating	segments	
of	 the	 labor	 force.	 In	 his	model,	 unemployment	 itself	 becomes	 a	 cause	 of	
unemployment,	 fueled	 by	 human	 capital	 deterioration.	Whether	 your	 job	
position	actually	affects	your	skill	formation,	and	to	what	degree,	is	therefore	
central	for	the	understanding	of	career	developments.		
A	priori,	 there	are	both	pecuniary	and	non-pecuniary	motivations	 for	a	
relationship	between	your	work	situation	and	cognitive	performance.	Gross-
man	(1972)	introduced	the	idea	of	health	as	an	endogenous	variable,	formed	
by	 both	market	 and	 non-market	 inputs.	 This	model	 presents	 a	 couple	 of	
potential	mechanisms,	if	we	allow	for	the	concept	of	health	to	also	include	
cognitive	health.	First,	 there	 is	 the	 ‘investment-argument’:	Some	jobs	have	
higher	returns	on	cognitive	investments.	Hence,	we	might	expect	individuals	
with	cognitively	challenging	jobs	to	make	more	of	these	investments.	Then	
there	is	the	‘consumption-argument’,	where	cognitive	health	is	viewed	as	a	
normal	 good	 comparable	 to	 a	 gym-membership	 or	 a	 healthy	 diet.	 On	 the	
other	hand,	well-paid	jobs	may	also	increase	the	opportunity	cost	of	certain	
health-promoting	activities,	such	as	sleeping.		
One	can	also	make	a	case	for	a	stress-related	pathway,	i.e.	that	the	stresses	
of	a	poor	labor	market	position	affects	your	cognitive	functioning.	There	is	
robust	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 unemployment	 and	
several	other	adverse	outcomes,	including	general	dissatisfaction,	poor	men-
tal	 health	 and	 depression	 (Clark	 et	 al.,	 2001;	Dooley	 et	 al.,	 1994;	Kassen-
boehmer	 &	 Haisken-DeNew,	 2009;	 Krueger	 &	Mueller,	 2011;	 Kuhn	 et	 al.,	
                                                             
81 Brunner & Kuhn (2014) is an exception in this regard, finding larger effects later on.  
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2009;	 Winkelmann	 &	 Winkelmann,	 1998)82,	 social	 isolation	 and	 marital	
disruption	(Brand	&	Burgard,	2008;	Eliason,	2012;	Hansen,	2005)	as	well	as	
declining	physical	health	and	mortality	(Beale	&	Nethercott,	1985;	Browning	
&	Heinesen,	2012;	Eliason	&	Storrie,	2009;	Sullivan	&	von	Wachter,	2009).83	
Among	 the	 employed,	 a	 couple	 of	 job	 characteristics	 –	 including	 type	 of	
contract	and	earnings	–	have	been	linked	to	mental	and	physical	well-being.84		
Of	special	interest	for	this	study	is	a	couple	of	recent	findings	showing	that	
graduating	in	an	economic	downturn	predicts	several	adverse	health-related	
outcomes,	 including	 lowered	 life	 satisfaction,	 greater	 obesity	 and	 more	
smoking	 and	 drinking	 (Cutler	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Among	 men,	 worse	 physical	
functioning	(Maclean,	2013),	more	heavy	drinking	(Maclean,	2015),	lowered	
chance	of	being	married	and	having	children	(Maclean	et	al.,	2016),	lowered	
body	weight	(Maclean,	2016)	and	lowered	self-esteem	(Maclean	&	Hill,	2015)	
have	also	been	reported.	These	patterns	are	often	different	for	women,	who	
generally	seem	to	fair	better	or	even	benefit	from	graduating	in	a	recession	
(see	the	work	by	Maclean	and	others).	
Based	on	this	body	of	research,	it	is	not	very	controversial	to	suggest	that	
a	 poor	 labor	market	 position	 can	 be	 stressful.	 The	 emerging	 view	 in	 the	
psychological	 field	 is	 that	 high	 or	 chronic	 stress	 impairs	 cognitive	 func-
tioning	as	measured	by	explicit	memory	(Sandi,	2013).85	There	is	also	several	
epidemiological	studies	showing	that	poor	health	–	as	captured	by	metabolic	
indicators	–	is	successful	in	predicting	cognitive	decline	in	both	younger	and	
older	adults	(see	the	review	by	Yates	et	al.,	2012).	Furthermore,	some	health-
related	behaviors,	including	exercise	and	quality	sleep,	have	been	shown	to	
improve	 cognitive	 functioning	 (Alhola	 &	 Polo-Kantola,	 2007;	 Loprinzi	 &	
                                                             
82 See also the reviews by Björklund & Eriksson (1998) and Paul & Moser (2009). 
83 There are also studies casting doubt on the importance of unemployment for mental and 
physical health. Böckerman & Ilmakunnas (2009) find no effect on self-reported health connected 
to the event of becoming unemployed using Finnish panel data. Similar results are reported for 
Germany (Schmitz, 2011) and United States (Salm, 2009) when looking at various health measures, 
and exploiting longitudinal data and plant closures. Similarly, Browning et al. (2006) find no effect 
of job displacement on stress-related hospitalizations. 
84 Employees on temporary contracts and part-time workers experience poor physical and mental 
health as compared to standard workers (for physical health, see Kim et al., 2008; Pirani & Salvini, 
2015 and Virtanen et al., 2005; for mental health, see Han et al., 2017; Ferrie et al., 2002; Kim et 
al., 2006; Quesnel-Vallée et al., 2010). There is also some evidence that higher earnings have 
mental health benefits. Changes in incomes correlate positively with changes in self-reported 
health (see the review by Gunasekara, 2011; Meraya et al., 2018). Studies that exploit lottery 
winnings, inheritances or the Social Security Notch as exogenous sources of variation in income 
have also found beneficial effects on mental health (Apouey & Clark, 2015; Au & Johnston, 2014; 
Golberstein, 2015; Lindqvist et al., 2018); the physical health effects are debatable, however (see 
Apouey & Clark, 2015; Au & Johnston, 2014; Au & Johnston, 2015; Kim & Ruhm, 2012). 
85 Mild and transitory stressors, on the other hand, can have beneficial cognitive effects. 
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Kane,	2015;	Hwang	et	al.,	2017;	Winter	et	al.,	2007).	To	sum	up:	 the	poor	
labor	market	outcomes	resulting	from	graduating	in	a	bad	economy	may	lead	
to	long-term	stress,	declining	mental	and	physical	health,	all	of	which	may	
contribute	to	cognitive	impairment.		
To	date,	the	empirical	evidence	on	labor	market-related	skill	formation	is	
sparse,	however.	To	my	knowledge,	there	is	only	one	study	looking	at	this	
relationship	directly:	Edin	&	Gustavsson	(2008)	use	Swedish	panel	data	and	
find	that	a	full	year	of	non-employment	decreases	literacy	by	five	percentile	
points.	Also	related	is	a	study	by	Mani	et	al.	(2013)	showing	that	periodical	
poverty	 causes	 losses	 in	 IQ	by	exploiting	 the	cyclical	variation	 in	 incomes	
among	Indian	sugarcane	farmers.	I	contribute	to	this	emerging	literature	on	
labor	market-related	skill	formation	by	studying	whether	leaving	school	in	a	
bad	economy	affects	your	future	cognitive	functioning	as	measured	by	litera-
cy	and	numeracy.	To	my	knowledge,	this	 is	the	first	study	of	 its	kind.	This	
study	 does	 not,	 however,	 discriminate	 between	 pecuniary	 and	 non-pecu-
niary	pathways.		
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4.3.	EMPIRICAL	STRATEGIES	
The	aim	is	to	measure	the	cognitive	effect	of	leaving	school	in	a	bad	economy.	
The	 empirical	 challenge	 is	 to	 disentangle	 the	 causal	 effect	 from	 other	
unobservable	 confounders.	 Naturally,	 graduating	 dates	 are	 not	 randomly	
assigned.	 Hence,	 there	might	 be	 relevant	 differences	 between	 individuals	
who	graduate	while	the	unemployment	rate	is	high,	and	those	who	graduate	
while	 it	 is	 low.	 Most	 importantly,	 individuals	 might	 choose	 this	 date	
strategically,	postponing	or	preponing	graduation	depending	on	their	labor	
market	 prospects.	 Ex	 ante,	 I	 expect	 high-achievers	 to	 be	 less	 affected	 by	
business	 cycles,	 as	 their	 employment	 opportunities	 might	 also	 be	 less	
affected	(Cutler	et	al.,	2015	and	Hoynes	et	al.,	2012,	among	others,	show	that	
recessions	hit	poorly	educated	individuals	harder).	On	the	other	hand,	high-
achievers	might	have	better	adjustment	opportunities,	enabling	them	to	be	
more	flexible.	Hence,	any	potential	bias	could	go	in	either	direction.		
In	order	to	capture	the	cognitive	effect,	I	contrast	three	complementary	
identification	strategies.	First,	I	measure	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	
at	 school	 leaving,	 controlling	 for	 observable	 confounders.	 Secondly,	 I	
instrument	 this	 unemployment	 rate	 using	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	
expected	time	of	graduation.	Lastly,	I	measure	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	
rate	 in	 the	 first	 year(s)	 following	 school	 leaving,	 conditional	 on	 the	
unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 year	 of	 leaving	 school.	 The	 first	 two	 strategies	
have	been	employed	in	several	studies	(Brunner	&	Kuhn,	2014;	Cutler	et	al.,	
2015;	Kahn,	2010;	Kondo,	2015;	Oreopoulos	et	al.,	2012	and	the	studies	by	
Maclean	and	others,	all	exploit	this	or	similar	instruments).	
4.3.1	Measuring	the	effect,	adjusted	for	observable	confounders	
As	an	opening	 strategy,	 I	measure	 the	effect	of	 the	unemployment	 rate	at	
school	 leaving	 –	 graduation	 or	 dropping	 out	 –	while	 controlling	 for	 other	
variables	that	are	expected	to	predict	literacy	and	numeracy	(cog):	
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐÷b = 𝛼𝛼÷ + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢÷b + 𝜗𝜗𝑋𝑋÷b + 𝜀𝜀÷b 	 (1)	
where	 c	 is	 a	 country	 index	 and	 i	 is	 indexing	 individuals;	 𝛼𝛼÷ 	 represents	
country-specific	fixed	intercepts;	unemp	is	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	
leaving	with	𝛽𝛽	representing	the	parameter	of	central	interest;	𝑋𝑋÷b 	is	a	vector	
of	 background	 characteristics	 including	 age	 (using	 age-dummies),	 gender,	
immigration	status,	years	of	schooling,	as	well	as	the	mother’s	and	father’s	
educational	levels;	𝜀𝜀÷b 	is	the	random	error	term.		
It	is	worth	noting	that	I	do	not	control	for	the	unemployment	rate	in	later	
years.	Hence,	a	factor	such	as	the	average	unemployment	rate	since	leaving	
school	 is	 likely	 to	be	 larger,	on	average,	among	 those	who	 left	 school	 in	a	
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recession.	I	interpret	these	later	labor	market	conditions	as	part	of	the	stim-
uli	of	interest.	The	contemporaneous	unemployment	rate	will	have	little	to	
no	 influence	 on	 the	 estimates,	 however,	 as	 there	 is	 little	 within-country	
variation	in	interviewing	dates.			
This	identification	strategy	is	valid	if	there	are	no	relevant	differences	in	
background	characteristics	between	those	who	leave	school	while	the	econ-
omy	 is	 strong	and	 those	who	 leave	 it	while	 it	 is	weak	 (conditional	on	 the	
other	covariates).	If	students	choose	their	school	leaving	date	strategically,	
however,	 then	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 suspect	 that	𝛽𝛽	may	not	 fairly	 reflect	 the	
causal	effect.	I	explore	this	issue	further	in	section	6.	
4.3.2	The	instrumental	variables	technique	
My	main	identification	strategy	relies	on	instrumenting	the	unemployment	
rate	at	school	leaving,	using	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	expected	time	of	
graduation.86	I	specify	the	reduced	form	equation87	in	the	following	way:	
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐÷b = 𝛼𝛼÷ + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒÷b + 𝜗𝜗𝑋𝑋÷b + 𝜀𝜀÷b 	 (2)	
where	expunemp	is	the	instrument	measuring	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	
expected	time	of	graduation;	𝑋𝑋÷b 	represents	the	same	vector	of	background	
characteristics	described	in	section	3.1.	Similarly,	𝛼𝛼÷ 	and	𝜀𝜀÷b 	 represent	the	
country-specific	fixed	intercepts	and	error	term	for	this	equation.	
The	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 time	 of	 graduation	 is	 a	 valid	
instrument,	assuming	that	𝛽𝛽	owns	its	value	only	due	to	it	mediating	the	effect	
of	the	actual	unemployment	rate.88	Put	differently,	individuals	are	‘allowed’	
to	choose	their	school	leaving	date,	but	not	their	expected	graduation	date.	
Hence,	students	might	choose	to	postpone	graduation	when	they	fail	to	find	
a	job	in	a	slow	economy.	If	they,	however,	choose	to	enter	a	new	educational	
program	that	they	would	not	have	entered	otherwise,	then	there	is	reason	to	
suspect	that	𝛽𝛽	may	not	fairly	reflect	the	causal	effect.	I	discuss	this	possibility	
further	in	section	6.	
	
                                                             
86 The expected year of graduation is inferred from data based on your desired degree and 
country of residence, as described in section 4.2. 
87 Using two-stage-least-squares I estimate the ratio: 𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽fifl⁄ , where 𝛽𝛽 is the coefficient for the 
instrument (expunemp) from the reduced form equation (see (2)); 𝛽𝛽fifl is the coefficient for the 
instrument from the first stage equation. The first stage equation models the independent variable 
of interest – the unemployment rate at school leaving – as a function of the instrument and the 
same set of covariates (X) described in equation (2).  
88 Also, the unemployment rate in the expected time of graduation needs to be a sufficiently 
strong predictor of the actual unemployment rate. 
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86 The expected year of graduation is inferred from data based on your desired degree and 
country of residence, as described in section 4.2. 
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4.3.3	The	conditional	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	
year(s)	following	graduation	
As	a	last	strategy,	I	estimate	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	
year(s)	following	school	leaving,	conditional	on	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	
year	of	leaving	school:		
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐÷b = 𝛼𝛼÷ + 𝛽𝛽?𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝÷b + 𝛽𝛽5𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝÷b + 𝜗𝜗𝑋𝑋÷b + 𝜀𝜀÷b 	 (3)	
Example:	Assume	two	individuals,	A	and	B,	who	both	graduated	while	the	
unemployment	rate	was	7.5	percent	(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝	=	7.5).	In	the	following	year,	A	
experiences	an	unemployment	rate	at	eight	percent	(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝	=	8)	while	
B	experiences	an	unemployment	rate	at	seven	percent	(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝	=	7).	In	
this	model,	the	parameter	of	interest	is	𝛽𝛽?,	capturing	the	effect	of	this	labor	
market	difference	on	literacy	and	numeracy	(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐).	I	also	control	for	the	same	
set	of	covariates	(𝑋𝑋)	described	in	section	3.1,	as	well	as	country	fixed	effects	
(𝛼𝛼÷).		
Now,	assuming	that	individuals	can	react	to	the	current	unemployment	
rate,	 but	 do	 not	 adjust	 their	 school	 leaving	 date	 depending	 on	 future	
unemployment	rates,	then	conditioning	on	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	
leaving	 is	arguably	making	 the	 future	unemployment	 rate	exogenous.	The	
validity	of	this	strategy	is	called	into	question	if	students	have	well-formed	
expectations	 regarding	 future	 labor	market	 conditions	 and	 react	 to	 these	
strategically,	 or	 if	 they	 choose	 to	 re-enter	 the	educational	 system	as	 a	 re-
sponse	 to	 their	 post-graduate	 labor	 market	 situation.	 I	 return	 to	 these	
possibilities	in	section	6.	
Naturally,	 there	 would	make	 little	 sense	 to	 estimate	𝛽𝛽?	 in	 this	 model,	
unless	 the	 conditional	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 year(s)	 following	 school	
leaving	 also	 predicts	 your	 future	 career	 path.	 Previous	 research	 gives	me	
reason	to	believe	that	this	is,	indeed,	the	case.	Oreopoulos	et	al.	(2012)	find	
that	a	 large	part	of	 the	effect,	 i.e.	 the	wage	deficit	 from	leaving	school	 in	a	
recession,	can	be	attributed	to	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	year	after	
leaving	school.	The	current	data	also	show	that	the	conditional	unemploy-
ment	rate	following	graduation	predicts	your	future	employment	prospects	
(as	discussed	further	in	section	5.3).	
4.3.4	Weights	and	standard	errors	
There	are	some	survey	design	issues	to	consider	in	the	estimations.	Firstly,	
the	sample	has	been	selected	using	a	stratified	cluster-design.	Secondly,	the	
testing	 procedure	 for	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 are	 based	 on	 item	 response	
theory	and	multiple	imputations	using	so	called	‘plausible	values’.	I	account	
for	the	survey	design	by	using	appropriate	weights	as	assigned	by	OECD;	on	
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a	 cross-country	 level,	 I	 weigh	 each	 country	 equally	 in	 each	 regression.	 I	
estimate	the	standard	errors	using	jackknife	replicate	sampling	weights	and	
account	for	the	imputation	variance	added	by	using	plausible	values.	
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4.4		DATA	&	SAMPLE	SELECTION	
I	use	PIAAC	survey	data	that	has	been	collected	and	compiled	by	OECD.	The	
sample	I	exploit	is	a	cross-sectional	data	covering	roughly	48,000	individuals	
in	24	countries89	and	has	been	collected	during	2010-2015	using	personal	
house	interviews.	The	outcome	variables	of	central	interest	are	literacy	and	
numeracy,	 measuring	 your	 ability	 to	 solve	 text-based	 and	 mathematical	
problems.	See	chapter	1	for	a	description	of	these	concepts.	
4.4.1	Sample	selection	and	descriptive	statistics		
The	main	 identification	relies	on	 instrumenting	the	unemployment	rate	at	
school	 leaving	 using	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 time	 of	
graduation.	 In	 order	 to	measure	 this	 effect,	 I	 select	 individuals	who	were	
expected	 to	 graduate	 in	 1982	 to	 2008,	 varying	 somewhat	 depending	 on	
country	and	interviewing	date.90	Furthermore,	I	exclude	individuals	who	are	
still	enrolled	in	an	educational	program,	who	graduated	or	dropped	out	in	
the	last	year	(as	these	could	be	in-between	educational	programs),	those	who	
have	 inconsistencies	 in	 their	 graduating	 date91,	 who	 are	 known	 to	 have	
immigrated	 to	 the	 current	 country	 of	 residence	 after	 leaving	 school,	who	
earned	their	highest	degree	abroad,	who	were	expected	to	graduate	at	the	
age	 of	 13	 or	 younger,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 who	 have	 missing	 values	 on	 key	
                                                             
89 Belgium (Flanders), Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation 
(excluding Moscow municipal area), Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United 
Kingdom (England & Northern Ireland). 
90 Making the selection based on the actual year of leaving school (as opposed to the expected 
year) could potentially bias the estimates: The probability of being included in the sample could 
then become a function of your cognitive abilities. Example: For most countries, I observe 
unemployment rates from 1980 going forward. Hence, I restrict the sample to those who were 
expected to graduate in 1982 or later, so that ‘early leavers’ are included from the start, i.e. those 
leaving school in 1980 or 1981. For some countries*, mostly post-Soviet states, unemployment 
rates are not observed until years later, and I adjust the sample selection criteria accordingly. 
Similarly, the typical individual took the survey in 2011. Hence, I include such an individual if she 
were expected to graduate in 2008 or earlier, so that ‘late leavers’ are included till the end. *This 
includes Cyprus (1982), Czech Republic (1995), Ireland (1985), Lithuania (1999), Poland (1990), 
Russia (1992), Slovak Republic (1993) and Slovenia (1992). Example: Slovenians are included if 
they were expected to graduate in 1994 or later. Data on unemployment rates from World 
Economic Forum. 
91 This is identified by calculating the current year based on your graduating date and the number 
of years elapsed since graduation. If the proposed ‘current year’ falls outside the survey period 
(2010-2015) you are excluded.  
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variables.92	This	also	includes	individuals	who	are	observed	leaving	school	
unusually	late,	at	the	age	of	35	or	older:	These	individuals	are	likely	to	have	
spent	years	outside	the	educational	system	at	some	earlier	date;	hence,	their	
‘relevant’	school	leaving	date	is	likely	not	the	one	observed.	Naturally,	this	
cutoff	 is	 somewhat	 arbitrary,	 and	 I	 return	 to	 this	 issue	 in	 the	 robustness	
section	(5.4).	This	leaves	me	with	a	sample	consisting	of	47,842	observations	
whose	mean	characteristics	are	described	in	table	1	below.	Here	I	also	divide	
the	sample	into	two	groups:	those	who	graduated	when	the	unemployment	
rate	was	 high	 and	 those	who	 graduated	when	 it	 was	 low,	where	 a	 ‘high’	
unemployment	rate	is	one	at	or	above	the	country	median	for	the	relevant	
time	period.	The	table	includes	the	full	set	of	covariates	regularly	included	in	
the	preceding	regressions,	excluding	only	country	of	residence.	
Table	1	shows	that	the	individual	background	characteristics	are	striking-
ly	 similar	 among	 those	who	graduated	when	 the	unemployment	 rate	was	
low,	and	those	who	graduated	when	it	was	high.	Neither	is	there	any	notice-
able	 difference	 in	 literacy	 or	 numeracy	 that	 would	 favor	 those	 who	
graduated	in	a	strong	economy.		
On	average,	the	sample	individuals	score	almost	0.2	standard	deviations	
above	average	on	literacy	and	numeracy,	meaning	that	they	score	above	the	
expected	 value	 for	 a	 randomly	 chosen	 individual	 from	 the	 PIAAC	 target	
population.93	Furthermore,	48	percent	of	individuals	are	female;	4	percent	
are	known	to	be	 immigrants;	on	average,	 the	 individuals	are	35	years	old	
with	13	years	of	schooling.94	The	age	range	is	wide,	however,	stretching	from	
17	to	60	years,	with	outcomes	measured	1	to	34	years	after	leaving	school	
(average:	14	years).		
	
                                                             
92 Including age, gender, literacy/numeracy, schooling, the year of leaving school or the 
corresponding unemployment rate, and the expected year of leaving school. I allow for missing 
values on other covariates, and code these accordingly. 
93 The target population consists of everyone aged 16-65 from the relevant set of countries, i.e. the 
31 countries included in the first two rounds of PIAAC (totally 197,754 individuals). The standard 
deviation for literacy and numeracy are estimated using within-country variation only: First, I 
estimate the (weighted) variance separately for each country. These variances are then averaged 
and the standard deviation of interest is the square root of that variance. 
94 The distribution for the highest (completed) degrees is as follows: Primary education (1 %), 
Lower secondary school (11 %), Upper secondary school (42 %), Post-secondary non-tertiary 
degree (4 %), Tertiary degree (42 %), Research degree (1 %). 
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Table 1. Weighted means for the individual characteristics 
 All Low 
unemp.a 
High 
unemp.a  
Literacy (z-scoreb) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Numeracy (z-scoreb) 0.19 0.18 0.19 
Female 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Immigration status 
  Immigrant 
  Native 
  Unknown 
 
0.035 
0.96 
0.0052 
 
0.036 
0.96 
0.0053 
 
0.034 
0.97 
0.0050 
Age 35.2 35.3 35.0 
Schooling (years) 13.2 13.2 13.2 
Educational field 
  Lower educ./General program 
  Teaching/Educational sciences 
  Hum./Languages/Art 
  Social sciences/Business/Law 
  Science/Math/Computing 
  Engineering/Manufact./Constr. 
  Agriculture/Veterinary 
  Health/Welfare 
  Services 
  Doesn’t know 
 
0.26 
0.053 
0.064 
0.16 
0.075 
0.19 
0.026 
0.067 
0.075 
0.032 
 
0.26 
0.051 
0.064 
0.17 
0.075 
0.19 
0.027 
0.065 
0.072 
0.032 
 
0.25 
0.054 
0.063 
0.16 
0.076 
0.19 
0.026 
0.068 
0.077 
0.032 
Mother’s educationc 
  Low 
  Medium 
  High 
  Unknown 
 
0.47 
0.35 
0.15 
0.023 
 
0.47 
0.35 
0.16 
0.022 
 
0.47 
0.36 
0.15 
0.024 
Father’s educationc 
  Low 
  Medium 
  High 
  Unknown 
 
0.41 
0.37 
0.19 
0.034 
 
0.41 
0.36 
0.19 
0.034 
 
0.41 
0.37 
0.18 
0.034 
 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
 
8.4 
 
6.3 
 
10.2 
Observations 47,842 22,432 25,410 
Notes: The means are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; on a 
cross-country level, all countries are weighted equally according to the sample “All” (47,842 
obs.). a’Low unemployment’ means that the rate is below the country median for the studied 
period; ‘high unemployment’ means that the rate is at or above the country median. bz-scores 
are estimated using the full sample of 16-65 year olds (roughly 200,000 individuals) with 
standard deviations estimated using within-country variation only. cEducational degrees: Low 
= Lower secondary school, primary school or less. Medium = Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary degree. High = Tertiary degree.  
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4.4.2	Determining	the	expected	year	of	graduation	
The	main	 identification	relies	on	 instrumenting	the	unemployment	rate	at	
school	 leaving	 using	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 time	 of	
graduation.	 Your	 expected	 year	 of	 graduation	 is	 calculated	 based	 on	 the	
median	age	at	graduation	in	an	appropriate	reference	group.	Your	reference	
group	is	made	up	of	individuals	from	your	country	who	graduated	with	the	
same	educational	degree	as	yourself	 (for	dropouts	–	 the	degree	you	were	
aiming	for).	The	reference	group	excludes	anyone	who	graduated	at	the	age	
of	 35	or	 older,	 as	 the	 target	 population	 consists	 of	 individuals	who	 finish	
school	 ‘for	 the	 first	 time’.	Your	educational	degree	 is	based	on	 the	 ISCED-
scale,	 measured	 in	 roughly	 10	 categories95	 depending	 on	 country.	 In	 the	
robustness	 section	 (5.4)	 I	 also	 experiment	 with	 using	 other	 criteria	 for	
constructing	an	instrument.		
The	most	common	expected	ages	 for	graduating	are	18	years	 (21	%	of	
sample),	19	years	(14	%),	23	years	(14	%)	and	25	years	(11	%).	Of	the	sample	
individuals,	30	percent	left	school	on	time;	another	25	percent	left	school	one	
or	 two	years	before	expected	and	22	percent	 left	school	one	or	 two	years	
later	 than	expected.	See	the	Appendix,	section	A.1,	 for	 the	expected	age	at	
graduation	depending	on	country	and	degree.	
	 	
                                                             
95 These categories are: ISCED 1 (Primary education), ISCED 2 (Lower secondary school), ISCED 
3C short (Upper-secondary school, vocational track, less than two years), ISCED 3C long, ISCED 
3A-B (Upper-secondary school, academic track), ISCED 3 long without distinction A-B-C, ISCED 
4C (Post-secondary non-tertiary degree, vocational track), ISCED 4A-B (Post-secondary non-
tertiary degree, academic track), ISCED 4 without distinction A-B-C, ISCED 5B (Tertiary education, 
professional), ISCED 5A bachelor, ISCED 5A master, ISCED 5A without distinction bachelor-
master, ISCED 6 (Research degree), ISCED master-research without distinction. (No country is 
represented by all of these categories.)  
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4.5		RESULTS	
Overall,	 these	 data	 provide	 some	 evidence	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 small	
cognitive	decline	from	graduating	in	a	recession;	higher	unemployment	rates	
around	the	time	of	leaving	school	predict	lower	cognitive	performances	later	
on.	The	‘standard	regressions’	and	the	instrumental	variables	approach	give	
similar	estimates:	As	 the	three-year	average	unemployment	rate	at	school	
leaving	 increases	 by	 one	 percentage	 point,	 your	 future	 literacy	 score	 is	
predicted	 to	 drop	 by	 0.005-0.006	 standard	 deviations	 depending	 on	
estimator.	This	effect	is	significant	or	marginally	significant	(IV).	The	effect	
on	numeracy	is	even	smaller	and	insignificant	for	both	estimators.	Further-
more,	 higher	 unemployment	 rates	 in	 the	 years	 following	 school	 leaving	
predict	significantly	lower	performances	on	literacy	and	numeracy	later	on,	
conditional	on	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving.		
4.5.1	The	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving,		
model	(1)		
In	 this	 section,	 I	 measure	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 at	 school	
leaving,	adjusted	for	observable	confounders	(see	model	(1)	in	section	3).	I	
find	 that	 high	 unemployment	 rates	 at	 the	 time	 of	 leaving	 school	 are	
associated	with	lower	cognitive	performances	later	on.	These	effects,	how-
ever,	are	small	and	only	significant	for	literacy	when	the	unemployment	rate	
is	 measured	 as	 a	 three-year	 average	 (starting	 from	 the	 year	 of	 leaving	
school).	Here,	a	one-percentage	point	increase	in	the	mean	unemployment	
rate	predicts	a	0.005	standard	deviation	drop	in	literacy	(95	%	confidence	
interval:	-0.0095	to	-0.0007).	This	effect	is	modest	indeed,	comparable	to	a	
decline	by	0.14	percentile	points.96	For	numeracy,	this	effect	is	even	smaller	
and	 insignificant.	The	results	are	presented	 in	 table	2	 for	 literacy;	 see	 the	
Appendix,	section	A.2,	for	numeracy.	
                                                             
96 The ‘average percentile rank effect’ (APE) is given by: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =
𝛽𝛽
2√𝜋𝜋
 
assuming that literacy is normally distributed. For reference, see section 5 in chapter 2. 
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LITERACY (Z) ALL MEN WOMEN AGE: 
17-30 
(mean: 27) 
AGE: 
31-40 
(mean: 35) 
AGE: 
41-60 
(mean: 45) 
BELOW 
TERTIARY 
TERTIARY 
DEGREE 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
-0.0017 
(0.0021) 
-0.0030 
(0.0032) 
-0.00087 
(0.0025) 
-0.0035 
(0.0045) 
-0.00086 
(0.0035) 
-0.0092 
(0.0060) 
0.00024 
(0.0028) 
-0.00087 
(0.0031) 
Mean unemployment, % 
(first two years) 
Mean unemployment, % 
(first three years) 
Observations 
-0.0036* 
(0.0021) 
0.0051** 
(0.0022) 
47,842 
-0.0049 
(0.0033) 
-0.0067** 
(0.0033) 
23,391 
-0.0024 
(0.0026) 
-0.0035 
(0.0027) 
24,451 
-0.0053 
(0.0033) 
-0.0063 
(0.0041) 
13,767 
-0.0025 
(0.0034) 
-0.0036 
(0.0034) 
19,924 
-0.0083 
(0.0053) 
-0.0087 
(0.0055) 
14,151 
-0.0020 
(0.0030) 
-0.0039 
(0.0031) 
27,735 
-0.0027 
(0.0031) 
-0.0045 
(0.0032) 
20,107 
Notes: Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include the full set of controls described in section 3.1 and listed in table 1 (as well as 
fixed effects for country). All effects are expressed in standard deviations and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country 
level, all nations are given equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and corrected 
for the imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2. The effect of the unemployment rate at school leaving on literacy (WLS-regressions, model (1)) 
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A	couple	of	studies	have	reported	that	men	are	more	severely	affected	than	
women	are	by	leaving	school	in	a	bad	economy.97	This	pattern	also	shows	up	
in	this	data	set,	where	the	cognitive	decline	for	men	is	larger	than	that	for	
women	and	only	significant	for	men	(see	table	2).	The	difference	in	effects	is	
insignificant,	however.98	
Table	2	also	presents	estimates	separately	for	other	groups.	Here,	it	is	of	
special	interest	to	divide	the	sample	by	age.	Several	studies	have	shown	that	
the	 labor	market	effects	of	graduating	 in	a	bad	economy	tend	 to	decrease	
over	time.	Hence,	one	might	expect	any	cognitive	effects	to	be	larger	among	
the	younger	cohorts.	Yet,	I	find	no	such	pattern	in	these	data.	Here	I	divide	
the	sample	into	three	groups:	those	aged	17-30,	31-40	and	41-60.	There	is	
no	 discernable	 age	 pattern,	 however,	 with	 effects	 being	 rather	 small	 and	
insignificant	in	all	three	groups.	
Business	 cycles	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 affect	 poorly	 and	highly	 educated	
individuals	differently.	Hoynes	et	al.	(2012)	show	that	historical	fluctuations	
in	unemployment	rates	are	distinctly	stronger	among	those	with	high	school	
degrees	 or	 less,	 as	 compared	 to	 college	 graduates.	 Therefore,	 one	 might	
expect	 poorly	 educated	 individuals	 to	 experience	 larger	 cognitive	 deficits	
from	graduating	in	a	bad	economy.	I	observe	no	such	pattern	in	these	data	
however	(see	table	2).	
Although	the	cognitive	effects	of	graduating	in	a	bad	economy	are	small	
as	 judged	 from	 these	 estimates,	 the	 same	 is	 not	 true	 regarding	 the	 labor	
market	 outcomes.	 This	 is	 of	 some	 importance	 here,	 since	 any	 cognitive	
effects	 are	 assumed	 to	 work	 through	 the	 career	 path.	 See	 the	 Appendix,	
section	A.3,	for	the	labor	market	outcomes.	
                                                             
97 For example, Maclean (2012) finds that leaving school in a bad economy predicts significantly 
worse physical functioning and more depressive symptoms for men; for women, she finds no 
significant effect on physical functioning and a lowering of depressive symptoms. 
98 The gender difference in effects is 0.0032 standard deviations with a standard error at 0.0043 = 
(0.00332 + 0.00272)(1/2) standard deviations. 
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4.5.2	Instrumenting	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving,	
model	(2)	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 present	 the	 results	 from	 the	main	 identification	 strategy	
where	 I	 instrument	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 at	 school	 leaving,	 using	 the	
unemployment	rate	at	the	expected	time	of	graduation.	The	unemployment	
rate	at	the	expected	time	of	graduation	is	measured	in	three	ways:	firstly,	as	
the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 year	 when	 you	 are	 expected	 to	 graduate;	
secondly,	as	the	mean	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	two	years	and	thirdly,	
as	the	mean	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	three	years.	In	the	second	and	
third	 case,	 I	 also	 instrument	 the	 corresponding	 two-year	 and	 three-year	
actual	unemployment	rates.	
The	unemployment	 rate	at	 the	expected	 time	of	 graduation	 is	 a	 strong	
instrument:	As	this	unemployment	rate	increases	by	one	percentage	point,	
the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	increases	by	0.65-0.69	percentage	
points	 (depending	on	how	the	unemployment	rate	 is	measured).	The	 first	
stage	 F-values	 are	 large	 by	 any	 standards	 in	 all	 regressions.99	 See	 the	
Appendix,	section	A.4,	for	the	first	stage	estimates.		
The	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 time	 of	 graduation	 is	 also	 a	
significant	predictor	of	your	future	employment	prospects	(see	section	A.5	
in	the	Appendix).	Yet,	the	effects	on	literacy	and	numeracy	are	small	and	only	
marginally	significant	for	literacy	when	I	instrument	the	three-year	average	
unemployment	rate.	Here,	a	1.45	percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemploy-
ment	 rate	 at	 the	 expected	 time	of	 graduation	 increases	 the	actual	 (three-
year)	unemployment	rate	by	one	point,	while	literacy	decreases	slightly	by	
0.006	standard	deviations	(95	%	confidence	interval:	-0.012	to	0.0007).	This	
is	the	instrumental	variables	estimate	also	presented	in	table	3	for	literacy;	
see	section	A.6	in	the	Appendix	for	numeracy.	
Table	3	also	presents	estimates	separately	 for	different	subgroups.	The	
estimated	 cognitive	 decline	 from	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 three-year	 average	
unemployment	rate	 is	somewhat	 larger	 for	men,	 for	older	cohorts	and	for	
those	 with	 tertiary	 degrees.	 None	 of	 the	 group	 differences	 is	 significant,	
however.100	 In	general,	 estimates	are	 small	 and	 insignificant	 in	all	 groups,	
one	 exception	 being	 the	 31-40	 year	 olds:	 here,	 a	 one-percentage	 point	
                                                             
99 As a rule of thumb, F-values should be no lower than 10 (Stock & Yogo, 2002). Here, F-values 
are no lower than 755.  
100 Tested by calculating the standard error for a difference as â𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠?
5 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠D
5, where 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠:  is the 
standard error for the point estimate in subgroup j; j = 0, 1. Example: The difference in effects 
between men and women is 0.0023 standard deviations with a standard error at 
√0.00425 + 0.00455 ≈ 0.0062. 
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4.5.2	Instrumenting	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving,	
model	(2)	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 present	 the	 results	 from	 the	main	 identification	 strategy	
where	 I	 instrument	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 at	 school	 leaving,	 using	 the	
unemployment	rate	at	the	expected	time	of	graduation.	The	unemployment	
rate	at	the	expected	time	of	graduation	is	measured	in	three	ways:	firstly,	as	
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secondly,	as	the	 ean	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	two	years	and	thirdly,	
as	the	mean	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	three	years.	In	the	second	and	
third	 case,	 I	 also	 instrument	 the	 corresponding	 two-year	 and	 three-year	
actual	unemployment	rates.
The	unemployment	 rate	at	 the	expected	 time	of	 graduation	 is	 a	 strong	
instrument:	As	this	unemployment	rate	increases	by	one	percentage	point,	
the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	increases	by	0.65-0.69	percentage	
points	 (depending	on	how	the	unemployment	rate	 is	measured).	The	 first	
stage	 F-values	 are	 large	 by	 any	 standards	 in	 all	 regressions.99	 See	 the	
Appendix,	secti n	A.4,	for	the	first	stage	 s imates.		
The	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 time	 of	 graduation	 is	 also	 a	
significant	predictor	of	your	future	employment	prospects	(see	section	A.5	
in	the	Appendix).	Yet,	the	effects	on	literacy	and	numeracy	are	small	and	only	
marginally	significant	for	literacy	when	I	instrument	the	three-year	average	
unemployment	rate.	Here,	a	1.45	percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemploy-
ment	 rate	 at	 the	 expected	 time	of	 graduation	 increases	 the	actual	 (three-
year)	unemployment	rate	by	one	point,	while	literacy	decreases	slightly	by	
0.006	standard	deviations	(95	%	confidence	interval:	-0.012	to	0.0007).	This	
is	the	instrumental	variables	estimate	also	presented	in	table	3	for	literacy;	
see	section	A.6	in	the	App ndix	for	nume cy.	
Table	3	also	presents	estimates	separately	 for	different	subgroups.	The	
esti ated	 cognitive	 decline	 from	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 three-year	 average	
unemployment	rate	 is	somewhat	 larger	 for	men,	 for	older	cohorts	and	for	
those	 with	 tertiary	 degrees.	 None	 of	 the	 group	 differences	 is	 significant,	
however.100	 In	general,	 estimates	are	 small	 and	 insignificant	 in	all	 groups,	
one	 exception	 being	 the	 31-40	 year	 olds:	 here,	 a	 one-percentage	 point	
                                                             
99 As a rule of thumb, F-values should be no lower than 10 (Stock & Yogo, 2002). Here, F-values 
are no lower than 755.  
100 Tested by calculating the standard error for a difference as â𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠?
5 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠D
5, where 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠:  is the 
standard error for the point estimate in subgroup j; j = 0, 1. Example: The difference in effects 
between men and women is 0.0023 standard deviations with a standard error at 
√0.00425 + 0.00455 ≈ 0.0062. 
 
increase	 in	 the	 three-year	 average	 unemployment	 rate	 predicts	 a	 0.016	
standard	deviation	drop	in	literacy	(p	<	0.01).	
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4.5.2	Instrumenting	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving,	
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unemployment	rate.	Here,	a	1.45	percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemploy-
ment	 rate	 at	 the	 expected	 time	of	 graduation	 increases	 the	actual	 (three-
year)	unemployment	rate	by	one	point,	while	literacy	decreases	slightly	by	
0.006	standard	deviations	(95	%	confidence	interval:	-0.012	to	0.0007).	This	
is	the	instrumental	variables	estimate	also	presented	in	table	3	for	literacy;	
see	section	A.6	in	the	Appendix	for	numeracy.	
Table	3	also	presents	estimates	separately	 for	different	subgroups.	The	
estimated	 cognitive	 decline	 from	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 three-year	 average	
unemployment	rate	 is	somewhat	 larger	 for	men,	 for	older	cohorts	and	for	
those	 with	 tertiary	 degrees.	 None	 of	 the	 group	 differences	 is	 significant,	
however.100	 In	general,	 estimates	are	 small	 and	 insignificant	 in	all	 groups,	
one	 exception	 being	 the	 31-40	 year	 olds:	 here,	 a	 one-percentage	 point	
                                                             
99 As a rule of thumb, F-values should be no lower than 10 (Stock & Yogo, 2002). Here, F-values 
are no lower than 755.  
100 Tested by calculating the standard error for a difference as â𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠?
5 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠D
5, where 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠:  is the 
standard error for the point estimate in subgroup j; j = 0, 1. Example: The difference in effects 
between men and women is 0.0023 standard deviations with a standard error at 
√0.00425 + 0.00455 ≈ 0.0062. 
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in	the	Appendix).	Yet,	the	effects	on	literacy	and	numeracy	are	small	and	only	
marginally	significant	for	literacy	when	I	instrument	the	three-year	average	
unemployment	rate.	Here,	a	1.45	percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemploy-
ment	 rate	 at	 the	 expected	 time	of	 graduation	 increases	 the	actual	 (three-
year)	unemployment	rate	by	one	point,	while	literacy	decreases	slightly	by	
0.006	standard	deviations	(95	%	confidence	interval:	-0.012	to	0.0007).	This	
is	the	instrumental	variables	estimate	also	presented	in	table	3	for	literacy;	
see	section	A.6	in	the	App ndix	for	nume cy.	
Table	3	also	presents	estimates	separately	 for	different	subgroups.	The	
esti ated	 cognitive	 decline	 from	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 three-year	 average	
unemployment	rate	 is	somewhat	 larger	 for	men,	 for	older	cohorts	and	for	
those	 with	 tertiary	 degrees.	 None	 of	 the	 group	 differences	 is	 significant,	
however.100	 In	general,	 estimates	are	 small	 and	 insignificant	 in	all	 groups,	
one	 exception	 being	 the	 31-40	 year	 olds:	 here,	 a	 one-percentage	 point	
                                                             
99 As a rule of thumb, F-values should be no lower than 10 (Stock & Yogo, 2002). Here, F-values 
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increase	 in	 the	 three-year	 average	 unemployment	 rate	 predicts	 a	 0.016	
standard	deviation	drop	in	literacy	(p	<	0.01).	
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Lastly,	I	also	experim
ent	w
ith	using	an	alternative	identification	strategy:	I	
estim
ate	the	effect	of	the	unem
ploym
ent	rate	in	the	year(s)	follow
ing	school	
leaving,	conditional	on	the	unem
ploym
ent	rate	at	school	leaving.	In	other	
w
ords,	I	‘com
pare’	individuals	w
ho	experience	the	sam
e	unem
ploym
ent	rate	
w
hen	they	first	enter	the	labor	m
arket,	but	w
here	som
e	thereafter	experi-
ence	higher	unem
ploym
ent	rates	than	others.	T
his	has	a	significant	effect	on	
your	future	em
ploym
ent	prospects	(see	the	A
ppendix,	section	A
.7).	For	
exam
ple,	a	one-percentage	point	increase	in	the	unem
ploym
ent	rate	in	the	
first	year	follow
ing	school	leaving	predicts	an	increase	in	the	risk	of	not	
having	had	a	paid	job	in	the	last	tw
elve	m
onths	by	0.32	percentage	points	(p	
<	0.05).		
Furtherm
ore,	the	post-graduate	unem
ploym
ent	rate	also	has	significant	
effects	on	literacy	and	num
eracy.	A
s	the	unem
ploym
ent	rate	in	the	first	year	
follow
ing	school-leaving	increases	by	one	percentage	point,	literacy	and	
num
eracy	are	predicted	to	drop	by	roughly	0.01	standard	deviations	(p	<	
0.01).	T
his	effect	is	som
ew
hat	sm
aller,	but	still	highly	significant,	w
hen	the	
post-graduate	unem
ploym
ent	rate	is	m
easured	as	a	tw
o-year	average.	T
hese	
estim
ates	are	presented	in	table	4	for	literacy;	see	section	A
.8	in	the	A
ppendix	
for	num
eracy.	
T
able	4	also	show
s	that	the	estim
ated	cognitive	decline	is	som
ew
hat	
larger	for	m
en	than	for	w
om
en,	and	sm
aller	for	the	oldest	cohort	(41-60	year	
olds).	N
one	of	the	group	differences	is	significant,	how
ever.	
T
able	4	also	reveals	that	individuals	w
ho	leave	school	in	a	year	w
hen	the	
unem
ploym
ent	rate	is	high	are	predicted	to	perform
	significantly	better	on	
literacy	later	on,	conditional	on	the	unem
ploym
ent	rate	in	the	first	year	
follow
ing	school	leaving.	N
ow
,	a	causal	interpretation	of	this	effect	seem
s	far-
fetched.	O
ne	alternative	explanation	is	sorting;	individuals	w
ho	leave	school	
in	a	slow
	econom
y	are	overrepresented	by	high-perform
ers.	In	section	6,	I	
return	to	the	question	of	sorting	and	validity.	
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LITERACY (Z) ALL MEN WOMEN AGE: 
17-30 
(mean: 27) 
AGE: 
31-40 
(mean: 35) 
AGE: 
41-60 
(mean: 45) 
BELOW 
TERTIARY 
TERTIARY 
DEGREE 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
-0.0014 
(0.0033) 
-0.00091 
(0.0045) 
-0.0032 
(0.0044) 
-0.0028 
(0.0067) 
-0.0083 
(0.0057) 
-0.0093 
(0.013) 
0.0042 
(0.0039) 
-0.0056 
(0.0058) 
F.S. F-value (1, 79) 
Mean unemployment, % 
(first two years) 
F.S. F-value (1, 79) 
7542.00 
-0.0034 
(0.0032) 
8948.12 
3534.31 
-0.0040 
(0.0043) 
4460.52 
3833.22 
-0.0038 
(0.0044) 
3849.32 
1456.86 
-0.0045 
(0.0065) 
1492.02 
1940.54 
-0.011** 
(0.0057) 
2540.40 
846.62 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
805.39 
3912.99 
0.0026 
(0.0038) 
5911.76 
3157.52 
-0.0094 
(0.0059) 
3531.62 
Mean unemployment, % 
(first three years) 
F.S. F-value (1, 79) 
Observations 
0.0055* 
(0.0031) 
9988.77 
47,842 
-0.0070 
(0.0042) 
5016.69 
23,391 
-0.0047 
(0.0045) 
4118.33 
24,451 
-0.0044 
(0.0063) 
1424.29 
13,767 
-0.016*** 
(0.0057) 
3255.47 
19,924 
-0.0095 
(0.0099) 
755.36 
14,151 
-0.00035 
(0.0039) 
6261.76 
27,735 
-0.012* 
(0.0061) 
3083.00 
20,107 
Notes: Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include the full set of controls described in section 3.1 and listed in table 1 (as well as 
fixed effects for country). All effects are expressed in standard deviations and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country 
level all nations are given equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and corrected 
for the imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3. The effect of the unemployment rate at school leaving on literacy (2SLS-regressions, see model (2)) 
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4.5.3	The	conditional	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	
year	following	school	leaving,	model	(3)	
Lastly,	I	also	experiment	with	using	an	alternative	identification	strategy:	I	
estimate	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	year(s)	following	school	
leaving,	 conditional	 on	 the	unemployment	 rate	 at	 school	 leaving.	 In	 other	
words,	I	‘compare’	individuals	who	experience	the	same	unemployment	rate	
when	they	first	enter	the	labor	market,	but	where	some	thereafter	experi-
ence	higher	unemployment	rates	than	others.	This	has	a	significant	effect	on	
your	 future	 employment	 prospects	 (see	 the	 Appendix,	 section	 A.7).	 For	
example,	a	one-percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	
first	 year	 following	 school	 leaving	 predicts	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 risk	 of	 not	
having	had	a	paid	job	in	the	last	twelve	months	by	0.32	percentage	points	(p	
<	0.05).		
Furthermore,	the	post-graduate	unemployment	rate	also	has	significant	
effects	on	literacy	and	numeracy.	As	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	year	
following	 school-leaving	 increases	 by	 one	 percentage	 point,	 literacy	 and	
numeracy	are	predicted	 to	drop	by	roughly	0.01	standard	deviations	 (p	<	
0.01).	This	effect	is	somewhat	smaller,	but	still	highly	significant,	when	the	
post-graduate	unemployment	rate	is	measured	as	a	two-year	average.	These	
estimates	are	presented	in	table	4	for	literacy;	see	section	A.8	in	the	Appendix	
for	numeracy.	
Table	 4	 also	 shows	 that	 the	 estimated	 cognitive	 decline	 is	 somewhat	
larger	for	men	than	for	women,	and	smaller	for	the	oldest	cohort	(41-60	year	
olds).	None	of	the	group	differences	is	significant,	however.	
Table	4	also	reveals	that	individuals	who	leave	school	in	a	year	when	the	
unemployment	rate	is	high	are	predicted	to	perform	significantly	better	on	
literacy	 later	 on,	 conditional	 on	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 first	 year	
following	school	leaving.	Now,	a	causal	interpretation	of	this	effect	seems	far-
fetched.	One	alternative	explanation	is	sorting;	individuals	who	leave	school	
in	a	slow	economy	are	overrepresented	by	high-performers.	In	section	6,	I	
return	to	the	question	of	sorting	and	validity.	
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T
he	estim
ates	are	fairly	robust	to	different	specifications	and	sam
ple	selec-
tion	criteria.		I	experim
ent	w
ith	the	follow
ing	six	m
odifications:		
(1)	E
xtended	set	of	controls:	H
ere,	I	allow
	for	all	effects	to	vary	by	country,	
keeping	only	the	effect	of	the	unem
ploym
ent	rate	(and	its	instrum
ent)	
com
m
on.	In	this	specification,	I	also	m
ake	the	follow
ing	adjustm
ents	regar-
ding	functional	form
s:	I	replace	the	age	dum
m
ies	w
ith	polynom
ial	age	trends	
of	the	third	degree,	as	to	save	degrees	of	freedom
.	A
lso,	I	include	‘years	of	
schooling’	non-linearly,	using	a	second	degree	polynom
ial.		
(2)	R
estricted	set	of	controls:	H
ere,	I	only	include	controls	for	country	of	
residence,	age,	gender	and	schooling	(linearly).	
In	the	follow
ing	m
odifications,	I	include	the	sam
e	set	of	covariates	as	in	the	
m
ain	specification:		
(3)	E
xtended	(‘uncleaned’)	sam
ple:	T
he	original	sam
ple	is	restricted	in	tw
o	
im
portant	w
ays:	First,	I	only	use	individuals	w
ho	w
ere	expected	to	graduate	
in	1982	to	2008	(for	som
e	countries	this	tim
e	fram
e	is	shorter).	Secondly,	I	
exclude	individuals	w
ho	are	observed	leaving	school	at	the	age	of	35	or	older.	
H
ere	I	lift	these	restrictions,	w
hich	increases	the	sam
ple	by	~
11,000	
observations.	
(4)	E
xtended	sam
ple	w
ith	adult	students:	T
he	original	sam
ple	excludes	any-
one	w
ho	is	still	in	school.	T
his,	how
ever,	also	excludes	adult	students,	i.e.	
those	w
ho	left	school	years	ago	but	later	re-entered.	H
ere	I	attem
pt	at	
identifying	these	individuals:	I	reinstate	those	w
ho	are	currently	enrolled	in	
an	educational	program
	if	they	are	at	least	30	years	old	an
d	earned	their	
highest	degree	or	dropped	out	at	least	ten	years	ago.	T
his	increases	the	
sam
ple	by	~
1,700	observations.	
(5)	N
ew
	instrum
ent:	H
ere	I	exchange	the	instrum
ent	for	the	average	
unem
ploym
ent	rate	m
easured	at	the	age	of	18	to	20,	and	restrict	the	sam
ple	
to	individuals	w
ith	an	upper-secondary	degree	at	the	very	least,	including	
also	individuals	w
ho	dropped	out	from
	such	a	program
.	
(6)	Log-specification:	H
ere	I	m
easure	the	unem
ploym
ent	rate	on	a	logarith-
m
ic	scale	(the	natural	logarithm
).	I	calculate	the	average	unem
ploym
ent	rate	
by	taking	the	m
ean	of	the	logarithm
ic	unem
ploym
ent	rates	(as	opposed	to	
the	logarithm
	of	the	m
ean).		
T
he	results	from
	these	m
odified	regressions	are	presented	in	table	5,	
together	w
ith	the	m
ain	specification	(0).	H
ere	I	only	use	literacy	as	outcom
e,	
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LITERACY (Z) ALL MEN WOMEN AGE: 
17-30 
(mean: 27) 
AGE: 
31-40 
(mean: 35) 
AGE: 
41-60 
(mean: 45) 
BELOW 
TERTIARY 
TERTIARY 
Unemployment, % 
(year after leaving school) 
-0.013*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.015** 
(0.0059) 
-0.010** 
(0.0052) 
-0.011 
(0.0067) 
-0.011* 
(0.0063) 
0.0065 
(0.015) 
-0.016** 
(0.0062) 
-0.013** 
(0.0059) 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
Mean unemployment, % 
(1st & 2nd year after) 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
Observations 
0.0098** 
(0.0043) 
-0.011*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0062* 
(0.0033) 
47,842 
0.0098 
(0.0061) 
-0.013*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0065 
(0.0048) 
23,391 
0.0079 
(0.0053) 
-0.0079* 
(0.0041) 
0.0048 
(0.0040) 
24,451 
0.0060 
(0.0081) 
-0.0080 
(0.0054) 
0.0026 
(0.0065) 
13,767 
0.0083 
(0.0069) 
-0.0084* 
(0.0050) 
0.0051 
(0.0056) 
19,924 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
0.00024 
(0.012) 
-0.0090 
(0.013) 
14,151 
0.014** 
(0.0061) 
-0.013*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0096* 
(0.0046) 
27,735 
0.010 
(0.0062) 
-0.011** 
(0.0045) 
0.0074 
(0.0047) 
20,107 
Notes: Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include the full set of controls described in section 3.1 and listed in table 1 (as well as 
fixed effects for country). All effects are expressed in standard deviations and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country 
level all nations are given equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and corrected 
for the imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. The effect of the unemployment rate measured after leaving school, conditional on the unemployment rate in the 
year of leaving. Outcome: Literacy (WLS-estimates, model (3)) 
108
110 
 
4.5.4	Robustness	
The	estimates	are	fairly	robust	to	different	specifications	and	sample	selec-
tion	criteria.		I	experiment	with	the	following	six	modifications:		
(1)	Extended	set	of	controls:	Here,	I	allow	for	all	effects	to	vary	by	country,	
keeping	 only	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 (and	 its	 instrument)	
common.	In	this	specification,	I	also	make	the	following	adjustments	regar-
ding	functional	forms:	I	replace	the	age	dummies	with	polynomial	age	trends	
of	the	third	degree,	as	to	save	degrees	of	freedom.	Also,	I	 include	‘years	of	
schooling’	non-linearly,	using	a	second	degree	polynomial.		
(2)	Restricted	 set	 of	 controls:	Here,	 I	 only	 include	 controls	 for	 country	 of	
residence,	age,	gender	and	schooling	(linearly).	
In	the	following	modifications,	I	include	the	same	set	of	covariates	as	in	the	
main	specification:		
(3)	Extended	(‘uncleaned’)	sample:	The	original	sample	is	restricted	in	two	
important	ways:	First,	I	only	use	individuals	who	were	expected	to	graduate	
in	1982	to	2008	(for	some	countries	this	time	frame	is	shorter).	Secondly,	I	
exclude	individuals	who	are	observed	leaving	school	at	the	age	of	35	or	older.	
Here	 I	 lift	 these	 restrictions,	 which	 increases	 the	 sample	 by	 ~11,000	
observations.	
(4)	Extended	sample	with	adult	students:	The	original	sample	excludes	any-
one	who	 is	 still	 in	 school.	This,	 however,	 also	 excludes	adult	 students,	 i.e.	
those	 who	 left	 school	 years	 ago	 but	 later	 re-entered.	 Here	 I	 attempt	 at	
identifying	these	individuals:	I	reinstate	those	who	are	currently	enrolled	in	
an	educational	program	 if	 they	are	at	 least	30	years	old	and	earned	 their	
highest	 degree	 or	 dropped	 out	 at	 least	 ten	 years	 ago.	 This	 increases	 the	
sample	by	~1,700	observations.	
(5)	 New	 instrument:	 Here	 I	 exchange	 the	 instrument	 for	 the	 average	
unemployment	rate	measured	at	the	age	of	18	to	20,	and	restrict	the	sample	
to	 individuals	with	an	upper-secondary	degree	at	 the	very	 least,	 including	
also	individuals	who	dropped	out	from	such	a	program.	
(6)	Log-specification:	Here	I	measure	the	unemployment	rate	on	a	logarith-
mic	scale	(the	natural	logarithm).	I	calculate	the	average	unemployment	rate	
by	taking	the	mean	of	the	logarithmic	unemployment	rates	(as	opposed	to	
the	logarithm	of	the	mean).		
The	 results	 from	 these	modified	 regressions	 are	 presented	 in	 table	 5,	
together	with	the	main	specification	(0).	Here	I	only	use	literacy	as	outcome,	
109
111 
 
and	apply	the	modifications	to	all	three	identification	strategies,	presented	
separately	by	panel.	
The	estimates	are	fairly	insensitive	to	the	chosen	set	of	controls.	For	the	
IV-estimator,	 I	 observe	 no	 statistically	 significant	 differences	 in	 point	
estimates	between	the	main	specification	(0)	and	the	specification	with	the	
extended	 set	 of	 controls	 (1),	 nor	 between	 the	 extended	 set	 (1)	 and	 the	
restricted	set	(2).101	This	is	of	some	importance	here,	as	instrumental	validity	
is	 not,	 a	 priori,	 assumed	 to	 be	 conditional	 on	 controlling	 for	 other	 back-
ground	factors,	such	as	parental	education	levels.	For	the	other	two	identi-
fication	 strategies,	 estimates	 are	 also	 fairly	 stable	 between	 these	 speci-
fications.	
Modifications	 (3)	 and	 (4)	 exploit	 extended	 samples,	 with	 IV-estimates	
being	more	pronounced	in	sample	(3)	and	somewhat	suppressed	in	sample	
(4).	Taken	together,	I	regard	these	modifications	to	strengthen	the	case	for	a	
cognitive	decline,	if	anything.		
Perhaps	 the	 strongest	 argument	against	a	 cognitive	decline	 is	 given	by	
specification	(6)	which	measures	the	unemployment	rate	on	a	 logarithmic	
scale.	Here,	effect	sizes	are	smaller	and	insignificant	when	combined	with	the	
IV-estimator.102	Also,	using	the	alternative	instrument	(5)	fails	to	provide	any	
additional	support	for	a	cognitive	decline.	
	
                                                             
101 Compare the main specification (0) to the one with an extended set of controls (1). The 
difference in point estimates at 0.0017 standard deviations is insignificant, as the standard 
deviation for this difference is given by ä𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝛽𝛽v(D)) + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝛽𝛽v(?)) − 2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶õ𝛽𝛽v(D), 𝛽𝛽v(?)ú which is 
estimated to be 0.0014 standard deviations or higher. Here, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶õ𝛽𝛽v(D), 𝛽𝛽v(?)ú is unknown, but it can 
be no larger than ä𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝛽𝛽v(D)) ∙ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝛽𝛽v(?)). In any case, the difference at 0.0017 standard 
deviations is insignificant. Similarly, the difference in point estimates at 0.0027 standard deviations 
comparing specification (1) and (2) is, at most, marginally significant. 
102 An increase in the average unemployment rate from eight to nine percent predicts a loss in 
literacy by 0.0055 standard deviations (se: 0.0031) using specification (0) and a loss by 0.0038 
standard deviations (se: 0.0034) using specification (6).  
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1. ‘Standard 
regressions’ 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mean unemploymenta 
(three years) 
-0.0051** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0043* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0047** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0062*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0044** 
(0.0021) 
- -0.036* 
(0.019) 
Observations 47,842 47,842 47,842 59,251 49,584  47,842 
2. IV (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mean unemploymenta 
(three years) 
First stage F-value (1,79) 
Observations 
-0.0055* 
(0.0031) 
9988.77 
47,842 
-0.0072 
(0.0045) 
3344.43 
47,842 
-0.0045 
(0.0031) 
10,022.79 
47,842 
-0.0088*** 
(0.0025) 
9584.16 
59,251 
-0.0045 
(0.0030) 
10,360.79 
49,584 
-0.0036 
(0.0062) 
1665.25 
46,702 
-0.032 
(0.029) 
15,420.37 
47,842 
3. Conditional 
unemployment 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Mean unemploymenta 
(1st & 2nd year after) 
Unemploymenta 
(year of leaving school) 
Observations 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0062* 
(0.0033) 
47,842 
 
-0.0086*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0050 
(0.0035) 
47,842 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0064* 
(0.0034) 
47,842 
 
-0.0098*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0040 
(0.0028) 
59,251 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0071** 
(0.0032) 
49,584 
 
- 
 
 
-0.081*** 
(0.027) 
0.047* 
(0.026) 
47,842 
Notes: aMean unemployment is the average unemployment rate (%) measured over three years, starting from the year of leaving school. The exception is 
specification (5) where the unemployment rate is measured on a logarithmic scale (the same goes for the instrument). (0) is the main specification, (1) uses an 
extended set of controls, (2) uses a restricted set of controls, (3) and (4) use an extended samples, (5) uses an alternative instrument (the mean unemployment rate 
at age 18-20) and (6) uses a logarithmic scale. All effects are expressed in standard deviations and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; 
on a cross-country level all nations are given equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling 
weights and corrected for the imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5. Robustness: The effect of the unemployment rate at school leaving on literacy using alternative specifications, 
samples and/or instruments  
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4.6		VALIDITY	
In	 this	 study,	 I	 contrast	 three	 empirical	 strategies	 relying	 on	 different	
assumptions.	Here,	I	test	these	assumptions	indirectly.	The	first	 identifica-
tion	 strategy	 relies	 on	measuring	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 at	
school	 leaving,	 adjusted	 for	 observable	 confounders.	 The	 validity	 of	 this	
strategy	 is	 called	 into	 question	 if	 individuals	 postpone	 or	 prepone	 school	
leaving	depending	on	the	state	of	the	labor	market.	The	second	identification	
strategy	instruments	the	school	leaving	unemployment	rate	using	the	unem-
ployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 time	of	 graduation.	The	 validity	 of	 this	 ap-
proach	 becomes	 questionable	 if	 individuals	 also	 choose	 their	 expected	
school	leaving	date	strategically.	This	would	be	the	case	if	students	forgo,	or	
enroll	in,	educational	programs	depending	on	labor	market	conditions.		
A	couple	of	 studies	have	 investigated	 these	hypotheses,	usually	 finding	
evidence	of	such	effects	(see,	for	example,	Betts	&	McFarland,	1995;	Hersh-
bein,	2012	and	Kahn,	2009).	For	example,	Betts	&	McFarland	find	that	a	one-
percent	 increase	 in	 the	 adult	 unemployment	 rate	 increases	 full-time	
attendance	 at	 American	 community	 colleges	 by	 four	 percent,	 which	 also	
carries	 over	 to	 degrees	 earned.	 The	 research	 evidence	 is	 not	 entirely	
streamlined,	however.	Johnson	(2013)	finds	that	American	graduate	school	
enrollments	 are	 only	 countercyclical	 for	women,	 but	 procyclical	 for	men.	
Raaum	&	Røed	(2006)	use	Norwegian	data	and	find	that	students	at	age	16	
and	19	postpone	graduation	when	local	unemployment	rates	are	high,	but	
find	no	evidence	of	effects	on	educational	attainment.		
The	current	data	also	provides	evidence	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	
that	 individuals	 choose	 their	 school	 leaving	 date	 strategically,	 at	 least	 to	
some	degree.	I	test	for	this	by	running	several	logit-regressions,	estimating	
the	probability	of	continuing	your	studies	as	a	function	of	the	unemployment	
rate.	 First,	 I	 select	 everyone	who	was	 still	 in	 school	 at	 the	 age	 of	 16	 and	
measure	whether	they	continued	studying	beyond	that.	To	this	end,	I	restrict	
the	sample	to	individuals	who	are	‘currently’	at	least	30	years	old.103	I	regard	
you	as	having	continued	your	studies	if	you	earned	your	highest	degree	or	
dropped	out	at	the	age	of	17	or	later.	I	also	control	for	country	of	residence,	
age	 (using	 a	 second-degree	 polynomial),	 gender,	 immigration	 status	 and	
parental	 education	 levels.	 I	 repeat	 this	 exercise,	 using	 the	 same	 sample	
selection	criteria,	 for	 individuals	who	were	still	 in	school	at	 the	age	of	17,	
then	18,	and	so	on,	up	to	age	25.	The	result	is	presented	in	table	6.	
                                                             
103 I choose to create this ‘data gap’ for the intervening ages, as to avoid having to code the 
outcome based on your ‘current’ status as a student or non-student. Instead, I can use the same 
coding criteria for everyone independently of age, by applying the assumption that anyone who 
continued studying would have either earned a higher degree or dropped out by the age of 30.  
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 X = 16 X = 17 X = 18 X = 19 X = 20 X = 21 X = 22 X = 23 X = 24 X = 25 
Unemployment, % 
(at age X) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
0.039*** 
(0.012) 
0.0090 
(0.0090) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.0000076 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.0075 
(0.013) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.0021 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
Continued studying, % 
Observations 
95.6 
34,889 
93.3 
35,546 
81.8 
35,354 
85.8 
30,894 
88.6 
27,465 
89.6 
25,541 
85.2 
23,812 
83.5 
21,291 
82.8 
19,023 
81.6 
16,985 
 X = 16 X = 17 X = 18 X = 19 X = 20 X = 21 X = 22 X = 23 X = 24 X = 25 
Mean unemployment, % 
(at age X, X+1 & X+2) 
-0.018 
(0.020) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
0.025** 
(0.0097) 
-0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.00083 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
0.031*** 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.035** 
(0.013) 
Observations 34,889 35,546 35,354 30,894 27,465 25,541 23,812 21,291 19,023 16,985 
 X = 16 X = 17 X = 18 X = 19 X = 20 X = 21 X = 22 X = 23 X = 24 X = 25 
Mean unemployment, % 
(at age X+1 & X+2) 
0.0084 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
0.045*** 
(0.016) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
0.0029 
(0.019) 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
0.042* 
(0.022) 
-0.024 
(0.020) 
0.025 
(0.018) 
0.060*** 
(0.018) 
Unemployment, % 0.0098 0.014 -0.023 0.043*** -0.0022 0.031 -0.026 0.055*** -0.015 -0.029 
(at age X) 
Joint sig., F(2, 78) 
Observations 
(0.022) 
0.48 
34,889 
(0.021) 
7.18*** 
35,546 
(0.015) 
4.81** 
35,354 
(0.016) 
5.27*** 
30,894 
(0.018) 
0.01 
27,465 
(0.019) 
1.77 
25,541 
(0.021) 
1.86 
23,812 
(0.021) 
5.21*** 
21,291 
(0.019) 
1.18 
19,023 
(0.018) 
5.99*** 
16,985 
Notes: All regressions control for country of residence, age, gender, immigration status and parental education levels. All effects are expressed as log odds ratios 
and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all nations are given equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors 
(in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6. The probability of continuing your studies for those who were still in school at age X, as a function of the 
unemployment rate in that year and later (logit coefficients)  
113
116 
 
Typically,	 the	unemployment	 rate	 is	positively	 associated	with	 the	proba-
bility	of	continuing	your	studies	(see	the	top	and	middle	panel	of	table	6).	For	
those	 who	 were	 still	 in	 school	 at	 age	 17,	 18,	 23	 or	 25,	 this	 positive	
relationship	 is	 significant,	 although	 sometimes	 only	 when	 the	 unemploy-
ment	rate	is	measured	as	a	three-year	average	(see	the	middle	panel).	For	
example,	at	 the	age	of	17,	93.3	percent	of	 students	continue	 their	 studies.	
Hence,	 a	 deep	 recession,	 increasing	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 by	 five	
percentage	points	in	that	year,	is	predicted	to	postpone	school	leaving	for	11	
out	of	1000	students.104	For	those	who	were	still	in	school	at	age	19,	however,	
the	effect	is	significantly	negative.	It	is	not	fully	clear	why	this	would	be	the	
case,	 but	 here	 is	 one	 possibility:	 Unemployment	 rates	 are	 known	 to	 be	
strongly	 auto-correlated.	 Perhaps	 a	 high	 unemployment	 rate	 at	 age	 18	
postponed	graduation	for	a	group	of	students,	who	then	graduated	at	the	age	
of	19	while	the	unemployment	rate	was	still	high.	This	could	be	the	case	if	
further	 postponement	 is	 especially	 costly	 at	 this	 age,	 perhaps	 demanding	
entry	 into	 tertiary	programs.	This	 idea	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
unemployment	rate	at	age	19	 loses	any	predictive	power,	once	 the	unem-
ployment	 rate	 in	 the	 previous	 year	 is	 controlled	 for	 (not	 reported	 in	 the	
table).	
Table	6	also	shows	that	there	is	some	evidence	that	students	respond	to	
future	unemployment	rates	(see	the	bottom	panel	of	table	6).	For	example,	
students	who	will	experience	high	future	unemployment	rates	if	they	leave	
school	at	age	18	are	significantly	more	likely	to	stay	in	school,	conditional	on	
the	current	unemployment	rate.	This	could	reflect	a	tendency	to	re-enter	the	
educational	system	for	 individuals	with	 little	 labor	market	success.	 In	any	
case,	this	has	implications	for	this	study,	as	one	identification	strategy	relies	
on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 future	 unemployment	 rate	 is	 exogenous	
(conditional	on	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving).	This	exercise	does	
weaken	the	support	for	this	assumption.	
Even	 if	 these	 data	 provide	 evidence	 of	 students	 choosing	 their	 school	
leaving	 date	 strategically,	 I	 find	 no	 evidence	 of	 them	 also	 choosing	 their	
expected	 school	 leaving	 date	 strategically.	 I	 test	 this	 by	 firstly	 selecting	
everyone	with	 an	 upper-secondary	 degree	 that	 are	 ‘currently’	 at	 least	 30	
years	old.	 I	predict	 the	probability	of	having	a	post-secondary	degree	as	a	
function	of	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	year	when	you	were	expected	to	
graduate	 from	 upper-secondary	 school.	 I	 control	 for	 the	 same	 set	 of	
covariates	 as	 earlier.	 I	 repeat	 this	 exercise	 for	 everyone	with	a	bachelor’s	
                                                             
104 First, 933 out of 1000 students continue their studies, i.e. the odds of continuing is 933/67 = 
13.925… . If the unemployment rate increases by one percentage point, the odds of continuing 
increases by a factor of exp(0.039); if the unemployment rate increases by five percentage points, 
the odds increases by a factor of exp(0.039)5 = 1.215… . Hence, the odds of continuing is now 
16.923…, which is roughly equal to 944 students out of 1000.  
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degree.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 is	 unable	 to	 significantly	
predict	the	event	of	earning	a	higher	degree	(or	dropping	out	from	a	higher	
educational	program).	See	section	A.9	in	the	Appendix.	
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4.7		CONCLUSIONS	
Graduating	in	a	bad	economy	is	potentially	harmful	for	your	future	cognitive	
functioning.	As	 judged	from	these	data,	such	an	effect	 is	 likely	to	be	small,	
however.	 The	 main	 estimate	 from	 the	 instrumental	 variables	 approach	
suggests	that	a	one-percentage	point	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate	at	
school	leaving	decreases	literacy	by	0.006	standard	deviations,	with	an	even	
smaller	effect	on	numeracy.	Here,	the	unemployment	rate	is	measured	as	a	
three-year	average,	starting	from	the	year	of	 leaving	school;	outcomes	are	
measured	 1-34	 years	 after	 leaving	 school	 (mean:	 14	 years).	 To	 make	 it	
concrete,	 Finnish	 students	 who	 graduated	 in	 1988	 experienced	 a	 labor	
market	 where	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 averaged	 at	 3.5	 percent	 over	 the	
following	three	years	(1988-1990).	For	those	who	graduated	five	years	later,	
in	 1992,	 the	 corresponding	 unemployment	 rate	 was	 16.2	 percent.	 This	
massive	change	in	employment	prospects	is	predicted	to	have	only	a	modest	
effect	on	your	future	literacy	performance,	equal	to	a	loss	at	0.07	standard	
deviations	or	roughly	two	percentile	points.		
It	can	be	noted,	however,	that	a	conservative	interpretation	of	the	data,	
heavily	punishing	a	type	one	error,	would	also	make	room	for	a	null	effect:	
Firstly,	the	IV-estimate	is	only	marginally	significant.	Furthermore,	the	effect	
becomes	smaller	and	insignificant	when	combining	the	IV-estimator	with	a	
log-specification.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	however,	the	mere	fact	that	the	
estimate	 is	 close	 to	 zero,	makes	 its	 existence	 sensitive	 to	 the	 influence	 of	
confounders.	 The	 validity	 tests	 do	 support	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 students	
choosing	their	school	leaving	date	strategically.	It	is	also	possible	that	they	
choose	 their	 expected	 school	 leaving	 date	 strategically,	 at	 least	 to	 some	
degree,	although	 I	 find	no	evidence	 for	 this	 in	 the	data.	 In	either	case,	 the	
unemployment	rate	at	graduation	is	likely	to	be	an	economically	unimpor-
tant	 factor	 for	 explaining	 the	 cohort-to-cohort	 variation	 in	 literacy	 and	
numeracy	among	adults	later	in	life.	
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Appendix	
A.1	Median	age	at	graduation	
	
Table A1. Median age at graduation, by educational degree 
Country 
 
Prim. Sec. 
low. 
Sec. 
upp. 
short 
Sec. 
upp. 
long 
Post 
sec. 
Tert. 
prof. 
Bach. Mast. Res. 
Belgium 14 15 - 18 19 21 22 23 29 
Chile 14 15 - 18 - 23 25 29 29a 
Cyprus - 15 - 18 - 21 24 25 30 
Czech R. - 15 18 19 21 23 24 25 26 
Denmark - 16 21 21 22 25 26 27 29 
Finland 15 16 - 19 24 23 25 27 29 
France 14 16 - 18 - 22 23 24 27 
Greece - 15 - 18 21 23 24 25 25a 
Ireland 14 16 - 18 20 22 23 25 27 
Israel - 15 - 18 - 22 26 28 28a 
Italy - 14 17 19 23 - 26 28 28a 
Japan - 15 18 18 19 20 22 24 24a 
Korea - 16 - 19 - 23 25 27 31 
Lithuania - 16 - 18 20 22 23 24 25a 
Netherl. - 16 - 19 - 23 23 26 31 
Norway - 16 19 20 22 24 25 26 31 
Poland 15 15 - 20 21 - 23 25 25a 
Russia 15 16 - 17 19 20 22 23 25 
Slovakia 15 15 18 19 22 - 23 24 27 
Slovenia 14 15 18 19 - 25 25 28 30 
Spain 14 16 18 18 21 20 23 24 30 
Sweden 15 16 16 19 22 24 25 26 29 
Turkey - 15 - 18 - 22 23 24 25a 
United K. - 17 16 18 - 22 23b 23b - 
Notes: Prim. = Primary education (ISCED 1). Sec. low. = Lower secondary school (ISCED 2). 
Sec.upp. short = Upper secondary school short (ISCED 3C less than two years). Sec. upp long 
= Upper secondary school long (ISCED 3C two years or more, ISCED 3A-B or ISCED 3 two 
years or more without distinction A-B-C, depending on country; for a country represented by 
at least two of these categories, the most abundant one is reported). Post sec. = Post-
secondary, non-tertiary degree (ISCED 4C, ISCED 4A-B or ISCED 4 without distinction A-B-C, 
depending on country. For a country represented by at least two of these categories, the most 
abundant one is reported). Tert. prof. = Tertiary degree, professional (ISCED 5B). Bach. = 
Bachelor (ISCED 5A bachelor) or bBachelor/Master (ISCED 5A bachelor-master without 
distinction). Mast. = Master (ISCED 5A, master) or bBachelor/Master (ISCED 5A without 
distinction). Res. = Research degree (ISCED 6) alternatively aMaster/Research (ISCED 5A 
master & ISCED 6 without distinction).   
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NUMERACY (Z) ALL MEN WOMEN AGE: 
17-30 
(mean: 27) 
AGE: 
31-40 
(mean: 35) 
AGE: 
41-60 
(mean: 45) 
BELOW 
TERTIARY 
TERTIARY 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
-
0.00058 
(0.0021) 
-0.0015 
(0.0032) 
0.00010 
(0.0027) 
-0.0054 
(0.0046) 
0.0011 
(0.0032) 
-0.010* 
(0.0057) 
0.00092 
(0.0028) 
-0.0019 
(0.0036) 
Mean unemployment, % 
(first two years) 
Mean unemployment, % 
(first three years) 
Observations 
-0.0021 
(0.0022) 
-0.0032 
(0.0023) 
47,842 
-0.0035 
(0.0033) 
-0.0052 
(0.0034) 
23,391 
-0.00066 
(0.0027) 
-0.00093 
(0.0028) 
24,451 
-0.0069 
(0.0046) 
-0.0077 
(0.0046) 
13,767 
-0.00039 
(0.0033) 
-0.0011 
(0.0034) 
19,924 
-0.0087* 
(0.0050) 
-0.0092* 
(0.0049) 
14,151 
-0.0010 
(0.0028) 
-0.0023 
(0.0028) 
27,735 
-0.0033 
(0.0036) 
-0.0045 
(0.0036) 
20,107 
Notes: Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include the full set of controls listed in table 1 as well as fixed effects for country. All 
effects are expressed in standard deviations and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country level, all nations are given 
equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and further corrected for the imputation 
variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. The effect of the unemployment rate at school leaving on numeracy (WLS-regressions, model (1)) 
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A.2		The	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	on	
numeracy,	model	(1)	
Summary	of	table	A2:	The	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	has	no	signif-
icant	 effect	 on	numeracy	 in	 any	 sample,	 independently	 of	 how	 the	unem-
ployment	 rate	 is	measured	 (at	 the	 year	 of	 leaving	 school,	 or	 as	 a	 two-	 or	
three-year	average).	
A.3		Predicting	employment	prospects	as	a	function	of	the	
unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	(WLS-regressions)	
Summary	 of	 table	 A3:	 As	 the	 three-year	 average	 unemployment	 rate	 at	
school	leaving	increases	by	one	percentage	point,	the	risk	of	not	having	had	
a	paid	job	in	the	last	year	increases	by	0.35	percentage	points	(p	<	0.01)	and	
the	risk	of	never	having	had	a	paid	job	increases	by	0.19	percentage	points	
(p	<	0.01).	Estimates	are	similar,	but	somewhat	smaller	in	magnitude,	when	
the	unemployment	rate	is	measured	as	a	one-	or	two-year	average.		
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Table A3. The effect of the unemployment rate at school leaving on 
labor market outcomes (WLS-regressions) 
 No paid job 
(last 12 months) 
No paid job ever 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving)  
0.0027*** 
(0.00080) 
0.0013*** 
(0.00047) 
Mean unemployment 
(first two years) 
Mean unemployment 
(first three years) 
Observations 
0.0031*** 
(0.00084) 
0.0035*** 
(0.00086) 
47,834 
0.0016*** 
(0.00047) 
0.0019*** 
(0.00049) 
47,837 
Notes: Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include the full 
set of controls described in section 3.1 and listed in table 1 (including also country fixed 
effects). All effects are weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a 
cross-country level all countries are given equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors 
(in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.4		First	stage	estimates	
Summary	 of	 table	 A4:	 As	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 year	 of	
graduation	increases	by	one	percentage	point,	the	actual	unemployment	rate	
increases	by	0.65	percentage	points.	This	relationship	is	strong	with	an	F-
value	at	7542	(df	=	1,	79).	The	relationships	are	similar	when	the	unemploy-
ment	rate	is	measured	as	a	two-	or	three-year	average.	
		
	
FIRST STAGE  Actual 
unemployment  
(first year) 
Actual 
unemployment  
(first 2 years) 
Actual 
unemployment 
(first 3 years) 
 
Expected 
unemploymenta 
 
0.65*** 
(0.0075) 
 
0.67*** 
(0.0071) 
 
0.69*** 
(0.0069) 
F-value (1, 79) 
Observations 
7542.00 
47,842 
8948.12 
47,842 
9988.77 
47,842 
aExpected unemployment is the unemployment rate (%) in the expected time of graduation. This is 
measured in three ways: as the unemployment rate in the year when you are expected to graduate 
(with the corresponding estimate presented in the first column); as the mean unemployment rate in 
the first two years (second column) and as the mean unemployment rate in the first three years (third 
column). All regressions include the full set of controls described in section 3.1 and listed in table 1 
(including also country fixed effects). All effects are weighted as to account for the country-specific 
survey designs; on a cross-country level all countries are given equal weights in all regressions. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
A.5		Predicting	employment	prospects	as	a	function	of	the	
unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	(IV-estimates)	
Summary	of	table	A5:	As	the	three-year	average	unemployment	rate	in	the	
expected	time	of	graduation	increases	by	1.45	percentage	points,	the	corres-
ponding	actual	unemployment	rate	increases	by	one	point	(p	<	0.01)	and	the	
risk	of	not	having	had	a	paid	job	in	the	last	year	increases	by	0.30	percentage	
points	 (p	 <	 0.05).	 Furthermore,	 the	 risk	 of	 never	 having	 had	 a	 paid	 job	
increases	by	0.21	percentage	points	 (p	<	0.01).	 The	 effects	 are	 smaller	 in	
magnitude	–	and	generally	 insignificant	–	when	the	unemployment	rate	 is	
measured	 as	 a	 one-	 or	 two-year	 average.	 All	 effects	 are	 adjusted	 for	 the	
covariates	described	in	section	3.1.	
	
	
Table A4. First stage estimates 
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A.4		First	stage	estimates	
Summary	 of	 table	 A4:	 As	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 expected	 year	 of	
graduation	increases	by	one	percentage	point,	the	actual	unemployment	rate	
increases	by	0.65	percentage	points.	This	relationship	is	strong	with	an	F-
value	at	7542	(df	=	1,	79).	The	relationships	are	similar	when	the	unemploy-
ment	rate	is	measured	as	a	two-	or	three-year	average.	
		
	
FIRST STAGE  Actual 
unemployment  
(first year) 
Actual 
unemployment  
(first 2 years) 
Actual 
unemployment 
(first 3 years) 
 
Expected 
unemploymenta 
 
0.65*** 
(0.0075) 
 
0.67*** 
(0.0071) 
 
0.69*** 
(0.0069) 
F-value (1, 79) 
Observations 
7542.00 
47,842 
8948.12 
47,842 
9988.77 
47,842 
aExpected unemployment is the unemployment rate (%) in the expected time of graduation. This is 
measured in three ways: as the unemployment rate in the year when you are expected to graduate 
(with the corresponding estimate presented in the first column); as the mean unemployment rate in 
the first two years (second column) and as the mean unemployment rate in the first three years (third 
column). All regressions include the full set of controls described in section 3.1 and listed in table 1 
(including also country fixed effects). All effects are weighted as to account for the country-specific 
survey designs; on a cross-country level all countries are given equal weights in all regressions. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
A.5		Predicting	employment	prospects	as	a	function	of	the	
unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	(IV-estimates)	
Summary	of	table	A5:	As	the	three-year	average	unemployment	rate	in	the	
expected	time	of	graduation	increases	by	1.45	percentage	points,	the	corres-
ponding	actual	unemployment	rate	increases	by	one	point	(p	<	0.01)	and	the	
risk	of	not	having	had	a	paid	job	in	the	last	year	increases	by	0.30	percentage	
points	 (p	 <	 0.05).	 Furthermore,	 the	 risk	 of	 never	 having	 had	 a	 paid	 job	
increases	by	0.21	percentage	points	 (p	<	0.01).	 The	 effects	 are	 smaller	 in	
magnitude	–	and	generally	 insignificant	–	when	the	unemployment	rate	 is	
measured	 as	 a	 one-	 or	 two-year	 average.	 All	 effects	 are	 adjusted	 for	 the	
covariates	described	in	section	3.1.	
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A.6		The	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	on	
numeracy,	2SLS-estimates	
Summary	of	table	A6:	I	find	no	significant	effects	of	the	unemployment	rate	
at	 school	 leaving	 on	 numeracy	 when	 using	 the	 instrumental	 variables	
approach.	Estimates	are	generally	 small	 in	magnitude	as	 compared	 to	 the	
corresponding	WLS-estimates,	and	small	 in	magnitude	as	compared	to	the	
corresponding	literacy-estimates.
Table A5. The effect of the school leaving unemployment rate on 
employment prospects (IV-regressions) 
 No job 
last 12 months 
No job  
ever 
Unemployment, %  
(year of leaving)  
0.0019 
(0.0012) 
0.00089 
(0.00061) 
 
Mean unemployment, % 
(first two years) 
 
Mean unemployment; % 
(first three years) 
 
Observations 
 
0.0024* 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0030** 
(0.0012) 
 
47,834 
 
0.0014** 
(0.00061) 
 
0.0021*** 
(0.00063) 
 
47,837 
Notes: All regressions include the full set of controls described in section 3.1 and listed in table 
1 (including also country fixed effects). All effects are weighted as to account for the country-
specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all countries are given equal weights in all 
regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling 
weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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NUMERACY (Z) ALL MEN WOMEN AGE: 
17-30 
(mean: 27) 
AGE: 
31-40 
(mean: 35) 
AGE: 
41-60 
(mean: 45) 
BELOW 
TERTIARY 
TERTIARY 
 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving 
school) 
 
0.00057 
(0.0035) 
 
0.0020 
(0.0045) 
 
-0.0019 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0020 
(0.0068) 
 
-0.0032 
(0.0058) 
 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
 
0.0049 
(0.0041) 
 
-0.0041 
(0.0051) 
F.S. F-value (1, 79) 
 
Mean 
unemployment, % 
(first two years) 
F.S. F-value (1, 79) 
7542.00 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0034) 
8948.12 
3534.31 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0043) 
4460.52 
3833.22 
 
-0.0018 
(0.0049) 
3849.32 
1456.86 
 
-0.0031 
(0.0066) 
1492.02 
1940.54 
 
-0.0052 
(0.0059) 
2540.40 
846.62 
 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
805.39 
3912.99 
 
0.0033 
(0.0040) 
5911.76 
3157.52 
 
-0.0069 
(0.0051) 
3531.62 
 
Mean 
unemployment, % 
(first three years) 
F.S. F-value (1, 79) 
Observations 
 
-0.0029 
(0.0033) 
9988.77 
47,842 
 
-0.0042 
(0.0043) 
5016.69 
23,391 
 
-0.0021 
(0.0049) 
4118.33 
24,451 
 
-0.0042 
(0.0063) 
1424.29 
13,767 
 
-0.0079 
(0.0060) 
3255.47 
19,924 
 
-0.0067 
(0.0098) 
755.36 
14,151 
 
0.00069 
(0.0041) 
6261.76 
27,735 
 
-0.0085 
(0.0052) 
3083.00 
20,107 
Notes: Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions include the full set of controls listed in table 1 as well as fixed effects for country. All 
effects are expressed in standard deviations and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all nations are given 
equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and corrected for the imputation 
variance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A6. The effect of the unemployment rate at school leaving on numeracy (2SLS-regressions, see model (2)) 
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A.7		Predicting	labor	market	outcomes	as	a	function	of	the	
unemployment	rate	in	the	year(s)	following	school	leaving,	
conditional	on	the	unemployment	rate	at	school	leaving	
Summary	of	table	A7:	As	the	conditional	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	year	
following	school	 leaving	increases	by	one	percentage	point,	the	risk	of	not	
having	had	a	paid	job	in	the	last	year	increases	by	0.32	percentage	points	(p	
<	 0.05)	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 never	 having	 had	 a	 paid	 job	 increases	 by	 0.20	
percentage	points	(p	<	0.05).	These	estimates	are	similar	in	magnitude,	but	
somewhat	 more	 precisely	 measured,	 when	 the	 post-graduate	 unemploy-
ment	rate	is	measured	as	a	two-year	average.	All	effects	are	adjusted	for	the	
covariates	described	in	section	3.1.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table A7. The effect of the unemployment rate in the year(s) following 
school leaving, conditional on the unemployment rate at school leaving 
(WLS-estimates) 
 No paid job 
(last 12 months) 
No paid job ever 
Unemployment, % 
(year after leaving)  
0.0032** 
(0.0016) 
0.0020** 
(0.00096) 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving)  
-0.000063 
(0.0015) 
-0.00045 
(0.00098) 
Mean unemployment 
(1st and 2nd year after) 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving) 
0.0028** 
(0.0013) 
0.00059 
(0.0013) 
0.0020*** 
(0.00074) 
-0.00017 
(0.00074) 
Observations 47,834 47,837 
Notes: All regressions include the full set of controls described in section 3.1. All effects are 
weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country level, all 
countries are given equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights. Here, your work experience is top-
coded so that the maximum value is given by age-15. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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NUMERACY (Z) ALL MEN WOMEN AGE: 
17-30 
(mean: 
27) 
AGE: 
31-40 
(mean: 
35) 
AGE: 
41-60 
(mean: 
45) 
BELOW 
TERTIARY 
TERTIARY 
Unemployment, % 
(year after leaving school) 
-0.011*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.015** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0050 
(0.0048) 
-0.0094 
(0.0068) 
-0.0097 
(0.0061) 
0.0094 
(0.015) 
-0.013** 
(0.0056) 
-0.0092 
(0.0061) 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
 
Mean unemployment, % 
(1st & 2nd year after) 
Unemployment, % 
(year of leaving school) 
Observations 
0.0089** 
(0.0042) 
 
0.0083** 
(0.0033) 
0.0055* 
(0.0033) 
47,842 
0.012* 
(0.0061) 
 
-0.013*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0078 
(0.0048) 
23,391 
0.0044 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0030 
(0.0041) 
0.0023 
(0.0041) 
24,451 
0.0031 
(0.0077) 
 
-0.0072 
(0.0055) 
0.000074 
(0.0061) 
13,767 
0.0093 
(0.0061) 
 
-0.0063 
(0.0051) 
0.0055 
(0.0049) 
19,924 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
 
0.0020 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
14,151 
0.012** 
(0.0058) 
 
-0.010** 
(0.0043) 
0.0082* 
(0.0044) 
27,735 
0.0061 
(0.0065) 
 
-0.0082 
(0.0050) 
0.0041 
(0.0053) 
20,107 
Notes: All regressions include the full set of controls listed in table 1 as well as fixed effects for country. All effects are expressed in standard deviations 
and weighted as to account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all nations are given equal weights in all regressions. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and corrected for the imputation variance. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
Table A8. The effect of the unemployment rate measured after leaving school, conditional on the unemployment 
rate in the year of leaving. Outcome: Numeracy (WLS-estimates, model (3)) 
129
133 
 
CHAPTER	5	
The	Effect	of	Retiring	on	Cognitive	Functioning	and	
Subjective	Health	
	
Abstract	
This	study	uses	PIAAC	survey	data	to	estimate	the	effect	of	retiring	on	cogni-
tive	abilities	and	subjective	health,	where	cognitive	abilities	are	measured	
via	 literacy	 and	 numeracy.	 The	 data	 is	 a	 pooled	 cross-section	 covering	
roughly	40,000	individuals	in	25	countries	in	the	age	range	of	50	to	65.	The	
identification	relies	on	instrumenting	retirement	as	well	as	years	as	retired	
by	exploiting	the	variation	in	incentives	created	by	country-specific	retire-
ment	ages.	I	find	no	significant	discontinuity	in	cognitive	functioning	as	indi-
viduals	 reach	 the	 retirement	 age.	 However,	 I	 do	 find	 a	 significant	 trend-
break,	suggesting	that	retiring	slows	down	the	age-related	decline	in	literacy	
and	numeracy	among	men.	For	women,	the	evidence	points	towards	a	posi-
tive	health-effect.	
	 	
131 
 
A.8		The	conditional	effect	of	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	
year(s)	following	school	leaving	on	numeracy,	model	(3)	
Summary	of	table	A8:	As	the	conditional	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	year	
following	 graduation	 increases	 by	 one	 percentage	 point,	 the	 risk	 of	 not	
having	had	a	paid	job	in	the	last	year	increases	by	0.18	percentage	points	(p	
>	 0.1)	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 never	 having	 had	 a	 paid	 job	 increases	 by	 0.20	
percentage	 points	 (p	 <	 0.05).	 The	 effect	 on	 average	 work	 experience	 is	
insignificant	at	-0.023	years.	For	the	first	two	outcomes,	estimates	are	based	
on	 linear	 probability	 models.	 All	 effects	 are	 adjusted	 for	 the	 covariates	
described	in	section	3.1.	These	estimates	are	similar,	but	somewhat	larger	in	
magnitude	 and	 more	 precisely	 measured,	 when	 the	 post-graduation	
unemployment	rate	is	calculated	as	a	two-year	average.	
A.9	The	probability	of	entering	a	higher	educational	program	
Summary	 of	 table	 A9:	 Looking	 specifically	 at	 individuals	 with	 an	 upper	
secondary	degree,	I	find	no	significant	effect	on	the	probability	of	earning	a	
higher	degree	depending	on	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	year	when	you	
were	expected	 to	 earn	your	upper	 secondary	degree.	 Similarly,	 the	unem-
ployment	rate	in	the	year	when	you	were	expected	to	earn	your	bachelors	
degree,	 does	 not	 significantly	 predict	 the	 probability	 of	 earning	 a	 higher	
degree.	
	
Table A9. The probability of entering a higher educational program for 
those with degree X, as a function of the unemployment rate in the year 
when you were expected to claim that degree (logit coefficients) 
 X = Upper 
secondary 
X = Bachelor 
Unemployment, % 
(expected year) 
-0.0035 
(0.0076) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
   
Observations 37,097 13,907 
Notes: All regressions control for country of residence, age, gender, immigration status and 
parental education levels. All effects are expressed as log odds ratios and weighted as to 
account for the country-specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all nations are given 
equal weights in all regressions. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife 
replicate sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Subjective	Health	
	
Abstract	
This	study	uses	PIAAC	survey	data	to	estimate	the	effect	of	retiring	on	cogni-
tive	abilities	and	subjective	health,	where	cognitive	abilities	are	measured	
via	 literacy	 and	 numeracy.	 The	 data	 is	 a	 pooled	 cross-section	 covering	
roughly	40,000	individuals	in	25	countries	in	the	age	range	of	50	to	65.	The	
identification	relies	on	instrumenting	retirement	as	well	as	years	as	retired	
by	exploiting	the	variation	in	incentives	created	by	country-specific	retire-
ment	ages.	I	find	no	significant	discontinuity	in	cognitive	functioning	as	indi-
viduals	 reach	 the	 retirement	 age.	 However,	 I	 do	 find	 a	 significant	 trend-
break,	suggesting	that	retiring	slows	down	the	age-related	decline	in	literacy	
and	numeracy	among	men.	For	women,	the	evidence	points	towards	a	posi-
tive	health-effect.	
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5.1		INTRODUCTION	
Effective	 retirement	 ages	 have	 been	 slowly	 increasing	 in	 most	 OECD-
countries	 over	 the	 21st	 century.	 As	 compared	 to	 the	 year	 2000,	men	 and	
women	in	2014	were	retiring	1.4	and	2.0	years	later	on	average.105	A	majority	
of	OECD-countries	are	now	in	the	process	of	postponing	official	retirement	
ages	or	planning	such	reforms.	These	reforms	are	driven	by	the	pressure	on	
social	security	systems;	the	effect	on	the	cognitive	and	physical	health	of	the	
elderly	is	unclear.		
In	this	study,	I	investigate	if	retiring	affects	your	cognitive	functioning	and	
subjective	health,	where	your	cognitive	functioning	is	measured	by	literacy	
and	numeracy	(see	chapter	1).	The	data	is	a	cross-section	covering	roughly	
40,000	 individuals	 from	 25	 countries	 in	 the	 age	 range	 of	 50	 to	 65.	 The	
identification	relies	on	instrumenting	retirement	as	well	as	your	retirement	
duration	by	exploiting	the	incentives	created	by	country-specific	retirement	
ages.	I	find	no	significant	discontinuity	in	cognitive	functioning	as	you	reach	
the	retirement	age.	However,	I	do	find	a	significant	trend-break	among	men,	
suggesting	that	retiring	slows	down	the	age-related	decline	in	literacy	and	
numeracy.	The	main	estimate	suggests	 that	 retiring	causes	a	performance	
advantage	in	 literacy	that	grows	by	0.08	(SE	0.03)	standard	deviations	for	
each	 additional	 year	 as	 retired;	 the	 effect	 is	 smaller	 and	 only	marginally	
significant	for	numeracy.	These	estimates	should	not,	however,	be	extrapo-
lated	more	than	a	couple	of	years	into	retirement.106		
For	women,	 I	 find	no	 robust	 evidence	 for	 a	 cognitive	 effect	 of	 retiring,	
although	 the	 trend	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	men.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	
evidence	of	a	positive	effect	on	health:	entering	retirement	is	estimated	to	
increase	 your	 subjective	 health	 score	 by	 almost	 60	 percent	 of	 a	 standard	
deviation	(SE	18).	The	evidence	on	health	is	less	conclusive	for	men.	
	 	
                                                             
105 OECD Pensions at a glance, 2015 
106 For the men in the data who have reached the retirement age: roughly 90 percent reached it 
within the last 5.5 years (the average is 2.6 years). 
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5.2		BACKGROUND	AND	PREVIOUS	RESEARCH	
The	results	from	previous	studies	are	mixed,	finding	both	significant	benefits	
and	harms	 from	 retiring;	 there	 is	 no	 general	 agreement	 on	 the	 effects	 on	
cognitive	functioning	nor	health.	A	priori,	there	are	reasonable	arguments	on	
both	sides.	Firstly,	many	jobs	are	presumably	mentally	stimulating	as	com-
pared	 to	 retirement,	 possibly	 preventing	 age-related	declines	 in	 cognitive	
functioning.	This	is	the	so	called	‘use	it	or	lose	it’-hypothesis,	which	has	also	
gained	some	empirical	support.	For	example,	Fisher	et	al.	(2014)	show	that	
individuals	with	 intellectually	 demanding	 jobs	 experience	 slower	 rates	 of	
cognitive	decline	(both	in	the	years	before	and	after	retirement).	Interven-
tion	studies	have	also	found	that	mental	stimulation	can	improve	cognitive	
performance	 among	 the	 elderly	 (see	 the	 meta-analysis	 by	 Kelly	 et	 al.,	
2014).107	A	related	argument	is	presented	in	the	human	capital	frame-work	
by	Mazzonna	&	Peracchi	(2012)	building	on	Grossman	(1972)	where	the	in-
centives	for	cognitive	investments	decline	after	retirement	as	the	productiv-
ity	motive	is	lost.	Also,	some	authors	characterize	retirement	as	a	stressful	
life-event	 where	 individuals	 lose	 their	 work-identity	 and	 access	 to	 social	
networks,	and	are	forced	to	adjust	to	new	routines.	
On	the	other	hand,	working	life	can	also	be	stressful,	especially	among	the	
elderly	 in	 a	 transforming	 work	 environment.	 As	 compared	 to	 workers,	
American	 retirees	 of	 the	 same	 age	 spend	more	 time	 socializing,	 relaxing,	
reading,	watching	TV,	sleeping,	gardening	and	engaging	in	other	leisure-	and	
sport	activities	(Krantz-Kent	&	Stewart,	2007).	This	pattern	can	also	be	fitted	
into	 a	 health	 capital	 framework,	 where	 your	 health	 can	 improve	 after	
retirement	if	the	opportunity	cost	of	making	health	investments	(e.g.	exer-
cising	or	sleeping)	decrease.		
As	 these	 arguments	 leave	 much	 room	 for	 speculation,	 several	 recent	
studies	have	measured	the	effect	of	retiring	empirically.	The	descriptive	data	
tend	to	show	that	retirees	have	lower	cognitive	skills	and	more	health	issues	
than	workers.	There	are,	however,	several	possible	interpretations	of	these	
relationships.	Partly,	they	could	reflect	a	causal	connection,	but	it’s	also	likely	
that	 confounders	and	 reversed	causation	 influence	 the	 correlation.	To	ad-
dress	 the	 endogeneity	 of	 retirement,	mainly	 two	different	 strategies	 have	
been	employed.		
Firstly,	 there	are	a	number	of	studies	 that	exploit	 longitudinal	datasets	
and	follow	individuals	over	time	as	they	retire	(see,	for	example,	Dave	et	al.,	
2006;	de	Grip	et	al.	2015	and	Mein	et	al.,	2003	as	well	as	the	reviews	by	Meng	
et	al.,	2017	and	van	der	Heide	et	al.,	2013).	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	
                                                             
107 See also Salthouse (2010) who argue that the empirical support for this hypothesis is 
unconvincing as of yet.  
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107 See also Salthouse (2010) who argue that the empirical support for this hypothesis is 
unconvincing as of yet.  
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this	 strategy	 is	 still	 open	 to	 critique	 regarding	 reversed	 causation;	 if	
individuals	tend	to	opt	 for	retirement	as	their	cognitive	or	physical	health	
start	 to	 decline,	 this	would	 be	 captured	 as	 part	 of	 the	 estimate.108	 As	 for	
health,	 the	 findings	 from	 these	 studies	 are	 mixed.	 While	 Dave	 et	 al.	 find	
significant	and	negative	effects	on	several	health	outcomes	using	American	
data,	Mein	et	al.	find	that	retirement	at	age	60	has	no	effect	on	physical	health	
using	 British	 data.	 Based	 on	 a	 review	 of	 22	 longitudinal	 studies,	 van	 der	
Heide	et	al.	conclude	that	the	evidence	are	contradictory.	The	picture	isn’t	
much	 clearer	with	 regard	 to	 cognitive	 functioning.	 Based	 on	 seven	 longi-
tudinal	studies,	Meng	et	al.	conclude	that	there	is	‘weak	evidence’	supporting	
the	 notion	 that	 retirement	 accelerates	 the	 rate	 of	 decline	 in	 crystallized	
intelligence	among	those	retiring	from	with	socially	complex	jobs.	
Secondly,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 studies	 that	 exploit	 retirement	 ages,	
pension	windows	and	reforms	as	instruments	(e.g.	Atalay	&	Barrett,	2014;	
Bloemen	et	al.,	2013;	Bonsang	et	al.,	2012;	Coe	et	al.,	2012;	Coe	&	Zamarro,	
2011;	Eibich,	2015;	Hagen,	2016;	Hallberg	et	al.,	2015;	Hernaes	et	al.,	2013;	
Hessel,	2016;	Johnston	&	Lee,	2009;	Mazzonna	&	Peracchi,	2012;	Mazzonna	
&	 Peracchi,	 2017;	 Neuman,	 2008	 and	 Rohwedder	 &	Willis,	 2010).	 These	
studies	 typically	 find	 beneficial	 effects	 on	 health	 outcomes109	 but	 harmful	
effects	 on	 cognitive	 outcomes110.	However,	 the	magnitude	 of	 these	 effects	
differ	rather	sharply	between	different	studies.	For	example,	while	Rohwed-
der	 &	 Willis	 find	 that	 retiring	 decreases	 your	 word	 recall	 score	 by	 a	
substantial	amount	(roughly	1.35	standard	deviations),	Coe	et	al.	 find	that	
your	 retirement	duration	has	 little	or	positive	effects	on	several	 cognitive	
outcome	measures	(including	word	recall).		
There	 are	 several	 possible	 explanations	 for	 the	 variety	 in	 estimated	
effects,	 including	 differences	 in	 sampling	 frame,	 outcome	 measures	 and	
modeling	assumptions.	For	example,	it’s	possible	that	effects	vary	between	
countries	 due	 to	 differences	 in	 norms,	 labor	 market	 conditions	 or	 social	
security	systems.	The	results	may	also	be	sensitive	to	the	choice	of	outcome	
                                                             
108 Some of these studies have attempted to correct for the endogeneity of the retirement 
decision. For example, Bonsang et al. (2012) use the eligibility age for social security as instrument 
(included in the review by Meng et al.). 
109 Of these 15 studies, 11 had some measure of physical health (self-reported or objectively 
measured) as outcome. Of these, seven found a positive effect of retirement; four found 
insignificant effects and one found a negative effect (one study has been double-counted as 
having found both a positive and an insignificant effect). Four studies with mortality as outcome 
have also been included (Bloemen et al., 2013; Hagen, 2016; Hallberg et al., 2015 and Hernaes et 
al., 2013) where two studies found that retirement (or early retirement) decreases the risk of dying 
and two studies found no significant effects.  
110 Of these 15 studies, six had some measure of cognitive functioning as outcome. Of these, four 
found significant negative effects and one found a significant positive effect (although only among 
blue-collar workers); one finding was insignificant. 
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measure;	 while	 research	 on	 self-reported	 health	 tend	 to	 show	 beneficial	
effects	of	 retirement,	 the	 results	 are	more	mixed	with	 regard	 to	objective	
health	measures	 such	 as	mortality.	Modeling	 assumptions	may	 also	 be	 of	
importance.	Bingley	&	Martinello	(2013)	point	out	that	several	cross-country	
studies	that	use	retirement	ages	as	instrument	fail	to	control	for	schooling,	
and	argue	that	this	explains	a	large	part	of	the	negative	cognitive	effects	that	
have	 been	 found	 in	 the	 literature.	 I	 find	 that	 the	 parametric	 assumptions	
underlying	the	specification	of	the	age	effect	is	of	more	importance	for	these	
data,	 however.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 of	 importance	 to	 allow	 for	 different	 age-
trends	 from	one	 country	 to	 the	 next.	 Also,	 different	 pictures	may	 emerge	
depending	 on	 how	 the	 retirement-effect	 is	 modeled.	 While	 some	 studies	
model	retirement	as	having	a	constant	(added)	effect	to	the	outcome,	others	
allow	for	this	effect	 to	depend	on	the	retirement	duration.	Here	I	contrast	
both	strategies.	
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5.3		DATA	AND	DESCRPITIVE	STATISTICS	
I	use	PIAAC	survey	data	that	has	been	collected	and	compiled	by	OECD.	The	
subsample	I	exploit	covers	roughly	40,000	individuals	aged	50-65	years	in	
25	countries111	and	has	mainly	been	collected	during	2010-2014	using	house	
interviews.	The	variables	of	special	interest	are	those	describing	the	respon-
dents’	cognitive	abilities	and	subjective	health.	For	the	cognitive	outcomes,	I	
use	two	different	measures	–	literacy	and	numeracy	–	designed	to	capture	
your	 ability	 to	 interpret	 text-based	 and	 mathematical	 information	 (see	
chapter	1	for	a	description).	In	the	following	section,	I	describe	the	other	key	
variables	including	health	and	retirement.	
5.3.1	Variable	description:	Health	and	retirement	
Self-reported	health	
Self-reported	health	is	measured	on	a	5-point	scale	(1	=	Poor,	2	=	Fair,	3	=	
Good,	4	=	Very	good,	5	=	Excellent).	It’s	not	clear	how	one	should	appropri-
ately	interpret	such	a	measure,	as	health	isn’t	fully	observable	to	individuals	
themselves.	Part	of	the	variation	in	perceived	health	is	therefore	likely	due	
to	indicators	for	health,	such	as	 lifestyle	and	overall	wellbeing.	But	even	if	
health	were	fully	observable	to	individuals	themselves,	assigning	a	number	
to	your	health	status	is	not	straightforward,	making	this	outcome	susceptible	
to	measurement	errors.112	As	suggested	 in	 the	 literature,	 it’s	also	possible	
that	self-reported	health	suffers	from	a	‘justification	bias’	(see,	for	example,	
the	discussion	by	Dwyer	&	Mitchell,	 1999).	 Similarly,	 self-reported	health	
could	also	be	sensitive	to	a	placebo	effect;	personal	believes	regarding	the	
effect	of	retirement	may	influence	your	rating.	
	
                                                             
111 Belgium, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In practice, neither Ireland nor Norway 
contribute, however, since their retirement ages are falling outside the sample age frame. For 
men, Israel is not either contributing for the same reason. 
112 For example, women have significantly poorer self-reported health than men (the gap is 0.1 
points when keeping age constant). From this, I would not dare to conclude that women have 
worse health than men, nor that they experience their health being poorer, only that they rate their 
health being poorer, i.e. it is possible that the gender gap is fully explainable by a gender 
difference in rating norms. The existence of rating norms can be viewed as a measurement error (if 
this norm varies from one person to the next). In practice, this will only be a problem here if retiring 
affects your rating norm. 
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Retirement	
I	define	an	 individual	as	being	retired	 if	 she	 is	outside	 the	 labor	 force,	 i.e.	
neither	working,	looking	for	work,	nor	waiting	to	start	a	job.	Here,	you	are	a	
worker	if	you	work	for	at	least	10	hours	per	week	(this	includes	unpaid	work	
for	 a	 family	business)	or	 if	 you	have	a	 job	but	 the	working	hours	 are	un-
known.	You	are	 looking	 for	work	 if	you	were	 looking	 for	paid	work	at	any	
time	within	 the	 last	 four	weeks,	or	 if	 you	are	waiting	 for	a	 reply	on	a	 job	
application	or	for	help	from	a	training	agency.	You	are	waiting	to	start	a	job	
if	you	are	waiting	to	start	a	job	for	which	you’ve	already	been	hired,	or	if	you	
are	temporarily	absent	from	a	job	that	you	plan	on	returning	to.113	
I	 also	 consider	 an	 alternative	way	 of	measuring	 retirement	 using	 self-
reported	status.		
5.3.2	Sample	selection	and	descriptive	statistics	
The	focus	of	this	study	is	on	the	effect	of	retiring	on	cognitive	outcomes	and	
self-reported	health.	 To	 this	 end,	 I	make	 the	 following	 restrictions	 on	 the	
sample:	Each	individual	included	was	aged	50	to	65	at	the	time	of	the	survey.	
I	exclude	individuals	with	missing	values	on	the	outcome	variable	of	interest,	
age,	gender	or	labor	market	status.	I	include	individuals	with	missing	values	
on	 other	 covariates,	 and	 code	 these	 accordingly.	 This	 leaves	 me	 with	 a	
sample	of	43,978	 individuals	 (for	 literacy	and	numeracy)	 and	42,817	 (for	
self-reported	health).	Self-reported	health	is	unknown	for	individuals	from	
Turkey,	which	is	the	main	difference	between	the	samples.	
Table	1	presents	weighted	means	 for	 the	outcome	variables	 and	back-
ground	characteristics	 separately	 for	 retirees	and	 those	 in	 the	 labor	 force	
(‘active’).	Retirees	score	significantly	below	those	in	the	labor	force:	The	raw	
gaps	in	literacy	and	numeracy	are	0.38	and	0.45	standard	deviations114;	the	
gap	in	self-reported	health	is	0.55	points	(on	a	5-point	scale).	The	groups	also	
differ	in	several	other	ways,	however.	Most	importantly,	retirees	are	on	aver-
age	older,	less	educated	and	their	parents	are	also	less	educated.	Family	life	
also	 differs	 between	 the	 groups;	 not	 surprisingly,	 retirees	 are	 overrepre-
sented	among	those	having	a	partner	who	is	retired.	
                                                             
113 I allow for missing data to some extent: If it is known that an individual does not work, but it is 
unknown whether she is looking for work or waiting to start a job, then I treat that individual as 
retired (4.5 percent of retirees fall into this category; of those in the labor force, 93 percent are 
working and the remaining 7 percent are looking for work or waiting to start a job).  
114 Here, one standard deviation is measured using within-country variation only and the full PIAAC 
sample of 16-65 year olds. 
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113 I allow for missing data to some extent: If it is known that an individual does not work, but it is 
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114 Here, one standard deviation is measured using within-country variation only and the full PIAAC 
sample of 16-65 year olds. 
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Table 1. Weighted means for the outcomes and background variables, 
separately for retirees and those in the labor force (‘active’) 
 All Retirees Active 
Literacy (z-score)a -0.32 -0.55 -0.17 
Numeracy (z-score)a 
Self-reported health (1-5)b 
-0.28 
2.89 
-0.55 
2.55 
-0.098 
3.10 
Female 0.51 0.62 0.45 
Age 
Immigrant 
Schooling (years)c   
57.2 
0.087 
11.6 
59.3 
0.078 
10.5 
55.8 
0.092 
12.3 
  Mother’s educationd 
Low 
 
0.77 
 
0.82 
 
0.73 
Medium 0.15 0.12 0.18 
High 0.048 0.025 0.063 
  Father’s educationd 
Low 
 
0.66 
 
0.71 
 
0.62 
Medium 0.22 0.19 0.23 
High 0.087 0.057 0.11 
  Children 
Have children 
 
0.89 
 
0.89 
 
0.90 
Don’t have children 
Number of children (0-25)c 
0.11 
2.10 
0.11 
2.09 
0.10 
2.11 
  Partner 
Have partner 
 
0.75 
 
0.73 
 
0.76 
Don’t have partner 
  If have partner: 
0.11 0.11 0.11 
  Partner working fulltime 0.44 0.28 0.55 
  Partner working halftime 0.10 0.061 0.13 
  Partner retired   
  None of the above or missing 
Observations 
0.24 
0.22 
43,978 
0.43 
0.23 
17,477 
0.12 
0.21 
26,501 
Notes: aThe sample individuals score roughly 0.3 standard deviations below average, 
meaning that they score 0.3 standard deviations below a randomly chosen individual from the 
PIAAC target population which consists of everyone aged 16-65 from the 31 countries 
included in the first two rounds of PIAAC. The standard deviations for literacy and numeracy 
are estimated using within-country variation only. bSelf-reported health is known for 42,817 
individuals in total. cSchooling is measured for those with non-missing values only which 
constitute 98.5 percent of the sample. Similarly, number of children is non-missing for 88.5 
percent of the sample. There are missing values on other variables also. For example: The 
percentages on ‘Mother’s education’ sum up to 97 meaning that the remaining 3 percent are 
missing. dEducational degree: Low = Lower secondary school, primary school or less. Medium 
= Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary school. High = Tertiary degrees. The 
averages are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; on a cross-country 
level all countries are weighted equally according the sample “All” (43,978 obs.) 
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In	the	Appendix	(A1.	Adjusting	for	observable	heterogeneity)	I	present	the	
adjusted	 gaps	 in	 literacy,	 numeracy	 and	 self-reported	 health	 between	
retirees	and	those	in	the	labor	force,	controlling	for	the	background	charac-
teristics	listed	in	table	1,	as	well	as	country	of	residence.	The	gaps	in	the	cog-
nitive	outcomes	are	now	rather	modest	at	0.13	and	0.14	standard	deviations	
on	literacy	and	numeracy,	respectively.	The	gap	in	self-reported	health,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 is	 mainly	 unaffected	 by	 adjusting	 for	 these	 covariates.	
Furthermore,	 the	 negative	 effects	 on	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 disappear	
altogether	 when	 I	 identify	 retirees	 by	 their	 self-reported	 status.115	 These	
estimates	suggest	that	there	are	no	large	harmful	cognitive	effects	of	retiring,	
assuming	 that	 any	 bias	 would	 inflate	 the	 gaps	 between	 the	 groups	 if	
anything.	
5.3.3	Country-level	analysis	
In	this	section,	I	use	country-level	data	and	measure	the	increase	in	retire-
ments	over	the	ages	of	50-55	and	60-65,	and	how	these	increases	relate	to	
changes	 in	 the	 outcomes.	 The	main	 advantage	 of	 this	 exercise	 is	 that	 the	
variation	 in	 retirements	 over	 age	 groups	 (and	 between	 countries)	 is	 pre-
sumeably	 more	 exogenous	 than	 the	 variation	 between	 individuals.	 For	
example,	I	observe	that	the	fraction	of	retirees	increases	by	15	percentage	
points	in	Chile	while	the	corresponding	number	in	Slovenia	is	70	percentage	
points.	This	difference	 is	presumably	 largely	driven	by	 institutional	differ-
ences	between	the	countries,	and	less	influenced	by	personal	health-related	
choices	 (although	 institutional	 rules	 can	 also	 be	 endogenous).	 With	 that	
caveat	in	mind,	I	find	no	support	for	to	the	notion	that	retiring	would	have	
negative	 consequences	 for	 cognitive	 functioning,	 at	 least	 as	measured	 by	
literacy	and	numeracy.	Figures	1a-1c	 illustrate	 these	relationships	graphi-
cally.	Countries	where	the	increase	in	retirements	is	large	experience	smaller	
declines	 in	 literacy	 and	numeracy	 on	 average,	 but	 this	 correlation	 is	 only	
marginally	significant	for	literacy.	In	some	samples,	however,	these	correla-
tions	 are	 more	 pronounced:	 The	 positive	 correlations	 with	 literacy	 and	
numeracy	 are	 significant	 when	 retirees	 are	 identified	 using	 self-reported	
status,	or	when	limiting	the	sample	to	women	only.	
	
                                                             
115 Individuals who self-identify as retirees have 0.0047 standard deviations worse performance on 
literacy and 0.052 standard deviations better performance on numeracy as compared to all others 
(controlling for the background characteristics listed in table 1 and country of residence). When 
restricting the reference group to self-identified workers, the corresponding gaps are 0.050 and 
0.013 standard deviations favoring workers. Here, I also restrict the sample to individuals who 
have had a paid job at some point in their life. For more detail, see the Appendix (A.1). 
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115 Individuals who self-identify as retirees have 0.0047 standard deviations worse performance on 
literacy and 0.052 standard deviations better performance on numeracy as compared to all others 
(controlling for the background characteristics listed in table 1 and country of residence). When 
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0.013 standard deviations favoring workers. Here, I also restrict the sample to individuals who 
have had a paid job at some point in their life. For more detail, see the Appendix (A.1). 
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Figure 1a. Retirements and numeracy, ages 50-55 to 60-65 
 
 
	
Figure 1b. Retirements and literacy, ages 50-55 to 60-65 
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 Figure 1c. Retirements and health, ages 50-55 to 60-65 
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 Figure 1c. Retirements and health, ages 50-55 to 60-65 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
141
144 
 
5.4		INSTRUMENTING	RETIREMENT	AND	RETIREMENT	
DURATION	
In	this	section,	I	instrument	retirement	as	well	as	years	as	retired	by	exploit-
ting	 the	 variation	 in	 incentives	 created	 by	 country-	 and	 gender-specific	
retirement	ages.	I	find	no	significant	discontinuity	in	literacy	or	numeracy	as	
individuals	reach	the	retirement	age.	However,	I	do	find	a	significant	trend-
break,	suggesting	that	retiring	slows	down	the	age-related	decline	in	literacy	
and	numeracy	among	men.	For	women,	there	is	evidence	of	a	positive	effect	
on	health.	
5.4.1	The	models	
The	instrument	is	a	dummy	taking	on	the	value	1	for	individuals	who	have	
reached	the	retirement	age	and	the	value	0	for	others.	Several	countries	have	
both	a	 ‘normal’	and	 ‘early’	 retirement	age;	 in	 these	cases,	 I	use	both.116	 In	
general,	 the	 fraction	 of	 retirees	 are	 higher	 in	 the	 years	 following	 the	
retirement	date,	but	there	is	no	clear	discontinuity;	retirees	are	common	also	
in	the	years	leading	up	to	that	date.	Figure	2	below	illustrates	the	proportion	
of	 retirees	 and	how	 it	 increases	with	 age,	 together	with	 the	 trends	 in	 the	
fraction	of	 individuals	who	have	reached	the	early	and	normal	retirement	
ages.		
	
	
                                                             
116 Retirement ages by country (normal/early): Belgium (65/60), Chilean males (65/-), Chilean 
females (60/-), Cyprus (65/63), Czechian males (62.33/60), Czechian females (59/-), Denmark 
(65/-), Estonian males (63/60), Estonian females (61.5/58.5), Finland (65/62), France (61.17/60), 
Greece (62/-), Ireland (66/-), Israeli males (67/-), Israeli females (62/-), Italy (60/-), Japan (65/60), 
Korea (60/55), Lithuanian males (63/-), Lithuanian females (61/-), Netherlands (65/-), Norway 
(67/62), Polish males (65/-), Polish females (60/-), Russian males (60/-), Russian females (55/-), 
Slovakian males (62/-), Slovakian females (58.75/-), Slovenian males (58.67/-), Slovenian females 
(58.33/-), Spain (65/61), Sweden (65/61), Turkish males (60/-), Turkish females (58/-), British 
males (65/-), British females (60.75/-).  Main source: OECD, Pensions at a glance 2015 & 2013. 
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Figure 2. Retirement ages and actual retirements	
	
‘Having	reached	the	retirement	age’	is	a	valid	instrument	for	being	retired	if	
any	differences	in	the	outcomes	between	individuals	who	have	reached	the	
retirement	age	and	those	who	have	yet	to	reach	it,	are	fully	explainable	by	a	
difference	in	the	probability	of	actually	being	retired.	Naturally,	age	is	one	
such	distinguishing	factor,	but	I	adjust	for	age	as	well	as	other	background	
characteristics.	I	specify	the	reduced	form	equation	in	the	following	way:	
𝑦𝑦÷b = 𝛼𝛼÷ + 𝛽𝛽?𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛÷b + 𝛽𝛽5𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦÷b + 𝜗𝜗𝑋𝑋÷b + 𝜀𝜀÷b 	 (1)	
where	c	is	a	country	index	and	i	is	indexing	individuals.	The	outcome,	𝑦𝑦÷b ,	is	
either	literacy,	numeracy	or	subjective	health;	𝛼𝛼÷ 	represents	country-specific	
fixed	intercepts;	normal	and	early	are	dummies	for	those	who	have	reached	
the	 normal	 and	 early	 retirement	 ages;	 𝑋𝑋÷b 	 is	 a	 vector	 of	 background	
characteristics	including	age,	gender,	immigration	status,	years	of	schooling,	
as	well	 as	 the	mother’s	 and	 father’s	 education	 levels.	Here	 I	 allow	 for	 the	
effects	 of	 age	 and	 gender	 to	 differ	 between	 countries;	 age	 is	 included	
linearly.117	(See	the	Appendix,	section	A2,	for	graphical	presentations	of	the	
age	trends.)	
Now,	subjective	health	is	a	latent	variable,	only	observed	on	a	collapsed	
ordinal	scale.	I	account	for	this	by	applying	adjusted-POLS	–	an	alternative	
                                                             
117 An alternative approach would be to use common age trends (for example in the form of age 
dummies). However, the age-trends differ between countries in a way that makes such an 
approach susceptible to bias. Country-specific polynomial age trends would be a more pertinent 
alternative in this regard, but adds a large penalty in terms of precision. The result-section (5.4.2) 
discusses the chosen specification and its robustness in more detail. 
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117 An alternative approach would be to use common age trends (for example in the form of age 
dummies). However, the age-trends differ between countries in a way that makes such an 
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linear	 estimator	 to	 ordered	 probit.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 coefficients	 are	
measured	in	units	of	standard	deviations.	Example:	An	effect	size	at	0.1	is	an	
estimated	increase	by	0.1	standard	deviations	on	the	latent	variable.118		
Note	that	this	model	assumes	that	retiring	creates	a	discontinuity	in	the	
age-trend	 if	 anything.	 An	 alternative	 possibility	 is	 that	 retiring	 creates	 a	
trend-break,	so	that	the	age-related	decline	either	accelerates	or	slows	down	
after	 retiring.	 In	 an	 alternative	 model,	 I	 allow	 for	 this	 possibility	 by	
instrumenting	your	retirement	duration	using	the	number	of	years	since	you	
reached	the	normal	retirement	age.	The	retirement	duration	is	a	variable	that	
takes	on	the	value	0.5	for	those	who	left	their	last	paid	job	within	the	last	12	
months,	the	value	1	for	those	who	left	that	job	last	year,	and	increases	by	1	
for	each	year	thereafter.	Those	who	are	currently	working	have	a	value	of	0.	
Here	I	further	limit	the	sample	to	individuals	who	were	still	working	at	the	
age	of	50	(or	who	left	their	last	paid	job	at	the	age	of	50).	All	individuals	who	
are	currently	working	are	included.		
The	reduced-form	equation	can	now	be	described:	
𝑦𝑦÷b = 𝛼𝛼÷ + 𝛽𝛽(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛÷b × 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦÷b) + 𝜗𝜗𝑋𝑋÷b + 𝜀𝜀÷b 	 (2)	
	 	
where	 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦	 is	 a	 variable	 that	 increases	 by	 1	 for	 each	
additional	year	that	passes	since	the	normal	retirement	age;	an	individual	at	
the	retirement	age	gets	a	value	of	0.5;	an	individual	below	that	age	gets	the	
value	0.	Example:	An	individual	who	is	65	and	who	lives	in	a	country	where	
the	retirement	age	is	62	years	and	4	months	gets	a	value	of	3.17	(65.5	–	62.33	
=	3.17).	In	some	countries,	the	retirement	age	has	increased	over	time	and	I	
account	for	this	when	calculating	the	number	of	years	since	individuals	from	
different	cohorts	reached	the	retirement	age.	𝑋𝑋÷b 	represents	the	same	set	of	
covariates	 as	 is	 equation	 (1);	 𝛼𝛼÷ 	 and	 𝜀𝜀÷b 	 are	 the	 country-specific	 fixed	
intercept	and	error	term.	
All	estimates	are	weighted	as	to	account	for	the	country	specific	survey	
designs;	on	a	cross-country	 level,	all	countries	are	weighted	equally.	Stan-
dard	errors	are	estimated	using	jackknife	replicate	sampling	weights.	In	the	
reduced-form	and	 instrumental	variables	regressions	 I	 further	correct	 the	
standard	errors	for	the	imputation	variance	added	by	using	plausible	values.	
                                                             
118 Adjusted-POLS works through quantifying the distances between the observed values on the 
ordinal variable. This requires an assumption regarding the distribution of the latent variable. Here, 
I assume that the latent variable – subjective health – is normally distributed. For each individual, I 
calculate the expected ‘standardized health score’ conditional on the observed score (using the 
relevant sample as reference). The new quantified variable is then divided by its variance, which 
adjusts for the ‘attenuation bias’ (see chapter 2; Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2006). 
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5.4.2	Results	when	instrumenting	retirement	
In	this	section,	 I	estimate	the	effect	of	being	retired	under	the	assumption	
that	retiring	creates	a	discontinuity	in	the	age-trend	if	anything	(see	model	
(1)	from	section	4.1).	Table	2	presents	the	first	stage	estimates.	Reaching	the	
‘early’	 retirement	 age	 increases	 your	 chance	 of	 being	 retired	 by	 16	 per-
centage	 points;	 reaching	 the	 ‘normal’	 retirement	 age	 adds	 another	 15	
percentage	points	 to	 that	probability.	The	 instruments	are	 strong,	with	F-
values	(df	=	2,	78)	at	258.3	(overall)	and	at	110.7	for	women	and	117.1	for	
men.	Using	the	slightly	smaller	sample	–	where	self-reported	health	is	known	
–	gives	similar	results	(not	reported	in	the	table).119	
	
	
Although	retirement	ages	have	clear	effects	on	your	chance	of	being	retired,	
I	 find	 little	 evidence	 of	 such	 effects	 on	 literacy	 or	 numeracy.120	 Table	 3	
presents	the	estimates	from	the	instrumental	variables	regressions.	Overall,	
retiring	is	estimated	to	increase	your	literacy	and	numeracy	scores	by	11	and	
7	percent	of	a	standard	deviation,	respectively.	These	effects	are	similar	for	
men	and	women.	None	of	the	effects	is	significant,	however.		
                                                             
119 For the smaller sample: Reaching the early retirement age increases your chance of being 
retired by 16 percentage points; reaching the normal retirement age adds 16 percentage points to 
that probability (F = 247.8). For women, the corresponding F-value is 100.4 and for men, 115.9. 
120 Reaching the early and normal retirement ages are estimated to increase your literacy score by 
0.020 (SE 0.027) and 0.015 (SE 0.024) standard deviations. For numeracy, the corresponding 
effects are 0.013 (SE 0.024) and 0.0099 (SE 0.023) standard deviations. 
Table 2. First stage estimates, overall and by gender. Outcome:  
Retired (0/1)  
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
Reached normal ret. age 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.0099) (0.012) (0.015) 
Reached early ret. age 
 
0.16*** 
(0.013) 
0.17*** 
(0.019) 
0.17*** 
(0.016) 
Observations 43,978 23,763 20,215 
R-squared 0.283 0.277 0.256 
Notes: Reached normal ret. age and Reached early ret. age are dummies for those who have 
reached the normal and early retirement ages, respectively. All regressions include country 
fixed effects and country-specific linear age trends, immigration status, years of schooling, 
mother’s and father’s education (three levels + unknown). The first regression (“ALL”) also 
includes a gender effect which is allowed to vary between countries. All regressions are 
weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all 
countries are weighted equally. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife 
replicate sampling weights.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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It	is	worth	noting	that	the	error	margins	are	rather	wide:	for	both	literacy	
and	numeracy,	 the	 confidence	 interval	 (95	%)	 includes	 anything	between	
modest	harmful	effects	to	meaningful	benefits.121	Identifying	retirees	by	their	
self-reported	status	produces	similar	estimates,	but	error	margins	are	now	
smaller,	 backing	 up	 the	 conclusion	 that	 there	 are	 no	 important	 harmful	
cognitive	effects	of	retiring.	122	
I	 do,	 however,	 find	 a	 significant	 discontinuity	 in	 ‘health’:	 reaching	 the	
early	and	normal	retirement	ages	are	estimated	to	increase	your	health	score	
by	0.053	and	0.068	standard	deviations,	respectively.	This	translates	into	a	
retirement-effect	at	42	percent	of	a	standard	deviation.	This	effect	is	larger	
for	women:	While	I	find	no	significant	effect	in	the	male	sample,	I	find	a	clear	
discontinuity	 in	the	female	sample,	suggesting	that	retiring	 increases	your	
health	 score	by	nearly	60	percent	 of	 a	 standard	deviation	 –	 a	 large	 effect	
indeed.	Identifying	retirees	by	their	self-reported	status,	however,	produces	
more	conservative	estimates.123	
As	an	alternative	to	adjusted-POLS,	I	also	use	a	binary	coding	for	health.	
This	produces	similar	results,	but	the	effect	is	now	of	equal	magnitude	for	
men	and	women:	retiring	is	estimated	to	increase	your	chance	of	having	a	
very	good	or	excellent	health	by	19	percentage	points	overall	(SE	4.6);	by	16	
percentage	points	for	women	(SE	6.8)	and	by	18	percentage	points	for	men	
(SE	7.2).	
                                                             
121 95 % CI (Literacy): -0.11 – 0.33. 95 % CI (Numeracy): -0.16 – 0.30. 
122 When identifying retirees by their self-reported status, the effect on literacy decreases from 0.11 
(SE 0.11) to 0.070 (SE 0.074); the effect on numeracy decreases from 0.072 (SE 0.11) to 0.045 (SE 
0.075). 
123 When identifying retirees by their self-reported status, the effect on health decreases from 
0.42*** (SE 0.12) to 0.25*** (SE 0.074). For women, the effect on health is now 0.39*** (SE 
0.098). 
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Hence,	 I	 find	 no	 evidence	 of	 a	 discontinuity	 in	 cognitive	 performance	 at	
retirement.	 I	 do,	 however,	 find	 a	 positive	 health-effect	 for	women.	 These	
conclusions	are	robust:	the	effect	on	literacy	and	numeracy	are	rather	small	
and	insignificant	independently	of	specification	and	sample	selection	criteria	
(described	in	more	detail	below).	For	health,	the	estimate	fluctuates	more,	
varying	 between	 0.092	 and	 0.42	 standard	 deviations.	 The	 health-effect	 is	
stable	for	women,	however,	varying	between	0.49	and	0.61	standard	devi-
ations.		
Table 3. The effect of retiring on literacy, numeracy and subjective 
health (IV-estimates)  
ALL Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(adjusted POLS) 
Retired 0.11 0.072 0.42*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Observations 43,978 43,978 42,817 
WOMEN Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(adjusted POLS) 
Retired 0.14 0.13 0.57*** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) 
Observations 23,763 23,763 23,185 
MEN Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(adjusted POLS) 
Retired 0.085 0.073 0.22 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) 
Observations 20,215 20,215 19,632 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and country-specific linear age trends or 
country-specific quadratic age trends (for ‘Health’); immigration status, years of schooling, 
mother’s and father’s education (three levels + unknown). The first regression (“ALL”) also 
includes a gender effect which is allowed to vary between countries. For ‘Health’, I apply 
the adjusted-POLS estimator, implying that the unit of measurement is one standard 
deviation. All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; 
on a cross-country level all countries are weighted equally. Standard errors (in parenthesis) 
are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and further adjusted for the use of 
plausible values (for literacy and numeracy). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Firstly,	 the	 estimates	 do	 not	 change	 much	 when	 I	 extend	 the	 number	 of	
controls,	 including	 also	 educational	 area124,	 educational	 degree125,	 having	
children,	and	if	so,	their	numbers;	having	a	partner,	and	if	so,	his	or	her	labor	
market	 status.	Here,	 I	 further	allow	 for	different	age	 trends	depending	on	
educational	 degree	 and	 gender.126	 Likewise,	 the	 estimates	 are	 practically	
unaffected	 by	 dropping	 all	 controls	 except	 for	 country,	 age	 and	 gender	
(where	 the	 effects	 of	 age	 and	 gender	 are	 allowed	 to	 vary	 between	 coun-
tries).127	
Of	special	concern	for	the	identification,	however,	is	the	possibility	that	
the	effect	of	aging	is	not	captured	satisfactorily	by	the	country-specific	linear	
trends.	 I	 test	 for	 this	 possibility	 in	 the	 following	ways.	 First,	 I	 create	 fake	
retirement	ages	by	moving	the	real	retirement	ages	five	years	into	the	past,	
and	estimate	the	reduced	form	equations	on	an	otherwise	identical	sample	
of	45-60	year	olds	(excluding	only	those	who	already	reached	a	real	retire-
ment	 age	 by	 this	 time).	 I	 find	 no	 significant	 effects	 of	 these	 fake	 instru-
ments.128	Secondly,	I	reduce	the	age-frame	of	the	data	to	individuals	with	no	
more	than	seven	years	to	or	from	a	retirement	age129,	and	experiment	with	
                                                             
124 The educational areas include: General programmes; Teacher training and education science; 
Humanities, languages and arts; Social sciences, business and law; Science, mathematics and 
computing; Engineering, manufacturing and construction; Agriculture and veterinary; Health and 
welfare; Services; None of these areas (i.e. no education/low education or missing).  
125 The educational degrees include: Primary or less; Lower secondary; Upper secondary; Post-
secondary, non-tertiary; Tertiary – professional degree; Tertiary – bachelor degree; Tertiary – 
master/research degree; Tertiary - bachelor/master/research degree without distinction; Missing. 
The former control variable – years of schooling – is excluded in this specification. 
126 The effect (IV) on literacy decreases from 0.11 (SE 0.11) to 0.081 (SE 0.12); the effect on 
numeracy decreases from 0.072 (SE 0.11) to 0.032 (SE 0.12) and the effect on health decreases 
from 0.42*** (SE 0.12) to 0.41*** (SE 0.12). For women, the effect on health decreases from 
0.57*** (SE 0.18) to 0.49*** (SE 0.16).  
127 The effect (IV) on literacy decreases from 0.11 (SE 0.11) to 0.10 (SE 0.12); the effect of numeracy 
decreases from 0.072 (SE 0.11) to 0.059 (SE 0.12); the effect on health decreases from 0.42*** 
(SE 0.12) to 0.39*** (SE 0.12). For women, the effect on health decreases from 0.57*** (SE 0.18) 
to 0.51*** (SE 0.17). 
128 Reaching the fake early and normal retirement ages are estimated to change your literacy score 
by -0.028 (SE 0.028) and 0.023 (SE 0.027) standard deviations (jointly insignificant). For 
numeracy, the corresponding numbers are -0.037 (SE 0.029) and 0.025 (SE 0.026) standard 
deviations (jointly insignificant). For health, the real early and normal retirement ages are estimated 
to change your score by 0.053** (SE 0.025) and 0.068*** (SE 0.025) standard deviations; for 
the fake dates, the corresponding numbers are -0.015 (SE 0.030) and 0.0060 (SE 0.025) standard 
deviations (jointly insignificant). For women: reaching the real early and normal retirement dates 
are estimates to change your health score by 0.017 (SE 0.035) and 0.12*** (SE 0.027) standard 
deviations; for the fake dates, the corresponding numbers are 0.044 (SE 0.036) and 0.0083 (SE 
0.030) standard deviations (jointly insignificant). 
129 The effect (IV) on literacy decreases from 0.11 (SE 0.11) to -0.046 (SE 0.23); the effect on 
numeracy decreases from 0.072 (SE 0.11) to 0.022 (SE 0.20); the effect on health decreases from 
0.42*** (SE 0.12) to 0.26 (SE 0.20). For women, this effect is still large and significant at 0.57** 
151 
 
country-specific	polynomial	age-trends	of	the	second	degree130.	For	both	of	
these	alternatives,	estimates	are	reduced,	and	especially	so	for	health.	The	
positive	health-effect	for	women	remains	mainly	unchanged,	however.	
It	 can	be	noted,	 that	 the	 estimates	 are	 sensitive	 to	 the	 choice	between	
country-specific	and	common	age	trends,	with	the	latter	doing	a	poor	job	at	
capturing	 the	 effect	 of	 aging.	 For	 example,	 a	 specification	with	 a	 common	
linear	age	trend	would	suggest	that	retiring	increases	your	literacy	score	by	
30	percent	of	a	standard	deviation	(p	<	0.01).	This	shows	that	countries	with	
early	retirement	dates	observe	less	of	a	decline	in	literacy	with	age.	When	
accounting	 for	 this	 heterogeneity	 in	 trends,	 then	 there	 is	 no	 significant	
discontinuity	in	cognitive	performance	related	to	the	date	of	retirement.		
5.4.3	Results	when	instrumenting	retirement	duration	
The	previous	 analysis	was	built	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 retiring	 creates	 a	
discontinuity	in	outcomes	by	shifting	the	age-trend	upwards	or	downwards	
(if	at	all).	Here	I	assume	that	retiring	creates	a	trend-break;	the	age-related	
decline	 in	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 is	 assumed	 to	 either	 accelerate	 or	 slow	
down	after	retirement	if	it	changes	at	all	(see	model	(2)	in	section	4.1).	Table	
4	 presents	 the	 first-stage	 estimates:	 For	 each	 year	 that	 passes	 since	 the	
retirement	date,	the	number	of	years	as	retired	increases	by	a	half.	This	effect	
is	of	similar	magnitude	for	men	and	women.	The	instrument	is	strong,	with	
F-values	(df	=	1,	79)	at	703.69	(overall)	and	at	452.24	for	women	and	128.28	
for	men.	Using	the	smaller	sample	–	where	health	is	known	–	gives	similar	
results	(not	reported	in	the	table).131	
                                                             
(SE 0.26) standard deviations. The instruments are sufficiently strong, with F-values at 86.5 for the 
cognitive outcomes, and at 83.5 for health (45.1 among women).  
130 The effect (IV) on literacy decreases from 0.11 (SE 0.11) to -0.11 (SE 0.27); the effect on 
numeracy decreases from 0.072 (SE 0.11) to -0.059 (SE 0.26); the effect on health decreases from 
0.42*** (SE 0.12) to 0.092 (SE 0.24), but increases for women to 0.61* (SE 0.32). The 
instruments are sufficiently strong, with F-values at 64.6 for the cognitive outcomes, and at 60.8 for 
health (32.9 among women). As a group, the country-specific quadratic age components are 
significant for literacy and numeracy, and insignificant for health.  
131 For the health sample: For each year that passes since the retirement date, the number of years 
as retired increases by 0.49 (F = 765.6). For women, the corresponding F-value is 522.2 and for 
men, 166.8. 
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131 For the health sample: For each year that passes since the retirement date, the number of years 
as retired increases by 0.49 (F = 765.6). For women, the corresponding F-value is 522.2 and for 
men, 166.8. 
149
152 
 
As	 you	 age,	 your	 literacy	 score	 is	 estimated	 to	 drop	 by	 0.014	 standard	
deviations	per	year	until	you	reach	the	retirement	age.132	At	that	point,	this	
changes	to	a	modest	0.001	standard	deviation	decrease	per	year.	The	pattern	
is	similar	for	numeracy.	Table	5	presents	the	corresponding	estimates	from	
the	instrumental	variables	regressions.	Here,	literacy	is	estimated	to	drop	by	
0.019	 standard	 deviations	 per	 year	 among	 workers.	 As	 you	 retire,	 this	
changes	to	a	0.009	standard	deviation	increase	per	year.	The	difference	in	
trends	 –	 0.027	 standard	 deviations	 –	 is	 significant	 although	 qualitatively	
rather	small.	For	numeracy,	the	corresponding	difference	is	insignificant	at	
0.011	standard	deviations.	The	effect	on	health	 is	 similarly	 small	 at	0.024	
standard	deviations.	
These	estimates	are	somewhat	larger	for	men	than	women,	and	especially	
so	for	literacy:	While	I	find	no	significant	trend-breaks	in	the	female	sample,	
I	find	a	clear	break	for	men.	One	year	after	retirement,	men	are	predicted	to	
score	 0.078	 standard	 deviations	 higher	 on	 literacy	 as	 compared	 to	 the	
counterfactual	 outcome.	 Another	 year	 later,	 the	 estimated	 advantage	 has	
grown	to	0.16	standard	deviations.	For	numeracy,	the	gender	gap	in	effect	
sizes	is	smaller,	and	for	health,	there	is	no	gap	worth	mentioning.		
	
                                                             
132 This is the simple average trend over all countries from the reduced-form regression.  
Table 4. First-stage regressions, overall and by gender. Outcome: 
Years as retired 
 ALL WOMEN MEN 
Years since retirement age 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.044) 
Observations 36,996 18,625 18,371 
R-squared 0.322 0.357 0.275 
Notes: Years since retirement age is a variable that increases by 1 for each year since the 
normal retirement age; for those at the retirement age the variable takes on the value 0.5 and 
for those below that age the variable takes on the value 0. All regressions include country 
fixed effects and country-specific linear age trends; immigration status, years of schooling, 
mother’s and father’s education (three levels + unknown). The first regression (“ALL”) also 
includes a gender effect which is allowed to vary between countries. All regressions are 
weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; on a cross-country level all 
countries are weighted equally. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are estimated using 
jackknife replicate sampling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Hence,	I	find	no	evidence	for	a	negative	trend-break	in	literacy,	numeracy	or	
health	at	retirement.	I	do,	however,	find	a	positive	cognitive	effect	for	men.	
This	 conclusion	 is	 robust:	 Overall,	 the	 effect	 on	 literacy	 varies	 between		
-0.0021	 and	 0.060	 standard	 deviations	 depending	 on	 specification	 and	
sample	 selection	 criteria	 (described	 in	 more	 detail	 below);	 the	 effect	 on	
numeracy	 varies	 between	 -0.00021	 and	 0.035	 standard	 deviations.	 For	
health,	 the	 corresponding	 interval	 goes	 between	 -0.026	 and	 0.024.	 In	 the	
male	sample,	effect	sizes	vary	between	0.046	and	0.14	standard	deviations	
for	literacy,	and	between	0.030	and	0.11	for	numeracy.		
Of	most	concern	for	the	identification	is	the	possibility	that	aging	has	non-
linear	 effects	 on	 the	 outcomes.	 If,	 for	 example,	 the	 decline	 in	 literacy	 and	
numeracy	 is	diminishing	with	age,	 then	that	could	potentially	also	explain	
the	 observed	 effects	 in	 the	data.	 I	 explore	 this	 possibility	 in	 several	ways	
(similarly	 to	 the	 previous	 analysis,	 see	 section	 4.2).	 First,	 I	 create	 fake	
retirement	ages	by	moving	the	real	retirement	ages	five	years	into	the	past,	
Table 5. The effect of each additional year as retired on literacy and 
numeracy (IV-estimates) 
ALL Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(adjusted POLS) 
Years as retired 0.027** 0.011 0.024* 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Observations 36,996 36,996 36,483 
WOMEN Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(adjusted POLS) 
Years as retired 0.031 0.015 0.032* 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.017) 
Observations 18,625 18,625 18,517 
MEN Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(adjusted POLS) 
Years as retired 0.078*** 0.047* 0.044 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) 
Observations 18,371 18,371 17,966 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects and country-specific linear age trends, 
immigration status, years of schooling, mother’s and father’s education (three levels + 
unknown). The first regression (“ALL”) also includes a gender effect which is allowed to vary 
between countries. All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific survey 
designs; on a cross-country level all countries are weighted equally. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and further adjusted for 
the use of plausible values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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and	estimate	the	reduced	form	equations	on	an	otherwise	identical	sample	
of	45-60	year	olds	(excluding	only	individuals	who	already	reached	the	real	
retirement	age	by	this	time).	I	find	no	significant	effects	of	this	fake	instru-
ment.133	Secondly,	I	reduce	the	age-frame	of	the	data	to	individuals	with	no	
more	than	seven	years	to	or	from	their	retirement	age.134	This	increases	the	
positive	effects	on	literacy	and	numeracy	while	decreasing	the	estimate	for	
health.135	 Thirdly,	 I	 experiment	 with	 different	 variants	 of	 nonlinear	 age	
specifications.	Firstly,	I	include	age	using	country-specific	polynomial	trends	
of	 the	 second	 degree.	 As	 a	 group,	 the	 quadratic	 age	 components	 are	
borderline	significant	or	significant	depending	on	outcome,	eliminating	any	
positive	effects	on	 literacy	and	health	 in	 the	 full	sample,	while	 leaving	the	
effect	on	numeracy	practically	unchanged.136	In	the	male	sample,	the	instru-
ment	is	now	lacking	significant	explanatory	power	in	the	first	stage,	ruling	
out	 any	 IV-based	 inference	 for	 this	 group	 and	 specification.	 However,	
extending	 the	 age	 frame	 by	 a	 couple	 of	 years	 allows	me	 to	 use	 country-
specific	quadratic	age	trends	in	the	male	sample	as	well,	which	marginally	
increases	 the	 estimates	 in	 this	 group.137	 Also,	 the	 estimates	 for	 men	 are	
                                                             
133 Literacy: The reduced form estimate decreases from 0.014** (SE 0.0067) when using the real 
instrument to 0.0034 (SE 0.0085) when using the fake instrument. For men, the corresponding 
numbers are 0.039*** (SE 0.014) for the real instrument and 0.0041 (SE 0.015) for the fake 
instrument. Numeracy: The reduced-form estimate decreases from 0.0055 (SE 0.0061) when 
using the real instrument to 0.0042 (SE 0.0081) for the fake instrument. For men, the 
corresponding numbers are 0.023* (SE 0.013) for the real instrument and -0.0024 (SE 0.014) for 
the fake instrument. Health: The reduced-form estimate increases from 0.012* (SE 0.0066) when 
using the real instrument to 0.015* (0.0075) for the fake instrument. 
134 For those who have not yet reached the retirement age, I make the cutoffs as if retirement ages 
are to stay at their current levels in the future. 
135 Sample restriction at +/- 7 years: The effect (IV) on literacy increases from 0.027** (SE 0.014) to 
0.060** (SE 0.029) overall, and from 0.078*** (SE 0.028) to 0.14** (SE 0.057) among men. The 
effect on numeracy increases from 0.011 (SE 0.012) to 0.035 (SE 0.028) overall, and from 0.047* 
(SE 0.026) to 0.11** (SE 0.053) among men. The effect on health decreases from 0.024* (SE 
0.014) to -0.0029 (0.028).  
136 The effect on literacy decreases from 0.027** (SE 0.014) to -0.0021 (SE 0.028); the effect on 
numeracy increases from 0.011 (SE 0.012) to 0.013 (SE 0.026); the effect on health decreases from 
0.024* (SE 0.014) to -0.026 (0.032). The instrument is sufficiently strong for this specification (with 
F > 100 in the first stage for both samples).  
137 The sample includes men at the age of 45-65: With country-specific linear age trends, the effect 
on literacy (IV) is 0.061*** (SE 0.018) and on numeracy 0.041** (SE 0.018). These effects increase 
to 0.072 (SE 0.061) and 0.042 (SE 0.054) when turning to country-specific quadratic age trends. 
The sample includes men at the age of 40-65: With country-specific linear age trends, the effect on 
literacy (IV) is 0.046*** (0.014) and on numeracy 0.030** (0.014). These effects increase to 
0.13*** (SE 0.048) and 0.094** (SE 0.045) when turning to country-specific quadratic age 
trends.  
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insensitive	 to	 using	 common	 age	 dummies	 or	 common	 quadratic	 age-
trends.138		
Furthermore,	I	experiment	with	including	the	instrument	using	a	second-
degree	polynomial	as	proposed	by	Dieterle	&	Snell	(2016)	as	a	test	of	validity.	
This	 leaves	 the	estimates	mainly	unchanged.139	Lastly,	 the	estimates	don’t	
change	much	when	I	extend140	or	limit141	the	set	of	controls.	
5.4.3	Heterogeneity		
It	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	effects	of	retiring	could	depend	on	your	
prior	career.	For	example,	 I	would	expect	any	positive	effects	 to	be	 larger	
among	individuals	retiring	from	poor	work	environments.	Prior	work	condi-
tions	are	not	observable	for	retirees,	however,	but	I	do	observe	education.	I	
find	 no	 evidence	 of	 heterogeneity	 in	 effects	 depending	 on	 education,	
however.142		
In	the	Appendix	(A.3	Country-specific	estimates)	I	present	the	first-stage	
and	reduced-form	regressions	separately	by	country;	table	A2a	and	A2b	use	
                                                             
138 With common quadratic age-trends (males only): The effect (IV) on literacy increases from 
0.078*** (SE 0.028) to 0.092*** (SE 0.025); the effect on numeracy decreases from 0.047* (SE 
0.026) to 0.042* (SE 0.025). With common age-fixed effects (males only): The effect on literacy 
increases to 0.097*** (SE 0.025) and the effect on numeracy decreases to 0.044* (SE 0.024).  
139 Overall: The effect (IV) on literacy decreases from 0.027** (SE 0.014) to 0.025* (0.013); the 
effect on numeracy decreases from 0.011 (SE 0.012) to 0.0088 (SE 0.012). For health, the effect 
decreases from 0.024* (SE 0.014) to 0.016 (0.013). Men only: The effect (IV) on literacy and 
numeracy remain unchanged at 0.078*** (SE 0.028) and 0.047* (SE 0.026), respectively. 
140 Extended set of controls (includes also educational area and degree, having children, and if so, 
there numbers, having a partner and if so, his or her labor market status, as well as interactions 
between age and gender and between age and the educational degrees): Overall, the effect (IV) 
on literacy decreases from 0.027** (SE 0.014) to 0.026 (SE 0.016); the effect on numeracy 
decreases from 0.011 (SE 0.012) to 0.0069 (SE 0.014) and the effect on health decreases from 
0.024* (SE 0.014) to 0.014 (SE 0.015). For men, the effect on literacy increases from 0.078*** (SE 
0.028) to 0.082*** (SE 0.031); the effect on numeracy remains unchanged. 
141 Limited set of controls (excludes each control except for country, age and gender, where the 
effects of age and gender is allowed to vary by country): Overall, the effect (IV) on literacy 
decreases from 0.027** (SE 0.014) to 0.017 (SE 0.014); the effect on numeracy decreases from 
0.011 (SE 0.012) to -0.00021 (SE 0.014) and the effect on health decreases from 0.024* (SE 0.014) 
to 0.017 (SE 0.014). For men, the effect on literacy increases from 0.078*** (SE 0.028) to 
0.088*** (SE 0.030); the effect on numeracy increases from 0.047* (SE 0.026) to 0.057** (SE 
0.028). 
142 By including interactions, I test whether effects differ between those holding a tertiary degree 
and others. I find no significant heterogeneities in effects for literacy or health when instrumenting 
your retirement duration, nor for health when instrumenting retirement. In these models, I also 
include interactions between holding a tertiary degree and several other covariates. Most 
importantly, I allow for different age trends for those with tertiary degrees and those without, and I 
also allow for this heterogeneity in age-trends to depend on country.  
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the	 full	 sample;	 table	A2c	uses	 the	male	 sample.	 In	 these	 regressions,	 the	
variable	of	interest	is	your	retirement	duration	(model	(2)).	The	average	first-
stage	and	reduced-form	estimates	match	quite	well	with	the	corresponding	
estimates	 from	 the	 pooled	 sample143,	 and	 no	 single	 country	 is	 highly	
influential	 on	 its	 own.144	 (Here,	 the	 average	 estimate	 is	 calculated	 using	
inverse	 variance	weighting.)	 Overall,	 I	 find	 no	 significant	 trend-breaks	 in	
literacy	 or	 numeracy	 for	 any	 country,	 after	 adjusting	 for	multiple	 testing	
using	the	Bonferroni	correction	(this	is	also	true	for	the	male	sample).145	For	
health,	Lithuania	produces	the	only	significant	effect.		
5.4.4	Validity	and	limitations	
I	find	no	significant	discontinuity	in	literacy	or	numeracy	as	individuals	reach	
the	 retirement	 age.	 I	 do,	 however,	 find	 a	 significant	 trend-break	 for	men,	
suggesting	 that	 retiring	 slows	 down	 the	 age-related	 decline	 in	 cognitive	
functioning	in	this	group.	Also,	there	is	evidence	for	a	positive	discontinuity	
in	 health	 for	 women.	 The	 instruments	 are	 valid,	 if	 there	 are	 no	 relevant	
differences	between	individuals	who	reached	the	retirement	age	years	ago	
and	 those	 who	 reached	 it	 recently	 (or	 have	 yet	 to	 reach	 it)	 other	 than	
retirement	alone.	The	fact	that	the	estimates	are	 insensitive	to	 including	a	
larger	 set	 of	 controls	 can	be	 viewed	as	 support	 for	 this	 assumption.	Also,	
retirement	ages	differ	from	one	country	to	the	next	(as	well	as	between	men	
and	women)	weakening	 the	 connection	 between	 specific	 cohorts	 and	 the	
instruments.	Naturally,	age	is	strongly	correlated	with	the	instruments	in	any	
case.	Hence,	the	validity	of	the	result	depends	critically	on	that	the	chosen	
specification	 is	 a	 sufficiently	 good	 approximation.	 I	 use	 country-specific	
linear	age-trends,	and	find	little	evidence	for	the	notion	that	nonlinearities	
can	explain	away	the	above	mentioned	patterns	in	these	data.		
Even	 if	 the	 estimates	 are	 internally	 valid,	 there	 are	 limitations	 to	 the	
external	 generalizability	 of	 the	 results.	 Firstly,	 the	 instrumental	 variables	
                                                             
143 Overall, the effect (IV) on literacy decreases from 0.027** (SE 0.014) to 0.017 standard 
deviations when averaging the country-specific estimates using inverse-variance weighting; for 
numeracy, the corresponding effect decreases from 0.011 (SE 0.012) to 0.0030; for health, the 
effect increases from 0.024* (SE 0.014) to 0.029. For men, the effect on literacy decreases from 
0.078*** (SE 0.028) to 0.064 standard deviations; the effect on numeracy decreases from 
0.047* (SE 0.026) to 0.040.  
144 The IV-estimates for literacy varies between 0.0087 and 0.023 standard deviations as one 
country at a time is excluded (these effects are based on the country-specific regressions). For 
numeracy, the corresponding interval goes between -0.0045 and 0.011 standard deviations. For 
health, the interval goes between 0.019 and 0.038 standard deviations.  For men, the intervals for 
literacy and numeracy are 0.053-0.077 and 0.024-0.055, respectively. 
145 Significance at the 5-percent level when p < 0.0022 or when p < 0.0023 depending on 
sample.  
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estimates	are	only	identified	by	those	affected	by	the	instrument	(Imbens	&	
Angrist,	1994).	Individuals	who	don’t	retire,	or	retire	for	unrelated	reasons,	
don’t	 contribute.	 From	 a	 policy	 perspective,	 this	 isn’t	 necessarily	 a	
disadvantage;	individuals	who	are	affected	by	retirement	ages	are	also	the	
ones	of	most	policy-concern.	On	the	other	hand,	it’s	worth	noting	that	I	can	
only	 estimate	 the	 effects	 given	 the	 current	 systems,	 where	 the	 average	
normal	retirement	age	is	62	years	(63	among	men).146	Propose	that	effective	
retirement	ages	were	to	increase	by	two	years.	This	model	predicts	that	men	
would	experience	a	long-run	loss	in	literacy	by	0.16	standard	deviations.	This	
estimate,	 however,	 is	 built	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 your	
retirement	duration	is	independent	of	your	age	at	retirement.	If,	on	the	other	
hand,	the	advantage	of	being	retired	increases	with	your	age	at	retirement,	
then	the	long-run	effects	could	be	substantially	smaller.	
	
	 	
                                                             
146 Note, however, that the estimates are influenced more heavily by countries with early 
retirement ages. 
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146 Note, however, that the estimates are influenced more heavily by countries with early 
retirement ages. 
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5.5		CONCLUSIONS	
In	 this	 study,	 I	 estimate	 the	 effect	 of	 retiring	 on	 cognitive	 abilities	 and	
subjective	 health.	 The	 identification	 relies	 on	 instrumenting	 retirement	 as	
well	as	years	as	retired	by	exploiting	the	variation	in	incentives	created	by	
country-specific	retirement	ages.	I	find	no	evidence	of	a	discontinuity	in	liter-
acy	or	numeracy	at	retirement.	However,	I	do	find	a	significant	trend-break	
for	men,	suggesting	that	retiring	causes	a	cognitive	performance	advantage	
in	literacy	that	grows	by	0.02-0.13	standard	deviations	for	each	additional	
year	 as	 retired.	 This	 finding	 goes	well	 together	with	 the	descriptive	data:	
Countries	where	a	 large	proportion	of	 the	 labor	 force	retire	 (between	 the	
ages	of	50-55	and	60-65)	are,	on	average,	countries	with	more	favorable	age-
trajectories	in	cognitive	functioning.	For	women,	I	find	a	significant	discon-
tinuity	in	health,	suggesting	that	retirement	increases	your	subjective	health	
score	by	0.21-0.93	standard	deviations.	
These	findings	don’t	fit	very	well	with	the	argument	that	individuals	‘give	
into’	cognitive	deterioration	as	the	market	incentive	is	lost	at	retirement	(as	
suggested	by	Mazzonna	&	Perecchi,	2012).	These	findings	fit	better	with	the	
idea	that	working	life	competes	with	healthy	lifestyle	activities.	Such	activi-
ties	may	include	exercise,	sleep,	engagement	in	social	or	intellectual	activi-
ties,	or	decreased	daily	stress-levels.	I	do	not	have	the	possibility	to	investi-
gate	these	mechanisms	using	these	data.	However,	a	couple	of	other	studies	
have	 shown	 that	 retirement	 indeed	 causes	 several	 beneficial	 lifestyle	
changes.147		
The	findings	in	this	study	are	in	line	with	much	of	the	recent	research	on	
retirement	and	health.	These	studies	typically	 find	that	retirees	have	poor	
health	as	compared	to	workers,	but	when	the	endogenity	of	the	retirement	
decision	is	accounted	for,	this	relationship	turns	positive.	This	is	also	what	I	
observe.	On	the	other	hand,	my	findings	don’t	fit	very	well	with	the	recent	
studies	 looking	 specifically	 at	 cognitive	 functioning,	which	 typically	 find	a	
negative	effect	of	retirement.	There	are	several	possible	explanations	for	this,	
including	 differences	 in	 sample	 frame,	 model	 specification	 and	 outcome	
measures.	However,	it	can	also	be	noted	that	this	study	is	not	an	outlier	per		
	
                                                             
147 For example, retiring has been found to cause changes in the form of reduced alcohol 
consumption, increased walking and heavy exercise, as well as increased sleep among Japanese 
elderly (Motegi et al., 2016) and decreased risk of ‘no physical exercise’ among European elderly 
(Celidoni & Rebba, 2017). The latter study also found retirement to cause increased number of 
drinking days. Both sleep patterns and exercise have been found to predict cognitive functioning 
among the elderly (Bherer et al., 2013; Scullin & Bliwise, 2015). 
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se;	 rather,	 the	magnitude	of	effects	differ	sharply	between	studies.148	This	
points	to	the	importance	of	further	investigation	into	the	relationship,	and	
into	the	potential	causes	for	heterogeneity	in	effects.	
	 	
                                                             
148 With Rohwedder & Willis (2010) finding substantial negative effects (roughly equal to -1.35 
standard deviations) while, for example, Bonsang et al. (2012) find comparatively modest negative 
effects. On the other hand, Coe et al. (2012) and Coe & Zamarro (2011) find insignificant effects or 
significantly positive effects (for blue-collar workers). 
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Appendix	
A.1	Adjusting	for	observable	heterogeneity	
Table	A1	 describes	 the	 estimated	 gaps	 between	 retirees	 and	 those	 in	 the	
labor	force,	controlling	for	a	range	of	background	characteristics	(i.e.	country	
of	residence	and	the	background	characteristics	listed	in	table	1,	where	the	
effects	of	age	and	gender	are	allowed	to	vary	between	countries).	The	regres-
sions	 reveal	 that	 the	 gaps	 in	 literacy	 and	 numeracy	 are	 comparatively	
modest	after	adjusting	for	differences	in	observable	heterogeneity;	the	effect	
on	health,	on	the	other	hand,	is	still	large.	
These	estimates	are	quite	sensitive	to	how	retirees	are	defined.	Indeed,	
individuals	who	self-identify	as	retirees	have	equally	good	or	better	cognitive	
performance	 than	 others	 (controlling	 for	 the	 same	 set	 of	 covariates	 as	
earlier).	The	effects	on	 literacy	and	numeracy	are	now	-0.0047	(SE	0.019)	
and	 0.052***	 standard	 deviations	 (SE	 0.016);	 the	 effect	 on	 self-reported	
health	 is	 -0.12***	 standard	deviations	 (SE	0.020).	Note,	 however,	 that	 the	
reference	group	–	others	–	consists	of	both	workers	as	well	as	unemployed	
individuals	and	others	outside	the	labor	force	(such	as	housewives).	Hence,	
even	if	retirement	is	exogenous	in	this	model,	these	estimates	are	not	only	
reflecting	 the	effect	of	 transitioning	 from	working	 life	 to	 retirement.	More	
importantly,	however,	retirement	is	probably	not	exogenous.	For	example,	it	
seems	likely	that	some	individuals	with	little	or	no	work	experience	do	not	
identify	 as	 retirees	 at	 any	 age.	 Hence,	 I	 am	 potentially	 comparing	 former	
workers	to	current	workers	and	non-workers.	However,	when	I	restrict	the	
reference	group	to	self-identified	workers	only,	 the	effects	on	 literacy	and	
numeracy	 are	 still	 small	 at	 -0.050**	 (SE	 0.021)	 and	 -0.013	 standard	
deviations	(SE	0.020);	the	effect	on	self-reported	health	is	-0.32***	standard	
deviations	(SE	0.021).	In	these	regressions,	I	also	exclude	anyone	who	has	
never	 had	 a	 paid	 job	 as	 to	 further	 homogenize	 the	 groups.	 Lastly,	 I	 also	
experiment	with	restricting	the	sample	by	excluding	anyone	who	quit	their	
last	paid	job	before	the	age	of	50	(as	all	workers	are	50+).	Now,	there	are	no	
differences	in	literacy	and	numeracy	between	the	retirees	and	the	workers,	
but	still	a	significant	and	quite	large	difference	in	health.149	
A	technical	note	(table	A1):	Subjective	health	is	measured	using	the	raw	
scale	 (1-5)	as	well	as	adjusted-POLS	(see	section	4.1).	Here,	 the	estimates	
happen	to	be	the	same	regardless.		
                                                             
149 The effect on literacy is -0.019 standard deviations (SE 0.024); the effect on numeracy is 0.028 
standard deviations (SE 0.022) and the effect on self-reported health is -0.23*** standard 
deviations (SE 0.022). 
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149 The effect on literacy is -0.019 standard deviations (SE 0.024); the effect on numeracy is 0.028 
standard deviations (SE 0.022) and the effect on self-reported health is -0.23*** standard 
deviations (SE 0.022). 
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Table A1. Adjusted differences in literacy, numeracy and subjective 
health between retirees and those in the labor force (ages 50-65) 
ALL Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(5-point 
scale) 
Health 
(adjusted 
POLS) 
Retired -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.47*** -0.49*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Observations 
 
43,978 
 
43,978 
 
42,817 
 
42,817 
R-squared 0.338 0.401 0.217 0.217 
WOMEN Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(5-point 
scale) 
Health 
(adjusted 
POLS) 
Retired -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.43*** -0.43*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
 
Observations 
 
23,763 
 
23,763 
 
23,185 
 
23,185 
R-squared 0.346 0.410 0.227 0.226 
MEN Literacy 
(z-score) 
Numeracy 
(z-score) 
Health 
(5-point 
scale) 
Health 
(adjusted 
POLS) 
Retired -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.53*** -0.53*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
Observations 
 
20,215 
 
20,215 
 
19,632 
 
19,632 
R-squared 0.333 0.385 0.212 0.212 
Notes: All regressions include country dummies and country-specific linear age trends, 
immigration status, years of schooling, mother’s and father’s education, having children and 
if so, their numbers; having a partner and if so, his or her labor market status. The regressions 
in the first panel (ALL) also include a gender effect witch is allowed to vary between countries. 
All regressions are weighted as to account for the country specific survey designs; on a cross-
country level all countries are weighted equally. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
estimated using jackknife replicate sampling weights and further adjusted for the use of 
plausible values (for literacy and numeracy). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.2	Age-trends	in	literacy,	numeracy	and	self-reported	health	
	
	
	
Figure A1. Average literacy and numeracy by age 
 
	
	
Figure A2. Average self-reported health by age 
	
Notes: These figures exploit all available data for 50-65 year olds (25 
countries for literacy and numeracy; 24 countries for self-reported 
health). All averages are weighted as to account for the country specific 
survey designs; on a cross-country level all countries are weighted 
equally when estimating the mean at each age. 
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A.3	Country-specific	estimates		
	
	
	
	 	
Table A2a. The number of years since you reached the retirement age and 
its effects: First-stage and reduced-form regressions separately by country. 
Sample: All  
Outcome: Years as retired Literacy Numeracy 
Belgium 2.28* (1.22) 0.28 (0.29) 0.24 (0.27) 
Chile 0.24* (0.14) -0.013 (0.044) -0.0020 (0.037) 
Cyprus 2.37** (0.97) -0.14 (0.29) -0.25 (0.33) 
Czech Republic 0.57*** (0.059) -0.0097 (0.019) -0.0038 (0.018) 
Denmark 2.75*** (0.49) 0.049 (0.15) 0.046 (0.15) 
Estonia 0.35*** (0.058) -0.0093 (0.017) 0.0064 (0.016) 
Finland 3.45*** (0.72) 0.077 (0.19) 0.24 (0.18) 
France 0.54*** (0.043) 0.050** (0.020) 0.042** (0.021) 
Greece 0.71*** (0.23) -0.018 (0.072) -0.018 (0.060) 
Ireland - - - 
Israel 0.42** (0.17) 0.022 (0.059) -0.0078 (0.059) 
Italy 0.52*** (0.054) 0.047** (0.023) 0.013 (0.024) 
Japan 0.26 (0.94) 0.044 (0.21) 0.17 (0.22) 
Korea 0.17** (0.068) -0.039* (0.023) -0.061** (0.024) 
Lithuania 0.19*** (0.064) -0.0091 (0.027) -0.030 (0.025) 
Netherlands 2.81*** (0.88) -0.13 (0.24) -0.11 (0.24) 
Norway - - - 
Poland 0.68*** (0.11) -0.024 (0.031) 0.011 (0.029) 
Russia 0.54*** (0.059) -0.023 (0.025) -0.044* (0.023) 
Slovakia 0.49*** (0.034) 0.011 (0.012) 0.0066 (0.013) 
Slovenia 0.68*** (0.052) 0.019 (0.021) 0.020 (0.021) 
Spain 2.53** (0.95) -0.094 (0.26) -0.066 (0.24) 
Sweden 0.96 (0.68) -0.037 (0.18) 0.24 (0.18) 
Turkey 0.47*** (0.17) 0.10* (0.053) 0.10* (0.061) 
United Kingdom  0.33*** (0.078) 0.051* (0.026) 0.0062 (0.024) 
Weighted    
averagea 
0.48 0.0082 0.0014 
Notes: Controls included for age (linearly), gender, immigration status, years of schooling and 
parental education levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 aInverse 
variance weighting. 
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Table A2b. The number of years since you reached the retirement age 
and its effects: First-stage and reduced-form regressions separately by 
country. Sample: All (Health)  
Outcome: Years as retired Health 
Belgium 2.29* (1.22) 0.17 (0.26) 
Chile 0.24* (0.14) -0.020 (0.042) 
Cyprus 2.37** (0.97) 0.46 (0.28) 
Czech Republic 0.57*** (0.059) 0.013 (0.020) 
Denmark 2.75*** (0.49) 0.42** (0.20) 
Estonia 0.34*** (0.058) -0.0011 (0.014) 
Finland 3.48*** (0.74) 0.33 (0.20) 
France 0.54*** (0.043) 0.0041 (0.017) 
Greece 0.71*** (0.23) 0.010 (0.058) 
Ireland - - 
Israel 0.41** (0.17) 0.067 (0.064) 
Italy 0.52*** (0.054) -0.0025 (0.028) 
Japan 0.26 (0.94) 0.36 (0.32) 
Korea 0.17** (0.068) -0.020 (0.028) 
Lithuania 0.19*** (0.064) 0.073*** (0.022) 
Netherlands 2.81*** (0.88) -0.51* (0.27) 
Norway - - 
Poland 0.68*** (0.11) -0.034 (0.022) 
Russia 0.54*** (0.059) -0.039 (0.025) 
Slovakia 0.49*** (0.034) 0.029** (0.012) 
Slovenia 0.68*** (0.052) 0.025 (0.024) 
Spain 2.53** (0.95) 0.19 (0.30) 
Sweden 0.96 (0.68) 0.34 (0.25) 
Turkey - - 
United Kingdom 0.33*** (0.092) 0.070*** (0.025) 
Weighted averagea 0.48 0.014 
Notes: Controls included for age (linearly), gender, immigration status, years of schooling 
and parental education levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 aInverse variance weighting. 
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p<0.1 aInverse variance weighting. 
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Outcome: Years as retired Literacy Numeracy 
Belgium 4.01** (1.62) 0.14 (0.34) 0.013 (0.32) 
Chile -0.40 (1.13) 0.55 (0.56) 0.28 (0.45) 
Cyprus 2.40** (1.19) 0.026 (0.35) -0.069 (0.39) 
Czech Republic 0.39*** (0.13) 0.024 (0.058) -0.0034 (0.051) 
Denmark 1.68** (0.67) -0.13 (0.21) -0.043 (0.21) 
Estonia 0.47*** (0.17) -0.090 (0.060) -0.012 (0.053) 
Finland 3.07** (1.23) 0.014 (0.31) 0.060 (0.28) 
France 0.47*** (0.065) 0.042 (0.029) 0.042 (0.028) 
Greece 0.63** (0.31) -0.042 (0.093) -0.043 (0.081) 
Ireland - - - 
Israel - - - 
Italy 0.54*** (0.075) 0.056* (0.029) 0.014 (0.031) 
Japan 0.62 (0.75) 0.0018 (0.29) 0.14 (0.31) 
Korea 0.20*** (0.074) -0.027 (0.033) -0.042 (0.033) 
Lithuania 0.33 (0.27) -0.0049 (0.083) -0.055 (0.074) 
Netherlands 1.84** (0.86) 0.0011 (0.27) 0.0024 (0.25) 
Norway - - - 
Poland 2.21 (1.75) -0.18 (0.48) -0.19 (0.43) 
Russia 0.58*** (0.16) 0.075 (0.053) 0.058 (0.055) 
Slovakia 0.67*** (0.21) 0.099 (0.067) 0.055 (0.066) 
Slovenia 0.50*** (0.073) 0.041 (0.029) 0.048* (0.027) 
Spain 2.93** (1.23) 0.10 (0.35) 0.030 (0.33) 
Sweden 2.22** (1.03) -0.35 (0.26) -0.055 (0.28) 
Turkey 0.46** (0.21) 0.085 (0.053) 0.067 (0.060) 
United Kingdom 0.38 (1.29) -0.33 (0.33) -0.34 (0.30) 
Weighed averagea 0.46 0.029 0.018 
Notes: Controls included for age (linearly), gender, immigration status, years of schooling and 
parental education levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 aInverse 
variance weighting. 
	
	
	
	 	
Table A2c. The number of years since you reached the retirement age and its 
effects: First-stage and reduced-form regressions separately by country. 
Sample: Males only 
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CHAPTER	6	
Socioeconomic	Background	and	College	Application	
Strategies150	
	
Abstract	
In	this	chapter,	we	analyze	college	application	behaviors	of	high	school	grad-
uates,	 and	 how	 these	 behaviors	 differ	 depending	 on	 socioeconomic	 back-
ground	as	measured	by	your	neighborhood	education	level.	To	this	purpose,	
we	use	a	large	administrative	data	consisting	of	Finnish	high	school	students	
who	 graduated	 in	 2012	 and	 applied	 to	 college	 that	 same	 spring.	 Using	 a	
discrete	 choice	 model,	 we	 find	 that	 students	 gravitate	 towards	 colleges	
located	nearby,	 and	 that	 this	 tendency	 is	 somewhat	 stronger	 for	 students	
from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods.	 Also,	 female	 students	 from	 poorly	
educated	neighborhoods	apply	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	having	a	com-
paratively	strong	aversion	to	risk.	These	differences	in	application	strategies	
are,	 however,	 unlikely	 to	 cause	 any	 large	wage	 gaps	between	 the	 student	
groups	(i.e.	those	from	highly	and	poorly	educated	neighborhoods).	
	 	
                                                             
150 In co-operation with Roope Uusitalo  
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6.1		INTRODUCTION	
The	relationship	between	parents	and	children’s	educational	and	financial	
outcomes	is	well-documented	(see,	for	example,	Jäntti	et	al.,	2006;	Chavelier,	
2004;	Hertz	et	al.,	2007	and	the	overview	by	Solon,	1999).	Whether	these	
intergenerational	 correlations	 are	problematic	 or	not,	 depends	heavily	on	
the	 mechanism	 behind:	 What	 are	 the	 driving	 forces?	 There	 are	 several	
hypotheses,	which	 includes	 inherited	ability	and	 financial	constraints	 (see	
the	 discussion	 by	 Black	 &	 Devereux,	 2010).	 Another	 possible	mechanism	
concerns	preferences	regarding	higher	education.	A	couple	of	recent	studies	
have	 looked	 into	 this	 by	 analyzing	 college	 application	 behaviors	 of	 high	
school	students.	These	studies	typically	find	clear	evidence	of	differences	in	
application	 strategies	 depending	 on	 social	 background.	 Hoxby	 and	 Avery	
(2013)	 find	 that	 high-achieving	 low-income	 students	 seldom	 apply	 to	
selective	 institutions,	 while	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 for	 their	 high-income	
counterparts.	They	 identify	a	 couple	of	potential	 explanations,	 including	a	
lack	 of	 guidance	 and	 lack	 of	 older	 role	models.	Other	 authors	 have	 found	
similar	patterns	 (see	Dillon	and	Smith,	 2017;	Heller,	 2004;	Hill,	 2005	and	
Smith	et	al.,	2013).	A	couple	of	authors	(see	Do,	2004;	Frenette,	2006	and	
Griffith	&	Rothstein,	2009)	have	further	tested	whether	proximity	to	colleges	
(or	selective	institutions)	can	explain	the	differences	in	outcomes	between	
student	 groups.	 The	 results	 from	 these	 studies	 are	 mixed.	 Although	
proximity	 seems	 to	 matter	 for	 college	 choices,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 it	
explains	the	outcome	gap	between	low-	and	high-income	students.	
In	this	chapter,	we	study	the	application	strategies	of	Finnish	high	school	
students,	and	how	these	strategies	differ	depending	on	social	background.	
We	find	that	students	gravitate	towards	colleges	located	nearby,	and	that	this	
tendency	 is	 stronger	 among	 those	 from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods.	
Furthermore,	female	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	apply	in	
a	way	that	 is	consistent	with	being	comparatively	wage	risk	averse.	These	
patterns	can	only	partly	be	explained	by	group	differences	in	ability.	
Despite	 these	 behavioral	 differences,	 the	 expected	 wage	 gap	 between	
students	 from	 highly	 and	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 is	 small.	
Furthermore,	there	is	little	support	for	the	notion	that	students	from	poorly	
educated	neighborhoods	are	hindered	by	their	application	behavior:	When	
students	 from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 are	 ‘given’	 the	 behavior	
model	of	students	from	highly	educated	neighborhoods,	the	expected	wage	
gaps	 between	 the	 groups	 are	 mainly	 unaffected.	 This	 suggests	 that	
differences	in	endowments	–	geographical	location	and	high	school	grades	–	
are	 of	more	 importance.	 The	 same	 is	 not	 true	when	 comparing	male	 and	
female	applicants	however:	When	female	students	are	‘given’	the	behavior	
model	of	male	students,	the	gender	wage	gap	is	practically	eliminated.		
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6.2		MODELING	PORTFOLIO	CHOICES	
The	aim	 is	 to	 analyze	application	behaviors	of	high	 school	 graduates,	 and	
how	 these	 behaviors	 differ	 between	 students	 depending	 on	 their	
neighborhood	education	level.	To	this	purpose	we	utilize	a	conditional	logit	
model,	 where	 students	 can	 choose	 one	 application	 portfolio	 from	 a	 near	
infinite	set	of	portfolios.	An	application	portfolio	is	a	possible	combination	of	
educational	 programs;	 in	 total	 there	 are	 313	 programs	 and	 students	 can	
apply	to	anywhere	between	one	and	thirteen	alternatives.151	We	assume	that	
the	student	chooses	the	one	portfolio	which	maximizes	expected	utility.	In	
the	 following	 section	 we	 present	 the	 main	 model	 describing	 portfolio	
expected	utility.	This	model	treats	students	as	having	one	shot	at	applying,	
so	 that	 the	 outcome	 of	 ‘accept’	 or	 ‘reject’	 fully	 determines	 the	 student’s	
educational	path.		
6.2.1	The	model	
The	student’s	expected	utility	from	choosing	a	specific	portfolio	is	given	by:	
𝐸𝐸g𝑈𝑈b,:j = ∑ 𝑝𝑝b,c𝑢𝑢b,cc ,	where	𝐸𝐸g𝑈𝑈b,:j	is	the	expected	utility	of	portfolio	j	from	
the	perspective	of	student	 i;	𝑢𝑢b,c	 is	 the	utility	 from	educational	program	n	
belonging	 to	 this	 portfolio,	with	 one	 of	 the	 educations	 being	 “high	 school	
diploma	only”.	𝑝𝑝b,c	denotes	the	probability	of	ending	up	with	education	n	if	
choosing	this	portfolio,	with	𝑝𝑝b,Ò	being	the	probability	of	ending	up	with	a	
high	school	diploma	only,	i.e.	of	not	being	admitted	to	any	of	the	programs.	
The	 student	 can	 only	 end	 up	 with	 one	 of	 these	 educations	 so	 that	 the	
probabilities	sum	to	one,	∑ 𝑝𝑝b,cc = 1.	The	utility	of	educational	program	n	is	
modeled	as:	
𝑢𝑢b,c = 𝑥𝑥b,c𝛽𝛽 + 𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤c) + 𝜀𝜀b,c	
where	𝑥𝑥b,c	represents	characteristics	of	education	n	including	the	log	of	the	
geographical	distance	to	that	college	from	the	students	home,	the	student’s	
employment	prospect	post-graduation,	the	female	percentage	on	the	post-
graduate	labor	market	and	this	percentage	interacted	with	the	gender	of	the	
student,	as	well	as	a	vector	of	18	indicator	variables	for	different	educational	
fields,	with	“high	school	diploma	only”	serving	as	reference.	152	The	‘female	
                                                             
151 Not all combinations are allowed as students can apply to maximally four polytechnical 
programs and nine university programs. 
152 The fields are: “Pharmacy and laboratory work”, “Business administration”, “Agronomy, 
horticulture, forestry”, “Pedagogy”, “TV- and movie-work, acting, art”, “Music and dance”, 
“Social sciences”, “Engineer, builder”, “Nutrition, veterinary medicine”, “Social work, health 
science”, “Science”, “Medicine, Odontology”, “Cultural worker”, “Languages, History, 
Philosophy”, “Theology, religious studies”, “Law”, “Architecture”, “Psychology”. 
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percentage’	 is	 primarily	 included	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 unobserved	 occupational	
characteristics	that	men	and	women	may	respond	differently	to.	𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤c)	is	the	
utility	 of	 the	 post-graduate	 wage	 for	 education	 n.	 The	 portfolio	 expected	
utility	is	then	described	by:	
𝐸𝐸g𝑈𝑈b,:j = 𝐸𝐸g𝑥𝑥b,:j𝛽𝛽 + 𝐸𝐸g𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤b,:)j+𝜀𝜀b,: 	 (1)	
	where	𝐸𝐸g𝑥𝑥b,:j	represents	the	student’s	expected	outcomes	if	choosing	port-
folio	 j:	 the	expected	 log	moving	distance,	 the	employment	probability,	 the	
expected	female	percentage	on	the	post-graduate	labor	market	(interacted	
with	the	gender	of	the	student)	as	well	as	a	vector	of	probabilities	for	ending	
up	in	each	of	the	18	fields.	The	expected	utility	of	the	future	wage,	𝐸𝐸g𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤b,:)j,	
is	modeled	as	linearly	increasing	in	expected	log	wages	with	an	added	effect	
for	wage	dispersion	as	measured	by	the	variance	for	log	wages.	Section	2.2	
(Measuring	portfolio	properties)	discusses	the	basis	for	this	specification,	as	
well	as	the	estimation	of	the	expected	values	mentioned	above.	Finally,	𝜀𝜀b,: 	is	
a	vector	of	random	error	components	which	are	treated	as	identically	and	
independently	extreme	value	distributed.	
For	practical	reasons,	we	use	only	a	tiny	fraction	of	the	full	choice	set	of	
application	portfolios	in	estimating	the	parameters.	As	shown	by	McFadden	
(1978)	one	can	consistently	estimate	the	parameters	of	a	conditional	logit	by	
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each	 student,	 randomly	 drawing	 nine	 portfolios	 from	 the	 distribution	 of	
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∑ exp	[𝑉𝑉b,: + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞(𝑆𝑆b|𝑗𝑗)]:∈ıˆ
	
where	𝑝𝑝b,Å 	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 student	 i	 choosing	 portfolio	 k	 among	 the	
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153 An alternative would be to draw each subset randomly and uniformly from the full choice set of 
portfolios. This, however, would arguably produce less precise estimators, as this subset would 
consist of comparatively undesirable alternatives providing little information on the reasons behind 
a student’s choice (Train, 2009).  
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probability,	with	coefficient	constrained	to	one	in	estimation.	A	description	
of	the	calculation	of	𝑞𝑞(𝑆𝑆b|𝑘𝑘)	is	given	in	the	Appendix,	section	A.1.	
One	 central	 issue	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 assessing	 whether	 the	 behavioral	
parameters	of	this	model	differ	depending	on	neighborhood	education	level.	
In	particular,	we	are	interested	in	whether	students	from	poorly	educated	
neighborhoods	are	more	(or	less)	sensitive	to	the	expected	moving	distance	
and	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 portfolio	 wage	 distribution	 in	 comparison	 to	
students	 from	highly	educated	neighborhoods.	To	the	extent	effects	differ,	
this	 can	 potentially	 be	 an	 important	 explanation	 for	 the	 differences	 in	
schooling	outcomes	between	groups.	If,	for	example,	distance	is	a	stronger	
barrier	for	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	–	making	choices	
more	geographically	restricted	for	this	group	–	then	this	is	also	likely	to	be	
reflected	in	schooling	outcomes.	In	practice,	we	test	for	differences	in	effects	
by	 estimating	 a	 model	 that	 includes	 interactions	 between	 neighborhood	
education	levels	and	the	independent	variables.	In	a	second	step	we	further	
test	whether	any	differences	in	effects	between	the	groups	can	be	explained	
by	 high	 school	 grades.	 To	 this	 purpose	 we	 reweight	 observations	 for	 all	
neighborhood	groups	as	to	represent	the	pooled	distribution	of	high	school	
grades.		
6.2.2	Measuring	portfolio	properties	
We	 now	 return	 to	 discussing	 how	 the	 expected	 values	 entering	 (1)	 are	
modeled.	Skipping	 the	student	 index	 for	simplicity,	 the	expected	value	 for	
some	characteristic	(𝑥𝑥)	of	a	portfolio	is	described	by:	
𝐸𝐸g𝑥𝑥:j = ≤𝑝𝑝(c)𝑥𝑥(c)
Ò
cÇ?
	
	
(2)	
=	𝜋𝜋(?)𝑥𝑥(?) + õ1 − 𝜋𝜋(?)ú𝜋𝜋(5)𝑥𝑥(5) + ⋯
+ õ1 − 𝜋𝜋(?)úõ1 − 𝜋𝜋(5)ú… õ1 − 𝜋𝜋(Ò>?)ú𝑥𝑥(Ò)	
where	𝜋𝜋(c)	 is	 the	 student’s	 probability	 of	 being	 admitted	 to	 the	 program	
ranked	as	number	n	among	the	programs	in	that	portfolio,	whereas	𝑝𝑝(c)	de-
notes	the	probability	of	enrolling	in	that	program.	If	a	student	is	admitted	to	
several	 programs	 she	 will,	 in	 other	 words,	 accept	 the	 one	 she	 ranks	 the	
highest.	As	this	ranking	is	unobservable	to	us,	however,	we	rank	programs	
according	 to	admissions	probabilities,	 starting	with	 the	 toughest	program	
(from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 student).	 Not	 being	 admitted	 to	 any	 of	 the	
portfolio	programs	is	treated	as	being	the	least	preferred	outcome,	denoted	
by	𝑥𝑥(Ò).	
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The	student’s	probability	of	being	admitted	to	a	program,	𝜋𝜋(c),	is	estima-ted	
based	on	data	 from	the	previous	cohort	of	applicants,	using	separate	 logit	
regressions	by	each	diploma	(33	in	total).	The	outcome	measures	whether	
an	 applicant	was	 admitted	 and	 the	 predictors	 include	 the	 national	matri-
culation	exam	results	and	different	intercepts	by	college.	The	matriculation	
exam	 results	 are	 included	 through	 several	 variables	measuring	 the	 result	
from	 different	 subjects,	 interacted	 with	 the	 student	 having	 taken	 that	
subject.154	This	 captures	how	educational	 fields	weigh	 subjects	differently	
(for	 example,	math	would	have	more	weight	 for	 a	 future	 engineer	 than	 a	
musician).	 In	 practice,	 matriculation	 exam	 scores	 are	 not	 the	 sole	
determinant	 of	 admittance	 success.	 Entrance	 exams,	 interviews,	 students’	
stated	priorities	and	earlier	work	experience	may	also	come	into	play.	Note,	
however,	that	our	goal	is	not	to	predict	the	outcome	of	‘admitted’	or	‘rejected’	
as	well	as	possible,	but	rather	to	estimate	the	admissions	probabilities	from	
the	viewpoint	of	students.	It	is	not	likely	that	students	have	access	to	more	
or	 higher	 quality	 information	 than	 we	 in	 general,	 and	 if	 anything,	 the	
predicted	 probabilities	 are	 likely	 to	 understate	 the	 uncertainty	 as	 experi-
enced	by	applicants.	
Using	(2)	with	estimated	probabilities,	𝜋𝜋Ã(c),	we	calculate	the	expected	log	
moving	distance,	the	employment	probability	and	the	probability	of	ending	
up	 in	a	specific	 field	 for	each	student-portfolio	combination.	The	expected	
utility	of	portfolio	wages,	𝐸𝐸g𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤:)j,	however,	cannot	be	calculated	directly	
using	(2)	as	this	expectancy	also	depends	on	the	specification	of	the	utility	
function,	u(𝑤𝑤:).	Here,	we	assume	that	students	exhibit	constant	relative	risk	
aversion,	described	by:		
𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤) =
𝑤𝑤?>¯
1 − 𝛾𝛾
	
where	w	denotes	wages	and	𝛾𝛾	is	the	relative	risk	aversion	parameter.	The	ex-
pected	utility	is	then	given	by	𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢(𝑤𝑤)] =
?
?>¯
𝐸𝐸[𝑤𝑤?>¯].	In	order	to	calculate	
this	expectancy,	we	need	a	distributional	model	for	portfolio	wages.	Letting	
𝑤𝑤: 	denote	the	wage	if	choosing	portfolio	j,	then	𝑤𝑤: 	is	described	as	a	sum	of	
random	variables	as	follows:	
                                                             
154 The student has two mandatory subjects – her mother tongue (or one of the native languages if 
the student has a foreign mother tongue) and a second language (chosen by the student, usually 
English or Swedish). Furthermore, the student selects at least another two subjects from the 
following three categories: math, languages and “general studies”. Within each category there are 
further choices to make. For example, if math is chosen then the student can write either the short 
or extended math curriculum; if “general studies” is chosen then the student can choose between 
an extended list of subjects including, for example, physics, chemistry, history, psychology and 
religion.     
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𝑤𝑤: = ≤ 𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧 = 𝑛𝑛)𝑤𝑤c
Ò
cÇ?
	
where	𝐼𝐼(𝑧𝑧 = 𝑛𝑛)	is	an	indicator	variable	taking	on	the	value	1	if	z	equals	n	and	
zero	otherwise;	z	equals	n	if	the	student	enrolls	in	program	n.	If	we	assume	
that	𝑤𝑤c	follows	a	lognormal	distribution	with	location	and	shape	parameters	
denoted	by	𝜇𝜇c	and	𝜎𝜎c5,	then	𝑤𝑤: 	is	approximately	log	normal	for	the	portfolios	
in	 the	data.155	This	 is	shown	by	example	 in	 the	Appendix,	section	A.2.	The	
location	 and	 shape	 parameters	 of	 𝑤𝑤: 	 are	 given	 by	 𝜇𝜇: = 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇c]	 and	 𝜎𝜎:
5 =
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉[𝜇𝜇c] + 𝐸𝐸[𝜎𝜎c5],	 respectively.	 Treating	 𝑤𝑤: 	 as	 log	 normally	 distributed	
implies	that	students	maximize:	
𝐸𝐸g𝑢𝑢õ𝑤𝑤:új =
1
1 − 𝛾𝛾
𝐸𝐸˘𝑤𝑤:
?>¯˙ =
1
1 − 𝛾𝛾
exp	g(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜇𝜇: + 0.5(1 − 𝛾𝛾)5𝜎𝜎:
5j	
which,	by	monotonicity,	is	equivalent	to	maximizing:	
𝑢𝑢õ𝜇𝜇:, 𝜎𝜎:
5ú = 𝜇𝜇: − 0.5(𝛾𝛾 − 1)𝜎𝜎:
5	 (3)	
From	(3)	we	observe	that	students	with	a	risk	aversion	parameter	above	one,	
𝛾𝛾 > 1,	are	penalized	by	increases	in	𝜎𝜎:
5	while	the	opposite	is	true	for	students	
with	a	risk	aversion	parameter	below	one.		
6.2.3	Marginal	effects	and	error	margins	
Unlike	in	linear	regression,	the	coefficients	in	a	conditional	logit	are	biased	
towards	 zero	 if	 relevant	 predictors	 are	 omitted,	 also	 when	 these	 are	
uncorrelated	with	the	remaining	predictors,	i.e.	the	coefficients	are	inherent-
ly	 linked	 to	 the	 error	 variance.	 The	 practical	 implication	 of	 this	 is	 that	
coefficients	 for	 different	 neighborhood	 education	 levels	 are	 not	 directly	
comparable,	only	ratios	between	coefficients	are	(such	as	 the	relative	risk	
aversion).	However,	average	marginal	effects	are	not	affected	by	this	kind	of	
attenuation	 bias	 (see	Mood,	 2010).	 For	 this	 reason,	we	 present	 effects	 as	
average	marginal	 effects	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 raw	 coefficients.	 The	marginal	
effects	are	calculated	separately	for	each	observation	(i.e.	for	each	student-
portfolio	combination)	and	averaged	over	all	observations.156	Note,	however,	
                                                             
155 The location parameter is the expected value of log wages; the shape parameter is the variance 
for log wages. 
156 The own marginal effect for an observation: ‹˚
‹`
= 𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝛽𝛽, where p is the probability of 
choosing this portfolio and β the coefficient of interest. 
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that	the	marginal	effects	are	conditional	on	the	sampled	subset	of	portfolios	
meaning	that	absolute	magnitudes	should	be	viewed	in	that	context.	Error	
margins	 for	 average	 marginal	 effects	 (and	 risk	 aversion	 parameters)	 are	
calculated	 by	 simulating	 the	 relevant	 sampling	 distribution	 by	 repeatedly	
drawing	 average	 marginal	 effects	 (risk	 aversion	 coefficients)	 using	 the	
empirical	 multivariate	 normal	 distribution	 for	 the	 underlying	 coefficient	
vector.	The	matrix	of	 covariances	describing	 this	distribution	 is	estimated	
using	clustering	on	the	high	school	level.		
6.2.4	Model	selection	and	validity	
An	 alternative	 approach	 for	 analyzing	 application	 behavior	 is	 to	 study	
program	choices	instead	of	portfolio	choices,	i.e.	a	model	where	the	choice	
set	 consists	 of	 the	 full	 set	 of	 programs	 with	 positive	 outcomes	 for	 all	
programs	 applied	 to.	 This	 is	 the	 approach	 chosen	 by	 Hoxby	 and	 Avery	
(2013).	Such	a	model	assumes	that	students	pick	each	program	they	prefer	
to	having	a	high	school	diploma	only,	and	that	the	value	of	adding	another	
program	 to	 the	 portfolio	 can	 be	 assessed	 independently	 of	 any	 programs	
already	 included.	 For	 example,	 the	 value	 of	 adding	 a	 program	 may	 then	
depend	on	it	being,	say,	medical,	but	not	on	how	that	changes	your	chances	
of	becoming	a	medical	doctor	–	something	determined	by	the	portfolio	com-
position	as	a	whole.	Our	assumption	is	that	students	actually	care	about	the	
latter,	why	this	is	the	modeling	strategy	chosen	here.		
The	random	expected	utility	approach	is	not	without	weaknesses,	how-
ever.	The	well-known	limitations	of	conditional	logit	estimators	and	obser-
vational	data	 analysis	 in	 general	 are	also	present	 in	 this	 setting.	The	 con-
ditional	 logit	 estimator	 relies	 on	 the	 assumption	 of	 unobservable	 factors	
being	uncorrelated	over	portfolios;	if	one	portfolio	becomes	more	attractive	
the	other	ones	loses	in	attractiveness	to	the	same	degree	(see	Train,	2009).	
In	other	words,	all	relevant	portfolio	characteristics	are	assumed	to	be	cap-
tured	by	the	model,	leaving	only	white	noise	in	the	error	term.	This	is	a	strong	
assumption	and	estimates	should	be	interpreted	with	caution	in	light	of	this	
limitation.		
Moreover,	 as	 with	 observational	 data	 in	 general,	 the	 estimated	 effects	
describe	statistical	associations,	not	causal	relationships.	If	we,	for	example,	
observe	that	students	are	more	likely	to	choose	portfolios	with	high	expected	
wages,	this	could	reflect	both	a	preference	for	high	wages	and/or	preferences	
regarding	other	correlated	portfolio	characteristics.	Even	if	the	model	would	
be	 causal,	measurement	 errors	may	 still	 bias	 the	 estimates.	 For	 example,	
students	may	systematically	over-	or	underestimate	their	chances	of	being	
admitted	 to	 different	 programs.	 Also,	 students	may	 not	 view	 their	 future	
wage	as	a	random	draw	from	the	same	wage	distribution	we	observe;	they	
177 
 
could	potentially	have	either	better	or	worse	information	available.	Both	of	
these	factors	could	contribute	to	the	students’	observed	behavior	differing	
from	the	intended	one.	
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6.3		DATA	DESCRIPTION	
This	 chapter	 presents	 the	 sampling	 procedure	 and	 describes	 the	 main	
variables	of	 interest.	A	descriptive	 comparison	of	 the	 chosen	portfolios	of	
students	 from	 different	 educational	 backgrounds	 is	 also	 presented.	 In	
summary,	 we	 observe	 clear	 differences	 in	 mean	 portfolio	 characteristics	
depending	on	neighborhood	education	level.	Students	from	highly	educated	
neighborhoods	choose	portfolios	giving	them	a	comparatively	small	chance	
of	admittance	to	an	educational	program,	but	a	comparatively	high	expected	
wage	and	wage	dispersion.	Students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods,	
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 choose	 portfolios	 giving	 them	 a	 comparatively	 high	
expected	moving	distance	from	home.			
6.3.1	Sampling	and	variable	description	
The	sample	is	based	on	a	large	administrative	data	on	individual	level	appli-
cations	to	higher	education.	The	sample	covers	roughly	18,000	students	or	
80	percent	of	the	total	population	of	Finnish	students	born	1991	or	later,	who	
graduated	 from	high	 school	 in	2012	 and	 applied	 to	higher	 education	 that	
same	spring.	The	20-percent	 fallout	 is	due	 to	missing	values	on	neighbor-
hood	education	level.		
For	each	student,	we	observe	 the	 full	set	of	applications	sent	 to	educa-
tional	programs	 in	2012.	Besides	 from	these	applications,	 the	sample	also	
contains	 information	 regarding	 a	 number	 of	 student-	 and	 program-level	
characteristics.	 The	 student-level	 variables	 include	 gender,	 matriculation	
exam	results,	place	of	residence	and	the	percentage	of	highly	educated	adults	
in	 the	 student’s	 local	 neighborhood	 (250	 x	 250	 meters).	 The	 bottom	 25	
percent	 on	 this	 scale	 are	 defined	 as	 ‘students	 from	 poorly	 educated	
neighborhood’;	the	middle	50	percent	as	‘students	from	neighborhoods	with	
moderate	education	levels’	and	the	top	25	percent	as	‘students	from	highly	
educated	neighborhoods’.	In	moderately	educated	neighborhoods,	the	per-
centage	of	highly	educated	adults	are	13-31	(average	20	percent);	in	poorly	
and	highly	educated	neighborhoods	these	numbers	are,	on	average,	7	and	44	
percent,	respectively.	The	data	on	neighborhoods	is	collected	in	2008,	ensur-
ing	that	the	student	herself	is	not	part	of	the	adult	population	(18	years	and	
above)	at	the	time	of	measurement.			
A	 program	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 college	 and	 a	 diploma	 (for	 example:	
Helsinki	 University,	 Class	 teacher).	 Program-level	 variables	 include	 the	
geographical	 location	of	 the	program	as	well	as	 some	post-graduate	 labor	
market	properties:	the	expected	wage,	the	wage	quartiles,	employment	rate	
and	the	gender	distribution.	The	employment	rate	and	wage	properties	are	
measured	 in	 2008	 using	 30-34	 year	 old	 individuals	 with	 the	 relevant	
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diploma.	 In	 other	 words,	 several	 programs	 share	 the	 same	 labor	 market	
properties	if	they	award	the	same	diploma.	If	a	student	is	not	admitted	to	any	
program,	her	 future	 labor	market	outcomes	 is	measured	using	 individuals	
with	a	high	school	diploma	only.	Using	the	expected	post-graduate	wage	and	
the	wage	quartiles,	we	calculate	the	expected	log	wage	and	log	wage	variance	
under	the	assumption	of	wages	being	log	normally	distributed.	The	gender	
distribution	on	the	post-graduate	labor	market	is	measured	as	the	percen-
tage	of	women	who	enrolled	in	that	program	among	the	previous	cohort	of	
applicants.157	The	labor	market	for	students	with	a	high	school	diploma	only	
is	treated	as	gender	neutral.		
By	 combining	 the	 student-	 and	 program-level	 information	 we	 further	
create	two	variables	that	are	specific	to	each	student-program	combination.	
This	includes	the	moving	distance	to	the	program	and	the	admittance	proba-
bility.	The	moving	distance	is	measured	as	the	straight-line	distance	between	
the	student’s	home	and	the	program,	or	set	to	zero	for	having	a	high	school	
diploma	only.	In	the	regressions,	we	use	the	log	of	the	moving	distance	and	
add	one	kilometer	to	each	distance.	The	admittance	probabilities	are	estima-
ted	 based	 on	matriculation	 exam	 results	 as	 described	 in	 section	 2.2.	 The	
following	two	sections	give	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	distributions	
for	these	variables.	
6.3.2	The	admittance	probability	
Overall,	the	average	admittance	probability	is	23	percent,	meaning	that	we	
expect	 a	 randomly	 chosen	 student	 to	 have	 a	 23	 percent	 chance	 of	 being	
admitted	 to	 a	 randomly	 chosen	 program.	 For	 90	 percent	 of	 students,	 the	
average	admittance	probability	(over	all	programs)	lies	somewhere	between	
9	 and	 42	 percent.	 Most	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 admittance	 probabilities	 is,	
however,	found	between	programs	rather	than	students;	generally	students	
can	choose	between	programs	with	admittance	probabilities	that	practically	
cover	the	whole	scale.	
Students	 from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 tend	 to	 have	 lower	
admittance	probabilities	than	those	from	highly,	the	former	group	averaging	
at	 22	 percent	 compared	 to	 25	 percent	 for	 students	 from	highly	 educated	
neighborhoods;	 this	difference	represents	roughly	one	 third	of	a	standard	
deviation.	 The	 difference	 in	 admittance	 probabilities	 between	 male	 and	
female	applicants	is	small,	but	marginally	favoring	males.	
                                                             
157 If this cohort is small (which is common), we use a weighted mean that combines information 
regarding the percentage of women in that specific program with the percentage of women in the 
larger group of programs awarding the same diploma. 
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157 If this cohort is small (which is common), we use a weighted mean that combines information 
regarding the percentage of women in that specific program with the percentage of women in the 
larger group of programs awarding the same diploma. 
177
180 
 
6.3.3	Moving	distance	
Overall,	mean	distance	from	a	student’s	home	to	a	program	is	259	kilometers.	
Students	 from	 highly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 generally	 live	 somewhat	
closer	to	the	programs;	for	this	group	the	mean	distance	is	249	kilometers	
compared	 to	270	kilometers	 for	 students	 from	poorly	educated	neighbor-
hoods.	 The	 sharpest	 difference	 between	 the	 groups,	 however,	 is	 that	 stu-
dents	from	highly	educated	neighborhoods	tend	to	live	in	close	proximity	to	
at	 least	 one	 educational	 program;	 of	 these	 students,	 97	 percent	 have	 an	
educational	program	within	20	kilometers	 from	home,	whereas	this	 is	 the	
case	for	only	67	percent	of	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods.	
This	geographical	pattern	is	also	illustrated	graphically	in	the	Appendix,	see	
section	A.3.		
6.3.4	Portfolio	characteristics	
In	 the	 regressions,	 we	 use	 information	 regarding	 portfolios	 rather	 than	
programs,	such	as	the	student’s	expected	log	moving	distance	or	expected	
log	wage	if	choosing	a	particular	portfolio.	This	section	describes	the	average	
portfolio	properties	of	the	chosen	portfolios.	These	statistics	are	presented	
in	table	1,	where	the	column	“chosen”	gives	the	average	portfolio	character-
istics	 for	 the	 chosen	portfolio;	 the	 column	 “control”	 presents	means	 for	 a	
random	sample	of	nine	portfolios	per	student,	drawn	from	the	distribution	
of	portfolios	chosen	by	the	student	population.	The	means	are	presented	for	
the	whole	sample	and	separately	by	neighborhood	education	levels.	
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The	table	shows	that	the	average	student	chooses	a	portfolio	giving	her	a	40	
percent	chance	of	being	admitted	to	at	 least	one	program.	 If,	on	 the	other	
hand,	students	would	choose	the	same	portfolios	as	other	applicants,	 they	
would	have	a	36	percent	chance	of	admittance.	This	discrepancy	is	reflecting	
the	 fact	 that	 a,	 say,	 linguistically	 gifted	 student	 is	more	prone	 to	 apply	 to	
linguistic	educations	than	other	students.	The	table	also	reveals	that	students	
from	 highly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 choose	 portfolios	 giving	 them	 a	
comparatively	 small	 chance	 of	 being	 admitted,	 38	 percent,	 which	 can	 be	
compared	to	the	42	percent	admittance	probability	for	students	from	poorly	
educated	 neighborhoods.	 In	 practice,	 the	 difference	 in	 actual	 admissions	
percentages	 is	 smaller	 (just	 under	 1	%-point)	which	 could	 be	 a	 result	 of	
students	from	highly	educated	neighborhoods	putting	more	effort	on	their	
Table 1. Mean portfolio characteristics 
Sample: All Chosen Control 
Pr(admitted) 0.403 0.358 
Expected moving distance (km) 48 87 
Expected wage (€/month) 2552 2459 
Wage standard deviation (€/month) 973 931 
Expected employment probability 0.874 0.872 
Sample: Poorly educated neighborhood Chosen Control 
Pr(admitted) 0.416 0.332 
Expected moving distance (km) 58 85 
Expected wage (€/month) 2522 2438 
Wage standard deviation (€/month) 939 921 
Expected employment probability 0.873 0.872 
Sample: Moderately educated neighborhood Chosen Control 
Pr(admitted) 0.409 0.359 
Expected moving distance (km) 49 87 
Expected wage (€/month) 2554 2461 
Wage standard deviation (€/month) 970 932 
Expected employment probability 0.874 0.872 
Sample: Highly educated neighborhood Chosen Control 
Pr(admitted) 0.378 0.382 
Expected moving distance (km) 36 87 
Expected wage (€/month) 2578 2477 
Wage standard deviation (€/month) 1012 940 
Expected employment probability 0.874 0.871 
Notes: 17,999 students in total (chosen: 17,999 observations; control: 161,991 observa-
tions). 
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applications.158	Nevertheless,	 they	are	admitted	and	eventually	enroll	 to	a	
somewhat	lesser	degree	than	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods,	
in	 spite	 of	 having	 higher	 grades.	 This	 pickiness	 of	 students	 from	 highly	
educated	neighborhoods	is	not	shared	by	highly	gifted	students	overall,	who	
tend	to	choose	portfolios	giving	them	a	high	chance	of	admittance	(also	in	
comparison	to	the	control	portfolios).		
Table	 1	 also	 shows	 that	 the	 expected	moving	 distance	 for	 the	 chosen	
portfolios	 is	 roughly	 half	 of	 that	 of	 the	 control,	 implying	 that	 students	
gravitate	 towards	 colleges	 located	nearby.	 Students	 from	poorly	 educated	
neighborhoods	 have	 the	 longest	 expected	 moving	 distance;	 those	 from	
highly	have	the	shortest.	This	is	no	surprise	given	the	fact	that	these	students	
have	a	comparatively	large	supply	of	programs	nearby,	and	also	take	a	higher	
risk	of	not	being	admitted	to	any	program.	
Furthermore,	students	generally	choose	portfolios	with	a	comparatively	
high	 expected	 wage.	 For	 the	 chosen	 portfolios	 the	 expected	 wage	 is	
approximately	90€	higher	per	month	than	for	the	controls.	This	is	partly	due	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 students	 choose	 portfolios	 giving	 them	 a	 relatively	 high	
admittance	probability.	But	also	after	accounting	for	this,	students	tend	to	
choose	 portfolios	with	 high	 expected	wages.	 This	 is	more	 so	 for	 students	
from	highly	educated	neighborhoods.	On	the	other	hand,	students	would	get	
portfolios	with	lower	wage	dispersion	if	they	applied	to	the	same	programs	
as	others.	This	is	especially	so	for	students	from	highly	educated	neighbor-
hoods.	
			
	 	
                                                             
158 By actual admittance percentages we mean the percentage of students who eventually were 
admitted to at least one program. 
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6.4		EVIDENCE	ON	DIFFERENCES	IN	APPLICANT	BEHAVIOR	BY	
NEIGHBORHOOD	EDUCATION	LEVEL	
For	most	portfolio	characteristics,	the	hypotheses	of	equality	of	parameters	
between	neighborhood	education	 levels	 can	be	 strongly	 rejected.	We	 find	
that	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	are	relatively	sensitive	to	
the	log	moving	distance	as	compared	to	those	from	highly	educated	neigh-
borhoods.	 Also,	 students	 from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 –	 girls	 in	
particular	–	apply	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	having	a	stronger	aversion	
to	risk.	The	main	results	are	presented	in	table	2	(for	the	whole	sample	and	
separately	by	gender)	and	in	table	3	(separately	by	neighborhood	education	
levels).	 The	 tables	 report	 both	 average	 marginal	 effects	 as	 well	 as	 the	
underlying	coefficients.	
6.4.1	Moving	distance	
Overall,	the	probability	of	choosing	a	portfolio	decreases	with	the	expected	
moving	distance;	when	increasing	all	distances	in	a	portfolio	by	ten	percent	
the	probability	of	choosing	that	portfolio	decreases	by	1.6	percentage	points	
or	21	percent	on	average.159	This	effect	 is	similar	for	boys	and	girls	and	is	
presented	in	table	2	for	the	whole	sample	and	separately	by	gender.	
There	are	also	significant	differences	 in	sensitivity	to	distance	between	
students	depending	on	neighborhood	education	level,	so	that	students	from	
poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 are	 estimated	 to	 be	 more	 sensitive	 to	
distance	 than	 those	 from	highly.160	These	results	are	presented	 in	 table	3.	
Overall,	a	ten	percent	increase	in	all	distances	corresponds	to	a	1.9	percen-
tage	point	(30	percent)	decrease	in	the	probability	of	choosing	that	portfolio	
for	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods.	For	students	from	mode-
rately	and	highly	educated	neighborhoods,	the	corresponding	effects	are	1.7	
percentage	points	(23	percent)	and	1.4	percentage	points	(19	percent),	re-
spectively.	This	pattern	is	similar	for	girls	and	boys;	see	section	A.4	 in	the	
Appendix.	
Can	this	pattern	be	accounted	for	by	differences	in	academic	ability	be-
tween	the	groups?	We	measure	a	student’s	academic	ability	as	her	expected	
probability	of	being	admitted	to	a	randomly	chosen	program.	This	measu-re	
                                                             
159 The marginal effect of a 10 percent increase is calculated as 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∙ ln	(1.1) where ME is the 
marginal effect when distance is measured in log-units. The corresponding elasticity is calculated 
as ¸˝
Ö
∙ ln	(1.1) where p is the probability of this student choosing this portfolio. 
160 The estimates have been adjusted for girls being slightly overrepresented among students from 
poorly educated neighborhoods by reweighting the observations in each subsample as to 
represent the pooled distribution.  
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 All Women Men Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME z-value (p-value) 
Expected log distance -2.464** 
(0.066) 
-0.164** 
(0.004) 
-2.444** 
(0.078) 
-0.171** 
(0.005) 
-2.505** 
(0.078) 
-0.160** 
(0.004) 
-0.72 
(0.474) 
Expected log wage 11.964** 
(1.018) 
0.797** 
(0.065) 
8.670** 
(2.113) 
0.606** 
(0.143) 
13.521** 
(1.115) 
0.863** 
(0.076) 
2.18 
(0.030) 
Log wage variance 2.895** 
(0.737) 
0.193** 
(0.052) 
-1.167 
(2.741) 
-0.082 
(0.189) 
8.039** 
(0.882) 
0.513** 
(0.058) 
3.13 
(0.002) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-1.426** 
(0.244) 
-0.095** 
(0.016) 
-1.201** 
(0.442) 
-0.084** 
(0.029) 
-1.021* 
(0.106) 
-0.065 
(0.032) 
0.32 
(0.747) 
Expected female percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-0.410** 
(0.067) 
-0.027** 
(0.005) 
1.096** 
(0.087) 
0.077** 
(0.006) 
-0.599** 
(0.106) 
-0.038* 
(0.007) 
-13.19 
(0.000) 
Expected female percentage 
*female student 
1.428** 
(0.035) 
0.095** 
(0.002) - - - -  
Observations 
Students 
179,990 
17,999 
107,320 
10,732 
72,670 
7,267 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.01; * p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 fields. 
Table 2. Conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, overall and separately by gender 
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 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.443** 
(0.138) 
-0.199** 
(0.005) 
-2.708** 
(0.070) 
-0.175** 
(0.003) 
-2.159** 
(0.075) 
-0.149** 
(0.004) 
82.39 
(0.000) 
Expected log wage 10.308** 
(2.457) 
0.596** 
(0.146) 
12.783** 
(1.408) 
0.828** 
(0.090) 
15.520** 
(1.887) 
1.073** 
(0.114) 
3.04 
(0.218) 
Log wage variance -2.410 
(3.538) 
-0.139 
(0.204) 
3.043** 
(0.962) 
0.197** 
(0.061) 
5.107** 
(0.892) 
0.353** 
(0.063) 
6.12 
(0.047) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-1.656** 
(0.575) 
-0.096** 
(0.035) 
-1.605** 
(0.314) 
-0.104** 
(0.021) 
-1.160* 
(0.494) 
-0.080* 
(0.031) 
0.74 
(0.692) 
Expected female percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-0.424** 
(0.108) 
-0.025** 
(0.007) 
-0.402** 
(0.095) 
-0.026** 
(0.006) 
-0.108 
(0.158) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
3.32 
(0.190) 
Expected female percentage 
*female student 
1.401** 
(0.068) 
0.081** 
(0.004) 
1.443** 
(0.049) 
0.094** 
(0.003) 
1.427** 
(0.077) 
0.099** 
(0.005) 
0.24 
(0.886) 
Observations 
Students 
45,270 
4,527 
89,340 
8,934 
45,380 
4,538 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 fields. The estimates have been adjusted for girls being slightly overrepresented among students from poorly educated neighborhoods 
by reweighting the observations in each subsample as to represent the pooled distribution.
Table 3. Conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level (low, medium & high) iti al logit estimates for portfolio choice, sep rately by neighborhoo  education level (low, medium & high)
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 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.267** 
(0.140) 
-0.193** 
(0.005) 
-2.709** 
(0.070) 
-0.176** 
(0.004) 
-2.220** 
(0.077) 
-0.153** 
(0.005) 
55.17 
(0.000) 
Expected log wage 8.447** 
(2.178) 
0.500** 
(0.129) 
12.676** 
(1.401) 
0.821** 
(0.085) 
15.108** 
(2.042) 
1.041** 
(0.117) 
4.99 
(0.082) 
Log wage variance 0.317 
(2.941) 
0.019 
(0.185) 
2.992** 
(0.958) 
0.194** 
(0.062) 
4.711** 
(1.008) 
0.325** 
(0.068) 
3.00 
(0.223) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-1.287** 
(0.511) 
-0.076** 
(0.030) 
-1.600** 
(0.312) 
-0.104** 
(0.019) 
-1.057* 
(0.532) 
-0.073* 
(0.036) 
1.02 
(0.601) 
Expected female percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-0.433** 
(0.112) 
-0.026** 
(0.007) 
-0.408** 
(0.095) 
-0.026** 
(0.007) 
-0.174 
(0.163) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
2.01 
(0.365) 
Expected female percentage 
*female student 
1.400** 
(0.070) 
0.083** 
(0.004) 
1.447** 
(0.049) 
0.094** 
(0.003) 
1.467** 
(0.081) 
0.101** 
(0.006) 
0.45 
(0.800) 
Observations 
Students 
45,270 
4,527 
89,340 
8,934 
45,380 
4,538 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 fields. The estimates have been adjusted as to represent the pooled two-dimensional distribution of academic ability and gender.
Table 4. Ability-weighted conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level 
(low, medium & high)  
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6.4.2	Properties	of	the	portfolio	wage	distribution	
Overall,	the	probability	of	choosing	an	application	portfolio	is	increasing	in	
both	 expected	 log	 wages	 and	 the	 log	 wage	 variance,	 the	 coefficient	 for	
expected	log	wages	being	roughly	four	times	the	coefficient	for	the	variance	
(see	table	2).	This	translates	into	a	modest	risk	aversion	coefficient	at	0.5,	
with	a	95-percent	confidence	interval	(CI)	allowing	for	a	parameter	value	in	
the	range	of	0.3	to	0.8.	In	order	to	put	this	number	into	perspective,	a	risk	
aversion	coefficient	at	0.5	corresponds	to	being	indifferent	between	a	certain	
wage	at	2914	euro	and	a	fair	bet	between	a	2000-	and	4000-euro	wage.162	
This	 estimate	 differs	 between	 girls	 and	 boys;	 for	 girls,	 the	 estimated	 risk	
coefficient	is	1.3	(CI:	-0.6;	2.1)	which	corresponds	to	a	certain	wage	at	2778	
euros	in	the	example	above,	while	boys	apply	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	
being	 practically	 risk	 neutral	with	 a	 coefficient	 at	 -0.2	 (CI:	 -0.5;	 0.1).	 The	
underlying	coefficients	for	these	estimates	are	given	in	table	2,	whereas	table	
5	compiles	the	risk	aversion	estimates.	
	
                                      Neighborhood education level 
Gender All Low Medium High 
All 0.5 
(0.3-0.8) 
1.5 
(-0.4-2.5) 
0.5 
(0.2-0.8) 
0.3 
(0.1-0.5) 
Women 1.3 
(-0.6-2.1) 
3.4 
(0.8-5.1)*  
1.0 
(-0.7-1.9) 
0.7 
(0.0-1.2) 
Men -0.2 
(-0.5-0.1) 
-0.3 
(-1.6-0.5) 
-0.1 
(-0.5-0.2) 
-0.2 
(-0.7-0.2) 
Notes: 95-percent confidence intervals in parentheses. *1.4 percent of the draws delivered 
nonsensical estimates – a distaste for higher wages – these draws were disregarded so that the final 
sampling distribution only contains possible risk aversion estimates. The lower limit is then given by 
the [100/(100 − q)] ∙ 2.5th percentile and the upper limit by the 100 − [100/(100 − q)] ∙ 2.5th 
percentile; q is the percentage of nonsensical estimates on repeated draws. 
 
There	are	also	differences	in	responsiveness	to	the	portfolio	wage	properties	
depending	on	neighborhood	education	level;	students	from	poorly	educated	
neighborhoods	 choose	 portfolios	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 consistent	 with	 being	
relatively	risk	averse	in	comparison	to	students	from	highly	educated	neigh-
borhoods	(see	table	5).	The	estimated	risk	aversion	coefficient	for	students	
from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	is	1.5	(CI:	-0.4;	2.5);	the	corresponding	
figures	for	students	from	moderately	and	highly	educated	neighborhoods	are	
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0.5	(CI:	0.2;	0.8)	and	0.3	(CI:	0.1;	0.5),	respectively.	These	estimates	have	been	
adjusted	 for	 the	 slight	 overrepresentation	 of	 girls	 among	 students	 from	
poorly	educated	neighborhoods.		
Splitting	 the	 data	 into	 a	 male	 and	 female	 subsample	 shows	 that	 this	
pattern	over	neighborhood	education	levels	is	driven	by	girls	while	all	male	
groups	are	estimated	to	be	more	or	less	risk	neutral	(see	table	5).	For	female	
stu-dents	 from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods,	 the	 coefficient	 of	 risk	
aversion	 is	 estimated	 to	 3.4	 (CI:	 0.8;	 5.1);	 for	 the	moderately	 and	 highly	
educated	neighborhoods	the	coefficients	are	1.0	(CI:	 -0.7;	1.9)	and	0.7	(CI:	
0.0;	1.2),	respectively.	For	male	students,	the	risk	aversion	coefficient	varies	
between	 -0.3	 and	 -0.1	 depending	 on	 group,	 with	 highly	 overlapping	
confidence	 inter-vals.	 The	 only	 significant	 difference	 is	 observed	between	
female	students	from	poorly	and	highly	educated	neighborhoods.		
Recent	research	has	suggested	an	association	between	 intelligence	and	
risk-taking	behavior	 (see	 the	discussion	by	Dohmen	et	 al.,	 2018).	We	 test	
whether	the	estimates	are	sensitive	to	adjusting	for	differences	in	academic	
ability	by	reweighting	the	observations	in	each	subgroup	as	to	represent	the	
pooled	 (two-dimensional)	 distribution	 of	 academic	 ability	 and	 gender.	 In	
particular,	we	would	expect	group	differences	in	risk	aversion	to	decrease	as	
a	consequence.	This	is	also	what	we	observe;	the	risk	coefficient	for	students	
from	 poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 decreases	 from	 1.5	 to	 0.9	 and	 for	
students	from	highly	educated	neighborhoods	the	coefficient	increases	from	
0.3	to	0.4.163		
One	interpretation	of	these	estimates	is	that	they	reflect	a	comparatively	
high	aversion	to	risk	among	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	
and	women	in	particular.	Another	possibility	is	that	they	reflect	differences	
in	unobservable	occupational	preferences.	There	is	suggestive	evidence	sup-
porting	both	of	these	interpretations.		
Firstly,	 for	 a	 subsample	 of	 students	 we	 have	 access	 to	 independent	
measures	 of	 risk	 attitude,	 and	 we	 find	 these	 to	 match	 well	 with	 actual	
application	behavior.	The	 independent	measures	come	from	a	representa-
tive	survey	targeting	high	school	graduates,	and	was	conducted	a	couple	of	
months	prior	to	the	application	deadlines.	One	of	the	survey	questions	asks	
students	to	make	a	choice	between	two	hypothetical	educational	programs.	
These	are	equal	in	all	respects	except	for	the	post-graduate	labor	markets,	
with	 one	 having	 a	 higher	 mean	 wage	 and	 wage	 dispersion.	 The	 wage	
                                                             
163 Highly able students are estimated to be less risk averse than moderately able students; the first 
group having an estimated risk coefficient at 0.2 and the second group 1.5. For poorly able 
students, the coefficient of risk aversion is undefined, as the coefficient for expected log wages is 
negative (and insignificant). Here, you are a highly able student if you belong to the top quartile 
group and a poorly able student if you belong to the bottom quartile group; the middle 50 
percent are ‘moderately able students’. 
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distributions	are	constructed	so	that	students	with	a	risk	aversion	coefficient	
at	unity	would	be	indifferent	between	the	programs.	Approximately	half	of	
the	students	claim	to	prefer	the	‘risky	labor	market’.	Turning	to	their	actual	
application	behavior,	we	estimate	their	risk	coefficient	to	0.2	(CI:	-0.2;	0.6).	
Students	who	picked	the	‘safe	labor	market’	have	an	estimated	risk	coeffici-
ent	at	2.7	(CI:	1.1;	4.9).	This	represents	a	highly	significant	difference,	and	
lends	credibility	 to	 the	 idea	that	 the	estimated	risk	coefficients	do,	 in	 fact,	
reflect	actual	risk	attitudes.	We	develop	the	discussion	on	these	results	in	the	
Appendix,	section	A.5.	
It	is,	however,	also	possible	that	the	risk	coefficients	reflect	differences	in	
unobservable	preferences	between	groups.	For	example,	we	observe	a	signif-
icantly	 negative	 effect	 of	 increasing	 the	 employment	 probability.	 This	 is	
likely	 to	 reflect	 unobserved	 occupational	 preferences	 rather	 than	 prefer-
ences	regarding	employment	prospects,	per	se.164		
6.4.3	Alternative	specifications	and	robustness	
In	this	section,	we	study	the	robustness	of	the	results	when	using	alternative	
models,	 and	 when	 measuring	 some	 independent	 variables	 in	 alternative	
ways.	Overall,	we	find	that	the	trends	in	the	data	are	relatively	robust,	while	
the	absolute	magnitudes	for	the	estimated	risk	coefficients	are	sensitive	to	
some	alterations.	This	is	shown	in	table	A3	in	the	Appendix	(see	section	A6.	
Robustness).	The	first	column	presents	the	main	estimates	for	the	coefficient	
of	 risk	 aversion	 in	 different	 subsamples;	 the	middle	 column	 presents	 the	
lowest	estimates	when	excluding	one	set	of	control	variables	at	a	time;	the	
last	column	presents	the	highest	estimates.	Most	notably,	the	risk	coefficient	
for	women	is	highly	sensitive	to	controlling	for	the	expected	gender	composi-
tion.	Excluding	this	control	brings	the	female	estimate	from	1.3	to	11.8.	To	
see	why,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	wage	distribution	for	a	particular	port-
folio	 is	 largely	determined	by	the	occupations	that	make	up	that	portfolio.	
Hence,	 covariates	 that	 capture	 relevant	 occupational	 characteristics	 are	
expected	to	set	the	level	for	the	risk	aversion	coefficient.		
We	further	experiment	with	three	alternative	ways	of	measuring	certain	
independent	variables.	Firstly,	we	recode	the	moving	distance	if	ending	up	
with	a	high	school	diploma	from	zero	to	50	kilometers.	It	is	not	clear	how	one	
appropriately	measures	moving	distance	for	the	outside	option,	why	using	
an	alternative	measurement	is	useful	as	a	comparison.	Similarly,	we	recode	
the	percentage	of	women	on	the	post-graduate	labor	market	if	not	admitted	
                                                             
164 It is not clear what these occupational characteristics are. One possibility is that high 
employment rates correlate with poor parental-leave opportunities. This interpretation is also in 
line with the finding that the negative employment-effect is only significant for women.  
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distributions	are	constructed	so	that	students	with	a	risk	aversion	coefficient	
at	unity	would	be	indifferent	between	the	programs.	Approximately	half	of	
the	students	claim	to	prefer	the	‘risky	labor	market’.	Turning	to	their	actual	
application	behavior,	we	estimate	their	risk	coefficient	to	0.2	(CI:	-0.2;	0.6).	
Students	who	picked	the	‘safe	labor	market’	have	an	estimated	risk	coeffici-
ent	at	2.7	(CI:	1.1;	4.9).	This	represents	a	highly	significant	difference,	and	
lends	credibility	 to	 the	 idea	that	 the	estimated	risk	coefficients	do,	 in	 fact,	
reflect	actual	risk	attitudes.	We	develop	the	discussion	on	these	results	in	the	
Appendix,	section	A.5.	
It	is,	however,	also	possible	that	the	risk	coefficients	reflect	differences	in	
unobservable	preferences	between	groups.	For	example,	we	observe	a	signif-
icantly	 negative	 effect	 of	 increasing	 the	 employment	 probability.	 This	 is	
likely	 to	 reflect	 unobserved	 occupational	 preferences	 rather	 than	 prefer-
ences	regarding	employment	prospects,	per	se.164		
6.4.3	Alternative	specifications	and	robustness	
In	this	section,	we	study	the	robustness	of	the	results	when	using	alternative	
models,	 and	 when	 measuring	 some	 independent	 variables	 in	 alternative	
ways.	Overall,	we	find	that	the	trends	in	the	data	are	relatively	robust,	while	
the	absolute	magnitudes	for	the	estimated	risk	coefficients	are	sensitive	to	
some	alterations.	This	is	shown	in	table	A3	in	the	Appendix	(see	section	A6.	
Robustness).	The	first	column	presents	the	main	estimates	for	the	coefficient	
of	 risk	 aversion	 in	 different	 subsamples;	 the	middle	 column	 presents	 the	
lowest	estimates	when	excluding	one	set	of	control	variables	at	a	time;	the	
last	column	presents	the	highest	estimates.	Most	notably,	the	risk	coefficient	
for	women	is	highly	sensitive	to	controlling	for	the	expected	gender	composi-
tion.	Excluding	this	control	brings	the	female	estimate	from	1.3	to	11.8.	To	
see	why,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	wage	distribution	for	a	particular	port-
folio	 is	 largely	determined	by	the	occupations	that	make	up	that	portfolio.	
Hence,	 covariates	 that	 capture	 relevant	 occupational	 characteristics	 are	
expected	to	set	the	level	for	the	risk	aversion	coefficient.		
We	further	experiment	with	three	alternative	ways	of	measuring	certain	
independent	variables.	Firstly,	we	recode	the	moving	distance	if	ending	up	
with	a	high	school	diploma	from	zero	to	50	kilometers.	It	is	not	clear	how	one	
appropriately	measures	moving	distance	for	the	outside	option,	why	using	
an	alternative	measurement	is	useful	as	a	comparison.	Similarly,	we	recode	
the	percentage	of	women	on	the	post-graduate	labor	market	if	not	admitted	
                                                             
164 It is not clear what these occupational characteristics are. One possibility is that high 
employment rates correlate with poor parental-leave opportunities. This interpretation is also in 
line with the finding that the negative employment-effect is only significant for women.  
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to	any	program	from	50	to	70	(for	girls)	and	from	50	to	30	(for	boys).	Again,	
these	are	(more	or	less)	arbitrarily	chosen	numbers,	but	nevertheless	infor-
mative	as	a	comparison.	Thirdly,	we	estimate	the	expected	values	and	vari-
ance	 entering	 the	 value	 function	 by	 randomly	 ranking	 programs.	 As	
discussed	in	section	2.2,	the	main	model	assumes	that	students	accept	the	
toughest	 program	 if	 given	 several	 choices.	 Now	we	 let	 students	 pick	 that	
program	 at	 random.	 The	 results	 are	 presented	 in	 table	 A4	 (risk	 aversion	
coefficients)	and	A.5	(average	marginal	effects	for	the	expected	log	distance).	
As	 shown	 in	 the	 tables,	 the	 estimates	 are	 relatively	 insensitive	 to	 these	
changes.	
6.4.4	Distributional	implications	–	a	descriptive	analysis	
Students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	are	estimated	to	be	relatively	
sensitive	to	moving	distance	and	apply	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	being	
comparatively	risk	averse.	Also,	these	students	live	further	from	colleges	and	
have	lower	admissions	probabilities	on	average.	In	this	section,	we	examine	
the	 implications	of	 these	differences	 in	 application	behaviors	 and	 endow-
ments	on	the	distribution	of	students	over	portfolios.	To	this	end,	we	focus	
specifically	on	one	portfolio	property	–	the	expected	wage.	We	carry	out	the	
following	 thought	 experiment.	 Students	 from	 poorly	 educated	 neighbor-
hoods	choose	portfolios	giving	them	an	expected	wage	at	~2750	euros	per	
month:	 What	 would	 their	 expected	 wage	 be	 if	 they	 had	 the	 application	
behavior	of	 students	 from	highly	educated	neighborhoods?	Or	conversely,	
what	would	 their	expected	wage	be	 if	 they	had	the	endowments	(place	of	
residence	 and	 high	 school	 grades)	 of	 students	 from	 highly	 educated	
neighborhoods?	
Table	6	shows	expected	wages	for	different	combinations	of	endowments	
and	application	behaviors.	For	example,	the	first	cell	in	the	upper	left	corner	
shows	 that	women	 from	poorly	 educated	neighborhoods	 are	predicted	 to	
choose	portfolios	giving	them	an	expected	wage	at	2638	euros/month.	When	
given	the	application	behavior,	i.e.	vector	of	coefficients,	of	girls	from	highly	
educated	neighborhoods,	this	expectancy	rises	to	2656	euros.	This	value	is	
calculated	 by	 predicting	 probabilities	 over	 portfolios	 using	 the	 sample	 of	
girls	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods,	but	the	coefficients	of	girls	from	
highly	educated	neighborhoods.	In	the	predictions,	we	exclude	the	portfolios	
actually	chosen	by	the	students,	so	that	the	choice	set	is	comparable	across	
groups.165	Expected	wages	in	other	cells	are	calculated	accordingly,	so	that	
endowments	vary	within	rows	while	application	behavior	is	held	constant.	
                                                             
165 The predicted probabilities are adjusted by an appropriate factor so that they always sum to 
unity. 
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Similarly,	application	behavior	varies	within	columns	while	endowments	are	
held	constant.	
		
Table	6	reveals	two	facts.	Firstly,	the	gender	gap	in	expected	wages	is	largely	
explainable	 by	 gender	 differences	 in	 application	 behavior	 (as	 opposed	 to	
endowments).	 For	 example,	women	 from	poorly	 educated	 neighborhoods	
have	an	expected	wage	at	2638	euros;	men	from	poorly	educated	neighbour-
hoods	have	an	expected	wage	at	2842	euros.	That	is	a	204-euro	difference.	
This	 gap	 reduces	 to	 44	 euros	when	 the	women	 are	 given	 the	 application	
behavior	of	the	men.	The	pattern	is	similar	when	reversing	the	roles	–	the	
men	are	given	the	application	behavior	of	the	women	–	or	when	comparing	
men	and	women	from	highly	educated	neighborhoods.	This	result	is	not	very	
surprising,	since	male	and	female	applicants	have	similar	endowments,	i.e.	
they	have	roughly	the	same	geographical	distribution	and	overall	admissions	
probability.166	Also,	the	application	strategy	of	men	is	favoring	higher	wages.	
For	example,	they	are	estimated	to	be	practically	risk	neutral.	
                                                             
166 However, men have a somewhat higher chance of being admitted to a top paid program; 
women have a somewhat higher chance of being admitted to a poorly paid program. Here, 
‘poorly paid’ means an education with an expected wage at 2500 euros/month or less; ‘top paid’ 
means an education with an expected wage of at least 3000 euros/month. Approximately one 
Table 6. Predicted expected wages depending on application 
behavior and endowments (low/high indicate neighborhood 
education level) 
 Coefficients of female + low 
Endowments of: Female + 
low 
Female + 
high 
Male  
+ low 
Male + 
high 
 2638 2699 2654 2736 
 
Coefficients of female + high 
Endowments of: Female + 
low 
Female + 
high 
Male  
+ low 
Male + 
high 
 2656 2708 2661 2721 
 
Coefficients of male + low 
Endowments of: Female + 
low 
Female + 
high 
Male  
+ low 
Male + 
high 
 2798 2841 2842 2892 
 
Coefficients of male + high 
Endowments of: Female + 
low 
Female + 
high 
Male  
+ low 
Male + 
high 
 2760 2834 2791 2868 
Notes: The own expected wage in bold. 
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Table	6	also	suggests	that	the	gap	between	students	from	highly	and	poorly	
educated	neighborhoods	is	largely	explainable	by	differences	in	endowments	
(as	 opposed	 to	 application	 behavior).	 For	women,	 there	 is	 a	 70-euro	 gap	
between	applicants	from	highly	and	poorly	educated	neighbor-hoods.	This	
gap	is	little	reduced	when	the	application	behavior	is	forced	to	be	the	same	
in	both	groups	(either	equal	to	that	of	women	from	highly	or	poorly	educated	
neighborhoods).	For	men,	the	gap	widens	as	students	from	poorly	educated	
neighborhoods	are	given	 the	application	strategy	of	 those	 from	highly	 (or	
when	 those	 from	highly	 are	 given	 the	 application	 behavior	 of	 those	 from	
poorly).	Hence,	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	 data	 that	would	 suggest	 that	male	
students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	are	hindered	by	their	applica-
tion	strategy	in	this	regard.	Also,	there	is	only	a	26-euro	gap	to	begin	with.	
What	kinds	of	endowments	make	students	from	poorly	educated	neigh-
borhoods	have	lower	expected	wages	than	those	from	highly?	A	comparison	
of	the	geographical	location	and	grades	between	the	groups	show	that	both	
factors	may	 come	 into	play.	 For	 students	 from	poorly	 educated	neighbor-
hoods,	 the	 geographically	 closest	 college	 pays	 an	 average	 post-graduate	
wage	at	2706	euros/month.167	The	corresponding	figure	for	students	from	
highly	educated	neighborhoods	is	3239	euros.	For	the	ten	closest	colleges,	
the	figures	are	3020	and	3160	euros,	respectively.168	Since	students	respond	
negatively	 to	 increasing	 moving	 distances,	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	 geogra-
phical	location	of	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	may	steer	
them	away	from	top	paid	programs.	Overall,	however,	there	is	little	correla-
tion	between	distance	to	a	program	and	the	expected	post-graduate	wage	in	
either	group.169	Nevertheless,	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	
                                                             
third of programs fit into each category. Girls have a 22.3 percent chance of being admitted to a 
highly paid program on average; for boys, the corresponding number is 25.9 percent. Similarly, 
girls have a 21.7 percent chance of being admitted to a poorly paid program; for boys, this 
number is 20.6 percent chance. For programs paying between 2500 and 3000 euros, the 
average admissions probability is of similar magnitude for girls and boys. Looking at the underlying 
grade distributions show that men are significantly more likely to have a grade in the extended 
math curriculum and science, while women are significantly more likely to have a grade in social 
sciences/humanities and they score higher on the Finnish language exam.  
167 This is a weighted average over averages, i.e. your closest college is often rewarding several 
diplomas, each with their own mean wage. For each individual, we weigh these mean wages 
according to the size of that program. 
168 Overall, however, there is little correlation between distance to a program and the expected 
post-graduate wage in either group. Here we calculate the rank correlation (Spearman) between 
distance to a program and its average post-graduate wage. This correlation is calculated 
separately for each individual. Among students from highly educated neighborhoods, this 
correlation is 0.02 on average; among those from poorly educated neighborhoods, the 
correlation is 0.03 on average. When weighting programs by their size, these correlations change 
to -0.04 and 0.02 for applicants from highly end poorly educated neighborhoods, respectively.  
169 Here we calculate the rank correlation (Spearman) between distance to a program and its 
average post-graduate wage. This correlation is calculated separately for each individual. Among 
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are	predicted	to	add	somewhat	more	to	their	expected	wage	than	students	
from	 highly	 educated	 neighborhoods,	 when	 equalizing	 the	 expected	 log	
distance	to	each	application	portfolio.170	Furthermore,	we	observe	students	
from	poorly	 educated	neighborhoods	having	 significantly	 lower	 grades	as	
measured	by	their	average	admissions	probabilities,	which	also	lowers	their	
expected	wages.	
In	 summary,	 this	analysis	 suggests	 that	 students	 from	poorly	educated	
neighborhoods	 are	 hindered	 by	 their	 endowments	 –	 rather	 than	 their	
application	behavior	–	when	 the	portfolio	outcome	of	 interest	 is	expected	
wages.	However,	there	are	only	small	differences	in	expected	wages	to	begin	
with.	 Data	 also	 suggests	 that	 girls	 choose	 portfolios	 giving	 them	 lower	
expected	 wages	 than	 boys,	 mainly	 due	 to	 their	 application	 strategy.	 For	
example,	 girls	 apply	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 being	 relatively	 risk	
averse.			
	
	
	 	
                                                             
students from highly educated neighborhoods, the correlation is 0.02 on average; among those 
from poorly educated neighborhoods, the correlation is 0.03 on average.   
170 Example: The wage gap between female students from highly and poorly educated 
neighborhoods is 61 euros when both are given the application behavior of students from poorly 
educated neighborhoods. When equalizing all expected log distances, this gap decreases to -11 
euros. Similarly, the wage gap between male students from highly and poorly educated 
neighborhoods is 50 euros when both are given the application behavior of students from poorly 
educated neighborhoods. When equalizing all expected log distances, this gap decreases to 35 
euros.  
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6.5		CONCLUSIONS	
This	chapter	studies	the	college	application	strategies	of	Finnish	high	school	
graduates,	and	how	these	strategies	differ	between	students	depending	on	
socioeconomic	 background.	 We	 find	 that	 students	 from	 poorly	 educated	
neighborhoods	apply	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	having	a	stronger	sensi-
tivity	to	the	moving	distance,	and	a	stronger	aversion	to	risk.	Among	students	
from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods,	the	relative	risk	aversion	coefficient	is	
estimated	to	1.5;	among	those	from	highly,	the	corresponding	estimate	is	0.3.	
This	pattern	 is	driven	by	women;	 female	applicants	 from	poorly	educated	
neighborhoods	apply	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	being	especially	wage	
risk	averse,	while	there	is	little	difference	in	risk	aversion	coefficients	among	
male	applicants.	These	differences	in	application	strategies	can	only	partly	
be	explained	by	differences	in	academic	ability	between	the	groups.		
Despite	 these	differences	 in	application	 strategies,	 there	are	only	quite	
small	 gaps	 in	 expected	 wages	 between	 students	 from	 poorly	 and	 highly	
educated	neighborhoods.	Furthermore,	there	is	little	support	for	the	notion	
that	students	from	poorly	educated	neighborhoods	would	have	much	to	gain	
regarding	expected	wages,	by	taking	on	the	application	strategy	of	students	
from	highly	educated	neighborhoods.	The	same	 is	not	 true	 for	 the	gender	
wage	 gap:	When	 female	 students	 are	 ‘given’	 the	 behavior	model	 of	 male	
students,	the	gender	wage	gap	is	practically	eliminated.	
It	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	the	adolescents	under	study	here	are	a	
selected	group;	all	of	them	have	graduated	from	high	school	and	all	of	them	
applied	to	college.	Hence,	 the	sample	 individuals	are	not	representative	of	
the	full	population	of	adolescents.	It	is	quite	possible	that	there	are	important	
differences	in	educational	choices	occurring	at	earlier	ages,	or	at	the	stage	
when	students	decide	on	whether	to	apply.	
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Appendix	
A.1		Measuring	𝒒𝒒(𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊|𝒌𝒌).	
The	probability	of	drawing	subset	𝑆𝑆b 	when	taking	portfolio	k	as	given,	and	
considering	the	selection	process,	is	described	by:	
𝑞𝑞(𝑆𝑆b|𝑘𝑘) =
𝑞𝑞(𝐶𝐶b|𝑘𝑘)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢|𝑘𝑘)
=
9! ∙∏ 𝑓𝑓::∈'ˆ
:(Å
𝜋𝜋Å ∙ (1 − 𝑓𝑓Å))
	
where	the	numerator	on	the	right-hand	side	is	the	probability	of	drawing	the	
observed	combination	of	portfolios,		𝐶𝐶b = 𝑆𝑆b ,	taking	portfolio	k	as	given	and	
considering	a	selection	process	where	repeated	draws	of	the	same	portfolio	
is	allowed.	𝑓𝑓: 	is	the	relative	frequency	of	students	having	chosen	portfolio	j	
in	the	student	population.		
The	 denominator	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 drawing	 a	 combination	 of	 ten	
unique	portfolios	when	taking	portfolio	k	as	given,	and	considering	a	selec-
tion	process	where	 repeated	draws	of	 the	 same	portfolio	 is	 allowed.	This	
probability	can	be	described	as	the	product	of	two	probabilities;	the	proba-
bility	of	drawing	a	set	of	nine	unique	portfolios	conditional	on	portfolio	k	not	
being	one	of	these	(𝜋𝜋Å),	and	the	probability	of	portfolio	k	not	being	sampled	
on	nine	repeated	draws,	(1 − 𝑓𝑓Å)).			
Here,	we	assume	that	𝜋𝜋Å/𝜋𝜋: 	 is	sufficiently	close	to	unity	so	that	we	can	
ignore	𝜋𝜋Å 	in	the	calculations	without	inducing	any	noticeable	bias.	(Note	that,	
for	our	purposes,	information	regarding	𝑞𝑞(𝑆𝑆b|𝑘𝑘)/𝑞𝑞(𝑆𝑆b|𝑗𝑗)	is	sufficient.)	Hence,	
𝑞𝑞(𝑆𝑆b|𝑘𝑘)	is	approximated	by:		
𝑞𝑞(𝑆𝑆*|𝑘𝑘)Q =
9! ∙∏ 𝑓𝑓::∈ıˆ
:(Å
(1 − 𝑓𝑓Å))
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A.2		The	distribution	for	portfolio	wages	
If	 post-graduate	 wages	 (𝑤𝑤c)	 are	 lognormally	 distributed,	 then	 portfolio	
wages	(𝑤𝑤:)	are	approximately	lognormal	for	the	portfolios	in	the	data.	This	
is	exemplified	below	(figure	A1)	showing	the	empirical	distribution	for	𝑤𝑤: 	
after	3,000,000	random	draws	of	wages	from	four	randomly	chosen	student	
portfolios,	together	with	the	corresponding	lognormal	approximation.		
	
	
		
	
Figure A1. The portfolio wage distribution, four simulations 
	
A.3		Geographical	distributions	
Figure	A2	presents	 the	distance	distribution	 for	students	 from	poorly	and	
highly	 educated	 neighborhoods,	 where	 the	 observations	 are	 weighted	
according	to	the	size	of	that	program	(enrollments).	Each	student	is	repre-
sented	 313	 times,	 i.e.	 one	 observation	 per	 student-program-combination.	
The	figures	hint	that	students	from	highly	educated	neighborhoods	are	living	
in	 certain	 geographical	 ‘islands’,	 whereas	 the	 poorly	 educated	 neighbor-
hoods	are	more	scattered.			
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Figure A2. Weighted distance distributions, separately by neighbourhood 
education level 
Note: An observation is one student-program combination. Weights proportional to  
the size of that program. 
	
This	pattern	becomes	clearer	in	figure	A3	a)	and	b),	which	maps	the	number	
of	 students	 form	 poorly	 (a)	 and	 highly	 (b)	 educated	 neighborhoods	 per	
applicant	 in	 that	municipality.	 The	 location	 of	 a	 program	 is	 depicted	 as	 a	
circle	with	size	proportional	 to	 the	number	of	students	who	enrolled.	The	
figures	 show	 a	 distinct	 geographical	 division	 between	 the	 groups;	 of	 all	
applicants,	students	from	highly	educated	neighborhoods	make	up	a	majori-
ty	in	only	a	handful	of	municipalities	including	Helsinki,	while	students	from	
poorly	educated	neighborhoods	make	up	a	majority	 in	 roughly	half	of	 the	
municipalities	of	which	practically	all	are	scarcely	populated	and	many	lack	
an	institution	for	higher	education.		
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Figure A3a. The geographical distribution of students from  
poorly educated neighborhoods.  
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Figure A3a. The geographical distribution of students from  
poorly educated neighborhoods.  
	
Figure A3b. The geographical distribution of students from 
highly educated neighborhoods.
Notes: A circle depicts an educational program, with size proportional 
to the number of students who enrolled.
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A.4	Gender	heterogeneity	in	portfolio	choice	
	
	
 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.366** 
(0.179) 
-0.194** 
(0.008) 
-2.794** 
(0.097) 
-0.173** 
(0.005) 
-2.221** 
(0.097) 
-0.145** 
(0.006) 
37.30 
(0.000) 
Expected log wage 9.587** 
(2.040) 
0.551** 
(0.127) 
14.866** 
(1.649) 
0.919** 
(0.101) 
18.459** 
(2.284) 
1.206** 
(0.136) 
8.48 
(0.014) 
Log wage variance 6.239** 
(1.956) 
0.359** 
(0.121) 
8.235** 
(1.154) 
0.509** 
(0.076) 
10.773** 
(1.775) 
0.704** 
(0.117) 
3.19 
(0.203) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-0.525 
(0.669) 
-0.030 
(0.042) 
-1.576* 
(0.646) 
-0.097* 
(0.040) 
-0.734 
(0.784) 
-0.048 
(0.055) 
1.62 
(0.444) 
Expected female percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-0.663** 
(0.181) 
-0.038** 
(0.010) 
-0.565** 
(0.150) 
-0.035** 
(0.010) 
-0.350 
(0.197) 
-0.023 
(0.013) 
1.45 
(0.484) 
Observations 
Students 
17,290 
1,729 
35,790 
3,579 
19,590 
1,959 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 fields.
Table A1a. Conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level. Sample: Men. 
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 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.531** 
(0.166) 
-0.212** 
(0.012) 
-2.663** 
(0.083) 
-0.182** 
(0.004) 
-2.125** 
(0.099) 
-0.153** 
(0.006) 
62.22 
(0.000) 
Expected log wage 14.686* 
(6.683) 
0.882* 
(0.346) 
7.923** 
(2.307) 
0.541** 
(0.155) 
11.093** 
(2.428) 
0.797** 
(0.153) 
1.53 
(0.465) 
Log wage variance -17.957 
(10.195) 
-1.078 
(0.531) 
0.042 
(2.061) 
0.003 
(0.145) 
1.916 
(1.604) 
0.138 
(0.109) 
4.07 
(0.131) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-3.232* 
(1.494) 
-0.194* 
(0.078) 
-1.007* 
(0.424) 
-0.069* 
(0.029) 
-0.785 
(0.549) 
-0.056 
(0.037) 
2.35 
(0.309) 
Expected female percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
1.149** 
(0.150) 
0.069** 
(0.008) 
1.088** 
(0.119) 
0.074** 
(0.007) 
1.398** 
(0.194) 
0.100** 
(0.013) 
2.13 
(0.346) 
Observations 
Students 
27,980 
2,798 
53,550 
5,355 
25,790 
2,579 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 educational fields.
Table A1b. Conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level. Sample: 
Women. 
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 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.531** 
(0.166) 
-0.212** 
(0.012) 
-2.663** 
(0.083) 
-0.182** 
(0.004) 
-2.125** 
(0.099) 
-0.153** 
(0.006) 
62.22 
(0.000) 
Expected log wage 14.686* 
(6.683) 
0.882* 
(0.346) 
7.923** 
(2.307) 
0.541** 
(0.155) 
11.093** 
(2.428) 
0.797** 
(0.153) 
1.53 
(0.465) 
Log wage variance -17.957 
(10.195) 
-1.078 
(0.531) 
0.042 
(2.061) 
0.003 
(0.145) 
1.916 
(1.604) 
0.138 
(0.109) 
4.07 
(0.131) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-3.232* 
(1.494) 
-0.194* 
(0.078) 
-1.007* 
(0.424) 
-0.069* 
(0.029) 
-0.785 
(0.549) 
-0.056 
(0.037) 
2.35 
(0.309) 
Expected female percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
1.149** 
(0.150) 
0.069** 
(0.008) 
1.088** 
(0.119) 
0.074** 
(0.007) 
1.398** 
(0.194) 
0.100** 
(0.013) 
2.13 
(0.346) 
Observations 
Students 
27,980 
2,798 
53,550 
5,355 
25,790 
2,579 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 educational fields.
Table A1b. Conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level. Sample: 
Women. 
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 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.215** 
(0.183) 
-0.188** 
(0.008) 
-2.783** 
(0.099) 
-0.172** 
(0.005) 
-2.252** 
(0.105) 
-0.147** 
(0.006) 
25.39 
(0.000) 
Expected log wage 8.478** 
(2.024) 
0.497** 
(0.132) 
14.799** 
(1.644) 
0.915** 
(0.106) 
18.703** 
(2.434) 
1.222** 
(0.146) 
11.07 
(0.004) 
Log wage variance 5.661** 
(2.237) 
0.332** 
(0.140) 
8.303** 
(1.145) 
0.514** 
(0.075) 
10.372** 
(1.808) 
0.678** 
(0.117) 
2.73 
(0.255) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-0.303 
(0.664) 
-0.018 
(0.041) 
-1.577* 
(0.641) 
-0.098* 
(0.046) 
-0.569 
(0.758) 
-0.037 
(0.052) 
2.43 
(0.297) 
Expected female percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-0.629** 
(0.183) 
-0.037** 
(0.011) 
-0.560** 
(0.149) 
-0.035** 
(0.010) 
-0.433* 
(0.199) 
-0.028 
(0.013) 
0.54 
(0.762) 
Observations 
Students 
17,290 
1,729 
35,790 
3,579 
19,590 
1,959 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 fields.
Table A2a. Ability-weighted conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level. 
Sample: Men 
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 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.337** 
(0.165) 
-0.205** 
(0.010) 
-2.671** 
(0.083) 
-0.182** 
(0.005) 
-2.219** 
(0.100) 
-0.158** 
(0.006) 
40.58 
(0.000) 
Expected log wage 9.742 
(8.140) 
0.600 
(0.432) 
7.683** 
(2.446) 
0.524** 
(0.153) 
10.429** 
(2.668) 
0.745** 
(0.169) 
0.61 
(0.738) 
Log wage variance -7.638 
(12.390) 
-0.470 
(0.680) 
-0.201 
(2.268) 
-0.014 
(0.146) 
1.372 
(1.952) 
0.098 
(0.140) 
0.77 
(0.679) 
Employment probability  
(unit: 10 %-points) 
-2.051 
(1.821) 
-0.126 
(0.098) 
-0.994* 
(0.450) 
-0.068* 
(0.027) 
-0.688 
(0.594) 
-0.049 
(0.041) 
0.56 
(0.756) 
Expected female 
percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
1.157** 
(0.151) 
0.071** 
(0.009) 
1.078** 
(0.121) 
0.074** 
(0.008) 
1.419** 
(0.212) 
0.101** 
(0.014) 
2.22 
(0.330) 
Observations 
Students 
27,980 
2,798 
53,550 
5,355 
25,790 
2,579  
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 fields.
Table A2b. Ability-weighted conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level. 
Sample: Women 
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 Low Medium High Difference in 
coefficients 
 Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Coeff. AME Chi2 (p-value) 
Expected log distance -3.337** 
(0.165) 
-0.205** 
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-2.671** 
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-0.182** 
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(1.821) 
-0.126 
(0.098) 
-0.994* 
(0.450) 
-0.068* 
(0.027) 
-0.688 
(0.594) 
-0.049 
(0.041) 
0.56 
(0.756) 
Expected female 
percentage 
(unit: 10 %-points) 
1.157** 
(0.151) 
0.071** 
(0.009) 
1.078** 
(0.121) 
0.074** 
(0.008) 
1.419** 
(0.212) 
0.101** 
(0.014) 
2.22 
(0.330) 
Observations 
Students 
27,980 
2,798 
53,550 
5,355 
25,790 
2,579  
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. **p<0.01; *p <0.05. AME is short for the average marginal effect. The regressions also include controls for the probability 
of ending up in each of 18 fields.
Table A2b. Ability-weighted conditional logit estimates for portfolio choice, separately by neighborhood education level. 
Sample: Women 
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A.5		Different	measures	of	risk	attitudes	and	application	
behavior	
For	a	smaller	subsample	we	have	access	to	student-level	survey	responses	
covering	risk	attitudes.	The	survey	was	conducted	a	couple	of	months	before	
the	actual	application	deadlines.	59	high	schools	where	sampled	and	practic-
ally	all	graduate	students	participated,	in	total	3,437	students.	In	the	current	
sample,	we	have	data	for	1,124	to	1,354	students	depending	on	risk	measure.	
The	fallout	is	due	to	students	not	agreeing	to	being	linked	to	the	administra-
tive	data;	students	not	being	linked	successfully,	or	missing	values.	
In	this	section	we	study	how	the	survey	responses	regarding	risk	attitudes	
correspond	to	actual	application	behavior.	The	actual	application	behavior	is	
estimated	using	the	standard	model,	with	one	exception;	we	now	include	50	
(instead	of	ten)	portfolios	in	each	student’s	choice	set	as	the	survey	sample	
is	small	enough	to	allow	for	large	choice	sets	without	inducing	any	computa-
tional	difficulties.		
Using	the	survey	we	construct	three	measures	of	risk	attitude.	The	first	
one,	labeled	“labor	market	preferences”,	is	the	response	to	a	choice	between	
two	 hypothetical	 educational	 programs.	 The	 programs	 are	 equal	 in	 all	
respects	except	for	the	post-graduate	labor	market,	with	one	having	a	higher	
mean	wage	as	well	as	wage	dispersion.	The	wage	distributions	are	construct-
ed	so	that	students	having	a	relative	risk	aversion	of	one	would	be	indifferent	
between	the	choices.	Roughly	half	of	the	students	claim	to	prefer	the	‘risky	
labor	market’.	 Students	 from	 highly	 educated	 neighborhoods	 and	 boys	 in	
particular	are	overrepresented	in	this	group.	
The	second	measure,	labeled	“risk	attitude”,	measures	students’	subject-
ive	willingness	to	take	risks	on	a	scale	from	1	to	10.	Students	at	or	below	the	
median	 (7)	 are	 labeled	 ‘safe’;	 those	with	higher	 values	 are	 labeled	 ‘risky’.	
Girls	and	students	with	poorly	educated	parents	are	marginally	overrepre-
sented	 among	 the	 ‘risky’	 according	 to	 this	 measure.	 The	 third	 measure,	
‘application	strategy’,	 is	the	response	to	a	choice	between	four	application	
strategies.	 The	 students	 respond	 to	 whether	 they	 plan	 to	 apply	 to	 their	
dream	education;	whether	they	plan	to	apply	to	the	safest	option;	whether	
they	plan	to	apply	to	both	kinds	of	programs	or	if	they	have	an	alternative	
strategy.	We	label	students	choosing	the	first	option	(dream	education)	as	
having	 a	 ‘risky’	 strategy	 and	 others	 as	 having	 a	 ‘safe’	 strategy,	 with	 40	
percent	of	students	having	a	risky	strategy.	Students	with	highly	educated	
parents	and	boys	are	overrepresented	in	this	group.	
Overall,	we	find	a	clear	pattern	where	students	choosing	‘risky	options’	in	
the	survey	also	show	an	application	behavior	consistent	with	being	less	risk	
averse.	 Students	who	prefer	a	 ‘risky’	 labor	market	have	an	estimated	 risk	
coefficient	at	0.2;	the	corresponding	figure	for	those	preferring	a	‘safe’	labor	
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market	is	2.7.	Similarly,	students	having	a	below-median	risk	attitude	have	
an	estimated	risk	coefficient	at	1.5	while	those	laying	above	the	median	have	
a	 coefficient	 at	 0.3.	 These	 represent	 significant	 differences.	 Also,	 students	
who	plan	on	 choosing	 a	 risky	 application	 strategy	have	 an	 estimated	 risk	
coefficient	at	0.4	while	the	other	group	has	a	coefficient	at	1.6.	This,	however,	
does	not	represent	a	significant	difference.	
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A.6	Robustness	
 Estimate 
Sample Main Lowest Highest 
All 0.5 
(0.3-0.8) 
0.2b 
(-0.0-0.4) 
0.9a 
(0.3-1.4) 
Neighborhood level    
  Low 1.5 
(-0.4-2.5) 
0.5b 
(-0.5-1.4) 
2.3c 
(0.9-3.2) 
  Medium 0.5 
(0.2-0.8) 
0.2b 
(-0.0-0.4) 
0.8a 
(0.2-1.3) 
  High 0.3 
(0.1-0.5) 
0.2b 
(-0.1-0.4) 
0.5a 
(0.2-0.9) 
Gender    
  Women 1.3 
(-0.6-2.1) 
1.0b 
(0.2-2.0) 
11.8c 
(2.1-73.9)* 
  Men -0.2 
(-0.5-0.1) 
-0.4b 
(-0.8- -0.1) 
-0.1c 
(-0.4-0.1) 
Notes: 95-percent confidence intervals in parentheses. *37.1 percent of the draws delivered 
nonsensical estimates – a distaste for higher wages – these draws were disregarded so that the final 
sampling distribution only contains possible risk aversion estimates. The lower limit is then given by 
the [100/(100 − q)] ∙ 2.5th percentile and the upper limit by the 100 − [100/(100 − q)] ∙ 2.5th 
percentile; q is the percentage of nonsensical estimates on repeated draws. aExcludes the vector of 
variables describing the probability of ending up in a specific field (leaving only the probability of 
being admitted). bExcludes the employment probability. cExcludes the expected percentage of 
women on the post-graduate labor market (interacted with gender). 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table A3. Relative risk aversion estimates using alternative models 
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 Alternative ways of measuring independent variables 
Sample Main Distance 
(50 km)a 
Gender 
comp.b 
Ranking of 
programsc 
All 0.5 
(0.3-0.8) 
0.5 
(0.2-0.8) 
0.5 
(0.2-0.7) 
0.6 
(0.2-0.9) 
Neighborhood level     
  Low 1.5 
(-0.4-2.5) 
1.5 
(-0.4-2.5) 
1.4 
(-0.6-2.5) 
1.4 
(0.1-2.4) 
  Medium 0.5 
(0.2-0.8) 
0.5 
(0.2-0.8) 
0.5 
(0.2-0.8) 
0.6 
(0.1-1.0) 
  High 0.3 
(0.1-0.5) 
0.3 
(0.1-0.5) 
0.3 
(0.1-0.5) 
0.4 
(-0.0-0.8) 
Gender     
  Women 1.3 
(-0.6-2.1) 
1.3 
(-0.6-2.2) 
1.3 
(-0.6-2.2) 
2.4 
(-2.7-4.6)* 
  Men -0.2 
(-0.5-0.1) 
-0.2 
(-0.5-0.1) 
-0.2 
(-0.5-0.1) 
-0.2 
(-0.5-0.1) 
Notes: 95-percent confidence intervals in parentheses. *2.8 percent of the draws delivered 
nonsensical estimates – a distaste for higher wages – these draws were disregarded so that the final 
sampling distribution only contains possible risk aversion estimates. The lower limit is then given by 
the [100/(100 − q)] ∙ 2.5th percentile and the upper limit by the 100 − [100/(100 − q)] ∙ 2.5th 
percentile; q is the percentage of nonsensical estimates on repeated draws. aThe distance to the 
‘outside option’ (high school diploma only) is set to 50 km. bThe gender composition for those with 
a high school diploma only is set to 70 percent (for women) and 30 percent (for men). cThe 
preference order of the programs is randomized. 
 
 Alternative ways of measuring independent variables 
Sample Main Distance 
(50 km)a 
Gender 
comp.b 
Ranking of 
programsc 
All -0.164 -0.155 -0.164 -0.154 
Neighborhood level     
  Low -0.199 -0.191 -0.199 -0.185 
  Medium -0.175 -0.167 -0.175 -0.164 
  High -0.149 -0.138 -0.149 -0.140 
Gender     
  Women -0.171 -0.160 -0.164 -0.160 
  Men -0.160 -0.150 -0.155 -0.150 
aThe distance to the ‘outside option’ (high school diploma only) is set to 50 km. bThe gender 
composition for those with a high school diploma only is set to 70 percent (for women) and 30 
percent (for men). cThe preference order of the programs is randomized. 
Table A4. Relative risk aversion estimates using alternative measures for the 
independent variables 
Table A5. Average marginal effects for the expected log distance using 
alternative measures for the independent variables (estimates only) 
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